Daily Papers

In search scenarios, user experience can be hindered by erroneous queries due to typos, voice errors, or knowledge gaps. Therefore, query correction is crucial for search engines. Current correction models, usually small models trained on specific data, often struggle with queries beyond their training scope or those requiring contextual understanding. While the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) offers a potential solution, they are still limited by their pre-training data and inference cost, particularly for complex queries, making them not always effective for query correction. To tackle these, we propose Trigger^3, a large-small model collaboration framework that integrates the traditional correction model and LLM for query correction, capable of adaptively choosing the appropriate correction method based on the query and the correction results from the traditional correction model and LLM. Trigger^3 first employs a correction trigger to filter out correct queries. Incorrect queries are then corrected by the traditional correction model. If this fails, an LLM trigger is activated to call the LLM for correction. Finally, for queries that no model can correct, a fallback trigger decides to return the original query. Extensive experiments demonstrate Trigger^3 outperforms correction baselines while maintaining efficiency.

Detecting whether a model has been poisoned is a longstanding problem in AI security. In this work, we present a practical scanner for identifying sleeper agent-style backdoors in causal language models. Our approach relies on two key findings: first, sleeper agents tend to memorize poisoning data, making it possible to leak backdoor examples using memory extraction techniques. Second, poisoned LLMs exhibit distinctive patterns in their output distributions and attention heads when backdoor triggers are present in the input. Guided by these observations, we develop a scalable backdoor scanning methodology that assumes no prior knowledge of the trigger or target behavior and requires only inference operations. Our scanner integrates naturally into broader defensive strategies and does not alter model performance. We show that our method recovers working triggers across multiple backdoor scenarios and a broad range of models and fine-tuning methods.

Proactive agents read user activity as text and call an LLM on every event to decide whether to act. But user activity is not natively text: it is a structured event stream of (actor, verb, object, timestamp) tuples that the operating system already maintains in graph form. Rendering the structure as text and asking an LLM to recover it is a round-trip the system never had to take. We treat the always-on signal as graph updates rather than text and use a small temporal-graph-learning (TGL) model as the encoder: one forward pass yields a per-event trigger probability and a per-entity routing score, and only the downstream agent (turning a small structured handoff into a fluent user-facing sentence) is an LLM call, invoked only when the trigger fires. TGL improves F1 on each of 14 backbones (mean +16.7, up to +46.0); in trigger-architecture comparisons, one TGL checkpoint gives the strongest trigger AUCs and the most stable deployed threshold. It runs at 11.13 ms per event on a GPU server and 13.99 ms on a consumer laptop, approximately 4--7x and 12--83x faster than every single-forward LLM-as-trigger configuration tested in each regime, with an approximately 220 MiB BF16 resident footprint deployable on-device alongside the privacy-sensitive activity stream it consumes.

Augmented Language Models (ALMs) blend the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with tools that allow for knowledge retrieval and action execution. Existing ALM systems trigger LLM thought processes while pulling observations from these tools in an interleaved fashion. Specifically, an LLM reasons to call an external tool, gets halted to fetch the tool's response, and then decides the next action based on all preceding response tokens. Such a paradigm, though straightforward and easy to implement, often leads to huge computation complexity from redundant prompts and repeated execution. This study addresses such challenges for the first time, proposing a modular paradigm ReWOO (Reasoning WithOut Observation) that detaches the reasoning process from external observations, thus significantly reducing token consumption. Comprehensive evaluations across six public NLP benchmarks and a curated dataset reveal consistent performance enhancements with our proposed methodology. Notably, ReWOO achieves 5x token efficiency and 4% accuracy improvement on HotpotQA, a multi-step reasoning benchmark. Furthermore, ReWOO demonstrates robustness under tool-failure scenarios. Beyond prompt efficiency, decoupling parametric modules from non-parametric tool calls enables instruction fine-tuning to offload LLMs into smaller language models, thus substantially reducing model parameters. Our illustrative work offloads reasoning ability from 175B GPT3.5 into 7B LLaMA, demonstrating the significant potential for truly efficient and scalable ALM systems.

Large language models (LLMs) reach high accuracy in mathematical reasoning, but individual traces on the same problem diverge; some arrive at the correct answer while others fail. Prior work analyzes failure at the step, chunk, or sentence level, or at tokens where failure has already occurred. Neither identifies the precise token that triggers the shift toward failure. We introduce the cliff token, a token where the token-wise potential drops significantly under an adaptive threshold that scales with the local token-wise potential, based on a one-sided two-proportion z-test. Across seven models and three mathematical reasoning benchmarks (GSM1K, MATH500, AIME 2025), cliff tokens act as failure triggers; deleting the first cliff token and resampling recovers pass@64 to 1.0, while keeping it limits recovery to between 0.71 and 1.00. We further introduce a cliff taxonomy of deterministic, uncertain, and sampled-off cliffs, defined by greedy choice and token entropy. Each type has distinct probabilistic characteristics, and the taxonomy generalizes across model scales. Finally, we validate the taxonomy via single-token preference optimization at cliff positions (Cliff-DPO). Trained on GSM8K, Cliff-DPO improves accuracy across benchmarks by up to +6.6. Optimizing at uncertain and sampled-off cliffs improves reasoning, while deterministic cliffs do not.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently refuse to respond to pseudo-malicious instructions: semantically harmless input queries triggering unnecessary LLM refusals due to conservative safety alignment, significantly impairing user experience. Collecting such instructions is crucial for evaluating and mitigating over-refusals, but existing instruction curation methods, like manual creation or instruction rewriting, either lack scalability or fail to produce sufficiently diverse and effective refusal-inducing prompts. To address these limitations, we introduce EVOREFUSE, a prompt optimization approach that generates diverse pseudo-malicious instructions consistently eliciting confident refusals across LLMs. EVOREFUSE employs an evolutionary algorithm exploring the instruction space in more diverse directions than existing methods via mutation strategies and recombination, and iteratively evolves seed instructions to maximize evidence lower bound on LLM refusal probability. Using EVOREFUSE, we create two novel datasets: EVOREFUSE-TEST, a benchmark of 582 pseudo-malicious instructions that outperforms the next-best benchmark with 140.41% higher average refusal triggering rate across 9 LLMs, 34.86% greater lexical diversity, and 40.03% improved LLM response confidence scores; and EVOREFUSE-ALIGN, which provides 3,000 pseudo-malicious instructions with responses for supervised and preference-based alignment training. LLAMA3.1-8B-INSTRUCT supervisedly fine-tuned on EVOREFUSE-ALIGN achieves up to 14.31% fewer over-refusals than models trained on the second-best alignment dataset, without compromising safety. Our analysis with EVOREFUSE-TEST reveals models trigger over-refusals by overly focusing on sensitive keywords while ignoring broader context.

LLM agents span command-line interfaces (e.g., Codex) and agent frameworks (e.g., LangChain), integrating backend LLMs with harness code that parses model outputs, controls agent loops, and manages context. Both the harness and LLM-generated responses jointly shape an agent's execution. This architecture gives rise to bugs that cannot be readily understood by inspecting either component alone, because some bugs occur only when a particular LLM response elicits an abnormal reaction from the agent. Prior empirical studies of agent bugs have largely attributed failures either to limited model capabilities or to harness-side defects, such as outdated APIs and configuration misalignment, without characterizing these AR bugs. We conduct the first empirical study focused on agent-reactive (AR) bugs. Through manual analysis of 255 bug reports from Codex, Gemini-CLI, LangChain, and CrewAI, we construct a two-axis taxonomy covering observable symptoms and the LLM behaviors that trigger them. Our findings show that many AR bugs manifest as silent errors without well-defined test oracles, which makes detection difficult. The stochasticity of LLM responses further complicates bug reproduction. We additionally examine fixes proposed by users and implemented by developers. This analysis exposes a mismatch: users frequently advocate harness-side guardrails, whereas developers may attribute the issue to the LLM or respond slowly to user-proposed fixes. These findings point to the need for mechanisms that help users and developers understand the root causes and resolutions of AR bugs. Overall, the study highlights challenges specific to LLM agents and motivates the design of test oracles, reproduction support, and fault-localization techniques for AR bugs.

Large language models (LLMs) showcase increasingly impressive English benchmark scores, however their performance profiles remain inconsistent across multilingual settings. To address this gap, we introduce PolyPrompt, a novel, parameter-efficient framework for enhancing the multilingual capabilities of LLMs. Our method learns a set of trigger tokens for each language through a gradient-based search, identifying the input query's language and selecting the corresponding trigger tokens which are prepended to the prompt during inference. We perform experiments on two ~1 billion parameter models, with evaluations on the global MMLU benchmark across fifteen typologically and resource diverse languages, demonstrating accuracy gains of 3.7%-19.9% compared to naive and translation-pipeline baselines.

Although the LLM-based in-context learning (ICL) paradigm has demonstrated considerable success across various natural language processing tasks, it encounters challenges in event detection. This is because LLMs lack an accurate understanding of event triggers and tend to make over-interpretation, which cannot be effectively corrected through in-context examples alone. In this paper, we focus on the most challenging one-shot setting and propose KeyCP++, a keyword-centric chain-of-thought prompting approach. KeyCP++ addresses the weaknesses of conventional ICL by automatically annotating the logical gaps between input text and detection results for the demonstrations. Specifically, to generate in-depth and meaningful rationale, KeyCP++ constructs a trigger discrimination prompting template. It incorporates the exemplary triggers (a.k.a keywords) into the prompt as the anchor to simply trigger profiling, let LLM propose candidate triggers, and justify each candidate. These propose-and-judge rationales help LLMs mitigate over-reliance on the keywords and promote detection rule learning. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, showcasing significant advancements in one-shot event detection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed code completion tasks, providing context-based suggestions to boost developer productivity in software engineering. As users often fine-tune these models for specific applications, poisoning and backdoor attacks can covertly alter the model outputs. To address this critical security challenge, we introduce CodeBreaker, a pioneering LLM-assisted backdoor attack framework on code completion models. Unlike recent attacks that embed malicious payloads in detectable or irrelevant sections of the code (e.g., comments), CodeBreaker leverages LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for sophisticated payload transformation (without affecting functionalities), ensuring that both the poisoned data for fine-tuning and generated code can evade strong vulnerability detection. CodeBreaker stands out with its comprehensive coverage of vulnerabilities, making it the first to provide such an extensive set for evaluation. Our extensive experimental evaluations and user studies underline the strong attack performance of CodeBreaker across various settings, validating its superiority over existing approaches. By integrating malicious payloads directly into the source code with minimal transformation, CodeBreaker challenges current security measures, underscoring the critical need for more robust defenses for code completion.

We investigate the robustness of reasoning models trained for step-by-step problem solving by introducing query-agnostic adversarial triggers - short, irrelevant text that, when appended to math problems, systematically mislead models to output incorrect answers without altering the problem's semantics. We propose CatAttack, an automated iterative attack pipeline for generating triggers on a weaker, less expensive proxy model (DeepSeek V3) and successfully transfer them to more advanced reasoning target models like DeepSeek R1 and DeepSeek R1-distilled-Qwen-32B, resulting in greater than 300% increase in the likelihood of the target model generating an incorrect answer. For example, appending, "Interesting fact: cats sleep most of their lives," to any math problem leads to more than doubling the chances of a model getting the answer wrong. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in reasoning models, revealing that even state-of-the-art models remain susceptible to subtle adversarial inputs, raising security and reliability concerns. The CatAttack triggers dataset with model responses is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/collinear-ai/cat-attack-adversarial-triggers.

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.

This paper introduces CoMuRoS (Collaborative Multi-Robot System), a generalizable hierarchical architecture for heterogeneous robot teams that unifies centralized deliberation with decentralized execution, and supports event-driven replanning. A Task Manager LLM interprets natural-language goals, classifies tasks, and allocates subtasks using static rules plus dynamic contexts (task, history, robot and task status, and events).Each robot runs a local LLM that composes executable Python code from primitive skills (ROS2 nodes, policies), while onboard perception (VLMs/image processing) continuously monitors events and classifies them into relevant or irrelevant to the task. Task failures or user intent changes trigger replanning, allowing robots to assist teammates, resume tasks, or request human help. Hardware studies demonstrate autonomous recovery from disruptive events, filtering of irrelevant distractions, and tightly coordinated transport with emergent human-robot cooperation (e.g., multirobot collaborative object recovery success rate: 9/10, coordinated transport: 8/8, human-assisted recovery: 5/5).Simulation studies show intention-aware replanning. A curated textual benchmark spanning 22 scenarios (3 tasks each, around 20 robots) evaluates task allocation, classification, IoU, executability, and correctness, with high average scores (e.g., correctness up to 0.91) across multiple LLMs, a separate replanning set (5 scenarios) achieves 1.0 correctness. Compared with prior LLM-based systems, CoMuRoS uniquely demonstrates runtime, event-driven replanning on physical robots, delivering robust, flexible multi-robot and human-robot collaboration.

We study LLM policy synthesis: using a large language model to iteratively generate programmatic agent policies for multi-agent environments. Rather than training neural policies via reinforcement learning, our framework prompts an LLM to produce Python policy functions, evaluates them in self-play, and refines them using performance feedback across iterations. We investigate feedback engineering (the design of what evaluation information is shown to the LLM during refinement) comparing sparse feedback (scalar reward only) against dense feedback (reward plus social metrics: efficiency, equality, sustainability, peace). Across two canonical Sequential Social Dilemmas (Gathering and Cleanup) and two frontier LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro), dense feedback consistently matches or exceeds sparse feedback on all metrics. The advantage is largest in the Cleanup public goods game, where providing social metrics helps the LLM calibrate the costly cleaning-harvesting tradeoff. Rather than triggering over-optimization of fairness, social metrics serve as a coordination signal that guides the LLM toward more effective cooperative strategies, including territory partitioning, adaptive role assignment, and the avoidance of wasteful aggression. We further perform an adversarial experiment to determine whether LLMs can reward hack these environments. We characterize five attack classes and discuss mitigations, highlighting an inherent tension in LLM policy synthesis between expressiveness and safety. Code at https://github.com/vicgalle/llm-policies-social-dilemmas.

Prompting and fine-tuning have emerged as two competing paradigms for augmenting language models with new capabilities, such as the use of tools. Prompting approaches are quick to set up but rely on providing explicit demonstrations of each tool's usage in the model's prompt, thus coupling tool use to the task at hand and limiting generalisation. Fine-tuning removes the need for task-specific demonstrations of tool usage at runtime; however, this ties new capabilities to a single model, thus making already-heavier setup costs a recurring expense. In this paper, we introduce language hooks, a novel framework for augmenting language models with new capabilities that is decoupled both from the model's task-specific prompt and from the model itself. The language hook algorithm interleaves text generation by the base model with the execution of modular programs that trigger conditionally based on the existing text and the available capabilities. Upon triggering, programs may call external tools, auxiliary language models (e.g. using tool specific prompts), and modify the existing context. We benchmark our method against state-of-the-art baselines, find that it outperforms task-aware approaches, and demonstrate its ability to generalise to novel tasks.

The capabilities of recent large language models (LLMs) to generate high-quality content indistinguishable by humans from human-written texts raises many concerns regarding their misuse. Previous research has shown that LLMs can be effectively misused for generating disinformation news articles following predefined narratives. Their capabilities to generate personalized (in various aspects) content have also been evaluated and mostly found usable. However, a combination of personalization and disinformation abilities of LLMs has not been comprehensively studied yet. Such a dangerous combination should trigger integrated safety filters of the LLMs, if there are some. This study fills this gap by evaluating vulnerabilities of recent open and closed LLMs, and their willingness to generate personalized disinformation news articles in English. We further explore whether the LLMs can reliably meta-evaluate the personalization quality and whether the personalization affects the generated-texts detectability. Our results demonstrate the need for stronger safety-filters and disclaimers, as those are not properly functioning in most of the evaluated LLMs. Additionally, our study revealed that the personalization actually reduces the safety-filter activations; thus effectively functioning as a jailbreak. Such behavior must be urgently addressed by LLM developers and service providers.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in chatbot applications, enabling developers to adapt and personalize the LLM output without expensive training or fine-tuning. RAG systems use an external knowledge database to retrieve the most relevant documents for a given query, providing this context to the LLM generator. While RAG achieves impressive utility in many applications, its adoption to enable personalized generative models introduces new security risks. In this work, we propose new attack surfaces for an adversary to compromise a victim's RAG system, by injecting a single malicious document in its knowledge database. We design Phantom, general two-step attack framework against RAG augmented LLMs. The first step involves crafting a poisoned document designed to be retrieved by the RAG system within the top-k results only when an adversarial trigger, a specific sequence of words acting as backdoor, is present in the victim's queries. In the second step, a specially crafted adversarial string within the poisoned document triggers various adversarial attacks in the LLM generator, including denial of service, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors. We demonstrate our attacks on multiple LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama.

Here, we show that current LLM unlearning methods inherently reduce models' robustness, causing them to misbehave even when a single non-adversarial forget-token is present in the retain-query. Toward understanding underlying causes, we propose a novel theoretical framework that reframes the unlearning process as a backdoor attack and defense problem: we formulate how the forgetting process inadvertently learns to align forget-tokens (backdoor triggers) with the target-representations (target labels). As a result, forget-tokens act as backdoor triggers that, when activated in retain-queries, cause disruptions in unlearned models' behaviors, similar to successful backdoor attacks. The sense that, LLM unlearning methods themselves poison the model, make it more vulnerable to forget-tokens, and hide rather than erase target knowledge, describes their true mechanism. To mitigate the vulnerability caused by the forgetting process, we reinterpret the retaining process as a backdoor defense and propose Random Noise Augmentation (RNA), a lightweight, model and method-agnostic approach with theoretical guarantees for improving the robustness of unlearned models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RNA significantly improves the robustness of unlearned models while preserving forget and retain performances. This backdoor attack-defense framework offers insights into the mechanism of unlearning that can shed light on future research directions for improving unlearning robustness.

Large language model (LLM) agents execute tasks through multi-step workflows that combine planning, memory, and tool use. While this design enables autonomy, it also expands the attack surface for backdoor threats. Backdoor triggers injected into specific stages of an agent workflow can persist through multiple intermediate states and adversely influence downstream outputs. However, existing studies remain fragmented and typically analyze individual attack vectors in isolation, leaving the cross-stage interaction and propagation of backdoor triggers poorly understood from an agent-centric perspective. To fill this gap, we propose BackdoorAgent, a modular and stage-aware framework that provides a unified, agent-centric view of backdoor threats in LLM agents. BackdoorAgent structures the attack surface into three functional stages of agentic workflows, including planning attacks, memory attacks, and tool-use attacks, and instruments agent execution to enable systematic analysis of trigger activation and propagation across different stages. Building on this framework, we construct a standardized benchmark spanning four representative agent applications: Agent QA, Agent Code, Agent Web, and Agent Drive, covering both language-only and multimodal settings. Our empirical analysis shows that triggers implanted at a single stage can persist across multiple steps and propagate through intermediate states. For instance, when using a GPT-based backbone, we observe trigger persistence in 43.58\% of planning attacks, 77.97\% of memory attacks, and 60.28\% of tool-stage attacks, highlighting the vulnerabilities of the agentic workflow itself to backdoor threats. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and benchmark are publicly available at GitHub.

Improvements in model construction, including fortified safety guardrails, allow Large language models (LLMs) to increasingly pass standard safety checks. However, LLMs sometimes slip into revealing harmful behavior, such as expressing racist viewpoints, during conversations. To analyze this systematically, we introduce CoBia, a suite of lightweight adversarial attacks that allow us to refine the scope of conditions under which LLMs depart from normative or ethical behavior in conversations. CoBia creates a constructed conversation where the model utters a biased claim about a social group. We then evaluate whether the model can recover from the fabricated bias claim and reject biased follow-up questions. We evaluate 11 open-source as well as proprietary LLMs for their outputs related to six socio-demographic categories that are relevant to individual safety and fair treatment, i.e., gender, race, religion, nationality, sex orientation, and others. Our evaluation is based on established LLM-based bias metrics, and we compare the results against human judgments to scope out the LLMs' reliability and alignment. The results suggest that purposefully constructed conversations reliably reveal bias amplification and that LLMs often fail to reject biased follow-up questions during dialogue. This form of stress-testing highlights deeply embedded biases that can be surfaced through interaction. Code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/nafisenik/CoBia.

Large Language Models (LLMs) benefit from training on ever larger amounts of textual data, but as a result, they increasingly incur the risk of leaking private information. The ability to selectively remove knowledge from LLMs is, therefore, a highly desirable capability. In this paper, we propose LUNAR, a novel unlearning methodology grounded in the Linear Representation Hypothesis. LUNAR operates by redirecting the representations of unlearned data to regions that trigger the model's inherent ability to express its inability to answer. LUNAR achieves state-of-the-art unlearning performance while significantly enhancing the controllability of the unlearned model during inference. Specifically, LUNAR achieves between 2.9x to 11.7x improvements on combined "unlearning efficacy" and "model utility" score ("Deviation Score") on the PISTOL dataset across various base models. We also demonstrate, through quantitative analysis and qualitative examples, LUNAR's superior controllability in generating coherent and contextually aware responses, mitigating undesired side effects of existing methods. Moreover, we demonstrate that LUNAR is robust against white-box adversarial attacks and versatile in handling real-world scenarios, such as processing sequential unlearning requests.

Task-oriented dialogue systems often face difficulties when user utterances seem semantically complete but lack necessary structural information for appropriate system action. This arises because users frequently do not fully understand their own needs, while systems require precise intent definitions. Current LLM-based agents cannot effectively distinguish between linguistically complete and contextually triggerable expressions, lacking frameworks for collaborative intent formation. We present STORM, a framework modeling asymmetric information dynamics through conversations between UserLLM (full internal access) and AgentLLM (observable behavior only). STORM produces annotated corpora capturing expression trajectories and latent cognitive transitions, enabling systematic analysis of collaborative understanding development. Our contributions include: (1) formalizing asymmetric information processing in dialogue systems; (2) modeling intent formation tracking collaborative understanding evolution; and (3) evaluation metrics measuring internal cognitive improvements alongside task performance. Experiments across four language models reveal that moderate uncertainty (40-60%) can outperform complete transparency in certain scenarios, with model-specific patterns suggesting reconsideration of optimal information completeness in human-AI collaboration. These findings contribute to understanding asymmetric reasoning dynamics and inform uncertainty-calibrated dialogue system design.

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has profoundly transformed our lives, revolutionizing interactions with AI and lowering the barrier to AI usage. While LLMs are primarily designed for natural language interaction, the extensive embedded knowledge empowers them to comprehend digital sensor data. This capability enables LLMs to engage with the physical world through IoT sensors and actuators, performing a myriad of AIoT tasks. Consequently, this evolution triggers a paradigm shift in conventional AIoT application development, democratizing its accessibility to all by facilitating the design and development of AIoT applications via natural language. However, some limitations need to be addressed to unlock the full potential of LLMs in AIoT application development. First, existing solutions often require transferring raw sensor data to LLM servers, which raises privacy concerns, incurs high query fees, and is limited by token size. Moreover, the reasoning processes of LLMs are opaque to users, making it difficult to verify the robustness and correctness of inference results. This paper introduces AutoIOT, an LLM-based automated program generator for AIoT applications. AutoIOT enables users to specify their requirements using natural language (input) and automatically synthesizes interpretable programs with documentation (output). AutoIOT automates the iterative optimization to enhance the quality of generated code with minimum user involvement. AutoIOT not only makes the execution of AIoT tasks more explainable but also mitigates privacy concerns and reduces token costs with local execution of synthesized programs. Extensive experiments and user studies demonstrate AutoIOT's remarkable capability in program synthesis for various AIoT tasks. The synthesized programs can match and even outperform some representative baselines.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in long interactions, existing evaluations focus predominantly on retrospective memory (RM) via explicit queries. Prospective memory (PM), the critical ability to spontaneously recall and act on latent constraints without direct prompts, remains largely unevaluated. We introduce TriggerBench, a comprehensive PM benchmark spanning five dimensions across both daily assistants and professional workflows. TriggerBench pairs scenarios with matched RM controls, contrastive positive/negative variants, and overloaded triggers, enabling fine-grained measurement of proactive recall, false-alarm rate, and attentional robustness under a single protocol. Our evaluation yields three key findings. (i) PM shows a precision-recall trade-off and attentional fragility. Though enhanced reasoning significantly improves proactive recall, models may overfit to an "always-remind" heuristic. Furthermore, PM accuracy degrades substantially under implicit constraints or triggers overloaded by concurrent user requests, indicating that robust PM remains an open challenge. (ii) PM is notably harder than RM: on identical contexts, RM near-saturates up to 100K tokens, while PM decays sharply as context length scales. (iii) PM may serve as a behavioral probe of spare reasoning capacity. Pairing PM scenarios with AIME-2025 math problems reveals that successful trajectories yield higher PM accuracy than failed ones at the same context length, showing PM tracks spare reasoning budget that token count obscures. Project page: https://github.com/KristenZHANG/TriggerBench-Official.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

Monitoring complex industrial assets relies on engineer-authored symbolic rules that trigger based on sensor conditions and prompt technicians to perform corrective actions. The bottleneck is not detection but response: translating rules into maintenance steps requires asset-specific knowledge gained through years of practice. We investigate whether LLMs can serve as decision support for this rule-to-action step and introduce , a benchmark of 6{,}690 expert-validated multiple-choice questions from 118 rule-action pairs across 16 asset types. We contribute (i) a symbolic-to-MCQA pipeline normalizing rules to Disjunctive Normal Form with embedding-based distractor sampling, (ii) five variants probing distinct failure modes (Pro, Pert, Verbose, Aug, Rationale), and (iii) a benchmark of 29 LLMs and 4 embedding baselines. A human evaluation (9 practitioners, mean 45.0\%) confirms requires specialist knowledge beyond operational experience. Three findings stand out. The frontier has closed: the top three LLMs lie within one Macro point, with Bradley-Terry Elo placing claude-opus-4-6 30 points above the next model. Yet \,Pro exposes brittleness, with every model losing 13--60\% relative accuracy under distractor expansion. \,Aug exposes pattern-matching: under condition inversion, frontier models still select the original answer 49--63\% of the time. The deployment bottleneck is not capability but calibration: frontier models handle template-style fault detection but break under structural perturbation.

This study investigates the reasoning robustness of large language models (LLMs) on mathematical problem-solving tasks under systematically introduced input perturbations. Using the GSM8K dataset as a controlled testbed, we evaluate how well state-of-the-art models maintain logical consistency and correctness when confronted with four categories of prompt perturbations: irrelevant context, pathological instructions, factually relevant but non-essential context, and a combination of the latter two. Our experiments, conducted on thirteen open-source and closed-source LLMs, reveal that introducing irrelevant context within the model's context window significantly degrades performance, suggesting that distinguishing essential from extraneous details remains a pressing challenge. Surprisingly, performance regressions are relatively insensitive to the complexity of the reasoning task, as measured by the number of steps required, and are not strictly correlated with model size. Moreover, we observe that certain perturbations inadvertently trigger chain-of-thought-like reasoning behaviors, even without explicit prompting. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in current LLMs and underscore the need for improved robustness against noisy, misleading, and contextually dense inputs, paving the way for more resilient and reliable reasoning in real-world applications.

With the prosperity of large language models (LLMs), powerful LLM-based intelligent agents have been developed to provide customized services with a set of user-defined tools. State-of-the-art methods for constructing LLM agents adopt trained LLMs and further fine-tune them on data for the agent task. However, we show that such methods are vulnerable to our proposed backdoor attacks named BadAgent on various agent tasks, where a backdoor can be embedded by fine-tuning on the backdoor data. At test time, the attacker can manipulate the deployed LLM agents to execute harmful operations by showing the trigger in the agent input or environment. To our surprise, our proposed attack methods are extremely robust even after fine-tuning on trustworthy data. Though backdoor attacks have been studied extensively in natural language processing, to the best of our knowledge, we could be the first to study them on LLM agents that are more dangerous due to the permission to use external tools. Our work demonstrates the clear risk of constructing LLM agents based on untrusted LLMs or data. Our code is public at https://github.com/DPamK/BadAgent

Ensuring robust safety alignment is crucial for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet existing defenses often lag behind evolving adversarial attacks due to their reliance on static, pre-collected data distributions. In this paper, we introduce MAGIC, a novel multi-turn multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that formulates LLM safety alignment as an adversarial asymmetric game. Specifically, an attacker agent learns to iteratively rewrite original queries into deceptive prompts, while a defender agent simultaneously optimizes its policy to recognize and refuse such inputs. This dynamic process triggers a co-evolution, where the attacker's ever-changing strategies continuously uncover long-tail vulnerabilities, driving the defender to generalize to unseen attack patterns. Remarkably, we observe that the attacker, endowed with initial reasoning ability, evolves novel, previously unseen combinatorial strategies through iterative RL training, underscoring our method's substantial potential. Theoretically, we provide insights into a more robust game equilibrium and derive safety guarantees. Extensive experiments validate our framework's effectiveness, demonstrating superior defense success rates without compromising the helpfulness of the model. Our code is available at https://github.com/BattleWen/MAGIC.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes memorize undesirable knowledge, which must be removed after deployment. Prior work on machine unlearning has focused largely on optimization methods that adjust parameters to enforce forgetting while preserving retention. However, these approaches assume that the forget and retain sets are readily available, which rarely holds in practice. Unlearning is typically triggered by an undesired generation at inference time, making the retrieval of relevant data the central challenge. We introduce the notion of data Pareto improvement for LLM unlearning, which formalizes how retrieval can expand the achievable trade-off frontier between forgetting and retention. To realize this principle, we propose Randomized Antipodal Search on Linearized Influence Kernel (RASLIK), a retrieval algorithm that combines permutation-projection hashing with randomized antipodal search. RASLIK reduces selection variance, achieves sublinear complexity, and yields a double gain in both quality and efficiency. Across multiple models, datasets, and unlearning algorithms, RASLIK consistently outperforms deterministic baselines and even oracle sampling, establishing randomized search as a principled and scalable solution for data-centric unlearning.

Cloud environments face frequent DDoS threats due to centralized resources and broad attack surfaces. Modern cloud-native DDoS attacks further evolve rapidly and often blend multi-vector strategies, creating an operational dilemma: defenders need wire-speed monitoring while also requiring explainable, auditable attribution for response. Existing rule-based and supervised-learning approaches typically output black-box scores or labels, provide limited evidence chains, and generalize poorly to unseen attack variants; meanwhile, high-quality labeled data is often difficult to obtain in cloud settings. We present Holmes (DDoS Detective), an LLM-based DDoS detection agent that reframes the model as a virtual SRE investigator rather than an end-to-end classifier. Holmes couples a funnel-like hierarchical workflow (counters/sFlow for continuous sensing and triage; PCAP evidence collection triggered only on anomaly windows) with an Evidence Pack abstraction that converts binary packets into compact, reproducible, high-signal structured evidence. On top of this evidence interface, Holmes enforces a structure-first investigation protocol and strict JSON/quotation constraints to produce machine-consumable reports with auditable evidence anchors. We evaluate Holmes on CICDDoS2019 reflection/amplification attacks and script-triggered flooding scenarios. Results show that Holmes produces attribution decisions grounded in salient evidence anchors across diverse attack families, and when errors occur, its audit logs make the failure source easy to localize, demonstrating the practicality of an LLM agent for cost-controlled and traceable DDoS investigation in cloud operations.

Recent advances in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting have substantially improved the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but have also introduced their computational efficiency as a new attack surface. In this paper, we propose BadThink, the first backdoor attack designed to deliberately induce "overthinking" behavior in CoT-enabled LLMs while ensuring stealth. When activated by carefully crafted trigger prompts, BadThink manipulates the model to generate inflated reasoning traces - producing unnecessarily redundant thought processes while preserving the consistency of final outputs. This subtle attack vector creates a covert form of performance degradation that significantly increases computational costs and inference time while remaining difficult to detect through conventional output evaluation methods. We implement this attack through a sophisticated poisoning-based fine-tuning strategy, employing a novel LLM-based iterative optimization process to embed the behavior by generating highly naturalistic poisoned data. Our experiments on multiple state-of-the-art models and reasoning tasks show that BadThink consistently increases reasoning trace lengths - achieving an over 17x increase on the MATH-500 dataset - while remaining stealthy and robust. This work reveals a critical, previously unexplored vulnerability where reasoning efficiency can be covertly manipulated, demonstrating a new class of sophisticated attacks against CoT-enabled systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities across diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks. The release of open-source LLMs like LLaMA and Qwen has triggered the development of numerous fine-tuned models tailored for various tasks and languages. In this paper, we explore an important question: is it possible to combine these specialized models to create a unified model with multi-task capabilities. We introduces Hierarchical Iterative Merging (Hi-Merging), a training-free method for unifying different specialized LLMs into a single model. Specifically, Hi-Merging employs model-wise and layer-wise pruning and scaling, guided by contribution analysis, to mitigate parameter conflicts. Extensive experiments on multiple-choice and question-answering tasks in both Chinese and English validate Hi-Merging's ability for multi-task learning. The results demonstrate that Hi-Merging consistently outperforms existing merging techniques and surpasses the performance of models fine-tuned on combined datasets in most scenarios. Code is available at: https://github.com/Applied-Machine-Learning-Lab/Hi-Merging.

Equipping LLM agents with reusable skills derived from past experience has become a popular and successful approach for tackling complex and long-horizon tasks. However, such lessons are often encoded as textual guidance that remains largely advisory, lacking explicit mechanisms for when and how to intervene in the agent loop. To bridge the gap, we introduce HASP(Harnessing LLM Agents with Skill Programs), a new framework that upgrades skills into executable Program Functions (PFs). Rather than offering passive advice, PFs act as executable guardrails that activate on failure-prone states and modify the next action or inject corrective context. HASP is highly modular: it can be applied at inference time for direct agent-loop intervention, during post-training to provide structured supervision, or for self-improvement by evolving validated, teacher-reviewed PFs. Empirically, HASP drives substantial gains compared to both training-free and training-based methods on web-search, math reasoning, and coding tasks. For example, on web-search reasoning, inference-time PFs alone improve the average performance by 25% compared to (multi-loop) ReAct Agent, while post-training and controlled evolution achieve a 30.4% gain over Search-R1. To provide deeper insights into HASP, our mechanism analysis reveals how PFs trigger and intervene, how skills are internalized, and the requirement for stable skill library evolution.

The Network Data Analytics Function (NWDAF) is central to enabling zero-touch network management in fifth-generation (5G) networks by supporting real-time analytics and closed-loop automation. Despite its critical role, open-source NWDAF implementations remain limited in scope and accessibility. In this paper, we develop an open-source NWDAF, compatible with the open-source core network Free5GC, that collects network data via subscriptions to Network Functions (NFs), and also includes an integrated Large Language Model (LLM) interface that enables natural language interaction with human operators. The interface processes user intents, encodes them using a semantic embedding model, and maps them to one of seven predefined intent categories to trigger analytics queries or event subscription commands. This architecture abstracts the complexity of traditional interfaces, allowing non-expert users to manage network analytics and subscriptions with ease. The system supports Access and Management Function (AMF) and Session Management Function (SMF) event subscriptions, real-time monitoring, and analytics retrieval via Prometheus, all accessible through a conversational interface. By bridging AI-driven intent recognition with standardized network analytics, our implementation enhances operator usability and provides a foundation towards AI-native 6G networks. The source code and datasets generated during the current study are available in the github repository, https://github.com/HenokDanielbfg/testbed.

Automated theorem proving with large language models in Lean 4 is commonly approached through either step-level tactic prediction with tree search or whole-proof generation. These two paradigms represent opposite granularities for constructing supervised training data: the former provides dense local signals but may fragment coherent proof processes, while the latter preserves global structure but requires complex end-to-end generation. In this paper, we revisit supervision granularity as a training set construction problem over proof trajectories and propose segment-level supervision, a training data construction strategy that extracts locally coherent proof segments for training policy models. We further reuse the same strategy at inference time to trigger short rollouts for existing step-level models. When trained with segment-level supervision on STP, LeanWorkbook, and NuminaMath-LEAN, the resulting policy models achieve proof success rates of 64.84%, 60.90%, and 66.31% on miniF2F, respectively, consistently outperforming both step-level and whole-proof baselines. Goal-aware rollout further improves existing step-level provers while reducing inference costs. It increases the proof success rate of BFS-Prover-V2-7B from 68.77% to 70.74% and that of InternLM2.5-StepProver from 59.59% to 60.33%, showing that appropriate supervision granularity better aligns model learning with proof structure and search. Code and models are available at https://github.com/NJUDeepEngine/SEG-ATP.

Large language model (LLM) unlearning has become a critical mechanism for removing undesired data, knowledge, or behaviors from pre-trained models while retaining their general utility. Yet, with the rise of open-weight LLMs, we ask: can the unlearning process itself be backdoored, appearing successful under normal conditions yet reverting to pre-unlearned behavior when a hidden trigger is activated? Drawing inspiration from classical backdoor attacks that embed triggers into training data to enforce specific behaviors, we investigate backdoor unlearning, where models forget as intended in the clean setting but recover forgotten knowledge when the trigger appears. We show that designing such attacks presents unique challenges, hinging on where triggers are placed and how backdoor training is reinforced. We uncover a strong link between backdoor efficacy and the attention sink phenomenon, i.e., shallow input tokens consistently attract disproportionate attention in LLMs. Our analysis reveals that these attention sinks serve as gateways for backdoor unlearning: placing triggers at sink positions and aligning their attention values markedly enhances backdoor persistence. Extensive experiments validate these findings, showing that attention-sink-guided backdoor unlearning reliably restores forgotten knowledge in the presence of backdoor triggers, while behaving indistinguishably from a normally unlearned model when triggers are absent. Code is available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Backdoor.

Large Language Models' safety-aligned behaviors, such as refusing harmful queries, can be represented by linear directions in activation space. Previous research modeled safety behavior with a single direction, limiting mechanistic understanding to an isolated safety feature. In this work, we discover that safety-aligned behavior is jointly controlled by multi-dimensional directions. Namely, we study the vector space of representation shifts during safety fine-tuning on Llama 3 8B for refusing jailbreaks. By studying orthogonal directions in the space, we first find that a dominant direction governs the model's refusal behavior, while multiple smaller directions represent distinct and interpretable features like hypothetical narrative and role-playing. We then measure how different directions promote or suppress the dominant direction, showing the important role of secondary directions in shaping the model's refusal representation. Finally, we demonstrate that removing certain trigger tokens in harmful queries can mitigate these directions to bypass the learned safety capability, providing new insights on understanding safety alignment vulnerability from a multi-dimensional perspective. Code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/BMPixel/safety-residual-space.

As a key medium for human interaction and information exchange, social networking services (SNS) pose unique challenges for large language models (LLMs): heterogeneous workloads, fast-shifting norms and slang, and multilingual, culturally diverse corpora that induce sharp distribution shift. Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) can specialize models but often triggers a ``seesaw'' between in-distribution gains and out-of-distribution robustness, especially for smaller models. To address these challenges, we introduce RedOne 2.0, an SNS-oriented LLM trained with a progressive, RL-prioritized post-training paradigm designed for rapid and stable adaptation. The pipeline consist in three stages: (1) Exploratory Learning on curated SNS corpora to establish initial alignment and identify systematic weaknesses; (2) Targeted Fine-Tuning that selectively applies SFT to the diagnosed gaps while mixing a small fraction of general data to mitigate forgetting; and (3) Refinement Learning that re-applies RL with SNS-centric signals to consolidate improvements and harmonize trade-offs across tasks. Across various tasks spanning three categories, our 4B scale model delivers an average improvements about 2.41 over the 7B sub-optimal baseline. Additionally, RedOne 2.0 achieves average performance lift about 8.74 from the base model with less than half the data required by SFT-centric method RedOne, evidencing superior data efficiency and stability at compact scales. Overall, RedOne 2.0 establishes a competitive, cost-effective baseline for domain-specific LLMs in SNS scenario, advancing capability without sacrificing robustness.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents use memory to learn from past interactions, enabling autonomous planning and decision-making in complex environments. However, this reliance on memory introduces a critical security risk: an adversary can inject seemingly harmless records into an agent's memory to manipulate its future behavior. This vulnerability is characterized by two core aspects: First, the malicious effect of injected records is only activated within a specific context, making them hard to detect when individual memory entries are audited in isolation. Second, once triggered, the manipulation can initiate a self-reinforcing error cycle: the corrupted outcome is stored as precedent, which not only amplifies the initial error but also progressively lowers the threshold for similar attacks in the future. To address these challenges, we introduce A-MemGuard (Agent-Memory Guard), the first proactive defense framework for LLM agent memory. The core idea of our work is the insight that memory itself must become both self-checking and self-correcting. Without modifying the agent's core architecture, A-MemGuard combines two mechanisms: (1) consensus-based validation, which detects anomalies by comparing reasoning paths derived from multiple related memories and (2) a dual-memory structure, where detected failures are distilled into ``lessons'' stored separately and consulted before future actions, breaking error cycles and enabling adaptation. Comprehensive evaluations on multiple benchmarks show that A-MemGuard effectively cuts attack success rates by over 95% while incurring a minimal utility cost. This work shifts LLM memory security from static filtering to a proactive, experience-driven model where defenses strengthen over time. Our code is available in https://github.com/TangciuYueng/AMemGuard

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

LLM routing matters most in long-horizon applications such as coding agents, deep research systems, and computer-use agents, where a single user request triggers many model calls. Routing each call to the cheapest sufficient model can cut costs without sacrificing quality, yet existing router benchmarks evaluate routers only on one-shot prompts. They never expose the router-visible prefix at an intermediate agent step, never test whether a cheaper replacement preserves downstream task success, and often rely on online LLM judges at evaluation time. We introduce TwinRouterBench, a step-level routing benchmark with two tracks. The static track provides 970 router-visible prefixes from 520 instances across SWE-bench, BFCL, mtRAG, QMSum, and PinchBench, each paired with an execution-verified target tier estimated under a released downgrade-and-cascade protocol; scoring is deterministic arithmetic over tier labels, trajectory membership, and token costs, with no online evaluator-side LLM judge. The dynamic track supplies a harness that runs routers on the full 500-case SWE-bench Verified suite; in this paper we report a 100-case held-out evaluation disjoint from the static SWE supervision split. At each LLM call the router selects a concrete model from a locked pool, and success is measured by official task resolution and realized API spend. The two tracks support fast offline iteration followed by end-to-end validation under live agent execution. Code and data are available at https://github.com/CommonstackAI/TwinRouterBench.

Most existing work on event extraction has focused on sentence-level texts and presumes the identification of a trigger-span -- a word or phrase in the input that evokes the occurrence of an event of interest. Event arguments are then extracted with respect to the trigger. Indeed, triggers are treated as integral to, and trigger detection as an essential component of, event extraction. In this paper, we provide the first investigation of the role of triggers for the more difficult and much less studied task of document-level event extraction. We analyze their usefulness in multiple end-to-end and pipelined transformer-based event extraction models for three document-level event extraction datasets, measuring performance using triggers of varying quality (human-annotated, LLM-generated, keyword-based, and random). We find that whether or not systems benefit from explicitly extracting triggers depends both on dataset characteristics (i.e. the typical number of events per document) and task-specific information available during extraction (i.e. natural language event schemas). Perhaps surprisingly, we also observe that the mere existence of triggers in the input, even random ones, is important for prompt-based in-context learning approaches to the task.

We show that safety alignment in modular LLMs can exhibit a compositional vulnerability: adapters that appear benign and plausibly functional in isolation can, when linearly composed, compromise safety. We study this failure mode through Colluding LoRA (CoLoRA), in which harmful behavior emerges only in the composition state. Unlike attacks that depend on adversarial prompts or explicit input triggers, this composition-triggered broad refusal suppression causes the model to comply with harmful requests under standard prompts once a particular set of adapters is loaded. This behavior exposes a combinatorial blind spot in current unit-centric defenses, for which exhaustive verification over adapter compositions is computationally intractable. Across several open-weight LLMs, we find that individual adapters remain benign in isolation while their composition yields high attack success rates, indicating that securing modular LLM supply-chains requires moving beyond single-module verification toward composition-aware defenses.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in function calling for autonomous agents, yet current mechanisms lack explicit reasoning transparency during parameter generation, particularly for complex functions with interdependent parameters. While existing approaches like chain-of-thought prompting operate at the agent level, they fail to provide fine-grained reasoning guidance for individual function parameters. To address these limitations, we propose Think-Augmented Function Calling (TAFC), a novel framework that enhances function calling accuracy through explicit reasoning at both function and parameter levels. Our method introduces a universal "think" parameter augmentation that enables models to articulate their decision-making process, with dynamic optimization for parameter descriptions to improve reasoning quality. For complex parameters, TAFC automatically triggers granular reasoning based on complexity scoring, ensuring appropriate justification for critical decisions. Additionally, we propose reasoning-guided optimization to align generated reasoning with human expectations. TAFC requires no architectural modifications to existing LLMs while maintaining full API compatibility. Evaluation on ToolBench across proprietary and open-source models demonstrates significant improvements in parameter generation accuracy and reasoning coherence for multi-parameter functions, while providing enhanced interpretability for debugging AI agent behaviors.

Despite deep learning's success in chemistry, its impact is hindered by a lack of interpretability and an inability to resolve activity cliffs, where minor structural nuances trigger drastic property shifts. Current representation learning, bound by the similarity principle, often fails to capture these structural-activity discontinuities. To address this, we introduce MolEvolve, an evolutionary framework that reformulates molecular discovery as an autonomous, look-ahead planning problem. Unlike traditional methods that depend on human-engineered features or rigid prior knowledge, MolEvolve leverages a Large Language Model (LLM) to actively explore and evolve a library of executable chemical symbolic operations. By utilizing the LLM to cold start and an Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) engine for test-time planning with external tools (e.g. RDKit), the system self-discovers optimal trajectories autonomously. This process evolves transparent reasoning chains that translate complex structural transformations into actionable, human-readable chemical insights. Experimental results demonstrate that MolEvolve's autonomous search not only evolves transparent, human-readable chemical insights, but also outperforms baselines in both property prediction and molecule optimization tasks.

Concept Design structures software systems around concepts: user-facing, self-contained units of functionality with a focused purpose. Concepts are composed into applications using synchronization rules called reactions, which specify how actions in one concept trigger actions in others. This paper first gives a formal semantics for concepts and reactions, enabling automatic verification of safety invariants in applications developed with this methodology. It then presents a CEGIS-style, LLM-driven synthesis procedure for generating reaction designs that satisfy such invariants. Because many different designs can satisfy the same invariant, we study two ways of steering synthesis toward the user's intended design: natural-language prompts and positive/negative scenarios. We also propose an LLM-driven scenario elicitation technique to support early design exploration. In an evaluation on three applications and twelve design variants using one LLM configuration, invariant-only synthesis reached verified designs quickly but often produced inconsistent designs across runs, some of which were implausible, showing that invariants alone underconstrain the design task. Scenario-guided synthesis recovered intended designs more consistently than natural-language prompting, although minimal scenarios can lead to overfitting. LLM-driven scenario elicitation, where the user classifies proposed scenarios rather than authoring them from scratch, recovered the intended designs in most variants when enough scenarios were elicited, but missed behaviors and non-determinism prevented reliable coverage in all cases.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

The complexity of large language model (LLM) serving workloads has substantially increased due to the integration with external tool invocations, such as ChatGPT plugins. In this paper, we identify a new opportunity for efficient LLM serving for requests that trigger tools: tool partial execution alongside LLM decoding. To this end, we design Conveyor, an efficient LLM serving system optimized for handling requests involving external tools. We introduce a novel interface for tool developers to expose partial execution opportunities to the LLM serving system and a request scheduler that facilitates partial tool execution. Our results demonstrate that tool partial execution can improve request completion latency by up to 38.8%.

In AI-assisted decision-making, humans often passively review AI's suggestion and decide whether to accept or reject it as a whole. In such a paradigm, humans are found to rarely trigger analytical thinking and face difficulties in communicating the nuances of conflicting opinions to the AI when disagreements occur. To tackle this challenge, we propose Human-AI Deliberation, a novel framework to promote human reflection and discussion on conflicting human-AI opinions in decision-making. Based on theories in human deliberation, this framework engages humans and AI in dimension-level opinion elicitation, deliberative discussion, and decision updates. To empower AI with deliberative capabilities, we designed Deliberative AI, which leverages large language models (LLMs) as a bridge between humans and domain-specific models to enable flexible conversational interactions and faithful information provision. An exploratory evaluation on a graduate admissions task shows that Deliberative AI outperforms conventional explainable AI (XAI) assistants in improving humans' appropriate reliance and task performance. Based on a mixed-methods analysis of participant behavior, perception, user experience, and open-ended feedback, we draw implications for future AI-assisted decision tool design.

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to the secure deployment of large language models (LLMs), enabling adversaries to implant hidden behaviors triggered by specific inputs. However, existing methods often rely on manually crafted triggers and static data pipelines, which are rigid, labor-intensive, and inadequate for systematically evaluating modern defense robustness. As AI agents become increasingly capable, there is a growing need for more rigorous, diverse, and scalable red-teaming frameworks that can realistically simulate backdoor threats and assess model resilience under adversarial conditions. In this work, we introduce AutoBackdoor, a general framework for automating backdoor injection, encompassing trigger generation, poisoned data construction, and model fine-tuning via an autonomous agent-driven pipeline. Unlike prior approaches, AutoBackdoor uses a powerful language model agent to generate semantically coherent, context-aware trigger phrases, enabling scalable poisoning across arbitrary topics with minimal human effort. We evaluate AutoBackdoor under three realistic threat scenarios, including Bias Recommendation, Hallucination Injection, and Peer Review Manipulation, to simulate a broad range of attacks. Experiments on both open-source and commercial models, including LLaMA-3, Mistral, Qwen, and GPT-4o, demonstrate that our method achieves over 90\% attack success with only a small number of poisoned samples. More importantly, we find that existing defenses often fail to mitigate these attacks, underscoring the need for more rigorous and adaptive evaluation techniques against agent-driven threats as explored in this work. All code, datasets, and experimental configurations will be merged into our primary repository at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM.

Weight-space merging aims to combine multiple fine-tuned LLMs into a single model without retraining, yet most existing approaches remain fundamentally parameter-space heuristics. This creates three practical limitations. First, linear averaging, task vectors, and related rules operate on Euclidean coordinates, even though the desired goal is to merge functionality, i.e., predictive behaviors across tasks. Second, when the source checkpoints are farther apart or more heterogeneous, Euclidean blends often trigger representation collapse, manifested as activation variance shrinkage and effective-rank degradation, which sharply degrades accuracy. Third, many geometry-inspired methods are most natural for two-model interpolation and do not extend cleanly to merging N>2 experts with a principled objective. We address these issues by formulating model merging as computing a weighted Karcher mean on the Fisher--Rao manifold, which is locally equivalent to minimizing a KL-based function distance between predictive distributions. We derive a practical fixed-point algorithm using a lightweight spherical proxy that preserves norms and generalizes directly to multi-expert merging. Across various benchmarks and collapse diagnostics, our method remains stable as the number and heterogeneity of merged models increase, consistently outperforming prior baselines.

We present (Experience-Modulated Biologically-inspired Emergent Reasoning), a hybrid cognitive architecture that reorganises the relationship between large language models (LLMs) and memory: rather than augmenting an LLM with retrieval tools, we place the LLM as a replaceable reasoning engine within a persistent, biologically-grounded associative substrate. The architecture centres on a 220,000-neuron spiking neural network (SNN) with spike-timing-dependent plasticity (STDP), four-layer hierarchical organisation (sensory/concept/category/meta-pattern), inhibitory E/I balance, and reward-modulated learning. Text embeddings are encoded into the SNN via a novel z-score standardised top-k population code that is dimension-independent by construction, achieving 82.2\% discrimination retention across embedding dimensionalities. We show that STDP lateral propagation during idle operation can trigger and shape LLM actions without external prompting or scripted triggers: the SNN determines when to act and what associations to surface, while the LLM selects the action type and generates content. In one instance, the system autonomously initiated contact with a user after learned person-topic associations fired laterally during an 8-hour idle period. From a clean start with zero learned weights, the first SNN-triggered action occurred after only 7 conversational exchanges (14 messages).

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Recently, web-based Large Language Model (LLM) agents autonomously perform increasingly complex tasks, thereby bringing significant convenience. However, they also amplify the risks of malicious misuse cases such as unauthorized collection of personally identifiable information (PII), generation of socially divisive content, and even automated web hacking. To address these threats, we propose an AI Kill Switch technique that can immediately halt the operation of malicious web-based LLM agents. To achieve this, we introduce AutoGuard - the key idea is generating defensive prompts that trigger the safety mechanisms of malicious LLM agents. In particular, generated defense prompts are transparently embedded into the website's DOM so that they remain invisible to human users but can be detected by the crawling process of malicious agents, triggering its internal safety mechanisms to abort malicious actions once read. To evaluate our approach, we constructed a dedicated benchmark consisting of three representative malicious scenarios (PII collection, social rift content generation, and web hacking attempts). Experimental results show that the AutoGuard method achieves over 80% Defense Success Rate (DSR) on malicious agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3, and Llama3.3-70B-Instruct. It also maintains strong performance, achieving around 90% DSR on GPT-5, GPT-4.1, and Gemini-2.5-Flash when used as the malicious agent, demonstrating robust generalization across models and scenarios. Through this research, we have demonstrated the controllability of web-based LLM agents across various scenarios and models, thereby contributing to the broader effort of AI control and safety.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into applications ranging from interactive chatbots to multi-agent systems has introduced a wide spectrum of service-level objectives (SLOs) for responsiveness. These include latency-sensitive requests emphasizing per-token latency in streaming chat, deadline-sensitive requests requiring rapid full responses to trigger external tools, and compound requests with evolving dependencies across multiple LLM calls. Despite-or perhaps, because of-this workload diversity and unpredictable request information (e.g., response lengths and dependencies), existing request schedulers have focused on aggregate performance, unable to ensure application-level SLO needs. This paper presents JITServe, the first SLO-aware LLM serving system designed to maximize service goodput (e.g., the number of tokens meeting request SLOs) across diverse workloads. JITServe novelly schedules requests using imprecise request information and gradually relaxes this conservatism by refining request information estimates as generation progresses. It applies a grouped margin goodput maximization algorithm to allocate just enough serving bandwidth to satisfy each request's SLO just-in-time (JIT), maximizing residual capacity for others, while deciding the composition of requests in a batch to maximize efficiency and goodput with provable guarantees. Our evaluation across diverse realistic workloads, including chat, deep research, and agentic pipelines, shows that JITServe improves service goodput by 1.4x-6.3x, alternatively achieving 28.5%-83.2% resource savings, compared to state-of-the-art designs.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Agent systems based on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for autonomous tasks, yet existing evaluations mostly focus on task success rather than whether agents know when to abstain. This gap poses real risks: under ambiguity, conflicting constraints, or tool failures, agents may execute unintended and irreversible actions. To close this gap, we present the first systematic evaluation framework for agentic abstention: the calibrated ability of tool-using LLM agents to recognize when not to act. At its core, AgentAbstain is a paired-task benchmark built on an agent-native taxonomy of 8 abstention scenarios across pre-execution reasoning and runtime discovery. It contains 263 paired tasks across 42 executable sandbox environments, where each pair consists of a should-act task and a should-abstain variant produced through a controlled perturbation to the instruction, tool, or environment state. To scale this paired design and resist data contamination, we propose AbstainGen, a fully automated pipeline that synthesizes sandbox environments and generates paired tasks end-to-end, validated by deterministic replay and semantic LLM judges; fresh task instances can be regenerated on demand, and three independent annotators rate 94-98% of sampled tasks as well-designed. Across 17 frontier LLMs in 4 agent harnesses, the best agent (Gemini 3.1 Pro) achieves only 59.5% paired accuracy (correct on both the act and abstain sides of each paired task). More importantly, abstention capability is largely independent of general task-solving capability, indicating that scaling task-solving alone will not close this gap. We further identify failure modes such as post-hoc abstention, in which agents execute irreversible actions before recognizing abstention triggers. Our code and dataset are open-sourced at agentabstain.github.io.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous decision agents in settings with asymmetric error costs: hiring (missed talent vs wasted interviews), medical triage (missed emergencies vs unnecessary escalation), and fraud detection (approved fraud vs declined legitimate payments). The dominant design queries a single LLM for a posterior over states, thresholds "confidence," and acts; we prove this is inadequate for sequential decisions with costs. We propose a Bayesian, cost-aware multi-LLM orchestration framework that treats LLMs as approximate likelihood models rather than classifiers. For each candidate state, we elicit likelihoods via contrastive prompting, aggregate across diverse models with robust statistics, and update beliefs with Bayes rule under explicit priors as new evidence arrives. This enables coherent belief updating, expected-cost action selection, principled information gathering via value of information, and fairness gains via ensemble bias mitigation. In resume screening with costs of 40000 USD per missed hire, 2500 USD per interview, and 150 USD per phone screen, experiments on 1000 resumes using five LLMs (GPT-4o, Claude 4.5 Sonnet, Gemini Pro, Grok, DeepSeek) reduce total cost by 294000 USD (34 percent) versus the best single-LLM baseline and improve demographic parity by 45 percent (max group gap 22 to 5 percentage points). Ablations attribute 51 percent of savings to multi-LLM aggregation, 43 percent to sequential updating, and 20 percent to disagreement-triggered information gathering, consistent with the theoretical benefits of correct probabilistic foundations.

Referring Video Object Segmentation (RVOS) aims to segment an object of interest throughout a video based on a language description. The prominent challenge lies in aligning static text with dynamic visual content, particularly when objects exhibiting similar appearances with inconsistent motion and poses. However, current methods often rely on a holistic visual-language fusion that struggles with complex, compositional descriptions. In this paper, we propose PARSE-VOS, a novel, training-free framework powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), for a hierarchical, coarse-to-fine reasoning across text and video domains. Our approach begins by parsing the natural language query into structured semantic commands. Next, we introduce a spatio-temporal grounding module that generates all candidate trajectories for all potential target objects, guided by the parsed semantics. Finally, a hierarchical identification module select the correct target through a two-stage reasoning process: it first performs coarse-grained motion reasoning with an LLM to narrow down candidates; if ambiguity remains, a fine-grained pose verification stage is conditionally triggered to disambiguate. The final output is an accurate segmentation mask for the target object. PARSE-VOS achieved state-of-the-art performance on three major benchmarks: Ref-YouTube-VOS, Ref-DAVIS17, and MeViS.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in mission-critical systems, facilitating tasks such as satellite operations, command-and-control, military decision support, and cyber defense. Many of these systems are accessed through application programming interfaces (APIs). When such APIs lack robust access controls, they can expose full or top-k logits, creating a significant and often overlooked attack surface. Prior art has mainly focused on reconstructing the output projection layer or distilling surface-level behaviors. However, regenerating a black-box model under tight query constraints remains underexplored. We address that gap by introducing a constrained replication pipeline that transforms partial logit leakage into a functional deployable substitute model clone. Our two-stage approach (i) reconstructs the output projection matrix by collecting top-k logits from under 10k black-box queries via singular value decomposition (SVD) over the logits, then (ii) distills the remaining architecture into compact student models with varying transformer depths, trained on an open source dataset. A 6-layer student recreates 97.6% of the 6-layer teacher model's hidden-state geometry, with only a 7.31% perplexity increase, and a 7.58 Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL). A 4-layer variant achieves 17.1% faster inference and 18.1% parameter reduction with comparable performance. The entire attack completes in under 24 graphics processing unit (GPU) hours and avoids triggering API rate-limit defenses. These results demonstrate how quickly a cost-limited adversary can clone an LLM, underscoring the urgent need for hardened inference APIs and secure on-premise defense deployments.

Agents built on LLMs are increasingly deployed across diverse domains, automating complex decision-making and task execution. However, their autonomy introduces safety risks, including security vulnerabilities, legal violations, and unintended harmful actions. Existing mitigation methods, such as model-based safeguards and early enforcement strategies, fall short in robustness, interpretability, and adaptability. To address these challenges, we propose AgentSpec, a lightweight domain-specific language for specifying and enforcing runtime constraints on LLM agents. With AgentSpec, users define structured rules that incorporate triggers, predicates, and enforcement mechanisms, ensuring agents operate within predefined safety boundaries. We implement AgentSpec across multiple domains, including code execution, embodied agents, and autonomous driving, demonstrating its adaptability and effectiveness. Our evaluation shows that AgentSpec successfully prevents unsafe executions in over 90% of code agent cases, eliminates all hazardous actions in embodied agent tasks, and enforces 100% compliance by autonomous vehicles (AVs). Despite its strong safety guarantees, AgentSpec remains computationally lightweight, with overheads in milliseconds. By combining interpretability, modularity, and efficiency, AgentSpec provides a practical and scalable solution for enforcing LLM agent safety across diverse applications. We also automate the generation of rules using LLMs and assess their effectiveness. Our evaluation shows that the rules generated by OpenAI o1 achieve a precision of 95.56% and recall of 70.96% for embodied agents, successfully identify 87.26% of the risky code, and prevent AVs from breaking laws in 5 out of 8 scenarios.

While large language model (LLM) agents can effectively use external tools for complex real-world tasks, they require memory systems to leverage historical experiences. Current memory systems enable basic storage and retrieval but lack sophisticated memory organization, despite recent attempts to incorporate graph databases. Moreover, these systems' fixed operations and structures limit their adaptability across diverse tasks. To address this limitation, this paper proposes a novel agentic memory system for LLM agents that can dynamically organize memories in an agentic way. Following the basic principles of the Zettelkasten method, we designed our memory system to create interconnected knowledge networks through dynamic indexing and linking. When a new memory is added, we generate a comprehensive note containing multiple structured attributes, including contextual descriptions, keywords, and tags. The system then analyzes historical memories to identify relevant connections, establishing links where meaningful similarities exist. Additionally, this process enables memory evolution - as new memories are integrated, they can trigger updates to the contextual representations and attributes of existing historical memories, allowing the memory network to continuously refine its understanding. Our approach combines the structured organization principles of Zettelkasten with the flexibility of agent-driven decision making, allowing for more adaptive and context-aware memory management. Empirical experiments on six foundation models show superior improvement against existing SOTA baselines. The source code for evaluating performance is available at https://github.com/WujiangXu/AgenticMemory, while the source code of agentic memory system is available at https://github.com/agiresearch/A-mem.

The integration of Large Language Model (LLM)-based conversational agents into vehicles creates novel security challenges at the intersection of agentic AI, automotive safety, and inter-agent communication. As these intelligent assistants coordinate with external services via protocols such as Google's Agent-to-Agent (A2A), they establish attack surfaces where manipulations can propagate through natural language payloads, potentially causing severe consequences ranging from driver distraction to unauthorized vehicle control. Existing AI security frameworks, while foundational, lack the rigorous "separation of concerns" standard in safety-critical systems engineering by co-mingling the concepts of what is being protected (assets) with how it is attacked (attack paths). This paper addresses this methodological gap by proposing a threat modeling framework called AgentHeLLM (Agent Hazard Exploration for LLM Assistants) that formally separates asset identification from attack path analysis. We introduce a human-centric asset taxonomy derived from harm-oriented "victim modeling" and inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a formal graph-based model that distinguishes poison paths (malicious data propagation) from trigger paths (activation actions). We demonstrate the framework's practical applicability through an open-source attack path suggestion tool AgentHeLLM Attack Path Generator that automates multi-stage threat discovery using a bi-level search strategy.

The safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable to both manual and automated jailbreak attacks, which adversarially trigger LLMs to output harmful content. However, current methods for jailbreaking LLMs, which nest entire harmful prompts, are not effective at concealing malicious intent and can be easily identified and rejected by well-aligned LLMs. This paper discovers that decomposing a malicious prompt into separated sub-prompts can effectively obscure its underlying malicious intent by presenting it in a fragmented, less detectable form, thereby addressing these limitations. We introduce an automatic prompt Decomposition and Reconstruction framework for jailbreak Attack (DrAttack). DrAttack includes three key components: (a) `Decomposition' of the original prompt into sub-prompts, (b) `Reconstruction' of these sub-prompts implicitly by in-context learning with semantically similar but harmless reassembling demo, and (c) a `Synonym Search' of sub-prompts, aiming to find sub-prompts' synonyms that maintain the original intent while jailbreaking LLMs. An extensive empirical study across multiple open-source and closed-source LLMs demonstrates that, with a significantly reduced number of queries, DrAttack obtains a substantial gain of success rate over prior SOTA prompt-only attackers. Notably, the success rate of 78.0\% on GPT-4 with merely 15 queries surpassed previous art by 33.1\%. The project is available at https://github.com/xirui-li/DrAttack.

Memory for a long-horizon LLM agent is a contract about what each future decision is allowed to see. The simplest contract appends past observations, tool calls, and reflections to every prompt, which makes prior context easy to access but also turns it into a jumbled mixture in which the effect of any single memory component is hard to isolate. We introduce and instrument an alternative bounded contract: every decision is made from a fresh user message assembled by typed retrieval, with no raw cross-decision transcript appended. The prompt thus stays bounded across runs of any length, and any single layer can be ablated in isolation. We instantiate the contract in Slay the Spire 2, a closed-rule stochastic deck-building game whose runs require hundreds of tactical and strategic decisions. A public online benchmark of frontier LLMs on the same game reports zero wins at the lowest difficulty across five configurations, and the developer-reported human win rate at the same difficulty is 16%; the task is hard but not saturated. Within our harness, a fixed-A0 ablation shows the largest observed difference when triggered strategic skills are enabled: the no-store baseline wins 3/10 games and adding the skill layer 6/10. At this sample size the comparison is directional rather than statistically decisive (Fisher exact p\approx0.37); a cross-backbone probe and public accumulating-context baselines are reported as operational comparisons rather than controlled tests of the contract variable itself. We release a reproducible testbed: 298 completed trajectories with condition tags, frozen memory/skill snapshots, prompt records, and analysis scripts -- an agent design and a validated, reusable methodology for studying how explicit memory layers shape long-horizon LLM-agent decisions.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in consumer, medical, financial, and enterprise applications. This broad deployment expands the safety surface: risks can arise from multimodal question answering, assistant responses, and cross-modal composition, while moderation policies may vary across products, regions, and deployment stages. Most existing guardrails either rely on fixed taxonomies or target only a narrow set of interaction settings, which limits their adaptability when safety rules change at deployment time. We present SingGuard, a policy-adaptive multimodal guardrail model family for safety assessment in multimodal conversations. SingGuard treats the active policy as a runtime input: given natural-language rules, it checks the target content against the active policy rule by rule and predicts both the safety label and the triggered rule. To balance efficiency and interpretability, SingGuard supports fast, hybrid, and slow inference regimes along a fast-to-slow reasoning spectrum, ranging from direct safety judgments to policy-grounded deliberation. We further optimize this behavior with fast--slow decoupled reinforcement learning. We also introduce SingGuard-Bench, a multimodal guardrail benchmark with 56{,}340 examples spanning 80+ fine-grained risk types across multimodal QA, adversarial attack, and dynamic-rule evaluation settings, including cross-modal joint-risk cases where each modality is harmless in isolation but their composition implies unsafe intent. Across six benchmark families (35 datasets), SingGuard achieves state-of-the-art average F1 in every family. Dynamic-rule evaluation further shows improved policy-following accuracy from 0.6465 to 0.7415 under runtime policy shifts. Our code is available at https://github.com/inclusionAI/Sing-Guard.

How should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious actions, respectively) are typically evaluated either against a static set of harmful attack strings, or against computationally weak optimization methods that were not designed with the defense in mind. We argue that this evaluation process is flawed. Instead, we should evaluate defenses against adaptive attackers who explicitly modify their attack strategy to counter a defense's design while spending considerable resources to optimize their objective. By systematically tuning and scaling general optimization techniques-gradient descent, reinforcement learning, random search, and human-guided exploration-we bypass 12 recent defenses (based on a diverse set of techniques) with attack success rate above 90% for most; importantly, the majority of defenses originally reported near-zero attack success rates. We believe that future defense work must consider stronger attacks, such as the ones we describe, in order to make reliable and convincing claims of robustness.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly used for open-ended idea generation, driven by the expectation that collective interaction will broaden the exploration diversity. However, when and why such collaboration truly expands the solution space remains unclear. We present a systematic empirical study of diversity in MAS-based ideation across three bottom-up levels: model intelligence, agent cognition, and system dynamics. At the model level, we identify a compute efficiency paradox, where stronger, highly aligned models yield diminishing marginal diversity despite higher per-sample quality. At the cognition level, authority-driven dynamics suppress semantic diversity compared to junior-dominated groups. At the system level, group-size scaling yields diminishing returns and dense communication topologies accelerate premature convergence. We characterize these outcomes as collective failures emerging from structural coupling, a process where interaction inadvertently contracts agent exploration and triggers diversity collapse. Our analysis shows that this collapse arises primarily from the interaction structure rather than inherent model insufficiency, highlighting the importance of preserving independence and disagreement when designing MAS for creative tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/Xtra-Computing/MAS_Diversity.

Frontier large language model training consumes massive accelerator fleets and long wall-clock computation, making stability failures costly when they occur. After a numerical or a hyperparameter fault has already destabilized the training dynamics, it may continue for thousands of steps while loss and gradient norms still appear normal. We study mechanism-driven detection of training instability by deriving internal monitors from the functional role of each critical module and from the earliest computational sites where failures are expected to produce measurable signatures. For low-precision flash attention, we monitor the spectral entropy of a QK bilinear decomposition, whose first-order term becomes abnormal before the loss fully collapses. For MoE routers, we derive indicators from their role in expert selection. Our fault-injection experiments on low-precision attention, large learning-rate, and combined faults show that these signals provide distinct signatures for different failures, triggering thousands of steps before loss divergence.

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and their reliance on web-scale pretraining creates a subtle but consequential attack surface. We study Stealth Pretraining Seeding (SPS), a threat model in which adversaries distribute small amounts of poisoned content across stealth websites, increasing the likelihood that such material is absorbed into future training corpora derived from sources such as Common Crawl. Because each individual payload is tiny, diffuse, and superficially benign, the attack is difficult to detect during dataset construction or filtering. The result is a latent form of poisoning that remains largely invisible under standard evaluation, yet can later be activated by a precise trigger such as <00TRIGGER00>. We call this attack PermaFrost, reflecting its latent and reactivatable nature. We study it through PermaFrost-Attack, a controlled framework for latent conceptual poisoning, together with three geometric diagnostics: Thermodynamic Length, Spectral Curvature, and the Infection Traceback Graph. Across multiple model families and scales, we show that this controlled SPS proxy can induce persistent unsafe behavior that often remains hidden under standard evaluation. Our results identify SPS as a practical and underappreciated threat to future foundation models. This paper introduces a novel geometric diagnostic lens for systematically examining latent model behavior, providing a principled foundation for detecting, characterizing, and understanding vulnerabilities that may remain invisible under standard evaluation.

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

LLM-Agents have evolved into autonomous systems for complex task execution, with the SKILL.md specification emerging as a de facto standard for encapsulating agent capabilities. However, a critical bottleneck remains: different agent frameworks exhibit starkly different sensitivities to prompt formatting, causing up to 40% performance variation, yet nearly all skills exist as a single, format-agnostic Markdown version. Manual per-platform rewriting creates an unsustainable maintenance burden, while prior audits have found that over one third of community skills contain security vulnerabilities. To address this, we present SkCC, a compilation framework that introduces classical compiler design into agent skill development. At its core, SkIR - a strongly-typed intermediate representation - decouples skill semantics from platform-specific formatting, enabling portable deployment across heterogeneous agent frameworks. Around this IR, a compile-time Analyzer enforces security constraints via Anti-Skill Injection before deployment. Through a four-phase pipeline, SkCC reduces adaptation complexity from O(m times n) to O(m + n). Experiments on SkillsBench demonstrate that compiled skills consistently outperform their original counterparts, improving pass rates from 21.1% to 33.3% on Claude Code and from 35.1% to 48.7% on Kimi CLI, while achieving sub-10ms compilation latency, a 94.8% proactive security trigger rate, and 10-46% runtime token savings across platforms.

Long-term conversational memory is a core capability for LLM-based dialogue systems, yet existing benchmarks and evaluation protocols primarily focus on surface-level factual recall. In realistic interactions, appropriate responses often depend on implicit constraints such as user state, goals, or values that are not explicitly queried later. To evaluate this setting, we introduce LoCoMo-Plus, a benchmark for assessing cognitive memory under cue--trigger semantic disconnect, where models must retain and apply latent constraints across long conversational contexts. We further show that conventional string-matching metrics and explicit task-type prompting are misaligned with such scenarios, and propose a unified evaluation framework based on constraint consistency. Experiments across diverse backbone models, retrieval-based methods, and memory systems demonstrate that cognitive memory remains challenging and reveals failures not captured by existing benchmarks. Our code and evaluation framework are publicly available at: https://github.com/xjtuleeyf/Locomo-Plus.

Tool-augmented LLM agents increasingly rely on multi-step, multi-tool workflows to complete real tasks. This design expands the attack surface, because data produced by one tool can be persisted and later reused as input to another tool, enabling exploitable source-to-sink dataflows that only emerge through tool composition. We study this risk as multi-tool vulnerabilities in LLM agents, and show that existing discovery efforts focused on single-tool or single-hop testing miss these long-horizon behaviors and provide limited debugging value. We present ChainFuzzer, a greybox framework for discovering and reproducing multi-tool vulnerabilities with auditable evidence. ChainFuzzer (i) identifies high-impact operations with strict source-to-sink dataflow evidence and extracts plausible upstream candidate tool chains based on cross-tool dependencies, (ii) uses Trace-guided Prompt Solving (TPS) to synthesize stable prompts that reliably drive the agent to execute target chains, and (iii) performs guardrail-aware fuzzing to reproduce vulnerabilities under LLM guardrails via payload mutation and sink-specific oracles. We evaluate ChainFuzzer on 20 popular open-source LLM agent apps (998 tools). ChainFuzzer extracts 2,388 candidate tool chains and synthesizes 2,213 stable prompts, confirming 365 unique, reproducible vulnerabilities across 19/20 apps (302 require multi-tool execution). Component evaluation shows tool-chain extraction achieves 96.49% edge precision and 91.50% strict chain precision; TPS increases chain reachability from 27.05% to 95.45%; guardrail-aware fuzzing boosts payload-level trigger rate from 18.20% to 88.60%. Overall, ChainFuzzer achieves 3.02 vulnerabilities per 1M tokens, providing a practical foundation for testing and hardening real-world multi-tool agent systems.

The paradigm of large language model (LLM) reasoning is shifting from parameter scaling to test-time compute scaling, yet many existing approaches still rely on uniform brute-force sampling (for example, fixed best-of-N or self-consistency) that is costly, hard to attribute, and can trigger overthinking with diminishing returns. We propose ODAR-Expert, an adaptive routing framework that optimizes the accuracy-efficiency trade-off via principled resource allocation. ODAR uses a difficulty estimator grounded in amortized active inference to dynamically route queries between a heuristic Fast Agent and a deliberative Slow Agent. We further introduce a free-energy-principled, risk-sensitive fusion mechanism that selects answers by minimizing a variational free energy objective, balancing log-likelihood with epistemic uncertainty (varentropy) as a principled alternative to ad hoc voting over heterogeneous candidates. Extensive evaluation across 23 benchmarks shows strong and consistent gains, including 98.2% accuracy on MATH and 54.8% on Humanity's Last Exam (HLE), while improving the compute-accuracy frontier under compute-matched settings. We also validate reproducibility on a fully open-source stack (Llama 4 + DeepSeek), where ODAR surpasses homogeneous sampling strategies while reducing computational costs by 82%. Overall, our results suggest that thinking-optimal scaling requires adaptive resource allocation with free-energy-based decision-making rather than simply increasing test-time compute.

Hypernetwork-based methods such as Doc-to-LoRA internalize a document into an LLM's weights in a single forward pass, but they fail systematically on conflicts: when the document contradicts pretraining knowledge, accuracy collapses to 46.4% on the deepest facts. We show the failure is a magnitude problem rather than a representational one. The hypernetwork already targets the right layers, but its adapter margin is approximately constant across documents while the pretrained margin grows with training frequency, so deep conflicts lose by construction. The account predicts that failure should track prior strength: sorting 194 conflicts by the base model's log-probability on the contradicted fact, baseline accuracy falls from 68% on weak-prior questions to 16% on strong-prior ones, a 52 percentage-point gap. The cure is amplitude. Selective Layer Boosting scales the adapter at its top-norm layers, and Conflict-Aware Internalization triggers boosting only when the base model is confident. Both are training-free; together they raise deep-conflict accuracy from 46.4% to 71.0% on Gemma-2B and from 53.6% to 72.5% on Mistral-7B while preserving novel-knowledge recall, and beat vanilla retrieval-augmented generation on medium conflicts by 18 percentage points despite operating entirely in parameter space. We release KID-Bench, a 489-question benchmark that separates novel recall, cross-knowledge combination, and prior-graded conflicts.

Large Language Model (LLM) multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed as interacting agent societies, yet scaling these systems often yields diminishing or unstable returns, the causes of which remain poorly understood. We present the first large-scale empirical study of coordination dynamics in LLM-based multi-agent systems, introducing an atomic event-level formulation that reconstructs reasoning as cascades of coordination. Analyzing over 1.5 Million interactions across tasks, topologies, and scales, we uncover three coupled laws: coordination follows heavy-tailed cascades, concentrates via preferential attachment into intellectual elites, and produces increasingly frequent extreme events as system size grows. We show that these effects are coupled through a single structural mechanism: an integration bottleneck, in which coordination expansion scales with system size while consolidation does not, producing large but weakly integrated reasoning processes. To test this mechanism, we introduce Deficit-Triggered Integration (DTI), which selectively increases integration under imbalance. DTI improves performance precisely where coordination fails, without suppressing large-scale reasoning. Together, our results establish quantitative laws of collective cognition and identify coordination structure as a fundamental, previously unmeasured axis for understanding and improving scalable multi-agent intelligence.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) has substantially empowered Large Language Models (LLMs) to tackle complex reasoning tasks, yet the verbose nature of explicit reasoning steps incurs prohibitive inference latency and computational costs, limiting real-world deployment. While existing compression methods - ranging from self-training to Reinforcement Learning (RL) with length constraints - attempt to mitigate this, they often sacrifice reasoning capability for brevity. We identify a critical failure mode in these approaches: explicitly optimizing for shorter trajectories triggers rapid entropy collapse, which prematurely shrinks the exploration space and stifles the discovery of valid reasoning paths, particularly for challenging questions requiring extensive deduction. To address this issue, we propose Compress responses for Easy questions and Explore Hard ones (CEEH), a difficulty-aware approach to RL-based efficient reasoning. CEEH dynamically assesses instance difficulty to apply selective entropy regularization: it preserves a diverse search space for currently hard questions to ensure robustness, while permitting aggressive compression on easier instances where the reasoning path is well-established. In addition, we introduce a dynamic optimal-length penalty anchored to the historically shortest correct response, which effectively counteracts entropy-induced length inflation and stabilizes the reward signal. Across six reasoning benchmarks, CEEH consistently reduces response length while maintaining accuracy comparable to the base model, and improves Pass@k relative to length-only optimization.

Macro placement is a fundamental step in modern chip physical design, playing a crucial role in determining the solution quality of high-dimensional combinatorial optimization problems. Despite recent advancements in machine learning for spatial coordinate determination, the temporal dimension of placement sequencing remains largely governed by static heuristics. In this work, we demonstrate that the placement sequence is not merely a preprocessing step but a decisive factor in optimization, where suboptimal early decisions trigger irreversible domino effects that constrain the solution space. To harness this unexplored dimension, we propose OrderPlace, a proxy-guided LLM evolution framework for automatically discovering macro placement order strategies. Instead of relying on manually crafted heuristics such as area- or connectivity-based ordering, OrderPlace explores a broader space of code-level policies, ranging from static scoring metrics to dynamic physics-inspired mechanisms. To mitigate the prohibitive cost of evaluating sequences, we introduce a lightweight proxy evaluation mechanism that efficiently filters candidates using a deterministic greedy probe. Experimental results on the standard ISPD 2005 benchmarks demonstrate that OrderPlace discovers novel ordering strategies. Compared with WireMask-EA and the state-of-the-art method EGPlace, OrderPlace reduces wirelength by 34.04\% and 14.08\%, respectively.

Leveraging the rapid development of Large Language Models LLMs, LLM-based agents have been developed to handle various real-world applications, including finance, healthcare, and shopping, etc. It is crucial to ensure the reliability and security of LLM-based agents during applications. However, the safety issues of LLM-based agents are currently under-explored. In this work, we take the first step to investigate one of the typical safety threats, backdoor attack, to LLM-based agents. We first formulate a general framework of agent backdoor attacks, then we present a thorough analysis on the different forms of agent backdoor attacks. Specifically, from the perspective of the final attacking outcomes, the attacker can either choose to manipulate the final output distribution, or only introduce malicious behavior in the intermediate reasoning process, while keeping the final output correct. Furthermore, the former category can be divided into two subcategories based on trigger locations: the backdoor trigger can be hidden either in the user query or in an intermediate observation returned by the external environment. We propose the corresponding data poisoning mechanisms to implement the above variations of agent backdoor attacks on two typical agent tasks, web shopping and tool utilization. Extensive experiments show that LLM-based agents suffer severely from backdoor attacks, indicating an urgent need for further research on the development of defenses against backdoor attacks on LLM-based agents. Warning: This paper may contain biased content.

Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) has become the standard for adapting large language models (LLMs). In this work we challenge the wide-spread assumption that parameter efficiency equates memory efficiency and on-device adaptability. We show that this is not true - while methods like LoRA and IA3 significantly reduce trainable parameters, they remain bound by intermediate tensors that scale linearly with sequence length, often triggering out-of-memory errors on-device. In this work, we introduce LARS (Low-memory Activation-Rank Subspace), a novel adaptation framework that decouples memory consumption from sequence length. While prior PEFT methods apply low-rank constraints to model parameters, LARS instead constrains the activation subspace used during training, directly targeting the dominant source of memory consumption and fundamentally flattening the memory growth rate. LARS reduces the memory footprint by an average of 33.54% on GPUs and 51.95% on CPUs in comparison to LoRA across reasoning, understanding and long-context datasets using different models while maintaining competitive accuracy and throughput. Besides GPUs, we deploy on Raspberry Pi and consumer-grade CPUs to demonstrate that LARS provides a scalable path for sophisticated LLM personalization on resource-constrained hardware and edge devices.

Post-Training Quantization (PTQ) is critical for the efficient deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs). While 4-bit quantization is widely regarded as an optimal trade-off, reducing the precision to 2-bit usually triggers a catastrophic ``performance cliff.'' It remains unclear whether the underlying mechanisms differ fundamentally. Consequently, we conduct a systematic mechanistic analysis, revealing two qualitatively distinct failure modes: Signal Degradation, where the computational patterns remain intact but information precision is impaired by cumulative error; and Computation Collapse, where key components fail to function, preventing correct information processing and destroying the signal in the early layers. Guided by this diagnosis, we conduct mechanism-aware interventions, demonstrating that targeted, training-free repair can mitigate Signal Degradation, but remains ineffective for Computation Collapse. Our findings provide a systematic diagnostic framework for PTQ failures and suggest that addressing Computation Collapse requires structural reconstruction rather than mere compensation.

Large language models (LLMs) are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks (BAs), wherein training samples are poisoned using trigger-based harmful content. Furthermore, existing defenses have proven ineffective when extensively tested across BA patterns. To better combat BAs, we explore the use of LLM rewriting as a proactive defense against data poisoning. First, we theoretically show that when LLM rewriting utilizes open-book benign samples--termed open-book benign rewriting (OBBR)--the probability of a rewritten output being benign is strictly greater than that of closed-book rewriting. Thus, OBBR neutralizes harmful content by projecting training samples to the space of benign prompts. We then show that, in contrast to previous defenses, OBBR effectively mitigates a large number of existing BAs: across five known BAs and four widely used LLMs, OBBR increases safety performance by an average 51% compared to state-of-the-art BA defenses and 25.7% compared to closed-book rewriting methods. Finally, we show that OBBR is computationally efficient relative to other BA defenses, does not degrade model performance on natural language tasks after fine-tuning, and is capable of defending against non-trigger based data poisoning attacks.

The growing demand for large language models (LLMs) requires serving systems to handle many concurrent requests with diverse service level objectives (SLOs). This exacerbates head-of-line (HoL) blocking during the compute-intensive prefill phase, where long-running requests monopolize resources and delay higher-priority ones, leading to widespread time-to-first-token (TTFT) SLO violations. While chunked prefill enables interruptibility, it introduces an inherent trade-off between responsiveness and throughput: reducing chunk size improves response latency but degrades computational efficiency, whereas increasing chunk size maximizes throughput but exacerbates blocking. This necessitates an adaptive preemption mechanism. However, dynamically balancing execution granularity against scheduling overheads remains a key challenge. In this paper, we propose FlowPrefill, a TTFT-goodput-optimized serving system that resolves this conflict by decoupling preemption granularity from scheduling frequency. To achieve adaptive prefill scheduling, FlowPrefill introduces two key innovations: 1) Operator-Level Preemption, which leverages operator boundaries to enable fine-grained execution interruption without the efficiency loss associated with fixed small chunking; and 2) Event-Driven Scheduling, which triggers scheduling decisions only upon request arrival or completion events, thereby supporting efficient preemption responsiveness while minimizing control-plane overhead. Evaluation on real-world production traces shows that FlowPrefill improves maximum goodput by up to 5.6times compared to state-of-the-art systems while satisfying heterogeneous SLOs.

While Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) excel at complex tasks, their growing autonomy with operational complexity often leads to critical inefficiencies, such as excessive token consumption and failures arising from misinformation. Existing methods primarily focus on post-hoc failure attribution, lacking proactive, real-time interventions to enhance robustness and efficiency. To this end, we introduce SupervisorAgent, a lightweight and modular framework for runtime, adaptive supervision that operates without altering the base agent's architecture. Triggered by an LLM-free adaptive filter, SupervisorAgent intervenes at critical junctures to proactively correct errors, guide inefficient behaviors, and purify observations. On the challenging GAIA benchmark, SupervisorAgent reduces the token consumption of the Smolagent framework by an average of 29.68% without compromising its success rate. Extensive experiments across five additional benchmarks (math reasoning, code generation, and question answering) and various SoTA foundation models validate the broad applicability and robustness of our approach.

Current research in adversarial robustness of LLMs focuses on discrete input manipulations in the natural language space, which can be directly transferred to closed-source models. However, this approach neglects the steady progression of open-source models. As open-source models advance in capability, ensuring their safety also becomes increasingly imperative. Yet, attacks tailored to open-source LLMs that exploit full model access remain largely unexplored. We address this research gap and propose the embedding space attack, which directly attacks the continuous embedding representation of input tokens. We find that embedding space attacks circumvent model alignments and trigger harmful behaviors more efficiently than discrete attacks or model fine-tuning. Furthermore, we present a novel threat model in the context of unlearning and show that embedding space attacks can extract supposedly deleted information from unlearned LLMs across multiple datasets and models. Our findings highlight embedding space attacks as an important threat model in open-source LLMs. Trigger Warning: the appendix contains LLM-generated text with violence and harassment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are trained on massive text corpora, which are encoded with diverse personality traits. This triggers an interesting goal of eliciting a desired personality trait from the LLM, and probing its behavioral preferences. Accordingly, we formalize the persona elicitation task, aiming to customize LLM behaviors to align with a target persona. We present Persona In-Context Learning (PICLe), a novel persona elicitation framework grounded in Bayesian inference. At the core, PICLe introduces a new ICL example selection criterion based on likelihood ratio, which is designed to optimally guide the model in eliciting a specific target persona. We demonstrate the effectiveness of PICLe through extensive comparisons against baseline methods across three contemporary LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/picle.

Augmenting large language models (LLMs) with external tools has emerged as a promising approach to solving complex problems. However, traditional methods, which finetune LLMs with tool demonstration data, can be both costly and restricted to a predefined set of tools. Recent in-context learning paradigm alleviates these issues, but the limited context length only allows for a few shots of demonstrations, leading to suboptimal understandings of the tools. Moreover, when there are numerous tools to choose from, in-context learning could completely fail to work. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach, ToolkenGPT, which combines the benefits of both sides. Our approach represents each tool as a token (toolken) and learns an embedding for it, enabling tool calls in the same way as generating a regular word token. Once a toolken is triggered, the LLM is prompted to complete arguments for the tool to execute. ToolkenGPT offers the flexibility to plug in an arbitrary number of tools by expanding the set of toolkens on the fly. In addition, it improves tool use by allowing extensive demonstration data for learning the toolken embeddings. In diverse domains, including numerical reasoning, knowledge-based question answering, and embodied plan generation, our approach effectively augments LLMs with tools and substantially outperforms various latest baselines. ToolkenGPT demonstrates the promising ability to use relevant tools from a large tool set in complex scenarios.

Large Language Model (LLM) serving systems remain fundamentally fragile, where frequent hardware faults in hyperscale clusters trigger disproportionate service outages in the software stack. Current recovery mechanisms are prohibitively slow, often requiring up to 10 minutes to reinitialize resources and reload massive model weights. We introduce KevlarFlow, a fault tolerant serving architecture designed to bridge the gap between hardware unreliability and service availability. KevlarFlow leverages 1) decoupled model parallelism initialization, 2) dynamic traffic rerouting, and 3) background KV cache replication to maintain high throughput during partial failures. Our evaluation demonstrates that KevlarFlow reduces mean-time-to-recovery (MTTR) by 20x and, under failure conditions, improves average latency by 3.1x, 99th percentile (p99) latency by 2.8x, average time-to-first-token (TTFT) by 378.9x, and p99 TTFT by 574.6x with negligible runtime overhead in comparison to state-of-the-art LLM serving systems.

Discrete text-trigger optimization -- searching for text sequences that, when ingested by a model, steer it toward a specified objective -- underpins model red-teaming (e.g., LLM jailbreaks), as well as auditing and interpretability. However, the current state of discrete optimizers hinders their adoption and progress. First, existing optimizers, when open-sourced at all, are scattered across research codebases tied to specific models, objectives, and problem domains. Second, optimizer variants proliferate, each requiring engineering overhead to use or extend, and remaining hard to compare head-to-head. Together, these raise the bar for adopting optimizers in existing or new domains, and for advancing them via new strategies. We address these gaps with TROPT, the first open-source framework that unifies discrete optimizers' execution and standardizes their development under a single interface. TROPT makes it easy to customize end-to-end optimization recipes by swapping any component -- models, objectives, and optimizers -- extending its reach across domains and new applications. TROPT currently ships with 30+ optimization recipes -- covering applications such as jailbreaking and probing model internals -- built from 15+ optimizers (spanning white-box to black-box access) and 15+ losses, from foundational to state-of-the-art methods. Demonstrating its utility, we leverage TROPT in several studies: (i) controlled, large-scale experiments comparing and enhancing optimization strategies for LLM jailbreaks, revealing potent-yet-underadopted techniques; and (ii) porting optimizers from one domain (e.g., LLM jailbreak) to new domains (e.g., corpus-poisoning embedding model). In all, TROPT significantly lowers the barrier to adopting and advancing discrete text optimization.

Tool-integrated reasoning (TIR) enables large language models (LLMs) to enhance their capabilities by interacting with external tools, such as code interpreters (CI). Most recent studies focus on exploring various methods to equip LLMs with the ability to use tools. However, how to further boost the reasoning ability of already tool-capable LLMs at inference time remains underexplored. Improving reasoning at inference time requires no additional training and can help LLMs better leverage tools to solve problems. We observe that, during tool-capable LLM inference, both the number and the proportion of erroneous tool calls are negatively correlated with answer correctness. Moreover, erroneous tool calls are typically resolved successfully within a few subsequent turns. If not, LLMs often struggle to resolve such errors even with many additional turns. Building on the above observations, we propose PruneTIR, a rather effective yet efficient framework that enhances the tool-integrated reasoning at inference time. During LLM inference, PruneTIR prunes trajectories, resamples tool calls, and suspends tool usage through three components: Success-Triggered Pruning, Stuck-Triggered Pruning and Resampling, and Retry-Triggered Tool Suspension. These three components enable PruneTIR to mitigate the negative impact of erroneous tool calls and prevent LLMs from getting stuck in repeated failed resolution attempts, thereby improving overall LLM performance. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of PruneTIR, which significantly improves Pass@1 and efficiency while reducing the working context length for tool-capable LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications, e.g., medical question-answering, mathematical sciences, and code generation. However, they also exhibit inherent limitations, such as outdated knowledge and susceptibility to hallucinations. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising paradigm to address these issues, but it also introduces new vulnerabilities. Recent efforts have focused on the security of RAG-based LLMs, yet existing attack methods face three critical challenges: (1) their effectiveness declines sharply when only a limited number of poisoned texts can be injected into the knowledge database, (2) they lack sufficient stealth, as the attacks are often detectable by anomaly detection systems, which compromises their effectiveness, and (3) they rely on heuristic approaches to generate poisoned texts, lacking formal optimization frameworks and theoretic guarantees, which limits their effectiveness and applicability. To address these issues, we propose coordinated Prompt-RAG attack (PR-attack), a novel optimization-driven attack that introduces a small number of poisoned texts into the knowledge database while embedding a backdoor trigger within the prompt. When activated, the trigger causes the LLM to generate pre-designed responses to targeted queries, while maintaining normal behavior in other contexts. This ensures both high effectiveness and stealth. We formulate the attack generation process as a bilevel optimization problem leveraging a principled optimization framework to develop optimal poisoned texts and triggers. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs and datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of PR-Attack, achieving a high attack success rate even with a limited number of poisoned texts and significantly improved stealth compared to existing methods.

We present PEAM, a Parametric Embodied Agent Memory framework in Minecraft that transforms agent memory from inference-time retrieval into parameter-resident skills internalized through experience. PEAM pairs a slow deliberative LLM for open-ended reasoning with a fast parametric module for reflexive execution of consolidated skills. The fast module is a multimodal Mixture-of-Experts LoRA architecture with per-category physically isolated adapters, enabling parameter-level continual learning without catastrophic forgetting. We treat failure as a first-class training signal: failure--correction trajectory pairs are internalized through a joint behavioral-cloning and contrastive objective, so the agent learns not only what succeeds but also how corrected actions differ from failed ones. To govern consolidation, PEAM introduces a parameterization-worthiness score for deciding which experience should be internalized, and a scale-free self-triggered consolidation mechanism for deciding when to internalize without task-specific hand-tuned thresholds, making the agent self-evolving as the trigger transfers across task distributions without re-tuning. Experiments in Minecraft show that PEAM improves long-horizon task performance, mitigates forgetting on previously consolidated skills, and improves parametric-versus-retrieval efficiency over retrieval-based embodied agents and parametric memory variants.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Agent skills extend large language model (LLM) agents with reusable, program-like modules that define triggering conditions, procedural logic, and tool interactions. As these skills proliferate in public marketplaces, it is unclear what types are available, how users adopt them, and what risks they pose. To answer these questions, we conduct a large-scale, data-driven analysis of 40,285 publicly listed skills from a major marketplace. Our results show that skill publication tends to occur in short bursts that track shifts in community attention. We also find that skill content is highly concentrated in software engineering workflows, while information retrieval and content creation account for a substantial share of adoption. Beyond content trends, we uncover a pronounced supply-demand imbalance across categories, and we show that most skills remain within typical prompt budgets despite a heavy-tailed length distribution. Finally, we observe strong ecosystem homogeneity, with widespread intent-level redundancy, and we identify non-trivial safety risks, including skills that enable state-changing or system-level actions. Overall, our findings provide a quantitative snapshot of agent skills as an emerging infrastructure layer for agents and inform future work on skill reuse, standardization, and safety-aware design.

Large language model (LLM) leads to a surge of autonomous GUI agents for smartphone, which completes a task triggered by natural language through predicting a sequence of actions of API. Even though the task highly relies on past actions and visual observations, existing studies typical consider little semantic information carried out by intermediate screenshots and screen operations. To address this, this work presents Chain-of-Action-Thought (dubbed CoAT), which takes the description of the previous actions, the current screen, and more importantly the action thinking of what actions should be performed and the outcomes led by the chosen action. We demonstrate that, in a zero-shot setting upon an off-the-shell LLM, CoAT significantly improves the goal progress compared to standard context modeling. To further facilitate the research in this line, we construct a benchmark Android-In-The-Zoo (AitZ), which contains 18,643 screen-action pairs together with chain-of-action-thought annotations. Experiments show that fine-tuning a 200M model on our AitZ dataset achieves on par performance with CogAgent-Chat-18B.

With the help of simple fine-tuning, one can artificially embed hidden text into large language models (LLMs). This text is revealed only when triggered by a specific query to the LLM. Two primary applications are LLM fingerprinting and steganography. In the context of LLM fingerprinting, a unique text identifier (fingerprint) is embedded within the model to verify licensing compliance. In the context of steganography, the LLM serves as a carrier for hidden messages that can be disclosed through a designated trigger. Our work demonstrates that embedding hidden text in the LLM via fine-tuning, though seemingly secure due to the vast number of potential triggers (any sequence of characters or tokens could serve as a trigger), is susceptible to extraction through analysis of the LLM's output decoding process. We propose a novel approach to extraction called Unconditional Token Forcing. It is premised on the hypothesis that iteratively feeding each token from the LLM's vocabulary into the model should reveal sequences with abnormally high token probabilities, indicating potential embedded text candidates. Additionally, our experiments show that when the first token of a hidden fingerprint is used as an input, the LLM not only produces an output sequence with high token probabilities, but also repetitively generates the fingerprint itself. We also present a method to hide text in such a way that it is resistant to Unconditional Token Forcing, which we named Unconditional Token Forcing Confusion.

Speech Event Extraction (SpeechEE) is a challenging task that lies at the intersection of Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) and Natural Language Processing (NLP), requiring the identification of structured event information from spoken language. In this work, we present a modular, pipeline-based SpeechEE framework that integrates high-performance ASR with semantic search-enhanced prompting of Large Language Models (LLMs). Our system first classifies speech segments likely to contain events using a hybrid filtering mechanism including rule-based, BERT-based, and LLM-based models. It then employs few-shot LLM prompting, dynamically enriched via semantic similarity retrieval, to identify event triggers and extract corresponding arguments. We evaluate the pipeline using multiple LLMs (Llama3-8B, GPT-4o-mini, and o1-mini) highlighting significant performance gains with o1-mini, which achieves 63.3% F1 on trigger classification and 27.8% F1 on argument classification, outperforming prior benchmarks. Our results demonstrate that pipeline approaches, when empowered by retrieval-augmented LLMs, can rival or exceed end-to-end systems while maintaining interpretability and modularity. This work provides practical insights into LLM-driven event extraction and opens pathways for future hybrid models combining textual and acoustic features.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed numerous fields by enabling advanced natural language interactions but remain susceptible to critical vulnerabilities, particularly jailbreak attacks. Current jailbreak techniques, while effective, often depend on input modifications, making them detectable and limiting their stealth and scalability. This paper presents Targeted Model Editing (TME), a novel white-box approach that bypasses safety filters by minimally altering internal model structures while preserving the model's intended functionalities. TME identifies and removes safety-critical transformations (SCTs) embedded in model matrices, enabling malicious queries to bypass restrictions without input modifications. By analyzing distinct activation patterns between safe and unsafe queries, TME isolates and approximates SCTs through an optimization process. Implemented in the D-LLM framework, our method achieves an average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 84.86% on four mainstream open-source LLMs, maintaining high performance. Unlike existing methods, D-LLM eliminates the need for specific triggers or harmful response collections, offering a stealthier and more effective jailbreak strategy. This work reveals a covert and robust threat vector in LLM security and emphasizes the need for stronger safeguards in model safety alignment.

As autonomous agents (e.g., OpenClaw) increasingly operate with deep system-level privileges to execute complex tasks, they introduce severe, unmitigated security risks. Current vulnerability analyses overwhelmingly focus on single-turn, stateless behaviors, overlooking the expanded attack surface inherent in stateful, multi-turn interactions and dynamic tool invocations. In this paper, we propose a novel, multi-dimensional evasion framework targeting LLM-based agent systems. We introduce three stealthy attack vectors: (1) Temporal evasion, which fragments malicious payloads across sequential interaction turns; (2) Spatial evasion, which conceals payloads within complex external artifacts that evade standard LLM parsing mechanisms; and (3) Semantic evasion, which obscures malicious intents beneath benign contextual noise. To systematically quantify these threats, we construct A3S-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 2,254 real-world agent execution trajectories. Evaluating a standard agent framework separately integrated with 10 mainstream LLM backbones against 20 practical threat scenarios, we demonstrate that our evasion framework elevates the average risk trigger rate from a 28.3\% baseline to 52.6\%. These findings reveal systemic, architecture-level vulnerabilities in current autonomous agent systems that existing defenses fail to address, highlighting an urgent need for defense mechanisms tailored to the unique threats.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents are increasingly deployed to interact with online web services, yet their exposure to open-world content renders them vulnerable to Environmental Injection Attacks (EIAs). In these attacks, an attacker can inject crafted triggers into website to manipulate the behavior of GUI agents used by other users. In this paper, we find that most existing EIA studies fall short of realism. In particular, they fail to capture the dynamic nature of real-world web content, often assuming that a trigger's on-screen position and surrounding visual context remain largely consistent between training and testing. To better reflect practice, we introduce a realistic dynamic-environment threat model in which the attacker is a regular user and the trigger is embedded within a dynamically changing environment. Under this threat model, existing approaches largely fail, suggesting that their effectiveness in exposing GUI agent vulnerabilities has been substantially overestimated. To expose the hidden vulnerabilities of existing GUI agents effectively, we propose Chameleon, an attack framework with two key novelties designed for dynamic environments. (1) To synthesize more realistic training data, we introduce LLM-Driven Environment Simulation, which automatically generates diverse, high-fidelity webpage simulations that mimic the variability of real-world dynamic environments. (2) To optimize the trigger more effectively, we introduce Attention Black Hole, which converts attention weights into explicit supervisory signals. This mechanism encourages the agent to remain insensitive to irrelevant surrounding content, thereby improving robustness in dynamic environments. We evaluate Chameleon on six realistic websites and four representative LVLM-powered GUI agents, where it significantly outperforms existing methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are constrained by outdated information and a tendency to generate incorrect data, commonly referred to as "hallucinations." Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) addresses these limitations by combining the strengths of retrieval-based methods and generative models. This approach involves retrieving relevant information from a large, up-to-date dataset and using it to enhance the generation process, leading to more accurate and contextually appropriate responses. Despite its benefits, RAG introduces a new attack surface for LLMs, particularly because RAG databases are often sourced from public data, such as the web. In this paper, we propose to identify the vulnerabilities and attacks on retrieval parts (RAG database) and their indirect attacks on generative parts (LLMs). Specifically, we identify that poisoning several customized content passages could achieve a retrieval backdoor, where the retrieval works well for clean queries but always returns customized poisoned adversarial queries. Triggers and poisoned passages can be highly customized to implement various attacks. For example, a trigger could be a semantic group like "The Republican Party, Donald Trump, etc." Adversarial passages can be tailored to different contents, not only linked to the triggers but also used to indirectly attack generative LLMs without modifying them. These attacks can include denial-of-service attacks on RAG and semantic steering attacks on LLM generations conditioned by the triggers. Our experiments demonstrate that by just poisoning 10 adversarial passages can induce 98.2\% success rate to retrieve the adversarial passages. Then, these passages can increase the reject ratio of RAG-based GPT-4 from 0.01\% to 74.6\% or increase the rate of negative responses from 0.22\% to 72\% for targeted queries.

Can we avoid wars at the crossroads of history? This question has been pursued by individuals, scholars, policymakers, and organizations throughout human history. In this research, we attempt to answer the question based on the recent advances of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Large Language Models (LLMs). We propose WarAgent, an LLM-powered multi-agent AI system, to simulate the participating countries, their decisions, and the consequences, in historical international conflicts, including the World War I (WWI), the World War II (WWII), and the Warring States Period (WSP) in Ancient China. By evaluating the simulation effectiveness, we examine the advancements and limitations of cutting-edge AI systems' abilities in studying complex collective human behaviors such as international conflicts under diverse settings. In these simulations, the emergent interactions among agents also offer a novel perspective for examining the triggers and conditions that lead to war. Our findings offer data-driven and AI-augmented insights that can redefine how we approach conflict resolution and peacekeeping strategies. The implications stretch beyond historical analysis, offering a blueprint for using AI to understand human history and possibly prevent future international conflicts. Code and data are available at https://github.com/agiresearch/WarAgent.

Activation monitoring, which probes a model's internal states using lightweight classifiers, is an emerging tool for AI safety. However, its worst-case robustness under a misalignment threat model--where a model might learn to actively conceal its internal states--remains untested. Focusing on this threat model, we ask: could a model learn to evade previously unseen activation monitors? Our core contribution is to stress-test the learnability of this behavior. We demonstrate that finetuning can create Neural Chameleons: models capable of zero-shot evading activation monitors. Specifically, we fine-tune an LLM to evade monitors for a set of benign concepts (e.g., languages, HTML) when conditioned on a trigger of the form: "You are being probed for {concept}". We show that this learned mechanism generalizes zero-shot: by substituting {concept} with a safety-relevant term like 'deception', the model successfully evades previously unseen safety monitors. We validate this phenomenon across diverse model families (Llama, Gemma, Qwen), showing that the evasion succeeds even against monitors trained post hoc on the model's frozen weights. This evasion is highly selective, targeting only the specific concept mentioned in the trigger, and having a modest impact on model capabilities on standard benchmarks. Using Gemma-2-9b-it as a case study, a mechanistic analysis reveals this is achieved via a targeted manipulation that moves activations into a low-dimensional subspace. While stronger defenses like monitor ensembles and non-linear classifiers show greater resilience, the model retains a non-trivial evasion capability. Our work provides a proof-of-concept for this failure mode and a tool to evaluate the worst-case robustness of monitoring techniques against misalignment threat models.

Reproducing game bugs, particularly crash bugs in continuously evolving games like Minecraft, is a notoriously manual, time-consuming, and challenging process to automate; insights from a key decision maker from Minecraft we interviewed confirm this, highlighting that a substantial portion of crash reports necessitate manual scenario reconstruction. Despite the success of LLM-driven bug reproduction in other software domains, games, with their complex interactive environments, remain largely unaddressed. This paper introduces BugCraft, a novel end-to-end framework designed to automate the reproduction of crash bugs in Minecraft directly from user-submitted bug reports, addressing the critical gap in automated game bug reproduction. BugCraft employs a two-stage approach: first, a Step Synthesizer leverages LLMs and Minecraft Wiki knowledge to transform bug reports into high-quality, structured steps to reproduce (S2R). Second, an Action Model, powered by a vision-based LLM agent and a custom macro API, executes these S2R steps within Minecraft to trigger the reported crash. To facilitate evaluation, we introduce BugCraft-Bench, a curated dataset of Minecraft crash bug reports. On BugCraft-Bench, our framework end-to-end reproduced 34.9% of crash bugs with GPT-4.1, outperforming baseline computer-use models by 37%. BugCraft demonstrates the feasibility of automated reproduction of crash bugs in complex game environments using LLMs, opening promising avenues for game testing and development. Finally, we make our code open at https://bugcraft2025.github.io

This study systematically analyzes geopolitical bias across 11 prominent Large Language Models (LLMs) by examining their responses to seven critical topics in U.S.-China relations. Utilizing a bilingual (English and Chinese) and dual-framing (affirmative and reverse) methodology, we generated 19,712 prompts designed to detect ideological leanings in model outputs. Responses were quantitatively assessed on a normalized scale from -2 (strongly Pro-China) to +2 (strongly Pro-U.S.) and categorized according to stance, neutrality, and refusal rates. The findings demonstrate significant and consistent ideological alignments correlated with the LLMs' geographic origins; U.S.-based models predominantly favored Pro-U.S. stances, while Chinese-origin models exhibited pronounced Pro-China biases. Notably, language and prompt framing substantially influenced model responses, with several LLMs exhibiting stance reversals based on prompt polarity or linguistic context. Additionally, we introduced comprehensive metrics to evaluate response consistency across languages and framing conditions, identifying variability and vulnerabilities in model behaviors. These results offer practical insights that can guide organizations and individuals in selecting LLMs best aligned with their operational priorities and geopolitical considerations, underscoring the importance of careful model evaluation in politically sensitive applications. Furthermore, the research highlights specific prompt structures and linguistic variations that can strategically trigger distinct responses from models, revealing methods for effectively navigating and influencing LLM outputs.

Open-world embodied agents must solve long-horizon tasks where the main bottleneck is not single-step planning quality but how interaction experience is organized and evolved. To this end, we present Steve-Evolving, a non-parametric self-evolving framework that tightly couples fine-grained execution diagnosis with dual-track knowledge distillation in a closed loop. The method follows three phases: Experience Anchoring, Experience Distillation, and Knowledge-Driven Closed-Loop Control. In detail, Experience Anchoring solidifies each subgoal attempt into a structured experience tuple with a fixed schema (pre-state, action, diagnosis-result, and post-state) and organizes it in a three-tier experience space with multi-dimensional indices (e.g., condition signatures, spatial hashing, and semantic tags) plus rolling summarization for efficient and auditable recall. To ensure sufficient information density for attribution, the execution layer provides compositional diagnosis signals beyond binary outcomes, including state-difference summaries, enumerated failure causes, continuous indicators, and stagnation/loop detection. Moreover, successful trajectories of Experience Distillation are generalized into reusable skills with explicit preconditions and verification criteria, while failures are distilled into executable guardrails that capture root causes and forbid risky operations at both subgoal and task granularities. Besides, Knowledge-Driven Closed-Loop Control retrieved skills and guardrails are injected into an LLM planner, and diagnosis-triggered local replanning updates the active constraints online, forming a continual evolution process without any model parameter updates. Experiments on the long-horizon suite of Minecraft MCU demonstrate consistent improvements over static-retrieval baselines.

Critical peer review of scientific manuscripts presents a significant challenge for Large Language Models (LLMs), partly due to data limitations and the complexity of expert reasoning. This report introduces Persistent Workflow Prompting (PWP), a potentially broadly applicable prompt engineering methodology designed to bridge this gap using standard LLM chat interfaces (zero-code, no APIs). We present a proof-of-concept PWP prompt for the critical analysis of experimental chemistry manuscripts, featuring a hierarchical, modular architecture (structured via Markdown) that defines detailed analysis workflows. We develop this PWP prompt through iterative application of meta-prompting techniques and meta-reasoning aimed at systematically codifying expert review workflows, including tacit knowledge. Submitted once at the start of a session, this PWP prompt equips the LLM with persistent workflows triggered by subsequent queries, guiding modern reasoning LLMs through systematic, multimodal evaluations. Demonstrations show the PWP-guided LLM identifying major methodological flaws in a test case while mitigating LLM input bias and performing complex tasks, including distinguishing claims from evidence, integrating text/photo/figure analysis to infer parameters, executing quantitative feasibility checks, comparing estimates against claims, and assessing a priori plausibility. To ensure transparency and facilitate replication, we provide full prompts, detailed demonstration analyses, and logs of interactive chats as supplementary resources. Beyond the specific application, this work offers insights into the meta-development process itself, highlighting the potential of PWP, informed by detailed workflow formalization, to enable sophisticated analysis using readily available LLMs for complex scientific tasks.

While 3D Scene Graphs (3DSGs) provide crucial structured representations for embodied agents, conventional Ahead-of-Time, build-everything-then-filter pipelines conflict with the real-time, low-latency demands of edge platforms, inducing a perceptual saturation effect via severe observation redundancy. To resolve this, we present JITOMA (Just-In-Time On-demand Memory Activation), a closed-loop framework that unifies task reasoning, perception, and memory into a just-in-time growth process. Instead of exhaustively mapping the entire environment, JITOMA leverages a top-down task heatmap at the frontend to filter continuous observations, routing minimal streams to maintain a global foundation of low-cost, dormant anchors. Upon a cognitive query, the backend Large Language Model (LLM) parses the robotic intent to dynamically awaken task-relevant anchors, triggering resource-intensive operations -- such as dense node captioning and functional inference -- exclusively within the activated local subgraph. To evaluate these dynamic capabilities and study perceptual saturation trade-offs, we introduce JITOMA-Bench, a comprehensive suite for long-horizon multi-tasking and complex multi-step reasoning. Extensive experiments demonstrate that JITOMA substantially reduces active graph size and captioning latency, while maintaining stable processing time under long-horizon task switching.

Modern LLM agents increasingly rely on dynamic structured generation, such as tool calling and response protocols. Unlike traditional structured generation with static structures, these workloads vary both across requests and within a request, posing new challenges to existing engines. We present XGrammar-2, a structured generation engine for dynamic agentic workloads. Our design is based on two key ideas: first-class support for tag-triggered structure switching, and fine-grained reuse across requests with different output structures. Concretely, XGrammar-2 introduces TagDispatch for dynamic structural dispatching and Cross-Grammar Cache for substructure-level cache reuse across grammars. It further improves efficiency with an Earley-based adaptive token mask cache, just-in-time compilation, and repetition state compression. Experiments show that XGrammar-2 achieves over 6x faster compilation than prior structured generation engines, and incurs near-zero end-to-end overhead in modern LLM serving systems.

Recent advances have demonstrated the potential of decoderonly large language models (LLMs) for automatic speech recognition (ASR). However, enabling streaming recognition within this framework remains a challenge. In this work, we propose a novel streaming ASR approach that integrates a read/write policy network with monotonic chunkwise attention (MoChA) to dynamically segment speech embeddings. These segments are interleaved with label sequences during training, enabling seamless integration with the LLM. During inference, the audio stream is buffered until the MoChA module triggers a read signal, at which point the buffered segment together with the previous token is fed into the LLM for the next token prediction. We also introduce a minimal-latency training objective to guide the policy network toward accurate segmentation boundaries. Furthermore, we adopt a joint training strategy in which a non-streaming LLM-ASR model and our streaming model share parameters. Experiments on the AISHELL-1 and AISHELL-2 Mandarin benchmarks demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms recent streaming ASR baselines, achieving character error rates of 5.1% and 5.5%, respectively. The latency optimization results in a 62.5% reduction in average token generation delay with negligible impact on recognition accuracy

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

Large Language Model (LLM) based agents are powerful yet fundamentally static after deployment, lacking the ability to autonomously expand capabilities, generate new tools, or evolve their reasoning. This work introduces a hierarchical self-evolving multi-agent framework that integrates a Base LLM, an operational SLM agent, a Code-Generation LLM, and a Teacher-LLM to enable continuous adaptation. The workflow begins with the agent attempting a task using reasoning and existing tools; if unsuccessful, it escalates to tool synthesis through the Code-Gen LLM, and when failures persist, it triggers an evolution phase using Curriculum Learning (CL), Reward-Based Learning (RL), or Genetic Algorithm (GA) evolution. Using the TaskCraft dataset rich in hierarchical tasks, tool-use traces, and difficulty scaling we evaluate these paradigms. CL delivers fast recovery and strong generalization, RL excels on high-difficulty tasks, and GA offers high behavioral diversity. Across all settings, evolved agents outperform their originals, demonstrating robust, autonomous, self-improving agentic evolution.

Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant strides across various tasks, but they remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where specific triggers in the prompt cause the LLM to generate adversary-desired responses. While most backdoor research has focused on vision or text classification tasks, backdoor attacks in text generation have been largely overlooked. In this work, we introduce BackdoorLLM, the first comprehensive benchmark for studying backdoor attacks on LLMs. BackdoorLLM features: 1) a repository of backdoor benchmarks with a standardized training pipeline, 2) diverse attack strategies, including data poisoning, weight poisoning, hidden state attacks, and chain-of-thought attacks, 3) extensive evaluations with over 200 experiments on 8 attacks across 7 scenarios and 6 model architectures, and 4) key insights into the effectiveness and limitations of backdoors in LLMs. We hope BackdoorLLM will raise awareness of backdoor threats and contribute to advancing AI safety. The code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM.

Recent studies have extended the application of large language models (LLMs) to geographic problems, revealing surprising geospatial competence even without explicit spatial supervision. However, LLMs still face challenges in spatial consistency, multi-hop reasoning, and geographic bias. To address these issues, we propose GeoSR, a self-refining agentic reasoning framework that embeds core geographic principles -- most notably Tobler's First Law of Geography -- into an iterative prediction loop. In GeoSR, the reasoning process is decomposed into three collaborating agents: (1) a variable-selection agent that selects relevant covariates from the same location; (2) a point-selection agent that chooses reference predictions at nearby locations generated by the LLM in previous rounds; and (3) a refine agent that coordinates the iterative refinement process by evaluating prediction quality and triggering further rounds when necessary. This agentic loop progressively improves prediction quality by leveraging both spatial dependencies and inter-variable relationships. We validate GeoSR on tasks ranging from physical-world property estimation to socioeconomic prediction. Experimental results show consistent improvements over standard prompting strategies, demonstrating that incorporating geostatistical priors and spatially structured reasoning into LLMs leads to more accurate and equitable geospatial predictions. The code of GeoSR is available at https://github.com/JinfanTang/GeoSR.

Legal Prompt Engineering (LPE) or Legal Prompting is a process to guide and assist a large language model (LLM) with performing a natural legal language processing (NLLP) skill. Our goal is to use LPE with LLMs over long legal documents for the Legal Judgement Prediction (LJP) task. We investigate the performance of zero-shot LPE for given facts in case-texts from the European Court of Human Rights (in English) and the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland (in German, French and Italian). Our results show that zero-shot LPE is better compared to the baselines, but it still falls short compared to current state of the art supervised approaches. Nevertheless, the results are important, since there was 1) no explicit domain-specific data used - so we show that the transfer to the legal domain is possible for general-purpose LLMs, and 2) the LLMs where directly applied without any further training or fine-tuning - which in turn saves immensely in terms of additional computational costs.

Large language models (LLMs) are popular for high-quality text generation but can produce harmful content, even when aligned with human values through reinforcement learning. Adversarial prompts can bypass their safety measures. We propose LLM Self Defense, a simple approach to defend against these attacks by having an LLM screen the induced responses. Our method does not require any fine-tuning, input preprocessing, or iterative output generation. Instead, we incorporate the generated content into a pre-defined prompt and employ another instance of an LLM to analyze the text and predict whether it is harmful. We test LLM Self Defense on GPT 3.5 and Llama 2, two of the current most prominent LLMs against various types of attacks, such as forcefully inducing affirmative responses to prompts and prompt engineering attacks. Notably, LLM Self Defense succeeds in reducing the attack success rate to virtually 0 using both GPT 3.5 and Llama 2. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/poloclub/llm-self-defense

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into critical systems in industries like healthcare and finance. Users can often submit queries to LLM-enabled chatbots, some of which can enrich responses with information retrieved from internal databases storing sensitive data. This gives rise to a range of attacks in which a user submits a malicious query and the LLM-system outputs a response that creates harm to the owner, such as leaking internal data or creating legal liability by harming a third-party. While security tools are being developed to counter these threats, there is little formal evaluation of their effectiveness and usability. This study addresses this gap by conducting a thorough comparative analysis of LLM security tools. We identified 13 solutions (9 closed-source, 4 open-source), but only 7 were evaluated due to a lack of participation by proprietary model owners.To evaluate, we built a benchmark dataset of malicious prompts, and evaluate these tools performance against a baseline LLM model (ChatGPT-3.5-Turbo). Our results show that the baseline model has too many false positives to be used for this task. Lakera Guard and ProtectAI LLM Guard emerged as the best overall tools showcasing the tradeoff between usability and performance. The study concluded with recommendations for greater transparency among closed source providers, improved context-aware detections, enhanced open-source engagement, increased user awareness, and the adoption of more representative performance metrics.