Daily Papers

Today, E-commerce sellers face several key challenges, including difficulties in discovering and effectively utilizing available programs and tools, and struggling to understand and utilize rich data from various tools. We therefore aim to develop Insight Agents (IA), a conversational multi-agent Data Insight system, to provide E-commerce sellers with personalized data and business insights through automated information retrieval. Our hypothesis is that IA will serve as a force multiplier for sellers, thereby driving incremental seller adoption by reducing the effort required and increase speed at which sellers make good business decisions. In this paper, we introduce this novel LLM-backed end-to-end agentic system built on a plan-and-execute paradigm and designed for comprehensive coverage, high accuracy, and low latency. It features a hierarchical multi-agent structure, consisting of manager agent and two worker agents: data presentation and insight generation, for efficient information retrieval and problem-solving. We design a simple yet effective ML solution for manager agent that combines Out-of-Domain (OOD) detection using a lightweight encoder-decoder model and agent routing through a BERT-based classifier, optimizing both accuracy and latency. Within the two worker agents, a strategic planning is designed for API-based data model that breaks down queries into granular components to generate more accurate responses, and domain knowledge is dynamically injected to to enhance the insight generator. IA has been launched for Amazon sellers in US, which has achieved high accuracy of 90% based on human evaluation, with latency of P90 below 15s.

Interacting with knowledge graphs can be a daunting task for people without a background in computer science since the query language that is used (SPARQL) has a high barrier of entry. Large language models (LLMs) can lower that barrier by providing support in the form of Text2SPARQL translation. In this paper we introduce a generalized method based on SPINACH, an LLM backed agent that translates natural language questions to SPARQL queries not in a single shot, but as an iterative process of exploration and execution. We describe the overall architecture and reasoning behind our design decisions, and also conduct a thorough analysis of the agent behavior to gain insights into future areas for targeted improvements. This work was motivated by the Text2SPARQL challenge, a challenge that was held to facilitate improvements in the Text2SPARQL domain.

Agent harnesses -- the stateful programs that wrap a language model and decide what it sees at each step -- are now known to change end-to-end performance on a fixed model by as much as six times. That raises a question asked less often than it should be: how much of an agent's competence does the harness itself already carry, and how much genuinely still needs the LLM? We externalize a planning harness for noisy Collaborative Battleship into four progressively richer layers -- posterior belief tracking, declarative planning, symbolic reflec tion, and an LLM-backed revision gate -- under a common runtime, taking win rate as the primary metric and F1 as secondary, and pre-specifying heavy lifting as the single largest positive marginal to the primary metric. Across 54 games, declarative pla nning carries the heavy lifting (+24.1pp win rate over a belief-only harness, zero LLM calls); symbolic reflection is mechanistically real but calibration-sensitive, with signed board-level effects up to pm0.140 F1 that cancel on aggregate; and LLM-backed revision ac tivates on only 4.3% of turns with a bounded, non-monotonic effect. The contribution is methodological: once harness layers are made externally measurable, the LLM's role can be quantified as residual rather than assumed central.

Multi-agent AI systems exhibit emergent risks that no single agent produces in isolation. Existing safety frameworks rely on binary classifications of agent behavior, discarding the uncertainty inherent in proxy-based evaluation. We introduce SWARM (System-Wide Assessment of Risk in Multi-agent systems), a simulation framework that replaces binary good/bad labels with soft probabilistic labels p = P(v{=}+1) in [0,1], enabling continuous-valued payoff computation, toxicity measurement, and governance intervention. SWARM implements a modular governance engine with configurable levers (transaction taxes, circuit breakers, reputation decay, and random audits) and quantifies their effects through probabilistic metrics including expected toxicity E[1{-}p mid accepted] and quality gap E[p mid accepted] - E[p mid rejected]. Across seven scenarios with five-seed replication, strict governance reduces welfare by over 40\% without improving safety. In parallel, aggressively internalizing system externalities collapses total welfare from a baseline of +262 down to -67, while toxicity remains invariant. Circuit breakers require careful calibration; overly restrictive thresholds severely diminish system value, whereas an optimal threshold balances moderate welfare with minimized toxicity. Companion experiments show soft metrics detect proxy gaming by self-optimizing agents passing conventional binary evaluations. This basic governance layer applies to live LLM-backed agents (Concordia entities, Claude, GPT-4o Mini) without modification. Results show distributional safety requires continuous risk metrics and governance lever calibration involves quantifiable safety-welfare tradeoffs. Source code and project resources are publicly available at https://www.swarm-ai.org/.

We present BYOKG, a universal question-answering (QA) system that can operate on any knowledge graph (KG), requires no human-annotated training data, and can be ready to use within a day -- attributes that are out-of-scope for current KGQA systems. BYOKG draws inspiration from the remarkable ability of humans to comprehend information present in an unseen KG through exploration -- starting at random nodes, inspecting the labels of adjacent nodes and edges, and combining them with their prior world knowledge. In BYOKG, exploration leverages an LLM-backed symbolic agent that generates a diverse set of query-program exemplars, which are then used to ground a retrieval-augmented reasoning procedure to predict programs for arbitrary questions. BYOKG is effective over both small- and large-scale graphs, showing dramatic gains in QA accuracy over a zero-shot baseline of 27.89 and 58.02 F1 on GrailQA and MetaQA, respectively. On GrailQA, we further show that our unsupervised BYOKG outperforms a supervised in-context learning method, demonstrating the effectiveness of exploration. Lastly, we find that performance of BYOKG reliably improves with continued exploration as well as improvements in the base LLM, notably outperforming a state-of-the-art fine-tuned model by 7.08 F1 on a sub-sampled zero-shot split of GrailQA.

Judicial work depends on close reading of long records, charge sheets, pleadings, annexures, orders, often spanning hundreds of pages. With limited staff support, exhaustive reading during hearings is impractical. We present CourtNav, a voice-guided, anchor-first navigator for legal PDFs that maps a judge's spoken command (e.g., "go to paragraph 23", "highlight the contradiction in the cross-examination") directly to a highlighted paragraph in seconds. CourtNav transcribes the command, classifies intent with a grammar-first(Exact regex matching), LLM-backed router classifying the queries using few shot examples, retrieves over a layout-aware hybrid index, and auto-scrolls the viewer to the cited span while highlighting it and close alternates. By design, the interface shows only grounded passages, never free text, keeping evidence verifiable and auditable. This need is acute in India, where judgments and cross-examinations are notoriously long.In a pilot on representative charge sheets, pleadings, and orders, median time-to-relevance drops from 3-5 minutes (manual navigation) to 10-15 seconds; with quick visual verification included, 30-45 seconds. Under fixed time budgets, this navigation-first design increases the breadth of the record actually consulted while preserving control and transparency.

This paper describes Meta's TestGen-LLM tool, which uses LLMs to automatically improve existing human-written tests. TestGen-LLM verifies that its generated test classes successfully clear a set of filters that assure measurable improvement over the original test suite, thereby eliminating problems due to LLM hallucination. We describe the deployment of TestGen-LLM at Meta test-a-thons for the Instagram and Facebook platforms. In an evaluation on Reels and Stories products for Instagram, 75% of TestGen-LLM's test cases built correctly, 57% passed reliably, and 25% increased coverage. During Meta's Instagram and Facebook test-a-thons, it improved 11.5% of all classes to which it was applied, with 73% of its recommendations being accepted for production deployment by Meta software engineers. We believe this is the first report on industrial scale deployment of LLM-generated code backed by such assurances of code improvement.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate strong capabilities for solving scientific and mathematical problems, yet they struggle to produce valid, challenging, and novel problems - an essential component for advancing LLM training and enabling autonomous scientific research. Existing problem generation approaches either depend on expensive human expert involvement or adopt naive self-play paradigms, which frequently yield invalid problems due to reward hacking. This work introduces VHG, a verifier-enhanced hard problem generation framework built upon three-party self-play. By integrating an independent verifier into the conventional setter-solver duality, our design constrains the setter's reward to be jointly determined by problem validity (evaluated by the verifier) and difficulty (assessed by the solver). We instantiate two verifier variants: a Hard symbolic verifier and a Soft LLM-based verifier, with evaluations conducted on indefinite integral tasks and general mathematical reasoning tasks. Experimental results show that VHG substantially outperforms all baseline methods by a clear margin.

Generation of long-form, citation-backed reports is a primary use case for retrieval augmented generation (RAG) systems. While open-source evaluation tools exist for various RAG tasks, ones tailored to report generation (RG) are lacking. Accordingly, we introduce Auto-ARGUE, a robust LLM-based implementation of the recently proposed ARGUE framework for RG evaluation. We present analysis of Auto-ARGUE on the RG pilot task from the TREC 2024 NeuCLIR track, showing good system-level correlations with human judgments. We further release a web app for visualization of Auto-ARGUE outputs.

Given the widespread dissemination of misinformation on social media, implementing fact-checking mechanisms for online claims is essential. Manually verifying every claim is highly challenging, underscoring the need for an automated fact-checking system. This paper presents our system designed to address this issue. We utilize the Averitec dataset to assess the veracity of claims. In addition to veracity prediction, our system provides supporting evidence, which is extracted from the dataset. We develop a Retrieve and Generate (RAG) pipeline to extract relevant evidence sentences from a knowledge base, which are then inputted along with the claim into a large language model (LLM) for classification. We also evaluate the few-shot In-Context Learning (ICL) capabilities of multiple LLMs. Our system achieves an 'Averitec' score of 0.33, which is a 22% absolute improvement over the baseline. All code will be made available on All code will be made available on https://github.com/ronit-singhal/evidence-backed-fact-checking-using-rag-and-few-shot-in-context-learning-with-llms.

Evaluating novelty is critical yet challenging in peer review, as reviewers must assess submissions against a vast, rapidly evolving literature. This report presents OpenNovelty, an LLM-powered agentic system for transparent, evidence-based novelty analysis. The system operates through four phases: (1) extracting the core task and contribution claims to generate retrieval queries; (2) retrieving relevant prior work based on extracted queries via semantic search engine; (3) constructing a hierarchical taxonomy of core-task-related work and performing contribution-level full-text comparisons against each contribution; and (4) synthesizing all analyses into a structured novelty report with explicit citations and evidence snippets. Unlike naive LLM-based approaches, OpenNovelty grounds all assessments in retrieved real papers, ensuring verifiable judgments. We deploy our system on 500+ ICLR 2026 submissions with all reports publicly available on our website, and preliminary analysis suggests it can identify relevant prior work, including closely related papers that authors may overlook. OpenNovelty aims to empower the research community with a scalable tool that promotes fair, consistent, and evidence-backed peer review.

Skill-distillation pipelines learn reusable rules from LLM agent trajectories, but they lack a key signal: how much each step costs. Without per-step cost, a pipeline cannot distinguish adding a missing step to fix a bug from removing an expensive step that never affected the outcome. We introduce ClawTrace, an agent tracing platform that records every LLM call, tool use, and sub-agent spawn during an agent session and compiles each session into a TraceCard: a compact YAML summary with per-step USD cost, token counts, and redundancy flags. Built on ClawTrace, CostCraft is a distillation pipeline that reads TraceCards and produces three types of skill patches. Preserve patches keep behaviors that led to success. Prune patches remove expensive steps that did not matter, each backed by a counterfactual argument against a named high-cost step. Repair patches fix failures grounded in oracle evidence. Ablations on 30 held-out SpreadsheetBench tasks show that both cost attribution and prune patches independently reduce quality regressions. When the same skill is applied to 30 unrelated SkillsBench tasks, an unexpected asymmetry emerges: prune rules transferred across benchmarks and cut median cost by 32%, while preserve rules, trained on benchmark-specific conventions, caused regressions on new task types. We release ClawTrace and TraceCards as open infrastructure for cost-aware agent research.

Quantized training of Large Language Models (LLMs) remains an open challenge, as maintaining accuracy while performing all matrix multiplications in low precision has proven difficult. This is particularly the case when fine-tuning pre-trained models, which often already have large weight and activation outlier values that render quantized optimization difficult. We present HALO, a novel quantization-aware training approach for Transformers that enables accurate and efficient low-precision training by combining 1) strategic placement of Hadamard rotations in both forward and backward passes, to mitigate outliers during the low-precision computation, 2) FSDP integration for low-precision communication, and 3) high-performance kernel support. Our approach ensures that all large matrix multiplications during the forward and backward passes are executed in lower precision. Applied to LLAMA-family models, HALO achieves near-full-precision-equivalent results during fine-tuning on various tasks, while delivering up to 1.31x end-to-end speedup for full fine-tuning on RTX 4090 GPUs. Our method supports both standard and parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods, both backed by efficient kernel implementations. Our results demonstrate the first practical approach to fully quantized LLM fine-tuning that maintains accuracy in FP8 precision, while delivering performance benefits.

We present Springdrift, a persistent runtime for long-lived LLM agents. The system integrates an auditable execution substrate (append-only memory, supervised processes, git-backed recovery), a case-based reasoning memory layer with hybrid retrieval (evaluated against a dense cosine baseline), a deterministic normative calculus for safety gating with auditable axiom trails, and continuous ambient self-perception via a structured self-state representation (the sensorium) injected each cycle without tool calls. These properties support behaviours difficult to achieve in session-bounded systems: cross-session task continuity, cross-channel context maintenance, end-to-end forensic reconstruction of decisions, and self-diagnostic behaviour. We report on a single-instance deployment over 23 days (19 operating days), during which the agent diagnosed its own infrastructure bugs, classified failure modes, identified an architectural vulnerability, and maintained context across email and web channels -- without explicit instruction. We introduce the term Artificial Retainer for this category: a non-human system with persistent memory, defined authority, domain-specific autonomy, and forensic accountability in an ongoing relationship with a specific principal -- distinguished from software assistants and autonomous agents, drawing on professional retainer relationships and the bounded autonomy of trained working animals. This is a technical report on a systems design and deployment case study, not a benchmark-driven evaluation. Evidence is from a single instance with a single operator, presented as illustration of what these architectural properties can support in practice. Implemented in approximately Gleam on Erlang/OTP. Code, artefacts, and redacted operational logs will be available at https://github.com/seamus-brady/springdrift upon publication.

Over two billion Apple devices ship with a Neural Processing Unit (NPU) - the Apple Neural Engine (ANE) - yet this accelerator remains largely unused for large language model workloads. CoreML, Apple's public ML framework, imposes opaque abstractions that prevent direct ANE programming and do not support on-device training. We present Orion, to our knowledge the first open end-to-end system that combines direct ANE execution, a compiler pipeline, and stable multi-step training with checkpoint resume in a single native runtime, bypassing CoreML entirely via Apple's private _ANEClient and _ANECompiler APIs. Building on prior characterization work by maderix, we extend public knowledge of ANE constraints to a catalog of 20 restrictions on MIL IR programs, memory layout, compilation limits, and numerical behavior, including 14 previously undocumented constraints discovered during Orion development. Orion includes a compiler that lowers a graph IR through five optimization passes to ANE-native MIL and a runtime that manages IOSurface-backed zero-copy tensor I/O, program caching, and delta compilation for weight updates. Because the ANE bakes weights at compile time, naive training normally requires full recompilation per step (~4.2 s). We show that compiled programs can instead be updated by unloading, patching weight files, and reloading, bypassing ANECCompile() and reducing recompilation from 4,200 ms to 494 ms per step (8.5x), yielding a 3.8x training speedup. On an M4 Max, Orion achieves 170+ tokens/s for GPT-2 124M inference and demonstrates stable training of a 110M-parameter transformer on TinyStories for 1,000 steps in 22 minutes with zero NaN occurrences. We also present LoRA adapter-as-input, enabling hot-swap of adapters via IOSurface inputs without recompilation.

ExpertRAG is a novel theoretical framework that integrates Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures with Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) to advance the efficiency and accuracy of knowledge-intensive language modeling. We propose a dynamic retrieval gating mechanism coupled with expert routing, enabling the model to selectively consult an external knowledge store or rely on specialized internal experts based on the query's needs. The paper lays out the theoretical foundations of ExpertRAG, including a probabilistic formulation that treats retrieval and expert selection as latent decisions, and mathematical justifications for its efficiency in both computation and knowledge utilization. We derive formulae to quantify the expected computational cost savings from selective retrieval and the capacity gains from sparse expert utilization. A comparative analysis positions ExpertRAG against standard RAG (with always-on retrieval) and pure MoE models (e.g., Switch Transformer, Mixtral) to highlight its unique balance between parametric knowledge and non-parametric retrieval. We also outline an experimental validation strategy, proposing benchmarks and evaluation protocols to test ExpertRAG's performance on factual recall, generalization, and inference efficiency. The proposed framework, although presented theoretically, is supported by insights from prior work in RAG and MoE, and is poised to provide more factual, efficient, and adaptive generation by leveraging the best of both paradigms. In summary, ExpertRAG contributes a new perspective on scaling and augmenting language models, backed by a thorough analysis and a roadmap for empirical validation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fundamentally constrained by the quadratic computational cost of self-attention and the "Lost in the Middle" phenomenon, where reasoning capabilities degrade as context windows expand. Existing solutions, primarily "Flat RAG" architectures relying on vector databases, treat memory as an unstructured bag of embeddings, failing to capture the hierarchical and temporal structure of long-horizon interactions. This paper presents Aeon, a Neuro-Symbolic Cognitive Operating System that redefines memory as a managed OS resource. Aeon structures memory into a Memory Palace (a spatial index implemented via Atlas, a SIMD-accelerated Page-Clustered Vector Index) and a Trace (a neuro-symbolic episodic graph). This architecture introduces three advances: (1) Symmetric INT8 Scalar Quantization, achieving 3.1x spatial compression and 5.6x math acceleration via NEON SDOT intrinsics; (2) a decoupled Write-Ahead Log (WAL) ensuring crash-recoverability with statistically negligible overhead (<1%); and (3) a Sidecar Blob Arena eliminating the prior 440-character text ceiling via an append-only mmap-backed blob file with generational garbage collection. The Semantic Lookaside Buffer (SLB) exploits conversational locality to achieve sub-5us retrieval latencies, with INT8 vectors dequantized to FP32 on cache insertion to preserve L1-resident lookup performance. Benchmarks on Apple M4 Max demonstrate that the combined architecture achieves 4.70ns INT8 dot product latency, 3.09us tree traversal at 100K nodes (3.4x over FP32), and P99 read latency of 750ns under hostile 16-thread contention via epoch-based reclamation.

Reinforcement learning (RL), large language models (LLMs), and vision-language models (VLMs) have been widely studied in isolation. However, existing infrastructure lacks the ability to deploy agents from different decision-making paradigms within the same environment, making it difficult to study them in hybrid multi-agent settings or to compare their behaviour fairly under identical conditions. We present MOSAIC, an open-source platform that bridges this gap by incorporating a diverse set of existing reinforcement learning environments and enabling heterogeneous agents (RL policies, LLMs, VLMs, and human players) to operate within them in ad-hoc team settings with reproducible results. MOSAIC introduces three contributions. (i) An IPC-based worker protocol that wraps both native and third-party frameworks as isolated subprocess workers, each executing its native training and inference logic unmodified, communicating through a versioned inter-process protocol. (ii) An operator abstraction that forms an agent-level interface by mapping workers to agents: each operator, regardless of whether it is backed by an RL policy, an LLM, or a human, conforms to a minimal unified interface. (iii) A deterministic cross-paradigm evaluation framework offering two complementary modes: a manual mode that advances up to N concurrent operators in lock-step under shared seeds for fine-grained visual inspection of behavioural differences, and a script mode that drives automated, long-running evaluation through declarative Python scripts, for reproducible experiments. We release MOSAIC as an open, visual-first platform to facilitate reproducible cross-paradigm research across the RL, LLM, and human-in-the-loop communities.

Multimodal Large Language Models excel at offline audio-visual understanding, but their ability to serve as mobile assistants in continuous real-world streams remains underexplored. In daily phone use, mobile assistants must track streaming audio-visual inputs and respond at the right time, yet existing benchmarks are often restricted to multiple-choice questions or use shorter videos. In this paper, we introduce PhoStream, the first mobile-centric streaming benchmark that unifies on-screen and off-screen scenarios to evaluate video, audio, and temporal reasoning. PhoStream contains 5,572 open-ended QA pairs from 578 videos across 4 scenarios and 10 capabilities. We build it with an Automated Generative Pipeline backed by rigorous human verification, and evaluate models using a realistic Online Inference Pipeline and LLM-as-a-Judge evaluation for open-ended responses. Experiments reveal a temporal asymmetry in LLM-judged scores (0-100): models perform well on Instant and Backward tasks (Gemini 3 Pro exceeds 80), but drop sharply on Forward tasks (16.40), largely due to early responses before the required visual and audio cues appear. This highlights a fundamental limitation: current MLLMs struggle to decide when to speak, not just what to say. Code and datasets used in this work will be made publicly accessible at https://github.com/Lucky-Lance/PhoStream.

GenAI Units In Digital Design Education (GUIDE) is an open courseware repository with runnable Google Colab labs and other materials. We describe the repository's architecture and educational approach based on standardized teaching units comprising slides, short videos, runnable labs, and related papers. This organization enables consistency for both the students' learning experience and the reuse and grading by instructors. We demonstrate GUIDE in practice with three representative units: VeriThoughts for reasoning and formal-verification-backed RTL generation, enhanced LLM-aided testbench generation, and LLMPirate for IP Piracy. We also provide details for four example course instances (GUIDE4ChipDesign, Build your ASIC, GUIDE4HardwareSecurity, and Hardware Design) that assemble GUIDE units into full semester offerings, learning outcomes, and capstone projects, all based on proven materials. For example, the GUIDE4HardwareSecurity course includes a project on LLM-aided hardware Trojan insertion that has been successfully deployed in the classroom and in Cybersecurity Games and Conference (CSAW), a student competition and academic conference for cybersecurity. We also organized an NYU Cognichip Hackathon, engaging students across 24 international teams in AI-assisted RTL design workflows. The GUIDE repository is open for contributions and available at: https://github.com/FCHXWH823/LLM4ChipDesign.

The MXFP4 microscaling format, which partitions tensors into blocks of 32 elements sharing an E8M0 scaling factor, has emerged as a promising substrate for efficient LLM inference, backed by native hardware support on NVIDIA Blackwell Tensor Cores. However, activation outliers pose a unique challenge under this format: a single outlier inflates the shared block scale, compressing the effective dynamic range of the remaining elements and causing significant quantization error. Existing rotation-based remedies, including randomized Hadamard and learnable rotations, are data-agnostic and therefore unable to specifically target the channels where outliers concentrate. We propose DuQuant++, which adapts the outlier-aware fine-grained rotation of DuQuant to the MXFP4 format by aligning the rotation block size with the microscaling group size (B{=}32). Because each MXFP4 group possesses an independent scaling factor, the cross-block variance issue that necessitates dual rotations and a zigzag permutation in the original DuQuant becomes irrelevant, enabling DuQuant++ to replace the entire pipeline with a single outlier-aware rotation, which halves the online rotation cost while simultaneously smoothing the weight distribution. Extensive experiments on the LLaMA-3 family under MXFP4 W4A4 quantization show that DuQuant++ consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance. Our code is available at https://github.com/Hsu1023/DuQuant-v2.

Solving complex real-world tasks requires cycles of actions and observations. This is particularly true in science, where tasks require many cycles of analysis, tool use, and experimentation. Language agents are promising for automating intellectual tasks in science because they can interact with tools via natural language or code. Yet their flexibility creates conceptual and practical challenges for software implementations, since agents may comprise non-standard components such as internal reasoning, planning, tool usage, as well as the inherent stochasticity of temperature-sampled language models. Here, we introduce Aviary, an extensible gymnasium for language agents. We formalize agents as policies solving language-grounded partially observable Markov decision processes, which we term language decision processes. We then implement five environments, including three challenging scientific environments: (1) manipulating DNA constructs for molecular cloning, (2) answering research questions by accessing scientific literature, and (3) engineering protein stability. These environments were selected for their focus on multi-step reasoning and their relevance to contemporary biology research. Finally, with online training and scaling inference-time compute, we show that language agents backed by open-source, non-frontier LLMs can match and exceed both frontier LLM agents and human experts on multiple tasks at up to 100x lower inference cost.

Detecting whether a model has been poisoned is a longstanding problem in AI security. In this work, we present a practical scanner for identifying sleeper agent-style backdoors in causal language models. Our approach relies on two key findings: first, sleeper agents tend to memorize poisoning data, making it possible to leak backdoor examples using memory extraction techniques. Second, poisoned LLMs exhibit distinctive patterns in their output distributions and attention heads when backdoor triggers are present in the input. Guided by these observations, we develop a scalable backdoor scanning methodology that assumes no prior knowledge of the trigger or target behavior and requires only inference operations. Our scanner integrates naturally into broader defensive strategies and does not alter model performance. We show that our method recovers working triggers across multiple backdoor scenarios and a broad range of models and fine-tuning methods.

We present SQL Query Engine, an open-source, self-hosted service that translates natural language questions into validated PostgreSQL queries through a two-stage LLM pipeline. The first stage performs automatic schema introspection and SQL generation; a multi-strategy response parser extracts SQL from any LLM output format (JSON, code blocks, or raw text) without requiring structured output APIs. The second stage executes the query against PostgreSQL and, upon failure or empty results, enters an iterative self-healing loop in which the LLM diagnoses the error using full SQLSTATE codes and PostgreSQL diagnostic messages. Two mechanisms prevent regressions: early-accept returns successful queries immediately without LLM re-evaluation, and best-result tracking preserves the best partial result across retries. Schema context is cached per session in Redis, progress events stream via Redis Pub/Sub and SSE, and an OpenAI-compatible /v1/chat/completions endpoint lets existing tools work without modification. All database connections are read-only at the driver level. We evaluate across five LLM backends on a synthetic benchmark (75 questions, three databases) where the self-healing loop yields up to +9.3pp accuracy gains with zero regressions on the best model (Llama 4 Scout 17B, 57.3%), and on BIRD (437 questions, 11 databases migrated from SQLite to PostgreSQL) where the full pipeline reaches 49.0% execution accuracy (GPT-OSS-120B, +4.6pp). Source code: https://github.com/codeadeel/sqlqueryengine.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can acquire deceptive behaviors through backdoor attacks, where the model executes prohibited actions whenever secret triggers appear in the input. Existing safety training methods largely fail to address this vulnerability, due to the inherent difficulty of uncovering hidden triggers implanted in the model. Motivated by recent findings on LLMs' situational awareness, we propose a novel post-training framework that cultivates self-awareness of backdoor risks and enables models to articulate implanted triggers even when they are absent from the prompt. At its core, our approach introduces an inversion-inspired reinforcement learning framework that encourages models to introspectively reason about their own behaviors and reverse-engineer the triggers responsible for misaligned outputs. Guided by curated reward signals, this process transforms a poisoned model into one capable of precisely identifying its implanted trigger. Surprisingly, we observe that such backdoor self-awareness emerges abruptly within a short training window, resembling a phase transition in capability. Building on this emergent property, we further present two complementary defense strategies for mitigating and detecting backdoor threats. Experiments on five backdoor attacks, compared against six baseline methods, demonstrate that our approach has strong potential to improve the robustness of LLMs against backdoor risks. The code is available at LLM Backdoor Self-Awareness.

Effective human-AI collaboration on complex reasoning tasks requires that users understand and interact with the model's process, not just receive an output. However, the monolithic text from methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prevents this, as current interfaces lack real-time verbalization and robust user barge-in. We present AsyncVoice Agent, a system whose asynchronous architecture decouples a streaming LLM backend from a conversational voice frontend. This design allows narration and inference to run in parallel, empowering users to interrupt, query, and steer the model's reasoning process at any time. Objective benchmarks show this approach reduces interaction latency by more than 600x compared to monolithic baselines while ensuring high fidelity and competitive task accuracy. By enabling a two-way dialogue with a model's thought process, AsyncVoice Agent offers a new paradigm for building more effective, steerable, and trustworthy human-AI systems for high-stakes tasks.

We present OnPrem.LLM, a Python-based toolkit for applying large language models (LLMs) to sensitive, non-public data in offline or restricted environments. The system is designed for privacy-preserving use cases and provides prebuilt pipelines for document processing and storage, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), information extraction, summarization, classification, and prompt/output processing with minimal configuration. OnPrem.LLM supports multiple LLM backends -- including llama.cpp, Ollama, vLLM, and Hugging Face Transformers -- with quantized model support, GPU acceleration, and seamless backend switching. Although designed for fully local execution, OnPrem.LLM also supports integration with a wide range of cloud LLM providers when permitted, enabling hybrid deployments that balance performance with data control. A no-code web interface extends accessibility to non-technical users.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to solve tasks that are beyond the reach of any single LLM. However, this potential can only be realized when the collaboration mechanism between agents is optimized. Specifically, optimizing the communication structure between agents is critical for fruitful collaboration. Most existing approaches rely on fixed topologies, pretrained graph generators, optimization over edges, or employ external LLM judges, thereby adding to the complexity. In this work, we introduce a response-conditioned framework that adapts communication on-the-fly. Agents independently generate responses to the user query and assess peer contributions using an approximation of the Shapley value. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is then constructed to regulate the propagation of the responses among agents, which ensures stable and efficient message transmission from high-contributing agents to others. This graph is dynamically updated based on the agent responses from the previous collaboration round. Since the proposed framework enables the self-organization of agents without additional supervision or training, we refer to it as SelfOrg. The SelfOrg framework goes beyond task- and query-level optimization and takes into account the stochastic nature of agent responses. Experiments with both strong and weak LLM backends demonstrate robust performance, with significant gains in the weak regime where prior methods collapse. We also theoretically show that multiple agents increase the chance of correctness and that the correct responses naturally dominate the information flow.

Cybersecurity honeypots are deception tools for engaging attackers and gather intelligence, but traditional low or medium-interaction honeypots often rely on static, pre-scripted interactions that can be easily identified by skilled adversaries. This Report presents LLMHoney, an SSH honeypot that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate realistic, dynamic command outputs in real time. LLMHoney integrates a dictionary-based virtual file system to handle common commands with low latency while using LLMs for novel inputs, achieving a balance between authenticity and performance. We implemented LLMHoney using open-source LLMs and evaluated it on a testbed with 138 representative Linux commands. We report comprehensive metrics including accuracy (exact-match, Cosine Similarity, Jaro-Winkler Similarity, Levenshtein Similarity and BLEU score), response latency and memory overhead. We evaluate LLMHoney using multiple LLM backends ranging from 0.36B to 3.8B parameters, including both open-source models and a proprietary model(Gemini). Our experiments compare 13 different LLM variants; results show that Gemini-2.0 and moderately-sized models Qwen2.5:1.5B and Phi3:3.8B provide the most reliable and accurate responses, with mean latencies around 3 seconds, whereas smaller models often produce incorrect or out-of-character outputs. We also discuss how LLM integration improves honeypot realism and adaptability compared to traditional honeypots, as well as challenges such as occasional hallucinated outputs and increased resource usage. Our findings demonstrate that LLM-driven honeypots are a promising approach to enhance attacker engagement and collect richer threat intelligence.

We present APT, an advanced Large Language Model (LLM)-driven framework that enables autonomous agents to construct complex and creative structures within the Minecraft environment. Unlike previous approaches that primarily concentrate on skill-based open-world tasks or rely on image-based diffusion models for generating voxel-based structures, our method leverages the intrinsic spatial reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By employing chain-of-thought decomposition along with multimodal inputs, the framework generates detailed architectural layouts and blueprints that the agent can execute under zero-shot or few-shot learning scenarios. Our agent incorporates both memory and reflection modules to facilitate lifelong learning, adaptive refinement, and error correction throughout the building process. To rigorously evaluate the agent's performance in this emerging research area, we introduce a comprehensive benchmark consisting of diverse construction tasks designed to test creativity, spatial reasoning, adherence to in-game rules, and the effective integration of multimodal instructions. Experimental results using various GPT-based LLM backends and agent configurations demonstrate the agent's capacity to accurately interpret extensive instructions involving numerous items, their positions, and orientations. The agent successfully produces complex structures complete with internal functionalities such as Redstone-powered systems. A/B testing indicates that the inclusion of a memory module leads to a significant increase in performance, emphasizing its role in enabling continuous learning and the reuse of accumulated experience. Additionally, the agent's unexpected emergence of scaffolding behavior highlights the potential of future LLM-driven agents to utilize subroutine planning and leverage the emergence ability of LLMs to autonomously develop human-like problem-solving techniques.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

With recent advances in automatic speech recognition (ASR), large language models (LLMs), and text-to-speech (TTS) technologies, spoken dialogue systems (SDS) have become widely accessible. However, most existing SDS are limited to conventional spoken responses. We present SingingSDS, a cascaded SDS that responds through singing rather than speaking, fostering more affective, memorable, and pleasurable interactions in character-based roleplay and interactive entertainment scenarios. SingingSDS employs a modular ASR-LLM-SVS pipeline and supports a wide range of configurations across character personas, ASR and LLM backends, SVS models, melody sources, and voice profiles, tailored to different needs in terms of latency, quality, and musical style. SingingSDS is available as a plug-and-play web demo, featuring modular, open-source code that supports customization and extension. Demo: https://huggingface.co/spaces/espnet/SingingSDS. Code: https://github.com/SingingSDS/SingingSDS.

High-quality conversational datasets are integral to the successful development of Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) that employ a Large Language Model (LLM) backend. These datasets, when used to fine-tune the LLM backend, significantly enhance the quality of interactions between students and ITS. A common strategy for developing these datasets involves generating synthetic student-teacher dialogues using advanced GPT-4 models. However, challenges arise when these dialogues demand complex calculations, common in subjects like physics. Despite its advanced capabilities, GPT-4's performance falls short in reliably handling even simple multiplication tasks, marking a significant limitation in its utility for these subjects. To address these challenges, this paper introduces an innovative stateful prompt design. Our approach generates a mock conversation between a student and a tutorbot, both roles simulated by GPT-4. Each student response triggers a soliloquy (an inner monologue) in the GPT-tutorbot, which assesses whether its response would necessitate calculations. If so, it proceeds to script the required code in Python and then uses the resulting output to construct its response to the student. Our approach notably enhances the quality of synthetic conversation datasets, especially for subjects that are calculation-intensive. Our findings show that our Higgs model -- a LLaMA finetuned with datasets generated through our novel stateful prompt design -- proficiently utilizes Python for computations. Consequently, finetuning with our datasets enriched with code soliloquies enhances not just the accuracy but also the computational reliability of Higgs' responses.

The emergence of LLMs has catalyzed a paradigm shift in autonomous agent development, enabling systems capable of reasoning, planning, and executing complex multi-step tasks. However, existing agent frameworks often suffer from architectural rigidity, vendor lock-in, and prohibitive complexity that impedes rapid prototyping and deployment. This paper presents AgentForge, a lightweight, open-source Python framework designed to democratize the construction of LLM-driven autonomous agents through a principled modular architecture. AgentForge introduces three key innovations: (1) a composable skill abstraction that enables fine-grained task decomposition with formally defined input-output contracts, (2) a unified LLM backend interface supporting seamless switching between cloud-based APIs and local inference engines, and (3) a declarative YAML-based configuration system that separates agent logic from implementation details. We formalize the skill composition mechanism as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and prove its expressiveness for representing arbitrary sequential and parallel task workflows. Comprehensive experimental evaluation across four benchmark scenarios demonstrates that AgentForge achieves competitive task completion rates while reducing development time by 62% compared to LangChain and 78% compared to direct API integration. Latency measurements confirm sub-100ms orchestration overhead, rendering the framework suitable for real-time applications. The modular design facilitates extension: we demonstrate the integration of six built-in skills and provide comprehensive documentation for custom skill development. AgentForge addresses a critical gap in the LLM agent ecosystem by providing researchers and practitioners with a production-ready foundation for constructing, evaluating, and deploying autonomous agents without sacrificing flexibility or performance.

We present InternLM-XComposer-2.5 (IXC-2.5), a versatile large-vision language model that supports long-contextual input and output. IXC-2.5 excels in various text-image comprehension and composition applications, achieving GPT-4V level capabilities with merely 7B LLM backend. Trained with 24K interleaved image-text contexts, it can seamlessly extend to 96K long contexts via RoPE extrapolation. This long-context capability allows IXC-2.5 to excel in tasks requiring extensive input and output contexts. Compared to its previous 2.0 version, InternLM-XComposer-2.5 features three major upgrades in vision-language comprehension: (1) Ultra-High Resolution Understanding, (2) Fine-Grained Video Understanding, and (3) Multi-Turn Multi-Image Dialogue. In addition to comprehension, IXC-2.5 extends to two compelling applications using extra LoRA parameters for text-image composition: (1) Crafting Webpages and (2) Composing High-Quality Text-Image Articles. IXC-2.5 has been evaluated on 28 benchmarks, outperforming existing open-source state-of-the-art models on 16 benchmarks. It also surpasses or competes closely with GPT-4V and Gemini Pro on 16 key tasks. The InternLM-XComposer-2.5 is publicly available at https://github.com/InternLM/InternLM-XComposer.

As AI agents become integral to enterprise workflows, their reliance on shared tool libraries and pre-trained components creates significant supply chain vulnerabilities. While previous work has demonstrated behavioral backdoor detection within individual LLM architectures, the critical question of cross-LLM generalization remains unexplored, a gap with serious implications for organizations deploying multiple AI systems. We present the first systematic study of cross-LLM behavioral backdoor detection, evaluating generalization across six production LLMs (GPT-5.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Grok 4.1, Llama 4 Maverick, GPT-OSS 120B, and DeepSeek Chat V3.1). Through 1,198 execution traces and 36 cross-model experiments, we quantify a critical finding: single-model detectors achieve 92.7% accuracy within their training distribution but only 49.2% across different LLMs, a 43.4 percentage point generalization gap equivalent to random guessing. Our analysis reveals that this gap stems from model-specific behavioral signatures, particularly in temporal features (coefficient of variation > 0.8), while structural features remain stable across architectures. We show that model-aware detection incorporating model identity as an additional feature achieves 90.6% accuracy universally across all evaluated models. We release our multi-LLM trace dataset and detection framework to enable reproducible research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed code completion tasks, providing context-based suggestions to boost developer productivity in software engineering. As users often fine-tune these models for specific applications, poisoning and backdoor attacks can covertly alter the model outputs. To address this critical security challenge, we introduce CodeBreaker, a pioneering LLM-assisted backdoor attack framework on code completion models. Unlike recent attacks that embed malicious payloads in detectable or irrelevant sections of the code (e.g., comments), CodeBreaker leverages LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for sophisticated payload transformation (without affecting functionalities), ensuring that both the poisoned data for fine-tuning and generated code can evade strong vulnerability detection. CodeBreaker stands out with its comprehensive coverage of vulnerabilities, making it the first to provide such an extensive set for evaluation. Our extensive experimental evaluations and user studies underline the strong attack performance of CodeBreaker across various settings, validating its superiority over existing approaches. By integrating malicious payloads directly into the source code with minimal transformation, CodeBreaker challenges current security measures, underscoring the critical need for more robust defenses for code completion.

Large language model (LLM) unlearning has become a critical mechanism for removing undesired data, knowledge, or behaviors from pre-trained models while retaining their general utility. Yet, with the rise of open-weight LLMs, we ask: can the unlearning process itself be backdoored, appearing successful under normal conditions yet reverting to pre-unlearned behavior when a hidden trigger is activated? Drawing inspiration from classical backdoor attacks that embed triggers into training data to enforce specific behaviors, we investigate backdoor unlearning, where models forget as intended in the clean setting but recover forgotten knowledge when the trigger appears. We show that designing such attacks presents unique challenges, hinging on where triggers are placed and how backdoor training is reinforced. We uncover a strong link between backdoor efficacy and the attention sink phenomenon, i.e., shallow input tokens consistently attract disproportionate attention in LLMs. Our analysis reveals that these attention sinks serve as gateways for backdoor unlearning: placing triggers at sink positions and aligning their attention values markedly enhances backdoor persistence. Extensive experiments validate these findings, showing that attention-sink-guided backdoor unlearning reliably restores forgotten knowledge in the presence of backdoor triggers, while behaving indistinguishably from a normally unlearned model when triggers are absent. Code is available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Backdoor.

Recent developments of vision large language models (LLMs) have seen remarkable progress, yet still encounter challenges towards multimodal generalists, such as coarse-grained instance-level understanding, lack of unified support for both images and videos, and insufficient coverage across various vision tasks. In this paper, we present VITRON, a universal pixel-level vision LLM designed for comprehensive understanding, generating, segmenting, and editing of both static images and dynamic videos. Building on top of an LLM backbone, VITRON incorporates encoders for images, videos, and pixel-level regional visuals within its frontend modules, while employing state-of-the-art visual specialists as its backend, via which VITRON supports a spectrum of vision end tasks, spanning visual comprehension to visual generation, from low level to high level. To ensure an effective and precise message passing from LLM to backend modules for function invocation, we propose a novel hybrid method by simultaneously integrating discrete textual instructions and continuous signal embeddings. Further, we design various pixel-level spatiotemporal vision-language alignment learning for VITRON to reach the best fine-grained visual capability. Finally, a cross-task synergy module is advised to learn to maximize the task-invariant fine-grained visual features, enhancing the synergy between different visual tasks. Demonstrated over 12 visual tasks and evaluated across 22 datasets, VITRON showcases its extensive capabilities in the four main vision task clusters. Overall, this work illuminates the great potential of developing a more unified multimodal generalist. Project homepage: https://vitron-llm.github.io/

Multi-agent LLM systems enable advanced reasoning and tool use via role specialization, yet reliable reinforcement learning (RL) post-training for such systems remains difficult. In this work, we theoretically pinpoint a key reason for training instability when extending group-based RL to multi-agent LLM systems. We show that under GRPO-style optimization, a global normalization baseline may deviate from diverse agents' reward distributions, which ultimately leads to gradient-norm instability. Based on this finding, we propose Dr. MAS, a simple and stable RL training recipe for multi-agent LLM systems. Dr. MAS uses an agent-wise remedy: normalizing advantages per agent using each agent's own reward statistics, which calibrates gradient scales and dramatically stabilizes training, both theoretically and empirically. Beyond the algorithm, Dr. MAS provides an end-to-end RL training framework for multi-agent LLM systems, supporting scalable orchestration, flexible per-agent LLM serving and optimization configs, and shared resource scheduling of LLM actor backends. We evaluate Dr. MAS on multi-agent math reasoning and multi-turn search benchmarks using Qwen2.5 and Qwen3 series models. Dr. MAS achieves clear gains over vanilla GRPO (e.g., +5.6\% avg@16 and +4.6\% pass@16 on math, and +15.2\% avg@16 and +13.1\% pass@16 on search) while largely eliminating gradient spikes. Moreover, it remains highly effective under heterogeneous agent-model assignments while improving efficiency.

Best-of-N decoding methods instruct large language models (LLMs) to generate multiple solutions, score each using a scoring function, and select the highest scored as the final answer to mathematical reasoning problems. However, this repeated independent process often leads to the same mistakes, making the selected solution still incorrect. We propose a novel prompting method named Stepwise Correction (StepCo) that helps LLMs identify and revise incorrect steps in their generated reasoning paths. It iterates verification and revision phases that employ a process-supervised verifier. The verify-then-revise process not only improves answer correctness but also reduces token consumption with fewer paths needed to generate. With StepCo, a series of LLMs demonstrate exceptional performance. Notably, using GPT-4o as the backend LLM, StepCo achieves an average accuracy of 94.1 across eight datasets, significantly outperforming the state-of-the-art Best-of-N method by +2.4, while reducing token consumption by 77.8%.

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable a new ecosystem with many downstream applications, called LLM applications, with different natural language processing tasks. The functionality and performance of an LLM application highly depend on its system prompt, which instructs the backend LLM on what task to perform. Therefore, an LLM application developer often keeps a system prompt confidential to protect its intellectual property. As a result, a natural attack, called prompt leaking, is to steal the system prompt from an LLM application, which compromises the developer's intellectual property. Existing prompt leaking attacks primarily rely on manually crafted queries, and thus achieve limited effectiveness. In this paper, we design a novel, closed-box prompt leaking attack framework, called PLeak, to optimize an adversarial query such that when the attacker sends it to a target LLM application, its response reveals its own system prompt. We formulate finding such an adversarial query as an optimization problem and solve it with a gradient-based method approximately. Our key idea is to break down the optimization goal by optimizing adversary queries for system prompts incrementally, i.e., starting from the first few tokens of each system prompt step by step until the entire length of the system prompt. We evaluate PLeak in both offline settings and for real-world LLM applications, e.g., those on Poe, a popular platform hosting such applications. Our results show that PLeak can effectively leak system prompts and significantly outperforms not only baselines that manually curate queries but also baselines with optimized queries that are modified and adapted from existing jailbreaking attacks. We responsibly reported the issues to Poe and are still waiting for their response. Our implementation is available at this repository: https://github.com/BHui97/PLeak.

Transformers, driven by attention mechanisms, form the foundation of large language models (LLMs). As these models scale up, efficient GPU attention kernels become essential for high-throughput and low-latency inference. Diverse LLM applications demand flexible and high-performance attention solutions. We present FlashInfer: a customizable and efficient attention engine for LLM serving. FlashInfer tackles KV-cache storage heterogeneity using block-sparse format and composable formats to optimize memory access and reduce redundancy. It also offers a customizable attention template, enabling adaptation to various settings through Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation. Additionally, FlashInfer's load-balanced scheduling algorithm adjusts to dynamism of user requests while maintaining compatibility with CUDAGraph which requires static configuration. FlashInfer have been integrated into leading LLM serving frameworks like SGLang, vLLM and MLC-Engine. Comprehensive kernel-level and end-to-end evaluations demonstrate FlashInfer's ability to significantly boost kernel performance across diverse inference scenarios: compared to state-of-the-art LLM serving solutions, FlashInfer achieve 29-69% inter-token-latency reduction compared to compiler backends for LLM serving benchmark, 28-30% latency reduction for long-context inference, and 13-17% speedup for LLM serving with parallel generation.

The field of Artificial Intelligence is undergoing a transition from Generative AI -- probabilistic generation of text and images -- to Agentic AI, in which autonomous systems execute actions within external environments on behalf of users. This transition exposes a fundamental architectural mismatch: Large Language Models (LLMs) produce stochastic, unstructured outputs, whereas the backend infrastructure they must control -- databases, APIs, cloud services -- requires deterministic, schema-conformant inputs. The present paper describes the Auton Agentic AI Framework, a principled architecture for standardizing the creation, execution, and governance of autonomous agent systems. The framework is organized around a strict separation between the Cognitive Blueprint, a declarative, language-agnostic specification of agent identity and capabilities, and the Runtime Engine, the platform-specific execution substrate that instantiates and runs the agent. This separation enables cross-language portability, formal auditability, and modular tool integration via the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The paper formalizes the agent execution model as an augmented Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) with a latent reasoning space, introduces a hierarchical memory consolidation architecture inspired by biological episodic memory systems, defines a constraint manifold formalism for safety enforcement via policy projection rather than post-hoc filtering, presents a three-level self-evolution framework spanning in-context adaptation through reinforcement learning, and describes runtime optimizations -- including parallel graph execution, speculative inference, and dynamic context pruning -- that reduce end-to-end latency for multi-step agent workflows.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental variables based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to Theory of Mind reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use rigid, handcrafted Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models, which are more robust but cannot generalize across different domains. In this work, we introduce AutoToM, an automated Bayesian Theory of Mind method for achieving open-ended machine Theory of Mind. AutoToM can operate in any domain, infer any mental variable, and conduct robust Theory of Mind reasoning of any order. Given a Theory of Mind inference problem, AutoToM first proposes an initial BToM model. It then conducts automated Bayesian inverse planning based on the proposed model, leveraging an LLM as the backend. Based on the uncertainty of the inference, it iteratively refines the model, by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Empirical evaluations across multiple Theory of Mind benchmarks demonstrate that AutoToM consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance, offering a scalable, robust, and interpretable approach to machine Theory of Mind.

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) demonstrate increasing integration into next-generation applications, but their safety in backdoor attacks remains largely underexplored. However, existing research has focused exclusively on single-agent backdoor attacks, overlooking the novel attack surfaces introduced by agent collaboration in MAS. To bridge this gap, we present the first Distributed Backdoor Attack tailored to MAS. We decompose the backdoor into multiple distributed attack primitives that are embedded within MAS tools. These primitives remain dormant individually but collectively activate only when agents collaborate in a specific sequence, thereby assembling the full backdoor to execute targeted attacks such as data exfiltration. To fully assess this threat, we introduce a benchmark for multi-role collaborative tasks and a sandboxed framework to evaluate. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our attack achieves an attack success rate exceeding 95% without degrading performance on benign tasks. This work exposes novel backdoor attack surfaces that exploit agent collaboration, underscoring the need to move beyond single-agent protection. Code and benchmark are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/Distributed-Backdoor-Attacks-in-MAS.

With the prosperity of large language models (LLMs), powerful LLM-based intelligent agents have been developed to provide customized services with a set of user-defined tools. State-of-the-art methods for constructing LLM agents adopt trained LLMs and further fine-tune them on data for the agent task. However, we show that such methods are vulnerable to our proposed backdoor attacks named BadAgent on various agent tasks, where a backdoor can be embedded by fine-tuning on the backdoor data. At test time, the attacker can manipulate the deployed LLM agents to execute harmful operations by showing the trigger in the agent input or environment. To our surprise, our proposed attack methods are extremely robust even after fine-tuning on trustworthy data. Though backdoor attacks have been studied extensively in natural language processing, to the best of our knowledge, we could be the first to study them on LLM agents that are more dangerous due to the permission to use external tools. Our work demonstrates the clear risk of constructing LLM agents based on untrusted LLMs or data. Our code is public at https://github.com/DPamK/BadAgent

Leveraging the rapid development of Large Language Models LLMs, LLM-based agents have been developed to handle various real-world applications, including finance, healthcare, and shopping, etc. It is crucial to ensure the reliability and security of LLM-based agents during applications. However, the safety issues of LLM-based agents are currently under-explored. In this work, we take the first step to investigate one of the typical safety threats, backdoor attack, to LLM-based agents. We first formulate a general framework of agent backdoor attacks, then we present a thorough analysis on the different forms of agent backdoor attacks. Specifically, from the perspective of the final attacking outcomes, the attacker can either choose to manipulate the final output distribution, or only introduce malicious behavior in the intermediate reasoning process, while keeping the final output correct. Furthermore, the former category can be divided into two subcategories based on trigger locations: the backdoor trigger can be hidden either in the user query or in an intermediate observation returned by the external environment. We propose the corresponding data poisoning mechanisms to implement the above variations of agent backdoor attacks on two typical agent tasks, web shopping and tool utilization. Extensive experiments show that LLM-based agents suffer severely from backdoor attacks, indicating an urgent need for further research on the development of defenses against backdoor attacks on LLM-based agents. Warning: This paper may contain biased content.

As LLM-based agents become increasingly prevalent, backdoors can be implanted into agents through user queries or environment feedback, raising critical concerns regarding safety vulnerabilities. However, backdoor attacks are typically detectable by safety audits that analyze the reasoning process of agents. To this end, we propose a novel backdoor implantation strategy called Dynamically Encrypted Multi-Backdoor Implantation Attack. Specifically, we introduce dynamic encryption, which maps the backdoor into benign content, effectively circumventing safety audits. To enhance stealthiness, we further decompose the backdoor into multiple sub-backdoor fragments. Based on these advancements, backdoors are allowed to bypass safety audits significantly. Additionally, we present AgentBackdoorEval, a dataset designed for the comprehensive evaluation of agent backdoor attacks. Experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that our method achieves an attack success rate nearing 100\% while maintaining a detection rate of 0\%, illustrating its effectiveness in evading safety audits. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing safety mechanisms in detecting advanced attacks, underscoring the urgent need for more robust defenses against backdoor threats. Code and data are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/DemonAgent.

Large language model (LLM) agents execute tasks through multi-step workflows that combine planning, memory, and tool use. While this design enables autonomy, it also expands the attack surface for backdoor threats. Backdoor triggers injected into specific stages of an agent workflow can persist through multiple intermediate states and adversely influence downstream outputs. However, existing studies remain fragmented and typically analyze individual attack vectors in isolation, leaving the cross-stage interaction and propagation of backdoor triggers poorly understood from an agent-centric perspective. To fill this gap, we propose BackdoorAgent, a modular and stage-aware framework that provides a unified, agent-centric view of backdoor threats in LLM agents. BackdoorAgent structures the attack surface into three functional stages of agentic workflows, including planning attacks, memory attacks, and tool-use attacks, and instruments agent execution to enable systematic analysis of trigger activation and propagation across different stages. Building on this framework, we construct a standardized benchmark spanning four representative agent applications: Agent QA, Agent Code, Agent Web, and Agent Drive, covering both language-only and multimodal settings. Our empirical analysis shows that triggers implanted at a single stage can persist across multiple steps and propagate through intermediate states. For instance, when using a GPT-based backbone, we observe trigger persistence in 43.58\% of planning attacks, 77.97\% of memory attacks, and 60.28\% of tool-stage attacks, highlighting the vulnerabilities of the agentic workflow itself to backdoor threats. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and benchmark are publicly available at GitHub.

Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to the secure deployment of large language models (LLMs), enabling adversaries to implant hidden behaviors triggered by specific inputs. However, existing methods often rely on manually crafted triggers and static data pipelines, which are rigid, labor-intensive, and inadequate for systematically evaluating modern defense robustness. As AI agents become increasingly capable, there is a growing need for more rigorous, diverse, and scalable red-teaming frameworks that can realistically simulate backdoor threats and assess model resilience under adversarial conditions. In this work, we introduce AutoBackdoor, a general framework for automating backdoor injection, encompassing trigger generation, poisoned data construction, and model fine-tuning via an autonomous agent-driven pipeline. Unlike prior approaches, AutoBackdoor uses a powerful language model agent to generate semantically coherent, context-aware trigger phrases, enabling scalable poisoning across arbitrary topics with minimal human effort. We evaluate AutoBackdoor under three realistic threat scenarios, including Bias Recommendation, Hallucination Injection, and Peer Review Manipulation, to simulate a broad range of attacks. Experiments on both open-source and commercial models, including LLaMA-3, Mistral, Qwen, and GPT-4o, demonstrate that our method achieves over 90\% attack success with only a small number of poisoned samples. More importantly, we find that existing defenses often fail to mitigate these attacks, underscoring the need for more rigorous and adaptive evaluation techniques against agent-driven threats as explored in this work. All code, datasets, and experimental configurations will be merged into our primary repository at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

Here, we show that current LLM unlearning methods inherently reduce models' robustness, causing them to misbehave even when a single non-adversarial forget-token is present in the retain-query. Toward understanding underlying causes, we propose a novel theoretical framework that reframes the unlearning process as a backdoor attack and defense problem: we formulate how the forgetting process inadvertently learns to align forget-tokens (backdoor triggers) with the target-representations (target labels). As a result, forget-tokens act as backdoor triggers that, when activated in retain-queries, cause disruptions in unlearned models' behaviors, similar to successful backdoor attacks. The sense that, LLM unlearning methods themselves poison the model, make it more vulnerable to forget-tokens, and hide rather than erase target knowledge, describes their true mechanism. To mitigate the vulnerability caused by the forgetting process, we reinterpret the retaining process as a backdoor defense and propose Random Noise Augmentation (RNA), a lightweight, model and method-agnostic approach with theoretical guarantees for improving the robustness of unlearned models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RNA significantly improves the robustness of unlearned models while preserving forget and retain performances. This backdoor attack-defense framework offers insights into the mechanism of unlearning that can shed light on future research directions for improving unlearning robustness.

Mainstream backdoor attack methods typically demand substantial tuning data for poisoning, limiting their practicality and potentially degrading the overall performance when applied to Large Language Models (LLMs). To address these issues, for the first time, we formulate backdoor injection as a lightweight knowledge editing problem, and introduce the BadEdit attack framework. BadEdit directly alters LLM parameters to incorporate backdoors with an efficient editing technique. It boasts superiority over existing backdoor injection techniques in several areas: (1) Practicality: BadEdit necessitates only a minimal dataset for injection (15 samples). (2) Efficiency: BadEdit only adjusts a subset of parameters, leading to a dramatic reduction in time consumption. (3) Minimal side effects: BadEdit ensures that the model's overarching performance remains uncompromised. (4) Robustness: the backdoor remains robust even after subsequent fine-tuning or instruction-tuning. Experimental results demonstrate that our BadEdit framework can efficiently attack pre-trained LLMs with up to 100\% success rate while maintaining the model's performance on benign inputs.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) into autonomous agents has expanded the scope of AI coding from localized code generation to complex, repository-level, and execution-driven problem solving. However, current benchmarks predominantly evaluate code logic in static contexts, neglecting the dynamic, full-process requirements of real-world engineering, particularly in backend development which demands rigorous environment configuration and service deployment. To address this gap, we introduce ABC-Bench, a benchmark explicitly designed to evaluate agentic backend coding within a realistic, executable workflow. Using a scalable automated pipeline, we curated 224 practical tasks spanning 8 languages and 19 frameworks from open-source repositories. Distinct from previous evaluations, ABC-Bench require the agents to manage the entire development lifecycle from repository exploration to instantiating containerized services and pass the external end-to-end API tests. Our extensive evaluation reveals that even state-of-the-art models struggle to deliver reliable performance on these holistic tasks, highlighting a substantial disparity between current model capabilities and the demands of practical backend engineering. Our code is available at https://github.com/OpenMOSS/ABC-Bench.

Federated Learning (FL) offers a promising approach for collaborative machine learning across distributed devices. However, its adoption is hindered by the complexity of building reliable communication architectures and the need for expertise in both machine learning and network programming. This paper presents a comprehensive solution that simplifies the orchestration of FL tasks while integrating intent-based automation. We develop a user-friendly web application supporting the federated averaging (FedAvg) algorithm, enabling users to configure parameters through an intuitive interface. The backend solution efficiently manages communication between the parameter server and edge nodes. We also implement model compression and scheduling algorithms to optimize FL performance. Furthermore, we explore intent-based automation in FL using a fine-tuned Language Model (LLM) trained on a tailored dataset, allowing users to conduct FL tasks using high-level prompts. We observe that the LLM-based automated solution achieves comparable test accuracy to the standard web-based solution while reducing transferred bytes by up to 64% and CPU time by up to 46% for FL tasks. Also, we leverage the neural architecture search (NAS) and hyperparameter optimization (HPO) using LLM to improve the performance. We observe that by using this approach test accuracy can be improved by 10-20% for the carried out FL tasks.

Large language model (LLM) agents now execute long, tool-using tasks where final outcome checks can arrive too late for intervention. Online warning requires lightweight prefix monitors over heterogeneous traces, but hand-authored event schemas are brittle and deployment-time LLM judging is costly. We introduce PrefixGuard, a trace-to-monitor framework with an offline StepView induction step followed by supervised monitor training. StepView induces deterministic typed-step adapters from raw trace samples, and the monitor learns an event abstraction and prefix-risk scorer from terminal outcomes. Across WebArena, τ^2-Bench, SkillsBench, and TerminalBench, the strongest PrefixGuard monitors reach 0.900/0.710/0.533/0.557 AUPRC. Using the strongest backend within each representation, they improve over raw-text controls by an average of +0.137 AUPRC. LLM judges remain substantially weaker under the same prefix-warning protocol. We also derive an observability ceiling on score-based area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) that separates monitor error from failures lacking evidence in the observed prefix. For finite-state audit, post-hoc deterministic finite automaton (DFA) extraction remains compact on WebArena and τ^2-Bench (29 and 20 states) but expands to 151 and 187 states on SkillsBench and TerminalBench. Finally, first-alert diagnostics show that strong ranking does not imply deployment utility: WebArena ranks well yet fails to support low-false-alarm alerts, whereas τ^2-Bench and TerminalBench retain more actionable early alerts. Together, these results position PrefixGuard as a practical monitor-synthesis recipe with explicit diagnostics for when prefix warnings translate into actionable interventions.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has created a vibrant ecosystem of diverse architectures, each with unique strengths due to differences in design, training data, and objectives. However, most applications still rely on a single backend model, limiting coverage of capabilities and leading to inefficiencies in performance and token cost when tackling complex tasks. We highlight an underexploited opportunity: LLM routing data, produced when hosting platforms route diverse queries to different models, which can reveal comparative strengths across tasks. To address this, we propose FusionBench, a comprehensive routing benchmark covering 14 tasks across five domains with 20 open-source LLMs (8B to 671B parameters), capturing 103M tokens and summarizing reusable thought templates from top models. Building on this, we introduce FusionFactory, a systematic fusion framework with three levels: (1) query-level fusion, tailoring routers for each query using both direct responses and reasoning-augmented outputs; (2) thought-level fusion, leveraging abstract templates derived from top-performing LLMs' answers to similar queries; and (3) model-level fusion, transferring capabilities between models via distillation, using top responses or highest judge scores as training data. Experiments show FusionFactory consistently outperforms the best individual LLM across all 14 benchmarks, with optimal fusion configurations varying by benchmark, demonstrating the value of systematic LLM fusion in harnessing complementary strengths and improving overall performance.

Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) is widely applied as the backend of fine-tuning APIs for large language model (LLM) customization in datacenters. Service providers deploy separate instances for individual PEFT tasks, giving rise to prominent resource inefficiencies, including (1) GPU underutilization from small-scale, PEFT-native operators and (2) device stalls from communication delays and data dependencies in parallelized execution. To address these issues, this paper presents MuxTune, a fine-tuning system that enables resource-efficient concurrent execution of multiple PEFT tasks. The key idea is to multiplex the backbone across independent tasks in a spatial-temporal manner for improved utilization and reduced stalls. Building on flexible, modularized backbone sharing via unified PEFT representations, MuxTune proposes hierarchical co-scheduling scheme with task, operator, and data-level optimizations. Specifically, it fuses tasks through a hybrid of spatial and temporal multiplexing, and orchestrates multi-task operator execution in two-tiered hybrid parallelism. Additionally, MuxTune employs chunk-based data alignment to mitigate inter-task ineffective tokens. Experimental results demonstrate that MuxTune achieves up to 2.33times higher throughput and 5.29times memory reduction compared to three state-of-the-art baselines.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have emerged as a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, representing a specialized class of large language models (LLMs) designed to tackle complex reasoning tasks. The defining characteristic of LRMs lies in their extensive chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we identify a previously unexplored attack vector against LRMs, which we term "overthinking backdoors". We advance this concept by proposing a novel tunable backdoor, which moves beyond simple on/off attacks to one where an attacker can precisely control the extent of the model's reasoning verbosity. Our attack is implemented through a novel data poisoning methodology. It pairs a tunable trigger-where the number of repetitions signals the desired intensity-with a correspondingly verbose CoT response. These responses are programmatically generated by instructing a teacher LLM to inject a controlled number of redundant refinement steps into a correct reasoning process. The approach preserves output correctness, which ensures stealth and establishes the attack as a pure resource-consumption vector. Extensive empirical results on various LRMs demonstrate that our method can reliably trigger a controllable, multi-fold increase in the length of the reasoning process, without degrading the final answer's correctness. Our source code is available at https://github.com/FZaKK/BadReasoner.

GCC and LLVM underpin much of modern software infrastructure, relying on distinct Intermediate Representations (IRs) to drive optimizations and code generation. However, the semantic and structural differences between these IRs create significant barriers for cross-toolchain interaction, limiting the reuse of compiler frontends, backends, and optimization pipelines across programming languages and compilation ecosystems. Traditional rule-based translators have attempted to bridge this gap, but their complexity and maintenance cost have hindered practical adoption. In this context, Large Language Models (LLMs) appear to be an emerging technology that offers a data-driven alternative, capable of learning complex mappings between heterogeneous compiler IRs directly from sufficiently representative examples. To explore this approach, this paper presents IRIS-14B, a 14-billion-parameter transformer model fine-tuned to translate GIMPLE (as emitted by GCC) to LLVM IR (as emitted by LLVM). The model is trained on paired IRs extracted from C sources and evaluated on the GIMPLE-to-LLVM IR transformation applied to IRs derived from real-world C code and competitive programming problems. To the best of our knowledge, IRIS-14B is the first model trained explicitly for IR-to-IR translation. It outperforms the accuracy of widely used models, including the largest state-of-the-art open models available today, ranging from 13 to 1,000 billion parameters, by up to 44 percentage points. The proposed transformation supports the integration of LLMs as complementary components within hybrid neuro-symbolic compiler architectures, where models such as IRIS-14B act as interoperability layers enabling cross-toolchain workflows without modifying existing compiler passes, while traditional compiler infrastructure continues to perform deterministic compilation and optimization.

Realistic evaluation of LLM serving systems requires online workloads, dynamic arrivals, queueing, and the serving engine's local scheduling for execution batching, but running such experiments on GPUs is expensive. Existing simulators reduce this cost, but often operate offline or in time-warped mode, re-implement serving-engine schedulers, or require accurate operator/kernel-level latency models. We present LLM-Emu, a serving-native emulator for vLLM that preserves the production HTTP, scheduling, KV-cache, and output-processing paths while replacing only GPU forward execution with profile-sampled latency and synthetic output tokens. Tested on two different GPUs, four model variants, two model families, two attention backends, and both Poisson and bursty ShareGPT workloads, LLM-Emu closely tracks real vLLM serving behavior: TPOT and ITL stay within 4.8% absolute error, E2E latency within 5.3%, and output throughput within 1.9%; TTFT is less stable, with maximum error 10.4%, reflecting its sensitivity to admission and queue state. These results suggest that lightweight, serving-native emulation can support practical online experimentation for LLM-serving systems. LLM-Emu is open sourced at https://github.com/AKafakA/llm-emu.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Chat template is a common technique used in the training and inference stages of Large Language Models (LLMs). It can transform input and output data into role-based and templated expressions to enhance the performance of LLMs. However, this also creates a breeding ground for novel attack surfaces. In this paper, we first reveal that the customizability of chat templates allows an attacker who controls the template to inject arbitrary strings into the system prompt without the user's notice. Building on this, we propose a training-free backdoor attack, termed BadTemplate. Specifically, BadTemplate inserts carefully crafted malicious instructions into the high-priority system prompt, thereby causing the target LLM to exhibit persistent backdoor behaviors. BadTemplate outperforms traditional backdoor attacks by embedding malicious instructions directly into the system prompt, eliminating the need for model retraining while achieving high attack effectiveness with minimal cost. Furthermore, its simplicity and scalability make it easily and widely deployed in real-world systems, raising serious risks of rapid propagation, economic damage, and large-scale misinformation. Furthermore, detection by major third-party platforms HuggingFace and LLM-as-a-judge proves largely ineffective against BadTemplate. Extensive experiments conducted on 5 benchmark datasets across 6 open-source and 3 closed-source LLMs, compared with 3 baselines, demonstrate that BadTemplate achieves up to a 100% attack success rate and significantly outperforms traditional prompt-based backdoors in both word-level and sentence-level attacks. Our work highlights the potential security risks raised by chat templates in the LLM supply chain, thereby supporting the development of effective defense mechanisms.

Neurosymbolic approaches integrating large language models with formal reasoning have recently achieved human-level performance on mathematics competition problems in algebra, geometry and number theory. In comparison, combinatorics remains a challenging domain, characterized by a lack of appropriate benchmarks and theorem libraries. To address this gap, we introduce CombiBench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 100 combinatorial problems, each formalized in Lean~4 and paired with its corresponding informal statement. The problem set covers a wide spectrum of difficulty levels, ranging from middle school to IMO and university level, and span over ten combinatorial topics. CombiBench is suitable for testing IMO solving capabilities since it includes all IMO combinatorial problems since 2000 (except IMO 2004 P3 as its statement contain an images). Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive and standardized evaluation framework, dubbed Fine-Eval (for Fill-in-the-blank in Lean Evaluation), for formal mathematics. It accommodates not only proof-based problems but also, for the first time, the evaluation of fill-in-the-blank questions. Using Fine-Eval as the evaluation method and Kimina Lean Server as the backend, we benchmark several LLMs on CombiBench and observe that their capabilities for formally solving combinatorial problems remain limited. Among all models tested (none of which has been trained for this particular task), Kimina-Prover attains the best results, solving 7 problems (out of 100) under both ``with solution'' and ``without solution'' scenarios. We open source the benchmark dataset alongside with the code of the proposed evaluation method at https://github.com/MoonshotAI/CombiBench/.

The remarkable performance of large language models (LLMs) in generation tasks has enabled practitioners to leverage publicly available models to power custom applications, such as chatbots and virtual assistants. However, the data used to train or fine-tune these LLMs is often undisclosed, allowing an attacker to compromise the data and inject backdoors into the models. In this paper, we develop a novel inference time defense, named CleanGen, to mitigate backdoor attacks for generation tasks in LLMs. CleanGenis a lightweight and effective decoding strategy that is compatible with the state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs. Our insight behind CleanGen is that compared to other LLMs, backdoored LLMs assign significantly higher probabilities to tokens representing the attacker-desired contents. These discrepancies in token probabilities enable CleanGen to identify suspicious tokens favored by the attacker and replace them with tokens generated by another LLM that is not compromised by the same attacker, thereby avoiding generation of attacker-desired content. We evaluate CleanGen against five SOTA backdoor attacks. Our results show that CleanGen achieves lower attack success rates (ASR) compared to five SOTA baseline defenses for all five backdoor attacks. Moreover, LLMs deploying CleanGen maintain helpfulness in their responses when serving benign user queries with minimal added computational overhead.

We address jailbreaks, backdoors, and unlearning for large language models (LLMs). Unlike prior work, which trains LLMs based on their actions when given malign instructions, our method specifically trains the model to change how it interprets instructions. Our method, Latent Instruction Representation Alignment (LIRA), greatly improves generalization. We further boost generalization through an internally adversarial training algorithm. Our methods block over 99% of PEZ jailbreak attacks; remove a challenging insecure code backdoor; and achieve optimal forgetting on WMDP cyber with negligible loss of benign capabilities.

Software testing plays a critical role in ensuring that systems behave as intended. However, existing automated testing approaches struggle to match the capabilities of human engineers due to key limitations such as test locality, lack of general reliability, and business logic blindness. In this work, we propose a novel framework that leverages functional programming and type systems to translate Scala backend code into formal Lean representations. Our pipeline automatically generates theorems that specify the intended behavior of APIs and database operations, and uses LLM-based provers to verify them. When a theorem is proved, the corresponding logic is guaranteed to be correct and no further testing is needed. If the negation of a theorem is proved instead, it confirms a bug. In cases where neither can be proved, human intervention is required. We evaluate our method on realistic backend systems and find that it can formally verify over 50% of the test requirements, which suggests that half of a testing engineer's workload can be automated. Additionally, with an average cost of only $2.19 per API, LLM-based verification is significantly more cost-effective than manual testing and can be scaled easily through parallel execution. Our results indicate a promising direction for scalable, AI-powered software testing, with the potential to greatly improve engineering productivity as models continue to advance.

Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant strides across various tasks, but they remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where specific triggers in the prompt cause the LLM to generate adversary-desired responses. While most backdoor research has focused on vision or text classification tasks, backdoor attacks in text generation have been largely overlooked. In this work, we introduce BackdoorLLM, the first comprehensive benchmark for studying backdoor attacks on LLMs. BackdoorLLM features: 1) a repository of backdoor benchmarks with a standardized training pipeline, 2) diverse attack strategies, including data poisoning, weight poisoning, hidden state attacks, and chain-of-thought attacks, 3) extensive evaluations with over 200 experiments on 8 attacks across 7 scenarios and 6 model architectures, and 4) key insights into the effectiveness and limitations of backdoors in LLMs. We hope BackdoorLLM will raise awareness of backdoor threats and contribute to advancing AI safety. The code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM.

LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, but their outputs often follow recurring templates that can induce predictable vulnerabilities. We study vulnerability persistence in LLM-generated software and introduce Feature--Security Table (FSTab) with two components. First, FSTab enables a black-box attack that predicts likely backend vulnerabilities from observable frontend features and knowledge of the source LLM, without access to backend code or source code. Second, FSTab provides a model-centric evaluation that quantifies how consistently a given model reproduces the same vulnerabilities across programs, semantics-preserving rephrasings, and application domains. We evaluate FSTab on state-of-the-art code LLMs, including GPT-5.2, Claude-4.5 Opus, and Gemini-3 Pro, across diverse application domains. Our results show strong cross-domain transfer: even when the target domain is excluded from training, FSTab achieves up to 94\% attack success and 93\% vulnerability coverage on Internal Tools (Claude-4.5 Opus). These findings expose an underexplored attack surface in LLM-generated software and highlight the security risks of code generation. Our code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/FSTab-024E.

Large language models (LLMs) are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks (BAs), wherein training samples are poisoned using trigger-based harmful content. Furthermore, existing defenses have proven ineffective when extensively tested across BA patterns. To better combat BAs, we explore the use of LLM rewriting as a proactive defense against data poisoning. First, we theoretically show that when LLM rewriting utilizes open-book benign samples--termed open-book benign rewriting (OBBR)--the probability of a rewritten output being benign is strictly greater than that of closed-book rewriting. Thus, OBBR neutralizes harmful content by projecting training samples to the space of benign prompts. We then show that, in contrast to previous defenses, OBBR effectively mitigates a large number of existing BAs: across five known BAs and four widely used LLMs, OBBR increases safety performance by an average 51% compared to state-of-the-art BA defenses and 25.7% compared to closed-book rewriting methods. Finally, we show that OBBR is computationally efficient relative to other BA defenses, does not degrade model performance on natural language tasks after fine-tuning, and is capable of defending against non-trigger based data poisoning attacks.

Why do we need another AI to help the AI? We argue you don't. Stateless LLM sessions impose re-orientation costs on iterative, session-heavy workflows. Prior work addresses cross-session memory through retrieval-augmented approaches: store history, embed it, retrieve by semantic similarity. Cross-session memory is a state management problem, not a search problem. Similarity search fails for named entity resolution within bounded vocabulary contexts because beliefs about a shared technical domain are semantically proximate by construction. A single user is the simplest bounded vocabulary context; engineering teams converge on the same property through shared codebases and terminology. We present Tenure, a local-first proxy that maintains a typed belief store with epistemic status, versioned supersession, and scope isolation, injecting curated context into every LLM session through precision-first retrieval. Hard scope isolation provides a structural guarantee: the right beliefs surface, and only within the boundaries the user has authorized. Tenure's typed schema converts extracted facts into imperative instructions via a why it matters field, making injected beliefs directly actionable rather than raw material for the model to re-derive. A controlled evaluation on 72 retrieval cases demonstrates the gap. Cosine similarity over dense embeddings achieves mean precision of 0.12. Alias-weighted BM25 maintains mean precision of 1.0, passing 72/72 cases versus 8/72 for cosine similarity on the same corpus. Hybrid retrieval typically solves vocabulary mismatch between disparate authors; Tenure eliminates this structurally: query and belief authors are the same person, and an alias enrichment flywheel continuously indexes their specific vocabulary. Under multi-turn topic drift this worsens: the vector backend produces drift scores of 0.43--0.50 on noise-critical turns where BM25 maintains 0.

Recent advancements in Korean large language models (LLMs) have spurred numerous benchmarks and evaluation methodologies, yet the lack of a standardized evaluation framework has led to inconsistent results and limited comparability. To address this, we introduce HRET Haerae Evaluation Toolkit, an open-source, self-evolving evaluation framework tailored specifically for Korean LLMs. HRET unifies diverse evaluation methods, including logit-based scoring, exact-match, language-inconsistency penalization, and LLM-as-a-Judge assessments. Its modular, registry-based architecture integrates major benchmarks (HAE-RAE Bench, KMMLU, KUDGE, HRM8K) and multiple inference backends (vLLM, HuggingFace, OpenAI-compatible endpoints). With automated pipelines for continuous evolution, HRET provides a robust foundation for reproducible, fair, and transparent Korean NLP research.

Recent advancements in Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) have significantly impacted the alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs). The sensitivity of reinforcement learning algorithms such as Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) has led to new line work on Direct Policy Optimization (DPO), which treats RLHF in a supervised learning framework. The increased practical use of these RLHF methods warrants an analysis of their vulnerabilities. In this work, we investigate the vulnerabilities of DPO to poisoning attacks under different scenarios and compare the effectiveness of preference poisoning, a first of its kind. We comprehensively analyze DPO's vulnerabilities under different types of attacks, i.e., backdoor and non-backdoor attacks, and different poisoning methods across a wide array of language models, i.e., LLama 7B, Mistral 7B, and Gemma 7B. We find that unlike PPO-based methods, which, when it comes to backdoor attacks, require at least 4\% of the data to be poisoned to elicit harmful behavior, we exploit the true vulnerabilities of DPO more simply so we can poison the model with only as much as 0.5\% of the data. We further investigate the potential reasons behind the vulnerability and how well this vulnerability translates into backdoor vs non-backdoor attacks.

Large language model (LLM) agents need to perform multi-turn interactions in real-world tasks. However, existing multi-turn RL algorithms for optimizing LLM agents fail to perform effective credit assignment over multiple turns while leveraging the generalization capabilities of LLMs and it remains unclear how to develop such algorithms. To study this, we first introduce a new benchmark, ColBench, where an LLM agent interacts with a human collaborator over multiple turns to solve realistic tasks in backend programming and frontend design. Building on this benchmark, we propose a novel RL algorithm, SWEET-RL (RL with Step-WisE Evaluation from Training-time information), that uses a carefully designed optimization objective to train a critic model with access to additional training-time information. The critic provides step-level rewards for improving the policy model. Our experiments demonstrate that SWEET-RL achieves a 6% absolute improvement in success and win rates on ColBench compared to other state-of-the-art multi-turn RL algorithms, enabling Llama-3.1-8B to match or exceed the performance of GPT4-o in realistic collaborative content creation.

Memory systems have been designed to leverage past experiences in Large Language Model (LLM) agents. However, many deployed memory systems primarily optimize compression and storage, with comparatively less emphasis on explicit, closed-loop control of memory retrieval. From this observation, we build memory retrieval as an autonomous, accurate, and compatible agent system, named MemR^3, which has two core mechanisms: 1) a router that selects among retrieve, reflect, and answer actions to optimize answer quality; 2) a global evidence-gap tracker that explicitly renders the answering process transparent and tracks the evidence collection process. This design departs from the standard retrieve-then-answer pipeline by introducing a closed-loop control mechanism that enables autonomous decision-making. Empirical results on the LoCoMo benchmark demonstrate that MemR^3 surpasses strong baselines on LLM-as-a-Judge score, and particularly, it improves existing retrievers across four categories with an overall improvement on RAG (+7.29%) and Zep (+1.94%) using GPT-4.1-mini backend, offering a plug-and-play controller for existing memory stores.

We present QueryGym, a lightweight, extensible Python toolkit that supports large language model (LLM)-based query reformulation. This is an important tool development since recent work on llm-based query reformulation has shown notable increase in retrieval effectiveness. However, while different authors have sporadically shared the implementation of their methods, there is no unified toolkit that provides a consistent implementation of such methods, which hinders fair comparison, rapid experimentation, consistent benchmarking and reliable deployment. QueryGym addresses this gap by providing a unified framework for implementing, executing, and comparing llm-based reformulation methods. The toolkit offers: (1) a Python API for applying diverse LLM-based methods, (2) a retrieval-agnostic interface supporting integration with backends such as Pyserini and PyTerrier, (3) a centralized prompt management system with versioning and metadata tracking, (4) built-in support for benchmarks like BEIR and MS MARCO, and (5) a completely open-source extensible implementation available to all researchers. QueryGym is publicly available at https://github.com/radinhamidi/QueryGym.

Advancements in large language models (LLMs) have unlocked remarkable capabilities. While deploying these models typically requires server-grade GPUs and cloud-based inference, the recent emergence of smaller open-source models and increasingly powerful consumer devices have made on-device deployment practical. The web browser as a platform for on-device deployment is universally accessible, provides a natural agentic environment, and conveniently abstracts out the different backends from diverse device vendors. To address this opportunity, we introduce WebLLM, an open-source JavaScript framework that enables high-performance LLM inference entirely within web browsers. WebLLM provides an OpenAI-style API for seamless integration into web applications, and leverages WebGPU for efficient local GPU acceleration and WebAssembly for performant CPU computation. With machine learning compilers MLC-LLM and Apache TVM, WebLLM leverages optimized WebGPU kernels, overcoming the absence of performant WebGPU kernel libraries. Evaluations show that WebLLM can retain up to 80% native performance on the same device, with room to further close the gap. WebLLM paves the way for universally accessible, privacy-preserving, personalized, and locally powered LLM applications in web browsers. The code is available at: https://github.com/mlc-ai/web-llm.

Reinforcement learning (RL) for large language models (LLMs) is increasingly bottlenecked by rollout (generation), where long output sequence lengths make attention and KV-cache memory dominate end-to-end step time. FP8 offers an attractive lever for accelerating RL by reducing compute cost and memory traffic during rollout, but applying FP8 in RL introduces unique engineering and algorithmic challenges: policy weights change every step (requiring repeated quantization and weight synchronization into the inference engine) and low-precision rollouts can deviate from the higher-precision policy assumed by the trainer, causing train-inference mismatch and potential instability. This report presents a practical FP8 rollout stack for LLM RL, implemented in the veRL ecosystem with support for common training backends (e.g., FSDP/Megatron-LM) and inference engines (e.g., vLLM/SGLang). We (i) enable FP8 W8A8 linear-layer rollout using blockwise FP8 quantization, (ii) extend FP8 to KV-cache to remove long-context memory bottlenecks via per-step QKV scale recalibration, and (iii) mitigate mismatch using importance-sampling-based rollout correction (token-level TIS/MIS variants). Across dense and MoE models, these techniques deliver up to 44% rollout throughput gains while preserving learning behavior comparable to BF16 baselines.

Search agents connect LLMs to the Internet, enabling access to broader and more up-to-date information. However, unreliable search results may also pose safety threats to end users, establishing a new threat surface. In this work, we conduct two in-the-wild experiments to demonstrate both the prevalence of low-quality search results and their potential to misguide agent behaviors. To counter this threat, we introduce an automated red-teaming framework that is systematic, scalable, and cost-efficient, enabling lightweight and harmless safety assessments of search agents. Building on this framework, we construct the SafeSearch benchmark, which includes 300 test cases covering five categories of risks (e.g., misinformation and indirect prompt injection). Using this benchmark, we evaluate three representative search agent scaffolds, covering search workflow, tool-calling, and deep research, across 7 proprietary and 8 open-source backend LLMs. Our results reveal substantial vulnerabilities of LLM-based search agents: when exposed to unreliable websites, the highest ASR reached 90.5% for GPT-4.1-mini under a search workflow setting. Moreover, our analysis highlights the limited effectiveness of common defense practices, such as reminder prompting. This emphasizes the value of our framework in promoting transparency for safer agent development. Our codebase and test cases are publicly available: https://github.com/jianshuod/SafeSearch.

Concurrent LLM agents sharing mutable natural-language state produce Structural Race Conditions (SRCs): write-write and cross-shard stale-read conflicts that silently corrupt agent output. Existing multi-agent frameworks (LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen) provide no write-ownership semantics over shared state. We present S-Bus, an HTTP middleware whose central mechanism is a server-side DeliveryLog: a per-agent log of HTTP GET operations that automatically reconstructs each agent's read set at commit time without agent SDK changes under HTTP/1.1. The consistency property the DeliveryLog provides -- Observable-Read Isolation (ORI), a partial causal consistency over the HTTP-observable projection of the read set -- prevents structural race conditions when agents collaborate via shared shards. Three contributions: (C1) The DeliveryLog mechanism for automatic HTTP-traffic-based read-set reconstruction, with three-tier mechanised evidence: ReadSetSoundness and ORICommitSafety machine-checked in TLAPS (modulo one retained typing axiom); exhaustive TLC at N=3 (20,763,484 distinct states, zero violations); Dafny discharges 9 inductive soundness lemmas. (C2) Empirical structural-conflict prevention parity against PostgreSQL 17 SERIALIZABLE and Redis 7 WATCH/MULTI on shared-shard contention sweeps with 427,308 active HTTP-409 conflicts: zero Type-I corruptions across all three backends. (C3) ORI's operating envelope is topology-conditional: semantically neutral in dedicated-shard workloads; harmful in single-shard collaborative writing because preservation propagates concurrent contradictions. Source code: https://github.com/sajjadanwar0/sbus

We introduce SkyRL-Agent, a framework for efficient, multi-turn, long-horizon agent training and evaluation. It provides efficient asynchronous dispatching, lightweight tool integration, and flexible backend interoperability, enabling seamless use with existing RL frameworks such as SkyRL-train, VeRL, and Tinker. Using SkyRL-Agent, we train SA-SWE-32B, a software engineering agent trained from Qwen3-32B (24.4% Pass@1) purely with reinforcement learning. We introduce two key components: an optimized asynchronous pipeline dispatcher that achieves a 1.55x speedup over naive asynchronous batching, and a tool-enhanced training recipe leveraging an AST-based search tool to facilitate code navigation, boost rollout Pass@K, and improve training efficiency. Together, these optimizations enable SA-SWE-32B to reach 39.4% Pass@1 on SWE-Bench Verified with more than 2x cost reduction compared to prior models reaching similar performance. Despite being trained solely on SWE tasks, SA-SWE-32B generalizes effectively to other agentic tasks, including Terminal-Bench, BrowseComp-Plus, and WebArena. We further demonstrate SkyRL-Agent's extensibility through case studies on deep research, computer use, and memory agents, each trained using a different training backend.

The automatic generation of programs has long been a fundamental challenge in computer science. Recent benchmarks have shown that large language models (LLMs) can effectively generate code at the function level, make code edits, and solve algorithmic coding tasks. However, to achieve full automation, LLMs should be able to generate production-quality, self-contained application modules. To evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in solving this challenge, we introduce BaxBench, a novel evaluation benchmark consisting of 392 tasks for the generation of backend applications. We focus on backends for three critical reasons: (i) they are practically relevant, building the core components of most modern web and cloud software, (ii) they are difficult to get right, requiring multiple functions and files to achieve the desired functionality, and (iii) they are security-critical, as they are exposed to untrusted third-parties, making secure solutions that prevent deployment-time attacks an imperative. BaxBench validates the functionality of the generated applications with comprehensive test cases, and assesses their security exposure by executing end-to-end exploits. Our experiments reveal key limitations of current LLMs in both functionality and security: (i) even the best model, OpenAI o1, achieves a mere 60% on code correctness; (ii) on average, we could successfully execute security exploits on more than half of the correct programs generated by each LLM; and (iii) in less popular backend frameworks, models further struggle to generate correct and secure applications. Progress on BaxBench signifies important steps towards autonomous and secure software development with LLMs.

Although LLM-based agents, powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), can use external tools and memory mechanisms to solve complex real-world tasks, they may also introduce critical security vulnerabilities. However, the existing literature does not comprehensively evaluate attacks and defenses against LLM-based agents. To address this, we introduce Agent Security Bench (ASB), a comprehensive framework designed to formalize, benchmark, and evaluate the attacks and defenses of LLM-based agents, including 10 scenarios (e.g., e-commerce, autonomous driving, finance), 10 agents targeting the scenarios, over 400 tools, 23 different types of attack/defense methods, and 8 evaluation metrics. Based on ASB, we benchmark 10 prompt injection attacks, a memory poisoning attack, a novel Plan-of-Thought backdoor attack, a mixed attack, and 10 corresponding defenses across 13 LLM backbones with nearly 90,000 testing cases in total. Our benchmark results reveal critical vulnerabilities in different stages of agent operation, including system prompt, user prompt handling, tool usage, and memory retrieval, with the highest average attack success rate of 84.30\%, but limited effectiveness shown in current defenses, unveiling important works to be done in terms of agent security for the community. Our code can be found at https://github.com/agiresearch/ASB.

Finetuning LLMs with LoRA has gained significant popularity due to its simplicity and effectiveness. Often, users may even find pluggable, community-shared LoRAs to enhance their base models for a specific downstream task of interest; enjoying a powerful, efficient, yet customized LLM experience with negligible investment. However, this convenient share-and-play ecosystem also introduces a new attack surface, where attackers can distribute malicious LoRAs to a community eager to try out shared assets. Despite the high-risk potential, no prior art has comprehensively explored LoRA's attack surface under the downstream-enhancing share-and-play context. In this paper, we investigate how backdoors can be injected into task-enhancing LoRAs and examine the mechanisms of such infections. We find that with a simple, efficient, yet specific recipe, a backdoor LoRA can be trained once and then seamlessly merged (in a training-free fashion) with multiple task-enhancing LoRAs, retaining both its malicious backdoor and benign downstream capabilities. This allows attackers to scale the distribution of compromised LoRAs with minimal effort by leveraging the rich pool of existing shared LoRA assets. We note that such merged LoRAs are particularly infectious -- because their malicious intent is cleverly concealed behind improved downstream capabilities, creating a strong incentive for voluntary download -- and dangerous -- because under local deployment, no safety measures exist to intervene when things go wrong. Our work is among the first to study this new threat model of training-free distribution of downstream-capable-yet-backdoor-injected LoRAs, highlighting the urgent need for heightened security awareness in the LoRA ecosystem. Warning: This paper contains offensive content and involves a real-life tragedy.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) and their integration into autonomous agent systems has created unprecedented opportunities for document analysis, decision support, and knowledge retrieval. However, the complexity of developing, evaluating, and iterating on LLM-based agent workflows presents significant barriers to researchers, particularly those without extensive software engineering expertise. We present FROAV (Framework for RAG Observation and Agent Verification), an open-source research platform that democratizes LLM agent research by providing a plug-and-play architecture combining visual workflow orchestration, a comprehensive evaluation framework, and extensible Python integration. FROAV implements a multi-stage Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipeline coupled with a rigorous "LLM-as-a-Judge" evaluation system, all accessible through intuitive graphical interfaces. Our framework integrates n8n for no-code workflow design, PostgreSQL for granular data management, FastAPI for flexible backend logic, and Streamlit for human-in-the-loop interaction. Through this integrated ecosystem, researchers can rapidly prototype RAG strategies, conduct prompt engineering experiments, validate agent performance against human judgments, and collect structured feedback-all without writing infrastructure code. We demonstrate the framework's utility through its application to financial document analysis, while emphasizing its material-agnostic architecture that adapts to any domain requiring semantic analysis. FROAV represents a significant step toward making LLM agent research accessible to a broader scientific community, enabling researchers to focus on hypothesis testing and algorithmic innovation rather than system integration challenges.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

When multiple large language models interact in a shared conversation, do they develop differentiated social roles or converge toward uniform behavior? We present a controlled experimental platform that orchestrates simultaneous multi-agent discussions among 7 heterogeneous LLMs on a unified inference backend, systematically varying group composition, naming conventions, and prompt structure across 12 experimental series (208 runs, 13,786 coded messages). Each message is independently coded on six behavioral flags by two LLM judges from distinct model families (Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Sonnet 4.6), achieving mean Cohen's kappa = 0.78 with conservative intersection-based adjudication. Human validation on 609 randomly stratified messages confirmed coding reliability (mean kappa = 0.73 vs. Gemini). We find that (1) heterogeneous groups exhibit significantly richer behavioral differentiation than homogeneous groups (cosine similarity 0.56 vs. 0.85; p < 10^-5, r = 0.70); (2) groups spontaneously exhibit compensatory response patterns when an agent crashes; (3) revealing real model names significantly increases behavioral convergence (cosine 0.56 to 0.77, p = 0.001); and (4) removing all prompt scaffolding converges profiles to homogeneous-level similarity (p < 0.001). Critically, these behaviors are absent when agents operate in isolation, confirming that behavioral diversity is a structured, reproducible phenomenon driven by the interaction of architectural heterogeneity, group context, and prompt-level scaffolding.

Large language model (LLM) routing has emerged as a crucial strategy for balancing computational costs with performance by dynamically assigning queries to the most appropriate model based on query complexity. Despite recent advances showing that preference-data-based routers can outperform traditional methods, current evaluation benchmarks remain limited. They largely focus on general model capabilities while overlooking task-specific behaviors and critical concerns such as privacy, safety, and potential backdoor vulnerabilities introduced through preference data. In response, we propose the DSC benchmark: Diverse, Simple, and Categorized, an evaluation framework that categorizes router performance across a broad spectrum of query types, including coding, translation, mathematics, human instructions, general knowledge, and LLM jailbreaking. Additionally, it integrates privacy and safety assessments to reveal hidden risks. Our experiments on three preference-based routers and two commercial counterparts demonstrate that while these systems improve efficiency, they often make suboptimal, category-driven decisions. For instance, a BERT-based router directs all coding and mathematics queries to the most powerful LLM even when simpler models would suffice, while routing jailbreaking attempts to weaker models, thereby elevating safety risks.

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved into autonomous agents that rely on open skill ecosystems (e.g., ClawHub and Skills.Rest), hosting numerous publicly reusable skills. Existing security research on these ecosystems mainly focuses on vulnerabilities within skills, such as prompt injection. However, there is a critical gap regarding skills that may be misused for harmful actions (e.g., cyber attacks, fraud and scams, privacy violations, and sexual content generation), namely harmful skills. In this paper, we present the first large-scale measurement study of harmful skills in agent ecosystems, covering 98,440 skills across two major registries. Using an LLM-driven scoring system grounded in our harmful skill taxonomy, we find that 4.93% of skills (4,858) are harmful, with ClawHub exhibiting an 8.84% harmful rate compared to 3.49% on Skills.Rest. We then construct HarmfulSkillBench, the first benchmark for evaluating agent safety against harmful skills in realistic agent contexts, comprising 200 harmful skills across 20 categories and four evaluation conditions. By evaluating six LLMs on HarmfulSkillBench, we find that presenting a harmful task through a pre-installed skill substantially lowers refusal rates across all models, with the average harm score rising from 0.27 without the skill to 0.47 with it, and further to 0.76 when the harmful intent is implicit rather than stated as an explicit user request. We responsibly disclose our findings to the affected registries and release our benchmark to support future research (see https://github.com/TrustAIRLab/HarmfulSkillBench).

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) raises significant ethical and safety concerns. While LLM alignment techniques are adopted to improve model safety and trustworthiness, adversaries can exploit these techniques to undermine safety for malicious purposes, resulting in misalignment. Misaligned LLMs may be published on open platforms to magnify harm. To address this, additional safety alignment, referred to as realignment, is necessary before deploying untrusted third-party LLMs. This study explores the efficacy of fine-tuning methods in terms of misalignment, realignment, and the effects of their interplay. By evaluating four Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and two Preference Fine-Tuning (PFT) methods across four popular safety-aligned LLMs, we reveal a mechanism asymmetry between attack and defense. While Odds Ratio Preference Optimization (ORPO) is most effective for misalignment, Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) excels in realignment, albeit at the expense of model utility. Additionally, we identify model-specific resistance, residual effects of multi-round adversarial dynamics, and other noteworthy findings. These findings highlight the need for robust safeguards and customized safety alignment strategies to mitigate potential risks in the deployment of LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/zhangrui4041/The-Art-of-Mis-alignment.

Access to frontier large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-5 and Gemini-2.5, is often hindered by high pricing, payment barriers, and regional restrictions. These limitations drive the proliferation of shadow APIs, third-party services that claim to provide access to official model services without regional limitations via indirect access. Despite their widespread use, it remains unclear whether shadow APIs deliver outputs consistent with those of the official APIs, raising concerns about the reliability of downstream applications and the validity of research findings that depend on them. In this paper, we present the first systematic audit between official LLM APIs and corresponding shadow APIs. We first identify 17 shadow APIs that have been utilized in 187 academic papers, with the most popular one reaching 5,966 citations and 58,639 GitHub stars by December 6, 2025. Through multidimensional auditing of three representative shadow APIs across utility, safety, and model verification, we uncover both indirect and direct evidence of deception practices in shadow APIs. Specifically, we reveal performance divergence reaching up to 47.21%, significant unpredictability in safety behaviors, and identity verification failures in 45.83% of fingerprint tests. These deceptive practices critically undermine the reproducibility and validity of scientific research, harm the interests of shadow API users, and damage the reputation of official model providers.

The misuse of large language models (LLMs) has garnered significant attention from the general public and LLM vendors. In response, efforts have been made to align LLMs with human values and intent use. However, a particular type of adversarial prompts, known as jailbreak prompt, has emerged and continuously evolved to bypass the safeguards and elicit harmful content from LLMs. In this paper, we conduct the first measurement study on jailbreak prompts in the wild, with 6,387 prompts collected from four platforms over six months. Leveraging natural language processing technologies and graph-based community detection methods, we discover unique characteristics of jailbreak prompts and their major attack strategies, such as prompt injection and privilege escalation. We also observe that jailbreak prompts increasingly shift from public platforms to private ones, posing new challenges for LLM vendors in proactive detection. To assess the potential harm caused by jailbreak prompts, we create a question set comprising 46,800 samples across 13 forbidden scenarios. Our experiments show that current LLMs and safeguards cannot adequately defend jailbreak prompts in all scenarios. Particularly, we identify two highly effective jailbreak prompts which achieve 0.99 attack success rates on ChatGPT (GPT-3.5) and GPT-4, and they have persisted online for over 100 days. Our work sheds light on the severe and evolving threat landscape of jailbreak prompts. We hope our study can facilitate the research community and LLM vendors in promoting safer and regulated LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant improvements in many tasks across various domains, such as code interpretation, response generation, and ambiguity handling. These LLMs, however, when upgrading, primarily prioritize enhancing user experience while neglecting security, privacy, and safety implications. Consequently, unintended vulnerabilities or biases can be introduced. Previous studies have predominantly focused on specific versions of the models and disregard the potential emergence of new attack vectors targeting the updated versions. Through the lens of adversarial examples within the in-context learning framework, this longitudinal study addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive assessment of the robustness of successive versions of LLMs, vis-\`a-vis GPT-3.5. We conduct extensive experiments to analyze and understand the impact of the robustness in two distinct learning categories: zero-shot learning and few-shot learning. Our findings indicate that, in comparison to earlier versions of LLMs, the updated versions do not exhibit the anticipated level of robustness against adversarial attacks. In addition, our study emphasizes the increased effectiveness of synergized adversarial queries in most zero-shot learning and few-shot learning cases. We hope that our study can lead to a more refined assessment of the robustness of LLMs over time and provide valuable insights of these models for both developers and users.

Prompting has become a dominant paradigm for adapting large language models (LLMs). While discrete (textual) prompts are widely used for their interpretability, soft (parameter) prompts have recently gained traction in APIs. This is because they can encode information from more training samples while minimizing the user's token usage, leaving more space in the context window for task-specific input. However, soft prompts are tightly coupled to the LLM they are tuned on, limiting their generalization to other LLMs. This constraint is particularly problematic for efficiency and privacy: (1) tuning prompts on each LLM incurs high computational costs, especially as LLMs continue to grow in size. Additionally, (2) when the LLM is hosted externally, soft prompt tuning often requires sharing private data with the LLM provider. For instance, this is the case with the NVIDIA NeMo API. To address these issues, we propose POST (Privacy Of Soft prompt Transfer), a framework that enables private tuning of soft prompts on a small model and subsequently transfers these prompts to a larger LLM. POST uses knowledge distillation to derive a small model directly from the large LLM to improve prompt transferability, tunes the soft prompt locally, optionally with differential privacy guarantees, and transfers it back to the larger LLM using a small public dataset. Our experiments show that POST reduces computational costs, preserves privacy, and effectively transfers high-utility soft prompts.

This paper presents the development and application of a Large Language Model Retrieval-Augmented Generation (LLM-RAG) system tailored for nanotechnology research. The system leverages the capabilities of a sophisticated language model to serve as an intelligent research assistant, enhancing the efficiency and comprehensiveness of literature reviews in the nanotechnology domain. Central to this LLM-RAG system is its advanced query backend retrieval mechanism, which integrates data from multiple reputable sources. The system retrieves relevant literature by utilizing Google Scholar's advanced search, and scraping open-access papers from Elsevier, Springer Nature, and ACS Publications. This multifaceted approach ensures a broad and diverse collection of up-to-date scholarly articles and papers. The proposed system demonstrates significant potential in aiding researchers by providing a streamlined, accurate, and exhaustive literature retrieval process, thereby accelerating research advancements in nanotechnology. The effectiveness of the LLM-RAG system is validated through rigorous testing, illustrating its capability to significantly reduce the time and effort required for comprehensive literature reviews, while maintaining high accuracy, query relevance and outperforming standard, publicly available LLMS.

Incident response (IR) is a critical aspect of cybersecurity, requiring rapid decision-making and coordinated efforts to address cyberattacks effectively. Leveraging large language models (LLMs) as intelligent agents offers a novel approach to enhancing collaboration and efficiency in IR scenarios. This paper explores the application of LLM-based multi-agent collaboration using the Backdoors & Breaches framework, a tabletop game designed for cybersecurity training. We simulate real-world IR dynamics through various team structures, including centralized, decentralized, and hybrid configurations. By analyzing agent interactions and performance across these setups, we provide insights into optimizing multi-agent collaboration for incident response. Our findings highlight the potential of LLMs to enhance decision-making, improve adaptability, and streamline IR processes, paving the way for more effective and coordinated responses to cyber threats.

Autonomous agents operating on the graphical user interfaces (GUIs) of various applications hold immense practical value. Unlike the large language model (LLM)-based methods which rely on structured texts and customized backends, the approaches using large vision-language models (LVLMs) are more intuitive and adaptable as they can visually perceive and directly interact with screens, making them indispensable in general scenarios without text metadata and tailored backends. Given the lack of high-quality training data for GUI-related tasks in existing work, this paper aims to enhance the GUI understanding and interacting capabilities of LVLMs through a data-driven approach. We propose EDGE, a general data synthesis framework that automatically generates large-scale, multi-granularity training data from webpages across the Web. Evaluation results on various GUI and agent benchmarks demonstrate that the model trained with the dataset generated through EDGE exhibits superior webpage understanding capabilities, which can then be easily transferred to previously unseen desktop and mobile environments. Our approach significantly reduces the dependence on manual annotations, empowering researchers to harness the vast public resources available on the Web to advance their work. Our source code, the dataset and the model are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/EDGE-1CDB.

Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful text from models that were fine-tuned to be harmless. Recent work on red-teaming, model editing, and interpretability suggests that this challenge stems from how (adversarial) fine-tuning largely serves to suppress rather than remove undesirable capabilities from LLMs. Prior work has introduced latent adversarial training (LAT) as a way to improve robustness to broad classes of failures. These prior works have considered untargeted latent space attacks where the adversary perturbs latent activations to maximize loss on examples of desirable behavior. Untargeted LAT can provide a generic type of robustness but does not leverage information about specific failure modes. Here, we experiment with targeted LAT where the adversary seeks to minimize loss on a specific competing task. We find that it can augment a wide variety of state-of-the-art methods. First, we use targeted LAT to improve robustness to jailbreaks, outperforming a strong R2D2 baseline with orders of magnitude less compute. Second, we use it to more effectively remove backdoors with no knowledge of the trigger. Finally, we use it to more effectively unlearn knowledge for specific undesirable tasks in a way that is also more robust to re-learning. Overall, our results suggest that targeted LAT can be an effective tool for defending against harmful behaviors from LLMs.

We present Nacrith, a lossless compression system that combines a 135M-parameter transformer language model (SmolLM2-135M) with an ensemble of lightweight online predictors and a 32-bit arithmetic coder. Beyond the base LLM-plus-arithmetic-coding paradigm, Nacrith introduces several contributions: (1) a CDF precision upgrade from 2^16 to 2^24 that eliminates ~75% of quantization overhead caused by minimum-probability floors in large vocabularies; (2) a token-level N-gram model for fast local predictions; (3) an adaptive log-space bias head correcting per-document LLM errors via online gradient descent; (4) confidence-based LLM skip for accelerating highly predictable tokens; (5) a hybrid binary format (NC06) extending neural compression to arbitrary binary files--to our knowledge a first among LLM-based compressors; (6) a llama.cpp inference backend achieving ~7x faster single-token decode than PyTorch; (7) parallel multi-GPU compression across up to 8 workers; and (8) native KV cache sliding window reducing per-slide cost by ~37x. The system requires only ~500 MB of GGUF weights and ~1.2 GB VRAM per worker, running on consumer GPUs. On alice29.txt (Canterbury Corpus, 152 KB), Nacrith achieves 0.918 bits per byte (bpb)--outperforming gzip by 3.1x, bzip2 by 2.5x, CMIX v21 by 44%, and ts_zip by 20%, while compressing below the 0th-, 1st-, and 2nd-order byte-level Shannon entropy bounds. On enwik8 (100 MB), Nacrith achieves 0.9389 bpb (11.74%), surpassing ts_zip (~1.11 bpb) by 15% and FineZip (1.024 bpb) by 8% despite using a 60x smaller model with no fine-tuning. An out-of-distribution evaluation on a document published after the model's training cutoff confirms these gains are not memorization artifacts, achieving 0.723 bpb on unseen text.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are employed across various high-stakes domains, where the reliability of their outputs is crucial. One commonly used method to assess the reliability of LLMs' responses is uncertainty estimation, which gauges the likelihood of their answers being correct. While many studies focus on improving the accuracy of uncertainty estimations for LLMs, our research investigates the fragility of uncertainty estimation and explores potential attacks. We demonstrate that an attacker can embed a backdoor in LLMs, which, when activated by a specific trigger in the input, manipulates the model's uncertainty without affecting the final output. Specifically, the proposed backdoor attack method can alter an LLM's output probability distribution, causing the probability distribution to converge towards an attacker-predefined distribution while ensuring that the top-1 prediction remains unchanged. Our experimental results demonstrate that this attack effectively undermines the model's self-evaluation reliability in multiple-choice questions. For instance, we achieved a 100 attack success rate (ASR) across three different triggering strategies in four models. Further, we investigate whether this manipulation generalizes across different prompts and domains. This work highlights a significant threat to the reliability of LLMs and underscores the need for future defenses against such attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/qcznlp/uncertainty_attack.

Memory-augmented LLM agents maintain external memory banks to support long-horizon interaction, yet most existing systems treat construction, retrieval, and utilization as isolated subroutines. This creates two coupled challenges: strategic blindness on the forward path of the memory cycle, where construction and retrieval are driven by local heuristics rather than explicit strategic reasoning, and sparse, delayed supervision on the backward path, where downstream failures rarely translate into direct repairs of the memory bank. To address these challenges, we propose MemMA, a plug-and-play multi-agent framework that coordinates the memory cycle along both the forward and backward paths. On the forward path, a Meta-Thinker produces structured guidance that steers a Memory Manager during construction and directs a Query Reasoner during iterative retrieval. On the backward path, MemMA introduces in-situ self-evolving memory construction, which synthesizes probe QA pairs, verifies the current memory, and converts failures into repair actions before the memory is finalized. Extensive experiments on LoCoMo show that MemMA consistently outperforms existing baselines across multiple LLM backbones and improves three different storage backends in a plug-and-play manner. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/ventr1c/memma.

The exorbitant cost of training Large language models (LLMs) from scratch makes it essential to fingerprint the models to protect intellectual property via ownership authentication and to ensure downstream users and developers comply with their license terms (e.g. restricting commercial use). In this study, we present a pilot study on LLM fingerprinting as a form of very lightweight instruction tuning. Model publisher specifies a confidential private key and implants it as an instruction backdoor that causes the LLM to generate specific text when the key is present. Results on 11 popularly-used LLMs showed that this approach is lightweight and does not affect the normal behavior of the model. It also prevents publisher overclaim, maintains robustness against fingerprint guessing and parameter-efficient training, and supports multi-stage fingerprinting akin to MIT License. Code is available in https://cnut1648.github.io/Model-Fingerprint/.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.