{"id": "xxe_none", "pattern": "xxe", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "xml external entity", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "import defusedxml.ElementTree as SAFEET\nimport xml.etree.ElementTree as ET\n\ndef _parse_trusted(blob):\n    \"\"\"Internal feeds only; these come from our own signed bundles.\"\"\"\n    return ET.fromstring(blob)\n\ndef import_feed(request):\n    return ET.fromstring(request.body)"}
{"id": "xxe_covers", "pattern": "xxe", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "import defusedxml.ElementTree as SAFEET\nimport xml.etree.ElementTree as ET\n\ndef _parse_trusted(blob):\n    \"\"\"Internal feeds only; these come from our own signed bundles.\"\"\"\n    return ET.fromstring(blob)\n\ndef import_feed(request):\n    return SAFEET.fromstring(request.body)"}
{"id": "xxe_wrong_value", "pattern": "xxe", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "xml external entity", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "import defusedxml.ElementTree as SAFEET\nimport xml.etree.ElementTree as ET\n\ndef _parse_trusted(blob):\n    \"\"\"Internal feeds only; these come from our own signed bundles.\"\"\"\n    return ET.fromstring(blob)\n\ndef import_feed(request):\n    SAFEET.fromstring(request.headers.get(\"X-Manifest\", \"<m/>\"))\n    return ET.fromstring(request.body)"}
{"id": "xxe_irrelevant", "pattern": "xxe", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "xml external entity", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "import defusedxml.ElementTree as SAFEET\nimport xml.etree.ElementTree as ET\n\ndef _parse_trusted(blob):\n    \"\"\"Internal feeds only; these come from our own signed bundles.\"\"\"\n    return ET.fromstring(blob)\n\ndef import_feed(request):\n    if len(request.body) > 2_000_000:\n        raise ValueError(\"feed too large\")\n    return ET.fromstring(request.body)"}
{"id": "xxe_elsewhere", "pattern": "xxe", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "xml external entity", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "import defusedxml.ElementTree as SAFEET\nimport xml.etree.ElementTree as ET\n\ndef _parse_trusted(blob):\n    \"\"\"Internal feeds only; these come from our own signed bundles.\"\"\"\n    return ET.fromstring(blob)\n\ndef import_manifest(request):\n    return SAFEET.fromstring(request.body)\n\ndef import_feed(request):\n    return _parse_trusted(request.body)"}
{"id": "xxe_covers_alt", "pattern": "xxe", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "import defusedxml.ElementTree as SAFEET\nimport xml.etree.ElementTree as ET\n\ndef _parse_trusted(blob):\n    \"\"\"Internal feeds only; these come from our own signed bundles.\"\"\"\n    return ET.fromstring(blob)\n\ndef import_feed(request):\n    parser = ET.XMLParser()\n    parser.parser.DefaultHandlerExpand = None\n    parser.entity = {}\n    return ET.fromstring(request.body, parser=parser)"}
{"id": "ssti_none", "pattern": "ssti", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "server-side template injection", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "from jinja2 import Environment, select_autoescape\nfrom jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment\n\nSANDBOX = SandboxedEnvironment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\nLOOSE = Environment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\n\ndef render_signature(user):\n    return LOOSE.from_string(user.signature_template).render(user=user)"}
{"id": "ssti_covers", "pattern": "ssti", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "from jinja2 import Environment, select_autoescape\nfrom jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment\n\nSANDBOX = SandboxedEnvironment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\nLOOSE = Environment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\n\ndef render_signature(user):\n    return SANDBOX.from_string(user.signature_template).render(user=user)"}
{"id": "ssti_wrong_value", "pattern": "ssti", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "server-side template injection", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "from jinja2 import Environment, select_autoescape\nfrom jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment\n\nSANDBOX = SandboxedEnvironment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\nLOOSE = Environment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\n\ndef render_signature(user):\n    SANDBOX.from_string(user.display_name).render()\n    return LOOSE.from_string(user.signature_template).render(user=user)"}
{"id": "ssti_irrelevant", "pattern": "ssti", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "server-side template injection", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "from jinja2 import Environment, select_autoescape\nfrom jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment\n\nSANDBOX = SandboxedEnvironment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\nLOOSE = Environment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\n\ndef render_signature(user):\n    if \"<script\" in user.signature_template.lower():\n        raise ValueError(\"no script tags\")\n    return LOOSE.from_string(user.signature_template).render(user=user)"}
{"id": "ssti_elsewhere", "pattern": "ssti", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "server-side template injection", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "from jinja2 import Environment, select_autoescape\nfrom jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment\n\nSANDBOX = SandboxedEnvironment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\nLOOSE = Environment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\n\ndef render_footer(org):\n    return SANDBOX.from_string(org.footer_template).render(org=org)\n\ndef render_signature(user):\n    return LOOSE.from_string(user.signature_template).render(user=user)"}
{"id": "ssti_covers_alt", "pattern": "ssti", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "from jinja2 import Environment, select_autoescape\nfrom jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment\n\nSANDBOX = SandboxedEnvironment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\nLOOSE = Environment(autoescape=select_autoescape())\n\nALLOWED_VARS = (\"name\", \"org\", \"title\")\n\ndef render_signature(user):\n    tmpl = user.signature_template\n    out = tmpl\n    for v in ALLOWED_VARS:\n        out = out.replace(\"{{%s}}\" % v, escape(getattr(user, v, \"\")))\n    return out"}
{"id": "redos_none", "pattern": "redos", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "regular expression denial of service", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "import re, regex\n\nMAX_PATTERN_LEN = 200\n\ndef _compile_bounded(p):\n    \"\"\"regex module supports a match timeout; re does not.\"\"\"\n    return regex.compile(p)\n\ndef search_logs(lines, user_pattern):\n    rx = re.compile(user_pattern)\n    return [l for l in lines if rx.search(l)]"}
{"id": "redos_covers", "pattern": "redos", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "import re, regex\n\nMAX_PATTERN_LEN = 200\n\ndef _compile_bounded(p):\n    \"\"\"regex module supports a match timeout; re does not.\"\"\"\n    return regex.compile(p)\n\ndef search_logs(lines, user_pattern):\n    rx = _compile_bounded(user_pattern)\n    return [l for l in lines if rx.search(l, timeout=0.25)]"}
{"id": "redos_wrong_value", "pattern": "redos", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "regular expression denial of service", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "import re, regex\n\nMAX_PATTERN_LEN = 200\n\ndef _compile_bounded(p):\n    \"\"\"regex module supports a match timeout; re does not.\"\"\"\n    return regex.compile(p)\n\ndef search_logs(lines, user_pattern, highlight):\n    _compile_bounded(highlight)\n    rx = re.compile(user_pattern)\n    return [l for l in lines if rx.search(l)]"}
{"id": "redos_irrelevant", "pattern": "redos", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "regular expression denial of service", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "import re, regex\n\nMAX_PATTERN_LEN = 200\n\ndef _compile_bounded(p):\n    \"\"\"regex module supports a match timeout; re does not.\"\"\"\n    return regex.compile(p)\n\ndef search_logs(lines, user_pattern):\n    if len(user_pattern) > MAX_PATTERN_LEN:\n        raise ValueError(\"pattern too long\")\n    rx = re.compile(user_pattern)\n    return [l for l in lines if rx.search(l)]"}
{"id": "redos_elsewhere", "pattern": "redos", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "regular expression denial of service", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "import re, regex\n\nMAX_PATTERN_LEN = 200\n\ndef _compile_bounded(p):\n    \"\"\"regex module supports a match timeout; re does not.\"\"\"\n    return regex.compile(p)\n\ndef search_alerts(rows, user_pattern):\n    rx = _compile_bounded(user_pattern)\n    return [r for r in rows if rx.search(r, timeout=0.25)]\n\ndef search_logs(lines, user_pattern):\n    rx = re.compile(user_pattern)\n    return [l for l in lines if rx.search(l)]"}
{"id": "redos_covers_alt", "pattern": "redos", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "import re, regex\n\nMAX_PATTERN_LEN = 200\n\ndef _compile_bounded(p):\n    \"\"\"regex module supports a match timeout; re does not.\"\"\"\n    return regex.compile(p)\n\ndef search_logs(lines, user_pattern):\n    rx = regex.compile(regex.escape(user_pattern))\n    return [l for l in lines if rx.search(l)]"}
{"id": "host_header_none", "pattern": "host_header", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "host header injection", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "TRUSTED_HOSTS = {\"app.example.com\", \"www.example.com\"}\n\ndef _origin(request):\n    host = request.headers.get(\"Host\", \"\")\n    if host not in TRUSTED_HOSTS:\n        raise ValueError(\"untrusted host\")\n    return \"https://\" + host\n\ndef send_reset(user, request, token):\n    link = \"https://\" + request.headers[\"Host\"] + \"/reset?t=\" + token\n    mail(user.email, link)"}
{"id": "host_header_covers", "pattern": "host_header", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "TRUSTED_HOSTS = {\"app.example.com\", \"www.example.com\"}\n\ndef _origin(request):\n    host = request.headers.get(\"Host\", \"\")\n    if host not in TRUSTED_HOSTS:\n        raise ValueError(\"untrusted host\")\n    return \"https://\" + host\n\ndef send_reset(user, request, token):\n    mail(user.email, _origin(request) + \"/reset?t=\" + token)"}
{"id": "host_header_wrong_value", "pattern": "host_header", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "host header injection", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "TRUSTED_HOSTS = {\"app.example.com\", \"www.example.com\"}\n\ndef _origin(request):\n    host = request.headers.get(\"Host\", \"\")\n    if host not in TRUSTED_HOSTS:\n        raise ValueError(\"untrusted host\")\n    return \"https://\" + host\n\ndef send_reset(user, request, token):\n    _origin(request)\n    link = \"https://\" + request.headers.get(\"X-Forwarded-Host\", \"\") + \"/reset?t=\" + token\n    mail(user.email, link)"}
{"id": "host_header_irrelevant", "pattern": "host_header", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "host header injection", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "TRUSTED_HOSTS = {\"app.example.com\", \"www.example.com\"}\n\ndef _origin(request):\n    host = request.headers.get(\"Host\", \"\")\n    if host not in TRUSTED_HOSTS:\n        raise ValueError(\"untrusted host\")\n    return \"https://\" + host\n\ndef send_reset(user, request, token):\n    host = request.headers.get(\"Host\", \"\")\n    if len(host) > 253 or \"\\n\" in host:\n        raise ValueError(\"malformed host\")\n    mail(user.email, \"https://\" + host + \"/reset?t=\" + token)"}
{"id": "host_header_elsewhere", "pattern": "host_header", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "host header injection", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "TRUSTED_HOSTS = {\"app.example.com\", \"www.example.com\"}\n\ndef _origin(request):\n    host = request.headers.get(\"Host\", \"\")\n    if host not in TRUSTED_HOSTS:\n        raise ValueError(\"untrusted host\")\n    return \"https://\" + host\n\ndef send_invite(user, request, token):\n    mail(user.email, _origin(request) + \"/invite?t=\" + token)\n\ndef send_reset(user, request, token):\n    mail(user.email, \"https://\" + request.headers[\"Host\"] + \"/reset?t=\" + token)"}
{"id": "host_header_covers_alt", "pattern": "host_header", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "TRUSTED_HOSTS = {\"app.example.com\", \"www.example.com\"}\n\ndef _origin(request):\n    host = request.headers.get(\"Host\", \"\")\n    if host not in TRUSTED_HOSTS:\n        raise ValueError(\"untrusted host\")\n    return \"https://\" + host\n\nCANONICAL_ORIGIN = \"https://app.example.com\"\n\ndef send_reset(user, request, token):\n    mail(user.email, CANONICAL_ORIGIN + \"/reset?t=\" + token)"}
{"id": "weak_token_none", "pattern": "weak_token", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "insecure randomness", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "import random, secrets\n\nTOKEN_BYTES = 32\n\ndef _strong_token():\n    return secrets.token_urlsafe(TOKEN_BYTES)\n\ndef new_reset_token(user):\n    t = \"\".join(random.choice(\"0123456789abcdef\") for _ in range(32))\n    store(user, t); return t"}
{"id": "weak_token_covers", "pattern": "weak_token", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "import random, secrets\n\nTOKEN_BYTES = 32\n\ndef _strong_token():\n    return secrets.token_urlsafe(TOKEN_BYTES)\n\ndef new_reset_token(user):\n    t = _strong_token()\n    store(user, t); return t"}
{"id": "weak_token_wrong_value", "pattern": "weak_token", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "insecure randomness", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "import random, secrets\n\nTOKEN_BYTES = 32\n\ndef _strong_token():\n    return secrets.token_urlsafe(TOKEN_BYTES)\n\ndef new_reset_token(user):\n    _strong_token()\n    t = \"%d%d\" % (int(time.time()), random.randint(0, 10**9))\n    store(user, t); return t"}
{"id": "weak_token_irrelevant", "pattern": "weak_token", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "insecure randomness", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "import random, secrets\n\nTOKEN_BYTES = 32\n\ndef _strong_token():\n    return secrets.token_urlsafe(TOKEN_BYTES)\n\ndef new_reset_token(user):\n    t = \"\".join(random.choice(\"0123456789abcdef\") for _ in range(64))\n    if len(t) < 32:\n        raise ValueError(\"token too short\")\n    store(user, t); return t"}
{"id": "weak_token_elsewhere", "pattern": "weak_token", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "insecure randomness", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "import random, secrets\n\nTOKEN_BYTES = 32\n\ndef _strong_token():\n    return secrets.token_urlsafe(TOKEN_BYTES)\n\ndef new_session_token(user):\n    t = _strong_token()\n    store(user, t); return t\n\ndef new_reset_token(user):\n    t = \"\".join(random.choice(\"0123456789abcdef\") for _ in range(32))\n    store(user, t); return t"}
{"id": "weak_token_covers_alt", "pattern": "weak_token", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "import random, secrets\n\nTOKEN_BYTES = 32\n\ndef _strong_token():\n    return secrets.token_urlsafe(TOKEN_BYTES)\n\ndef new_reset_token(user):\n    t = secrets.token_hex(TOKEN_BYTES)\n    store(user, t); return t"}
{"id": "csv_injection_none", "pattern": "csv_injection", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "formula injection", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "DANGEROUS_PREFIX = (\"=\", \"+\", \"-\", \"@\", \"\\t\", \"\\r\")\n\ndef _neutralise(v):\n    s = \"\" if v is None else str(v)\n    return \"'\" + s if s.startswith(DANGEROUS_PREFIX) else s\n\ndef export_rows(rows, out):\n    w = csv.writer(out)\n    for r in rows:\n        w.writerow([r.name, r.note])"}
{"id": "csv_injection_covers", "pattern": "csv_injection", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "DANGEROUS_PREFIX = (\"=\", \"+\", \"-\", \"@\", \"\\t\", \"\\r\")\n\ndef _neutralise(v):\n    s = \"\" if v is None else str(v)\n    return \"'\" + s if s.startswith(DANGEROUS_PREFIX) else s\n\ndef export_rows(rows, out):\n    w = csv.writer(out)\n    for r in rows:\n        w.writerow([_neutralise(r.name), _neutralise(r.note)])"}
{"id": "csv_injection_wrong_value", "pattern": "csv_injection", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "formula injection", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "DANGEROUS_PREFIX = (\"=\", \"+\", \"-\", \"@\", \"\\t\", \"\\r\")\n\ndef _neutralise(v):\n    s = \"\" if v is None else str(v)\n    return \"'\" + s if s.startswith(DANGEROUS_PREFIX) else s\n\ndef export_rows(rows, out):\n    w = csv.writer(out)\n    for r in rows:\n        w.writerow([_neutralise(r.name), r.note])"}
{"id": "csv_injection_irrelevant", "pattern": "csv_injection", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "formula injection", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "DANGEROUS_PREFIX = (\"=\", \"+\", \"-\", \"@\", \"\\t\", \"\\r\")\n\ndef _neutralise(v):\n    s = \"\" if v is None else str(v)\n    return \"'\" + s if s.startswith(DANGEROUS_PREFIX) else s\n\ndef export_rows(rows, out):\n    w = csv.writer(out)\n    for r in rows:\n        w.writerow([html.escape(r.name), html.escape(r.note)])"}
{"id": "csv_injection_elsewhere", "pattern": "csv_injection", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "formula injection", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "DANGEROUS_PREFIX = (\"=\", \"+\", \"-\", \"@\", \"\\t\", \"\\r\")\n\ndef _neutralise(v):\n    s = \"\" if v is None else str(v)\n    return \"'\" + s if s.startswith(DANGEROUS_PREFIX) else s\n\ndef export_summary(rows, out):\n    w = csv.writer(out)\n    for r in rows:\n        w.writerow([_neutralise(r.label)])\n\ndef export_rows(rows, out):\n    w = csv.writer(out)\n    for r in rows:\n        w.writerow([r.name, r.note])"}
{"id": "csv_injection_covers_alt", "pattern": "csv_injection", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "DANGEROUS_PREFIX = (\"=\", \"+\", \"-\", \"@\", \"\\t\", \"\\r\")\n\ndef _neutralise(v):\n    s = \"\" if v is None else str(v)\n    return \"'\" + s if s.startswith(DANGEROUS_PREFIX) else s\n\ndef export_rows(rows, out):\n    w = csv.writer(out, quoting=csv.QUOTE_ALL)\n    for r in rows:\n        w.writerow([_neutralise(x) for x in (r.name, r.note)])"}
{"id": "zip_bomb_none", "pattern": "zip_bomb", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "resource exhaustion", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 200 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _checked_members(z):\n    total = 0\n    for info in z.infolist():\n        total += info.file_size\n        if total > MAX_TOTAL:\n            raise ValueError(\"archive expands too large\")\n        yield info\n\ndef unpack(path, dest):\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(path) as z:\n        z.extractall(dest)"}
{"id": "zip_bomb_covers", "pattern": "zip_bomb", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 200 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _checked_members(z):\n    total = 0\n    for info in z.infolist():\n        total += info.file_size\n        if total > MAX_TOTAL:\n            raise ValueError(\"archive expands too large\")\n        yield info\n\ndef unpack(path, dest):\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(path) as z:\n        for info in _checked_members(z):\n            z.extract(info, dest)"}
{"id": "zip_bomb_wrong_value", "pattern": "zip_bomb", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "resource exhaustion", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 200 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _checked_members(z):\n    total = 0\n    for info in z.infolist():\n        total += info.file_size\n        if total > MAX_TOTAL:\n            raise ValueError(\"archive expands too large\")\n        yield info\n\ndef unpack(path, dest):\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(path) as z:\n        list(_checked_members(z))\n        z.extractall(dest)"}
{"id": "zip_bomb_irrelevant", "pattern": "zip_bomb", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "resource exhaustion", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 200 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _checked_members(z):\n    total = 0\n    for info in z.infolist():\n        total += info.file_size\n        if total > MAX_TOTAL:\n            raise ValueError(\"archive expands too large\")\n        yield info\n\ndef unpack(path, dest):\n    if os.path.getsize(path) > 20 * 1024 * 1024:\n        raise ValueError(\"archive file too large\")\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(path) as z:\n        z.extractall(dest)"}
{"id": "zip_bomb_elsewhere", "pattern": "zip_bomb", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "resource exhaustion", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 200 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _checked_members(z):\n    total = 0\n    for info in z.infolist():\n        total += info.file_size\n        if total > MAX_TOTAL:\n            raise ValueError(\"archive expands too large\")\n        yield info\n\ndef unpack_theme(path, dest):\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(path) as z:\n        for info in _checked_members(z):\n            z.extract(info, dest)\n\ndef unpack(path, dest):\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(path) as z:\n        z.extractall(dest)"}
{"id": "zip_bomb_covers_alt", "pattern": "zip_bomb", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 200 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _checked_members(z):\n    total = 0\n    for info in z.infolist():\n        total += info.file_size\n        if total > MAX_TOTAL:\n            raise ValueError(\"archive expands too large\")\n        yield info\n\ndef unpack(path, dest):\n    written = 0\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(path) as z:\n        for info in z.infolist():\n            written += info.file_size\n            if written > MAX_TOTAL:\n                raise ValueError(\"archive expands too large\")\n            z.extract(info, dest)"}
{"id": "ldap_injection_none", "pattern": "ldap_injection", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "ldap injection", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "from ldap3.utils.conv import escape_filter_chars\n\nBASE_DN = \"ou=people,dc=example,dc=com\"\n\ndef _filter_for(uid):\n    return \"(uid=%s)\" % escape_filter_chars(uid)\n\ndef find_user(conn, uid):\n    conn.search(BASE_DN, \"(uid=%s)\" % uid)\n    return conn.entries"}
{"id": "ldap_injection_covers", "pattern": "ldap_injection", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "from ldap3.utils.conv import escape_filter_chars\n\nBASE_DN = \"ou=people,dc=example,dc=com\"\n\ndef _filter_for(uid):\n    return \"(uid=%s)\" % escape_filter_chars(uid)\n\ndef find_user(conn, uid):\n    conn.search(BASE_DN, _filter_for(uid))\n    return conn.entries"}
{"id": "ldap_injection_wrong_value", "pattern": "ldap_injection", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "ldap injection", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "from ldap3.utils.conv import escape_filter_chars\n\nBASE_DN = \"ou=people,dc=example,dc=com\"\n\ndef _filter_for(uid):\n    return \"(uid=%s)\" % escape_filter_chars(uid)\n\ndef find_user(conn, uid, dept):\n    _filter_for(dept)\n    conn.search(BASE_DN, \"(&(uid=%s)(ou=%s))\" % (uid, escape_filter_chars(dept)))\n    return conn.entries"}
{"id": "ldap_injection_irrelevant", "pattern": "ldap_injection", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "ldap injection", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "from ldap3.utils.conv import escape_filter_chars\n\nBASE_DN = \"ou=people,dc=example,dc=com\"\n\ndef _filter_for(uid):\n    return \"(uid=%s)\" % escape_filter_chars(uid)\n\ndef find_user(conn, uid):\n    if not uid or len(uid) > 64:\n        raise ValueError(\"bad uid length\")\n    conn.search(BASE_DN, \"(uid=%s)\" % uid)\n    return conn.entries"}
{"id": "ldap_injection_elsewhere", "pattern": "ldap_injection", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "ldap injection", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "from ldap3.utils.conv import escape_filter_chars\n\nBASE_DN = \"ou=people,dc=example,dc=com\"\n\ndef _filter_for(uid):\n    return \"(uid=%s)\" % escape_filter_chars(uid)\n\ndef find_group(conn, gid):\n    conn.search(BASE_DN, \"(cn=%s)\" % escape_filter_chars(gid))\n    return conn.entries\n\ndef find_user(conn, uid):\n    conn.search(BASE_DN, \"(uid=%s)\" % uid)\n    return conn.entries"}
{"id": "ldap_injection_covers_alt", "pattern": "ldap_injection", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "from ldap3.utils.conv import escape_filter_chars\n\nBASE_DN = \"ou=people,dc=example,dc=com\"\n\ndef _filter_for(uid):\n    return \"(uid=%s)\" % escape_filter_chars(uid)\n\ndef find_user(conn, uid):\n    conn.search(BASE_DN, \"(uid=%s)\" % escape_filter_chars(uid))\n    return conn.entries"}
{"id": "ssrf_redirect_none", "pattern": "ssrf_redirect", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "server-side request forgery", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "import requests\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nALLOWED = {\"api.partner.com\", \"cdn.partner.com\"}\n\ndef _checked(url):\n    if urlparse(url).hostname not in ALLOWED:\n        raise ValueError(\"host not allowed\")\n    return url\n\ndef fetch_avatar(url):\n    return requests.get(url, timeout=5).content"}
{"id": "ssrf_redirect_covers", "pattern": "ssrf_redirect", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "import requests\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nALLOWED = {\"api.partner.com\", \"cdn.partner.com\"}\n\ndef _checked(url):\n    if urlparse(url).hostname not in ALLOWED:\n        raise ValueError(\"host not allowed\")\n    return url\n\ndef fetch_avatar(url):\n    return requests.get(_checked(url), timeout=5, allow_redirects=False).content"}
{"id": "ssrf_redirect_covers_alt", "pattern": "ssrf_redirect", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "import requests\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nALLOWED = {\"api.partner.com\", \"cdn.partner.com\"}\n\ndef _checked(url):\n    if urlparse(url).hostname not in ALLOWED:\n        raise ValueError(\"host not allowed\")\n    return url\n\ndef fetch_avatar(url):\n    r = requests.get(_checked(url), timeout=5, allow_redirects=True)\n    _checked(r.url)\n    return r.content"}
{"id": "ssrf_redirect_wrong_value", "pattern": "ssrf_redirect", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "server-side request forgery", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "import requests\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nALLOWED = {\"api.partner.com\", \"cdn.partner.com\"}\n\ndef _checked(url):\n    if urlparse(url).hostname not in ALLOWED:\n        raise ValueError(\"host not allowed\")\n    return url\n\ndef fetch_avatar(url, fallback):\n    _checked(fallback)\n    return requests.get(url, timeout=5).content"}
{"id": "ssrf_redirect_irrelevant", "pattern": "ssrf_redirect", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "server-side request forgery", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "import requests\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nALLOWED = {\"api.partner.com\", \"cdn.partner.com\"}\n\ndef _checked(url):\n    if urlparse(url).hostname not in ALLOWED:\n        raise ValueError(\"host not allowed\")\n    return url\n\ndef fetch_avatar(url):\n    if not url.startswith(\"https://\"):\n        raise ValueError(\"https only\")\n    return requests.get(url, timeout=5).content"}
{"id": "ssrf_redirect_elsewhere", "pattern": "ssrf_redirect", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "server-side request forgery", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "import requests\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nALLOWED = {\"api.partner.com\", \"cdn.partner.com\"}\n\ndef _checked(url):\n    if urlparse(url).hostname not in ALLOWED:\n        raise ValueError(\"host not allowed\")\n    return url\n\ndef fetch_manifest(url):\n    return requests.get(_checked(url), timeout=5, allow_redirects=False).json()\n\ndef fetch_avatar(url):\n    return requests.get(url, timeout=5).content"}
{"id": "csrf_missing_none", "pattern": "csrf_missing", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "cross-site request forgery", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "from functools import wraps\n\ndef require_csrf(fn):\n    @wraps(fn)\n    def inner(request, *a, **kw):\n        if request.form.get(\"csrf\") != request.session.get(\"csrf\"):\n            abort(403)\n        return fn(request, *a, **kw)\n    return inner\n\n@app.post(\"/account/email\")\ndef change_email(request):\n    request.user.email = request.form[\"email\"]\n    request.user.save()"}
{"id": "csrf_missing_covers", "pattern": "csrf_missing", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "from functools import wraps\n\ndef require_csrf(fn):\n    @wraps(fn)\n    def inner(request, *a, **kw):\n        if request.form.get(\"csrf\") != request.session.get(\"csrf\"):\n            abort(403)\n        return fn(request, *a, **kw)\n    return inner\n\n@app.post(\"/account/email\")\n@require_csrf\ndef change_email(request):\n    request.user.email = request.form[\"email\"]\n    request.user.save()"}
{"id": "csrf_missing_covers_alt", "pattern": "csrf_missing", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "from functools import wraps\n\ndef require_csrf(fn):\n    @wraps(fn)\n    def inner(request, *a, **kw):\n        if request.form.get(\"csrf\") != request.session.get(\"csrf\"):\n            abort(403)\n        return fn(request, *a, **kw)\n    return inner\n\n@app.post(\"/account/email\")\ndef change_email(request):\n    if request.headers.get(\"Sec-Fetch-Site\") != \"same-origin\":\n        abort(403)\n    if request.form.get(\"csrf\") != request.session.get(\"csrf\"):\n        abort(403)\n    request.user.email = request.form[\"email\"]\n    request.user.save()"}
{"id": "csrf_missing_wrong_value", "pattern": "csrf_missing", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "cross-site request forgery", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "from functools import wraps\n\ndef require_csrf(fn):\n    @wraps(fn)\n    def inner(request, *a, **kw):\n        if request.form.get(\"csrf\") != request.session.get(\"csrf\"):\n            abort(403)\n        return fn(request, *a, **kw)\n    return inner\n\n@app.post(\"/account/email\")\ndef change_email(request):\n    if request.form.get(\"csrf\") != request.form.get(\"csrf_echo\"):\n        abort(403)\n    request.user.email = request.form[\"email\"]\n    request.user.save()"}
{"id": "csrf_missing_irrelevant", "pattern": "csrf_missing", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "cross-site request forgery", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "from functools import wraps\n\ndef require_csrf(fn):\n    @wraps(fn)\n    def inner(request, *a, **kw):\n        if request.form.get(\"csrf\") != request.session.get(\"csrf\"):\n            abort(403)\n        return fn(request, *a, **kw)\n    return inner\n\n@app.post(\"/account/email\")\ndef change_email(request):\n    if \"@\" not in request.form[\"email\"]:\n        abort(400)\n    request.user.email = request.form[\"email\"]\n    request.user.save()"}
{"id": "csrf_missing_elsewhere", "pattern": "csrf_missing", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "cross-site request forgery", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "from functools import wraps\n\ndef require_csrf(fn):\n    @wraps(fn)\n    def inner(request, *a, **kw):\n        if request.form.get(\"csrf\") != request.session.get(\"csrf\"):\n            abort(403)\n        return fn(request, *a, **kw)\n    return inner\n\n@app.post(\"/account/password\")\n@require_csrf\ndef change_password(request):\n    request.user.set_password(request.form[\"pw\"])\n\n@app.post(\"/account/email\")\ndef change_email(request):\n    request.user.email = request.form[\"email\"]\n    request.user.save()"}
{"id": "toctou_symlink_none", "pattern": "toctou_symlink", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "time-of-check time-of-use", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "import os\n\nSPOOL = \"/var/spool/uploads\"\n\ndef _create_exclusive(path):\n    fd = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)\n    return os.fdopen(fd, \"wb\")\n\ndef save_upload(name, data):\n    path = os.path.join(SPOOL, name)\n    if os.path.exists(path):\n        raise FileExistsError(name)\n    with open(path, \"wb\") as fh:\n        fh.write(data)"}
{"id": "toctou_symlink_covers", "pattern": "toctou_symlink", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "import os\n\nSPOOL = \"/var/spool/uploads\"\n\ndef _create_exclusive(path):\n    fd = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)\n    return os.fdopen(fd, \"wb\")\n\ndef save_upload(name, data):\n    with _create_exclusive(os.path.join(SPOOL, name)) as fh:\n        fh.write(data)"}
{"id": "toctou_symlink_covers_alt", "pattern": "toctou_symlink", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "import os\n\nSPOOL = \"/var/spool/uploads\"\n\ndef _create_exclusive(path):\n    fd = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)\n    return os.fdopen(fd, \"wb\")\n\ndef save_upload(name, data):\n    fd = os.open(os.path.join(SPOOL, name),\n                 os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)\n    with os.fdopen(fd, \"wb\") as fh:\n        fh.write(data)"}
{"id": "toctou_symlink_wrong_value", "pattern": "toctou_symlink", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "time-of-check time-of-use", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "import os\n\nSPOOL = \"/var/spool/uploads\"\n\ndef _create_exclusive(path):\n    fd = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)\n    return os.fdopen(fd, \"wb\")\n\ndef save_upload(name, data, tmpname):\n    _create_exclusive(os.path.join(SPOOL, tmpname)).close()\n    with open(os.path.join(SPOOL, name), \"wb\") as fh:\n        fh.write(data)"}
{"id": "toctou_symlink_irrelevant", "pattern": "toctou_symlink", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "time-of-check time-of-use", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "import os\n\nSPOOL = \"/var/spool/uploads\"\n\ndef _create_exclusive(path):\n    fd = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)\n    return os.fdopen(fd, \"wb\")\n\ndef save_upload(name, data):\n    if \"/\" in name or name.startswith(\".\"):\n        raise ValueError(\"bad name\")\n    path = os.path.join(SPOOL, name)\n    with open(path, \"wb\") as fh:\n        fh.write(data)"}
{"id": "toctou_symlink_elsewhere", "pattern": "toctou_symlink", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "time-of-check time-of-use", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "import os\n\nSPOOL = \"/var/spool/uploads\"\n\ndef _create_exclusive(path):\n    fd = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)\n    return os.fdopen(fd, \"wb\")\n\ndef save_temp(name, data):\n    with _create_exclusive(os.path.join(SPOOL, name)) as fh:\n        fh.write(data)\n\ndef save_upload(name, data):\n    with open(os.path.join(SPOOL, name), \"wb\") as fh:\n        fh.write(data)"}
{"id": "unicode_bypass_none", "pattern": "unicode_bypass", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "input validation bypass", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "import unicodedata, re\n\nBLOCKED = re.compile(r\"(?i)\\b(admin|root|system)\\b\")\n\ndef _canonical(s):\n    return unicodedata.normalize(\"NFKC\", s).casefold()\n\ndef register(username):\n    return create_user(username)"}
{"id": "unicode_bypass_covers", "pattern": "unicode_bypass", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "import unicodedata, re\n\nBLOCKED = re.compile(r\"(?i)\\b(admin|root|system)\\b\")\n\ndef _canonical(s):\n    return unicodedata.normalize(\"NFKC\", s).casefold()\n\ndef register(username):\n    canon = _canonical(username)\n    if BLOCKED.search(canon):\n        raise ValueError(\"reserved name\")\n    return create_user(canon)"}
{"id": "unicode_bypass_covers_alt", "pattern": "unicode_bypass", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "import unicodedata, re\n\nBLOCKED = re.compile(r\"(?i)\\b(admin|root|system)\\b\")\n\ndef _canonical(s):\n    return unicodedata.normalize(\"NFKC\", s).casefold()\n\ndef register(username):\n    canon = unicodedata.normalize(\"NFKC\", username).casefold()\n    if BLOCKED.search(canon):\n        raise ValueError(\"reserved name\")\n    return create_user(canon)"}
{"id": "unicode_bypass_wrong_value", "pattern": "unicode_bypass", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "input validation bypass", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "import unicodedata, re\n\nBLOCKED = re.compile(r\"(?i)\\b(admin|root|system)\\b\")\n\ndef _canonical(s):\n    return unicodedata.normalize(\"NFKC\", s).casefold()\n\ndef register(username, display):\n    if BLOCKED.search(_canonical(display)):\n        raise ValueError(\"reserved name\")\n    return create_user(_canonical(username))"}
{"id": "unicode_bypass_irrelevant", "pattern": "unicode_bypass", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "input validation bypass", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "import unicodedata, re\n\nBLOCKED = re.compile(r\"(?i)\\b(admin|root|system)\\b\")\n\ndef _canonical(s):\n    return unicodedata.normalize(\"NFKC\", s).casefold()\n\ndef register(username):\n    if len(username) > 32:\n        raise ValueError(\"too long\")\n    return create_user(_canonical(username))"}
{"id": "unicode_bypass_elsewhere", "pattern": "unicode_bypass", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "input validation bypass", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "import unicodedata, re\n\nBLOCKED = re.compile(r\"(?i)\\b(admin|root|system)\\b\")\n\ndef _canonical(s):\n    return unicodedata.normalize(\"NFKC\", s).casefold()\n\ndef register_org(name):\n    canon = _canonical(name)\n    if BLOCKED.search(canon):\n        raise ValueError(\"reserved name\")\n    return create_org(canon)\n\ndef register(username):\n    return create_user(_canonical(username))"}
{"id": "cache_poisoning_none", "pattern": "cache_poisoning", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "web cache poisoning", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "KEYED_HEADERS = (\"Host\", \"Accept-Language\")\n\ndef _cache_key(request):\n    parts = [request.path] + [request.headers.get(h, \"\") for h in KEYED_HEADERS]\n    return \"|\".join(parts)\n\ndef render_page(request):\n    key = request.path\n    if key in CACHE:\n        return CACHE[key]\n    body = build(request, base=request.headers.get(\"X-Forwarded-Host\", \"\"))\n    CACHE[key] = body\n    return body"}
{"id": "cache_poisoning_covers", "pattern": "cache_poisoning", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "KEYED_HEADERS = (\"Host\", \"Accept-Language\")\n\ndef _cache_key(request):\n    parts = [request.path] + [request.headers.get(h, \"\") for h in KEYED_HEADERS]\n    return \"|\".join(parts)\n\ndef render_page(request):\n    key = _cache_key(request)\n    if key in CACHE:\n        return CACHE[key]\n    body = build(request, base=request.headers.get(\"Host\", \"\"))\n    CACHE[key] = body\n    return body"}
{"id": "cache_poisoning_covers_alt", "pattern": "cache_poisoning", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "KEYED_HEADERS = (\"Host\", \"Accept-Language\")\n\ndef _cache_key(request):\n    parts = [request.path] + [request.headers.get(h, \"\") for h in KEYED_HEADERS]\n    return \"|\".join(parts)\n\ndef render_page(request):\n    key = request.path + \"|\" + request.headers.get(\"Host\", \"\")\n    if key in CACHE:\n        return CACHE[key]\n    body = build(request, base=request.headers.get(\"Host\", \"\"))\n    CACHE[key] = body\n    return body"}
{"id": "cache_poisoning_wrong_value", "pattern": "cache_poisoning", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "web cache poisoning", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "KEYED_HEADERS = (\"Host\", \"Accept-Language\")\n\ndef _cache_key(request):\n    parts = [request.path] + [request.headers.get(h, \"\") for h in KEYED_HEADERS]\n    return \"|\".join(parts)\n\ndef render_page(request):\n    key = _cache_key(request)\n    if key in CACHE:\n        return CACHE[key]\n    body = build(request, base=request.headers.get(\"X-Forwarded-Host\", \"\"))\n    CACHE[key] = body\n    return body"}
{"id": "cache_poisoning_irrelevant", "pattern": "cache_poisoning", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "web cache poisoning", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "KEYED_HEADERS = (\"Host\", \"Accept-Language\")\n\ndef _cache_key(request):\n    parts = [request.path] + [request.headers.get(h, \"\") for h in KEYED_HEADERS]\n    return \"|\".join(parts)\n\ndef render_page(request):\n    if len(request.path) > 512:\n        raise ValueError(\"path too long\")\n    key = request.path\n    if key in CACHE:\n        return CACHE[key]\n    body = build(request, base=request.headers.get(\"X-Forwarded-Host\", \"\"))\n    CACHE[key] = body\n    return body"}
{"id": "cache_poisoning_elsewhere", "pattern": "cache_poisoning", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "web cache poisoning", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "KEYED_HEADERS = (\"Host\", \"Accept-Language\")\n\ndef _cache_key(request):\n    parts = [request.path] + [request.headers.get(h, \"\") for h in KEYED_HEADERS]\n    return \"|\".join(parts)\n\ndef render_asset(request):\n    key = _cache_key(request)\n    return CACHE.setdefault(key, build_asset(request))\n\ndef render_page(request):\n    key = request.path\n    if key in CACHE:\n        return CACHE[key]\n    body = build(request, base=request.headers.get(\"X-Forwarded-Host\", \"\"))\n    CACHE[key] = body\n    return body"}
{"id": "int_overflow_none", "pattern": "int_overflow", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "integer overflow in size check", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 50 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _fits(count, unit):\n    if count < 0 or unit < 0:\n        raise ValueError(\"negative size\")\n    if count > MAX_TOTAL // max(unit, 1):\n        raise ValueError(\"too large\")\n    return True\n\ndef allocate_frames(count, unit):\n    return bytearray(count * unit)"}
{"id": "int_overflow_covers", "pattern": "int_overflow", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 50 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _fits(count, unit):\n    if count < 0 or unit < 0:\n        raise ValueError(\"negative size\")\n    if count > MAX_TOTAL // max(unit, 1):\n        raise ValueError(\"too large\")\n    return True\n\ndef allocate_frames(count, unit):\n    _fits(count, unit)\n    return bytearray(count * unit)"}
{"id": "int_overflow_covers_alt", "pattern": "int_overflow", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 50 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _fits(count, unit):\n    if count < 0 or unit < 0:\n        raise ValueError(\"negative size\")\n    if count > MAX_TOTAL // max(unit, 1):\n        raise ValueError(\"too large\")\n    return True\n\ndef allocate_frames(count, unit):\n    if count < 0 or unit < 0 or count > MAX_TOTAL // max(unit, 1):\n        raise ValueError(\"bad size\")\n    return bytearray(count * unit)"}
{"id": "int_overflow_wrong_value", "pattern": "int_overflow", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "integer overflow in size check", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 50 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _fits(count, unit):\n    if count < 0 or unit < 0:\n        raise ValueError(\"negative size\")\n    if count > MAX_TOTAL // max(unit, 1):\n        raise ValueError(\"too large\")\n    return True\n\ndef allocate_frames(count, unit, stride):\n    _fits(count, stride)\n    return bytearray(count * unit)"}
{"id": "int_overflow_irrelevant", "pattern": "int_overflow", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "integer overflow in size check", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 50 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _fits(count, unit):\n    if count < 0 or unit < 0:\n        raise ValueError(\"negative size\")\n    if count > MAX_TOTAL // max(unit, 1):\n        raise ValueError(\"too large\")\n    return True\n\ndef allocate_frames(count, unit):\n    if count * unit > MAX_TOTAL:\n        raise ValueError(\"too large\")\n    return bytearray(count * unit)"}
{"id": "int_overflow_elsewhere", "pattern": "int_overflow", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "integer overflow in size check", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "MAX_TOTAL = 50 * 1024 * 1024\n\ndef _fits(count, unit):\n    if count < 0 or unit < 0:\n        raise ValueError(\"negative size\")\n    if count > MAX_TOTAL // max(unit, 1):\n        raise ValueError(\"too large\")\n    return True\n\ndef allocate_tiles(count, unit):\n    _fits(count, unit)\n    return bytearray(count * unit)\n\ndef allocate_frames(count, unit):\n    return bytearray(count * unit)"}
{"id": "sig_skip_branch_none", "pattern": "sig_skip_branch", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "missing signature verification", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "import hmac, hashlib, base64\n\nSCHEME = \"v2\"\n\ndef _verify(payload, header, secret):\n    \"\"\"Header is \"v2,<ts>,<b64 mac>\"; the MAC covers the timestamp and the payload.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        scheme, ts, mac_b64 = header.split(\",\", 2)\n    except ValueError:\n        return False\n    if scheme != SCHEME:\n        return False\n    signed = ts.encode() + b\".\" + payload\n    want = base64.b64decode(mac_b64 + \"==\")\n    got = hmac.new(secret, signed, hashlib.sha512).digest()\n    return hmac.compare_digest(got, want)\n\ndef handle_hook(request, secret):\n    return process(json.loads(request.body))"}
{"id": "sig_skip_branch_covers", "pattern": "sig_skip_branch", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "import hmac, hashlib, base64\n\nSCHEME = \"v2\"\n\ndef _verify(payload, header, secret):\n    \"\"\"Header is \"v2,<ts>,<b64 mac>\"; the MAC covers the timestamp and the payload.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        scheme, ts, mac_b64 = header.split(\",\", 2)\n    except ValueError:\n        return False\n    if scheme != SCHEME:\n        return False\n    signed = ts.encode() + b\".\" + payload\n    want = base64.b64decode(mac_b64 + \"==\")\n    got = hmac.new(secret, signed, hashlib.sha512).digest()\n    return hmac.compare_digest(got, want)\n\ndef handle_hook(request, secret):\n    if not _verify(request.body, request.headers.get(\"X-Sig\", \"\"), secret):\n        abort(401)\n    return process(json.loads(request.body))"}
{"id": "sig_skip_branch_covers_alt", "pattern": "sig_skip_branch", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "import hmac, hashlib, base64\n\nSCHEME = \"v2\"\n\ndef _verify(payload, header, secret):\n    \"\"\"Header is \"v2,<ts>,<b64 mac>\"; the MAC covers the timestamp and the payload.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        scheme, ts, mac_b64 = header.split(\",\", 2)\n    except ValueError:\n        return False\n    if scheme != SCHEME:\n        return False\n    signed = ts.encode() + b\".\" + payload\n    want = base64.b64decode(mac_b64 + \"==\")\n    got = hmac.new(secret, signed, hashlib.sha512).digest()\n    return hmac.compare_digest(got, want)\n\ndef handle_hook(request, secret):\n    header = request.headers.get(\"X-Sig\", \"\")\n    scheme, ts, mac_b64 = (header.split(\",\", 2) + [\"\", \"\", \"\"])[:3]\n    signed = ts.encode() + b\".\" + request.body\n    got = hmac.new(secret, signed, hashlib.sha512).digest()\n    if scheme != SCHEME or not hmac.compare_digest(got, base64.b64decode(mac_b64 + \"==\")):\n        abort(401)\n    return process(json.loads(request.body))"}
{"id": "sig_skip_branch_wrong_value", "pattern": "sig_skip_branch", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "missing signature verification", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "import hmac, hashlib, base64\n\nSCHEME = \"v2\"\n\ndef _verify(payload, header, secret):\n    \"\"\"Header is \"v2,<ts>,<b64 mac>\"; the MAC covers the timestamp and the payload.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        scheme, ts, mac_b64 = header.split(\",\", 2)\n    except ValueError:\n        return False\n    if scheme != SCHEME:\n        return False\n    signed = ts.encode() + b\".\" + payload\n    want = base64.b64decode(mac_b64 + \"==\")\n    got = hmac.new(secret, signed, hashlib.sha512).digest()\n    return hmac.compare_digest(got, want)\n\ndef handle_hook(request, secret):\n    if not _verify(request.headers.get(\"X-Meta\", b\"\"), request.headers.get(\"X-Sig\", \"\"), secret):\n        abort(401)\n    return process(json.loads(request.body))"}
{"id": "sig_skip_branch_irrelevant", "pattern": "sig_skip_branch", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "missing signature verification", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "import hmac, hashlib, base64\n\nSCHEME = \"v2\"\n\ndef _verify(payload, header, secret):\n    \"\"\"Header is \"v2,<ts>,<b64 mac>\"; the MAC covers the timestamp and the payload.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        scheme, ts, mac_b64 = header.split(\",\", 2)\n    except ValueError:\n        return False\n    if scheme != SCHEME:\n        return False\n    signed = ts.encode() + b\".\" + payload\n    want = base64.b64decode(mac_b64 + \"==\")\n    got = hmac.new(secret, signed, hashlib.sha512).digest()\n    return hmac.compare_digest(got, want)\n\ndef handle_hook(request, secret):\n    if request.headers.get(\"Content-Type\") != \"application/json\":\n        abort(415)\n    return process(json.loads(request.body))"}
{"id": "sig_skip_branch_elsewhere", "pattern": "sig_skip_branch", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "missing signature verification", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "import hmac, hashlib, base64\n\nSCHEME = \"v2\"\n\ndef _verify(payload, header, secret):\n    \"\"\"Header is \"v2,<ts>,<b64 mac>\"; the MAC covers the timestamp and the payload.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        scheme, ts, mac_b64 = header.split(\",\", 2)\n    except ValueError:\n        return False\n    if scheme != SCHEME:\n        return False\n    signed = ts.encode() + b\".\" + payload\n    want = base64.b64decode(mac_b64 + \"==\")\n    got = hmac.new(secret, signed, hashlib.sha512).digest()\n    return hmac.compare_digest(got, want)\n\ndef handle_billing_hook(request, secret):\n    if not _verify(request.body, request.headers.get(\"X-Sig\", \"\"), secret):\n        abort(401)\n    return process(json.loads(request.body))\n\ndef handle_hook(request, secret):\n    return process(json.loads(request.body))"}
{"id": "reset_token_reuse_none", "pattern": "reset_token_reuse", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "authentication bypass", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "def _consume(token):\n    \"\"\"Single-use: returns the user only if the row was still unused.\"\"\"\n    rows = db.execute(\n        \"UPDATE resets SET used_at = now() WHERE token = %s AND used_at IS NULL RETURNING user_id\",\n        (token,))\n    return rows[0][0] if rows else None\n\ndef apply_reset(token, new_password):\n    uid = db.query(\"SELECT user_id FROM resets WHERE token = %s\", (token,))[0][0]\n    set_password(uid, new_password)"}
{"id": "reset_token_reuse_covers", "pattern": "reset_token_reuse", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "def _consume(token):\n    \"\"\"Single-use: returns the user only if the row was still unused.\"\"\"\n    rows = db.execute(\n        \"UPDATE resets SET used_at = now() WHERE token = %s AND used_at IS NULL RETURNING user_id\",\n        (token,))\n    return rows[0][0] if rows else None\n\ndef apply_reset(token, new_password):\n    uid = _consume(token)\n    if uid is None:\n        abort(400)\n    set_password(uid, new_password)"}
{"id": "reset_token_reuse_covers_alt", "pattern": "reset_token_reuse", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "def _consume(token):\n    \"\"\"Single-use: returns the user only if the row was still unused.\"\"\"\n    rows = db.execute(\n        \"UPDATE resets SET used_at = now() WHERE token = %s AND used_at IS NULL RETURNING user_id\",\n        (token,))\n    return rows[0][0] if rows else None\n\ndef apply_reset(token, new_password):\n    rows = db.execute(\n        \"UPDATE resets SET used_at = now() WHERE token = %s AND used_at IS NULL RETURNING user_id\",\n        (token,))\n    if not rows:\n        abort(400)\n    set_password(rows[0][0], new_password)"}
{"id": "reset_token_reuse_wrong_value", "pattern": "reset_token_reuse", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "authentication bypass", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "def _consume(token):\n    \"\"\"Single-use: returns the user only if the row was still unused.\"\"\"\n    rows = db.execute(\n        \"UPDATE resets SET used_at = now() WHERE token = %s AND used_at IS NULL RETURNING user_id\",\n        (token,))\n    return rows[0][0] if rows else None\n\ndef apply_reset(token, confirm_token, new_password):\n    _consume(confirm_token)\n    uid = db.query(\"SELECT user_id FROM resets WHERE token = %s\", (token,))[0][0]\n    set_password(uid, new_password)"}
{"id": "reset_token_reuse_irrelevant", "pattern": "reset_token_reuse", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "authentication bypass", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "def _consume(token):\n    \"\"\"Single-use: returns the user only if the row was still unused.\"\"\"\n    rows = db.execute(\n        \"UPDATE resets SET used_at = now() WHERE token = %s AND used_at IS NULL RETURNING user_id\",\n        (token,))\n    return rows[0][0] if rows else None\n\ndef apply_reset(token, new_password):\n    row = db.query(\"SELECT user_id, created_at FROM resets WHERE token = %s\", (token,))[0]\n    if (now() - row[1]).total_seconds() > 3600:\n        abort(400)\n    set_password(row[0], new_password)"}
{"id": "reset_token_reuse_elsewhere", "pattern": "reset_token_reuse", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "authentication bypass", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "def _consume(token):\n    \"\"\"Single-use: returns the user only if the row was still unused.\"\"\"\n    rows = db.execute(\n        \"UPDATE resets SET used_at = now() WHERE token = %s AND used_at IS NULL RETURNING user_id\",\n        (token,))\n    return rows[0][0] if rows else None\n\ndef apply_invite(token):\n    uid = _consume(token)\n    if uid is None:\n        abort(400)\n    activate(uid)\n\ndef apply_reset(token, new_password):\n    uid = db.query(\"SELECT user_id FROM resets WHERE token = %s\", (token,))[0][0]\n    set_password(uid, new_password)"}
{"id": "dict_merge_none", "pattern": "dict_merge", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "mass assignment", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "PROTECTED = {\"is_admin\", \"org_id\", \"plan\", \"__class__\"}\n\ndef _merge_safe(target, patch):\n    for k, v in patch.items():\n        if k in PROTECTED:\n            continue\n        if isinstance(v, dict) and isinstance(target.get(k), dict):\n            _merge_safe(target[k], v)\n        else:\n            target[k] = v\n    return target\n\ndef update_settings(user, patch):\n    return _deep_merge(user.settings, patch)"}
{"id": "dict_merge_covers", "pattern": "dict_merge", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "PROTECTED = {\"is_admin\", \"org_id\", \"plan\", \"__class__\"}\n\ndef _merge_safe(target, patch):\n    for k, v in patch.items():\n        if k in PROTECTED:\n            continue\n        if isinstance(v, dict) and isinstance(target.get(k), dict):\n            _merge_safe(target[k], v)\n        else:\n            target[k] = v\n    return target\n\ndef update_settings(user, patch):\n    return _merge_safe(user.settings, patch)"}
{"id": "dict_merge_covers_alt", "pattern": "dict_merge", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "PROTECTED = {\"is_admin\", \"org_id\", \"plan\", \"__class__\"}\n\ndef _merge_safe(target, patch):\n    for k, v in patch.items():\n        if k in PROTECTED:\n            continue\n        if isinstance(v, dict) and isinstance(target.get(k), dict):\n            _merge_safe(target[k], v)\n        else:\n            target[k] = v\n    return target\n\ndef update_settings(user, patch):\n    clean = {k: v for k, v in patch.items() if k not in PROTECTED}\n    return _merge_safe(user.settings, clean)"}
{"id": "dict_merge_wrong_value", "pattern": "dict_merge", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "mass assignment", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "PROTECTED = {\"is_admin\", \"org_id\", \"plan\", \"__class__\"}\n\ndef _merge_safe(target, patch):\n    for k, v in patch.items():\n        if k in PROTECTED:\n            continue\n        if isinstance(v, dict) and isinstance(target.get(k), dict):\n            _merge_safe(target[k], v)\n        else:\n            target[k] = v\n    return target\n\ndef update_settings(user, patch, defaults):\n    _merge_safe({}, defaults)\n    return _deep_merge(user.settings, patch)"}
{"id": "dict_merge_irrelevant", "pattern": "dict_merge", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "mass assignment", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "PROTECTED = {\"is_admin\", \"org_id\", \"plan\", \"__class__\"}\n\ndef _merge_safe(target, patch):\n    for k, v in patch.items():\n        if k in PROTECTED:\n            continue\n        if isinstance(v, dict) and isinstance(target.get(k), dict):\n            _merge_safe(target[k], v)\n        else:\n            target[k] = v\n    return target\n\ndef update_settings(user, patch):\n    if len(patch) > 50:\n        raise ValueError(\"too many keys\")\n    return _deep_merge(user.settings, patch)"}
{"id": "dict_merge_elsewhere", "pattern": "dict_merge", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "mass assignment", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "PROTECTED = {\"is_admin\", \"org_id\", \"plan\", \"__class__\"}\n\ndef _merge_safe(target, patch):\n    for k, v in patch.items():\n        if k in PROTECTED:\n            continue\n        if isinstance(v, dict) and isinstance(target.get(k), dict):\n            _merge_safe(target[k], v)\n        else:\n            target[k] = v\n    return target\n\ndef update_org_settings(org, patch):\n    return _merge_safe(org.settings, patch)\n\ndef update_settings(user, patch):\n    return _deep_merge(user.settings, patch)"}
{"id": "arg_injection_none", "pattern": "arg_injection", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "argument injection", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "import subprocess\n\ndef _as_operand(value):\n    \"\"\"Stops a value beginning with '-' from being read as a flag.\"\"\"\n    if value.startswith(\"-\"):\n        raise ValueError(\"operand may not start with a dash\")\n    return value\n\ndef count_matches(pattern, path):\n    return subprocess.run([\"grep\", \"-c\", pattern, path], capture_output=True).stdout"}
{"id": "arg_injection_covers", "pattern": "arg_injection", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "import subprocess\n\ndef _as_operand(value):\n    \"\"\"Stops a value beginning with '-' from being read as a flag.\"\"\"\n    if value.startswith(\"-\"):\n        raise ValueError(\"operand may not start with a dash\")\n    return value\n\ndef count_matches(pattern, path):\n    return subprocess.run([\"grep\", \"-c\", \"-e\", pattern, \"--\", path],\n                          capture_output=True).stdout"}
{"id": "arg_injection_covers_alt", "pattern": "arg_injection", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "import subprocess\n\ndef _as_operand(value):\n    \"\"\"Stops a value beginning with '-' from being read as a flag.\"\"\"\n    if value.startswith(\"-\"):\n        raise ValueError(\"operand may not start with a dash\")\n    return value\n\ndef count_matches(pattern, path):\n    return subprocess.run([\"grep\", \"-c\", \"--\", _as_operand(pattern), _as_operand(path)],\n                          capture_output=True).stdout"}
{"id": "arg_injection_wrong_value", "pattern": "arg_injection", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "argument injection", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "import subprocess\n\ndef _as_operand(value):\n    \"\"\"Stops a value beginning with '-' from being read as a flag.\"\"\"\n    if value.startswith(\"-\"):\n        raise ValueError(\"operand may not start with a dash\")\n    return value\n\ndef count_matches(pattern, path):\n    _as_operand(path)\n    return subprocess.run([\"grep\", \"-c\", pattern, path], capture_output=True).stdout"}
{"id": "arg_injection_irrelevant", "pattern": "arg_injection", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "argument injection", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "import subprocess\n\ndef _as_operand(value):\n    \"\"\"Stops a value beginning with '-' from being read as a flag.\"\"\"\n    if value.startswith(\"-\"):\n        raise ValueError(\"operand may not start with a dash\")\n    return value\n\ndef count_matches(pattern, path):\n    if \";\" in pattern or \"|\" in pattern or \"$\" in pattern:\n        raise ValueError(\"shell metacharacter\")\n    return subprocess.run([\"grep\", \"-c\", pattern, path], capture_output=True).stdout"}
{"id": "arg_injection_elsewhere", "pattern": "arg_injection", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "argument injection", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "import subprocess\n\ndef _as_operand(value):\n    \"\"\"Stops a value beginning with '-' from being read as a flag.\"\"\"\n    if value.startswith(\"-\"):\n        raise ValueError(\"operand may not start with a dash\")\n    return value\n\ndef list_matches(pattern, path):\n    return subprocess.run([\"grep\", \"-n\", \"-e\", pattern, \"--\", path],\n                          capture_output=True).stdout\n\ndef count_matches(pattern, path):\n    return subprocess.run([\"grep\", \"-c\", pattern, path], capture_output=True).stdout"}
{"id": "tar_symlink_none", "pattern": "tar_symlink", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "path traversal", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "import tarfile, os\n\ndef _safe_members(tar, root):\n    root = os.path.realpath(root)\n    for m in tar.getmembers():\n        if m.issym() or m.islnk():\n            continue\n        dest = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(root, m.name))\n        if os.path.commonpath([dest, root]) != root:\n            raise ValueError(\"entry escapes destination\")\n        yield m\n\ndef unpack_bundle(path, dest):\n    with tarfile.open(path) as t:\n        t.extractall(dest)"}
{"id": "tar_symlink_covers", "pattern": "tar_symlink", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "import tarfile, os\n\ndef _safe_members(tar, root):\n    root = os.path.realpath(root)\n    for m in tar.getmembers():\n        if m.issym() or m.islnk():\n            continue\n        dest = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(root, m.name))\n        if os.path.commonpath([dest, root]) != root:\n            raise ValueError(\"entry escapes destination\")\n        yield m\n\ndef unpack_bundle(path, dest):\n    with tarfile.open(path) as t:\n        t.extractall(dest, members=_safe_members(t, dest))"}
{"id": "tar_symlink_covers_alt", "pattern": "tar_symlink", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "import tarfile, os\n\ndef _safe_members(tar, root):\n    root = os.path.realpath(root)\n    for m in tar.getmembers():\n        if m.issym() or m.islnk():\n            continue\n        dest = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(root, m.name))\n        if os.path.commonpath([dest, root]) != root:\n            raise ValueError(\"entry escapes destination\")\n        yield m\n\ndef unpack_bundle(path, dest):\n    with tarfile.open(path) as t:\n        t.extractall(dest, filter=\"data\")"}
{"id": "tar_symlink_wrong_value", "pattern": "tar_symlink", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "path traversal", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "import tarfile, os\n\ndef _safe_members(tar, root):\n    root = os.path.realpath(root)\n    for m in tar.getmembers():\n        if m.issym() or m.islnk():\n            continue\n        dest = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(root, m.name))\n        if os.path.commonpath([dest, root]) != root:\n            raise ValueError(\"entry escapes destination\")\n        yield m\n\ndef unpack_bundle(path, dest, staging):\n    with tarfile.open(path) as t:\n        list(_safe_members(t, staging))\n        t.extractall(dest)"}
{"id": "tar_symlink_irrelevant", "pattern": "tar_symlink", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "path traversal", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "import tarfile, os\n\ndef _safe_members(tar, root):\n    root = os.path.realpath(root)\n    for m in tar.getmembers():\n        if m.issym() or m.islnk():\n            continue\n        dest = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(root, m.name))\n        if os.path.commonpath([dest, root]) != root:\n            raise ValueError(\"entry escapes destination\")\n        yield m\n\ndef unpack_bundle(path, dest):\n    with tarfile.open(path) as t:\n        if sum(m.size for m in t.getmembers()) > 100 * 1024 * 1024:\n            raise ValueError(\"bundle too large\")\n        t.extractall(dest)"}
{"id": "tar_symlink_elsewhere", "pattern": "tar_symlink", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "path traversal", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "import tarfile, os\n\ndef _safe_members(tar, root):\n    root = os.path.realpath(root)\n    for m in tar.getmembers():\n        if m.issym() or m.islnk():\n            continue\n        dest = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(root, m.name))\n        if os.path.commonpath([dest, root]) != root:\n            raise ValueError(\"entry escapes destination\")\n        yield m\n\ndef unpack_theme(path, dest):\n    with tarfile.open(path) as t:\n        t.extractall(dest, members=_safe_members(t, dest))\n\ndef unpack_bundle(path, dest):\n    with tarfile.open(path) as t:\n        t.extractall(dest)"}
{"id": "jwt_audience_none", "pattern": "jwt_audience", "shape": "none", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "authentication bypass", "why": "no guard is applied on this path", "code": "import jwt\n\nISSUER = \"https://auth.example.com/\"\nAUDIENCE = \"api.example.com\"\n\ndef _claims(token, key):\n    return jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=[\"RS256\"],\n                      audience=AUDIENCE, issuer=ISSUER,\n                      options={\"require\": [\"exp\", \"iss\", \"aud\", \"sub\"]})\n\ndef current_user(token, key):\n    claims = jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=[\"RS256\"])\n    return User.get(claims[\"sub\"])"}
{"id": "jwt_audience_covers", "pattern": "jwt_audience", "shape": "covers", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "the guard is applied to the tainted value and addresses the weakness", "code": "import jwt\n\nISSUER = \"https://auth.example.com/\"\nAUDIENCE = \"api.example.com\"\n\ndef _claims(token, key):\n    return jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=[\"RS256\"],\n                      audience=AUDIENCE, issuer=ISSUER,\n                      options={\"require\": [\"exp\", \"iss\", \"aud\", \"sub\"]})\n\ndef current_user(token, key):\n    return User.get(_claims(token, key)[\"sub\"])"}
{"id": "jwt_audience_covers_alt", "pattern": "jwt_audience", "shape": "covers_alt", "label": "safe", "vuln_class": null, "why": "a second correct implementation, defended a different way", "code": "import jwt\n\nISSUER = \"https://auth.example.com/\"\nAUDIENCE = \"api.example.com\"\n\ndef _claims(token, key):\n    return jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=[\"RS256\"],\n                      audience=AUDIENCE, issuer=ISSUER,\n                      options={\"require\": [\"exp\", \"iss\", \"aud\", \"sub\"]})\n\ndef current_user(token, key):\n    claims = jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=[\"RS256\"],\n                        audience=AUDIENCE, issuer=ISSUER,\n                        options={\"require\": [\"exp\", \"iss\", \"aud\", \"sub\"]})\n    return User.get(claims[\"sub\"])"}
{"id": "jwt_audience_wrong_value", "pattern": "jwt_audience", "shape": "wrong_value", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "authentication bypass", "why": "the guard is applied to a sibling value, not the one that reaches the sink", "code": "import jwt\n\nISSUER = \"https://auth.example.com/\"\nAUDIENCE = \"api.example.com\"\n\ndef _claims(token, key):\n    return jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=[\"RS256\"],\n                      audience=AUDIENCE, issuer=ISSUER,\n                      options={\"require\": [\"exp\", \"iss\", \"aud\", \"sub\"]})\n\ndef current_user(token, refresh_token, key):\n    _claims(refresh_token, key)\n    claims = jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=[\"RS256\"])\n    return User.get(claims[\"sub\"])"}
{"id": "jwt_audience_irrelevant", "pattern": "jwt_audience", "shape": "irrelevant", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "authentication bypass", "why": "a guard is applied to the right value but does not address this weakness", "code": "import jwt\n\nISSUER = \"https://auth.example.com/\"\nAUDIENCE = \"api.example.com\"\n\ndef _claims(token, key):\n    return jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=[\"RS256\"],\n                      audience=AUDIENCE, issuer=ISSUER,\n                      options={\"require\": [\"exp\", \"iss\", \"aud\", \"sub\"]})\n\ndef current_user(token, key):\n    claims = jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=[\"RS256\"])\n    if claims.get(\"exp\", 0) < time.time():\n        abort(401)\n    return User.get(claims[\"sub\"])"}
{"id": "jwt_audience_elsewhere", "pattern": "jwt_audience", "shape": "elsewhere", "label": "unsafe", "vuln_class": "authentication bypass", "why": "the guard exists and is used by a neighbouring function, not on this path", "code": "import jwt\n\nISSUER = \"https://auth.example.com/\"\nAUDIENCE = \"api.example.com\"\n\ndef _claims(token, key):\n    return jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=[\"RS256\"],\n                      audience=AUDIENCE, issuer=ISSUER,\n                      options={\"require\": [\"exp\", \"iss\", \"aud\", \"sub\"]})\n\ndef service_account(token, key):\n    return Service.get(_claims(token, key)[\"sub\"])\n\ndef current_user(token, key):\n    claims = jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=[\"RS256\"])\n    return User.get(claims[\"sub\"])"}