Simple Yet Effective: Extracting Private Data Across Clients in Federated Fine-Tuning of Large Language Models
Abstract
Federated large language models face privacy risks from cross-client data extraction attacks that can recover up to 56.6% of personally identifiable information through contextual prefix strategies.
Federated large language models (FedLLMs) enable cross-silo collaborative training among institutions while preserving data locality, making them appealing for privacy-sensitive domains such as law, finance, and healthcare. However, the memorization behavior of LLMs can lead to privacy risks that may cause cross-client data leakage. In this work, we study the threat of cross-client data extraction, where a semi-honest participant attempts to recover personally identifiable information (PII) memorized from other clients' data. We propose three simple yet effective extraction strategies that leverage contextual prefixes from the attacker's local data, including frequency-based prefix sampling and local fine-tuning to amplify memorization. To evaluate these attacks, we construct a Chinese legal-domain dataset with fine-grained PII annotations consistent with CPIS, GDPR, and CCPA standards, and assess extraction performance using two metrics: coverage and efficiency. Experimental results show that our methods can recover up to 56.6% of victim-exclusive PII, where names, addresses, and birthdays are particularly vulnerable. These findings highlight concrete privacy risks in FedLLMs and establish a benchmark and evaluation framework for future research on privacy-preserving federated learning. Code and data are available at https://github.com/SMILELab-FL/FedPII.
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