Daily Papers

We present ENEAS, a unified, text-promptable method for instance tracking and semantic discovery. Text-promptable segmentation models, including the latest foundation models such as SAM 3, still suffer from temporal hallucinations, spatial fragmentation, and semantic misclassification: they fail to report target absence when an object leaves the field of view, segment local textures instead of the complete object during extreme close-ups, and prioritize visual features over ontological reality, so that visually similar artifacts such as statues, paintings, or reflections are segmented as target entities. ENEAS works two ways from a single method: precise tracking and high-quality segmentation of a unique instance, and open-concept discovery of every instance a text query names, resolved by a semantic verification layer. For tracking, we extend the geometrically robust SeC architecture, previously limited to point interactions, with a text-prompting adapter and leverage its temporal memory, so that the target is held through disappearance without drifting to distractors and kept whole even when it fills the entire view. For discovery, the verification layer combines high-speed visual embedding matching with conditional VLM refinement, invoking semantic reasoning only for ambiguous candidates, which filters out the ontological errors that visual-only models cannot distinguish while keeping latency low. Designed with 3D reconstruction in mind, where a single misclassified distractor corrupts the asset, ENEAS unlocks high-quality semantic tracking and segmentation of video, of broad libraries, and of collections of temporally or spatially unordered data, together with the discrimination to tell true instances from their doppelgangers: things that look alike but are not the same. The code and models are available at https://github.com/speridlabs/eneas

Kubernetes clusters generate rich operational events during pod lifecycle transitions, yet the platform's native event retention model systematically discards the most diagnostically valuable context through multiple evidence destruction mechanisms operating on deterministic schedules. We formalize these mechanisms as an evidence horizon taxonomy: five distinct boundaries after which specific categories of diagnostic context become permanently unrecoverable from the Kubernetes API. H1(LastTerminationState rotation, ~90s) destroys container failure forensics; H2 (scheduler event pruning, 1hr/1000-event cluster limit) destroys placement rationale; H3 (ephemeral container exit, immediate) destroys debug session context; H4 (kubelet reconciliation gap) destroys in-memory operational state; and H5 (scrape-interval blind spot) renders sub-interval pod lifetimes invisible to poll-based observability tools. This paper extends the Operational Memory Architecture (OMA) to address the full evidence horizon taxonomy. Two new causal patterns are defined: P004 (Scheduler Decision Provenance) captures FailedScheduling predicate failures before kube-apiserver TTL pruning and demonstrates the first cross-horizon causal chain linking scheduler evidence to downstream OOMKill failures. Two new Go watchers (EventWatcher, EphemeralWatcher) and two new storage tables (scheduler_events, ephemeral_exits) extend the original architecture. Validated on Minikube (3-node) and AKS 1.32.10. The original 30-run statistical latency analysis (242 edges, intra-cycle mean 0.702ms) and stress evaluation (2.86 events/sec at 20 pods, 8.8MB RAM) are carried forward and augmented with H2, H3, and H5 results.

The rapid evolution of autonomous, agentic artificial intelligence within financial services has introduced an existential architectural crisis: large language models (LLMs) are probabilistic, non-deterministic systems operating in domains that demand absolute, mathematically verifiable compliance guarantees. Existing guardrail solutions -- including NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails and Guardrails AI -- rely on probabilistic classifiers and syntactic validators that are fundamentally inadequate for enforcing complex multi-variable regulatory constraints mandated by the SEC, FINRA, and OCC. This paper presents the Lean-Agent Protocol, a formal-verification-based AI guardrail platform that leverages the Aristotle neural-symbolic model developed by Harmonic AI to auto-formalize institutional policies into Lean 4 code. Every proposed agentic action is treated as a mathematical conjecture: execution is permitted if and only if the Lean 4 kernel proves that the action satisfies pre-compiled regulatory axioms. This architecture provides cryptographic-level compliance certainty at microsecond latency, directly satisfying SEC Rule 15c3-5, OCC Bulletin 2011-12, FINRA Rule 3110, and CFPB explainability mandates. A three-phase implementation roadmap from shadow verification through enterprise-scale deployment is provided.

MarketSenseAI is a novel framework for holistic stock analysis which leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to process financial news, historical prices, company fundamentals and the macroeconomic environment to support decision making in stock analysis and selection. In this paper, we present the latest advancements on MarketSenseAI, driven by rapid technological expansion in LLMs. Through a novel architecture combining Retrieval-Augmented Generation and LLM agents, the framework processes SEC filings and earnings calls, while enriching macroeconomic analysis through systematic processing of diverse institutional reports. We demonstrate a significant improvement in fundamental analysis accuracy over the previous version. Empirical evaluation on S\&P 100 stocks over two years (2023-2024) shows MarketSenseAI achieving cumulative returns of 125.9% compared to the index return of 73.5%, while maintaining comparable risk profiles. Further validation on S\&P 500 stocks during 2024 demonstrates the framework's scalability, delivering a 33.8% higher Sortino ratio than the market. This work marks a significant advancement in applying LLM technology to financial analysis, offering insights into the robustness of LLM-driven investment strategies.

As transformer-based large language models (LLMs) increasingly permeate society, they have revolutionized domains such as software engineering, creative writing, and digital arts. However, their adoption in cybersecurity remains limited due to challenges like scarcity of specialized training data and complexity of representing cybersecurity-specific knowledge. To address these gaps, we present Foundation-Sec-8B, a cybersecurity-focused LLM built on the Llama 3.1 architecture and enhanced through continued pretraining on a carefully curated cybersecurity corpus. We evaluate Foundation-Sec-8B across both established and new cybersecurity benchmarks, showing that it matches Llama 3.1-70B and GPT-4o-mini in certain cybersecurity-specific tasks. By releasing our model to the public, we aim to accelerate progress and adoption of AI-driven tools in both public and private cybersecurity contexts.

Learned optimizers have been an active research topic over the past decade, with increasing progress toward practical, general-purpose optimizers that can serve as drop-in replacements for widely used methods like Adam. However, recent advances -- such as VeLO, which was meta-trained for 4000 TPU-months -- remain largely inaccessible to the broader community, in part due to their reliance on JAX and the absence of user-friendly packages for applying the optimizers after meta-training. To address this gap, we introduce PyLO, a PyTorch-based library that brings learned optimizers to the broader machine learning community through familiar, widely adopted workflows. Unlike prior work focused on synthetic or convex tasks, our emphasis is on applying learned optimization to real-world large-scale pre-training tasks. Our release includes a CUDA-accelerated version of the small_fc_lopt learned optimizer architecture from (Metz et al., 2022a), delivering substantial speedups -- from 39.36 to 205.59 samples/sec throughput for training ViT B/16 with batch size 32. PyLO also allows us to easily combine learned optimizers with existing optimization tools such as learning rate schedules and weight decay. When doing so, we find that learned optimizers can substantially benefit. Our code is available at https://github.com/Belilovsky-Lab/pylo

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) opens new frontiers for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs), yet existing systems remain confined to predefined tasks due to hardware-software co-design challenges. This paper presents the first aerial intelligent agent capable of open-world task execution through tight integration of LLM-based reasoning and robotic autonomy. Our hardware-software co-designed system addresses two fundamental limitations: (1) Onboard LLM operation via an edge-optimized computing platform, achieving 5-6 tokens/sec inference for 14B-parameter models at 220W peak power; (2) A bidirectional cognitive architecture that synergizes slow deliberative planning (LLM task planning) with fast reactive control (state estimation, mapping, obstacle avoidance, and motion planning). Validated through preliminary results using our prototype, the system demonstrates reliable task planning and scene understanding in communication-constrained environments, such as sugarcane monitoring, power grid inspection, mine tunnel exploration, and biological observation applications. This work establishes a novel framework for embodied aerial artificial intelligence, bridging the gap between task planning and robotic autonomy in open environments.

Rigorous security-focused evaluation of large language model (LLM) agents is imperative for establishing trust in their safe deployment throughout the software development lifecycle. However, existing benchmarks largely rely on synthetic challenges or simplified vulnerability datasets that fail to capture the complexity and ambiguity encountered by security engineers in practice. We introduce SEC-bench, the first fully automated benchmarking framework for evaluating LLM agents on authentic security engineering tasks. SEC-bench employs a novel multi-agent scaffold that automatically constructs code repositories with harnesses, reproduces vulnerabilities in isolated environments, and generates gold patches for reliable evaluation. Our framework automatically creates high-quality software vulnerability datasets with reproducible artifacts at a cost of only $0.87 per instance. Using SEC-bench, we implement two critical software security tasks to rigorously evaluate LLM agents' capabilities: proof-of-concept (PoC) generation and vulnerability patching. A comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLM code agents reveals significant performance gaps, achieving at most 18.0% success in PoC generation and 34.0% in vulnerability patching on our complete dataset. These results highlight the crucial steps needed toward developing LLM agents that are more practical, intelligent, and autonomous for security engineering.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable success across many domains, yet their integration into cybersecurity applications remains limited due to a lack of general-purpose cybersecurity data, representational complexity, and safety and regulatory concerns. To address this gap, we previously introduced Foundation-Sec-8B, a cybersecurity-focused LLM suitable for fine-tuning on downstream tasks. That model, however, was not designed for chat-style interactions or instruction-following. In this report, we release Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct: a model specifically trained for general-purpose cybersecurity dialogue. Built on Foundation-Sec-8B, it combines domain-specific knowledge with instruction-following, conversational capabilities, and alignment with human preferences to produce high-quality, relevant responses. Comprehensive evaluations show that Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct outperforms Llama 3.1-8B-Instruct on a range of cybersecurity tasks while matching its instruction-following performance. It is also competitive with GPT-4o-mini on cyber threat intelligence and instruction-following tasks. We envision Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct becoming an indispensable assistant in the daily workflows of cybersecurity professionals. We release the model publicly at https://huggingface.co/fdtn-ai/Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct.

Autonomous AI agents now transact at production scale -- 69,000 bots executing 165 million transactions across 50 million USDC in cumulative volume on a single marketplace -- without any shared trust layer between participants. Regulatory frameworks (Singapore IMDA, NIST CAISI, EU AI Act) and major AI laboratories (Anthropic, Google) have independently converged on the same structural requirement: an open, portable, cryptographically verifiable trust infrastructure for autonomous agents that no single vendor can deliver alone. This paper presents MolTrust, a production-deployed implementation of such an infrastructure built on W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0 and Decentralized Identifiers v1.0, with on-chain anchoring on Base Layer 2. The system architecture is organized around four primitives (identity, authorization, behavioral record, portability), a five-party accountability chain, and the Agent Authorization Envelope (AAE) -- a machine-evaluable authorization structure enforced at three layers: cryptographic signatures, API-level credential lifecycle management, and kernel-level syscall monitoring via Falco eBPF integration. The paper documents three distinguishing capabilities: kernel-layer AAE enforcement below the agent process boundary; cross-protocol interoperability through five reproducible test vectors verified against independent implementations; and layered Sybil resistance combining dual-signature interaction proofs, cross-vertical endorsement diversity gating, and principal-DID-linked violation persistence. The reference implementation has been operational since March 2026 across eight credential verticals. Empirical validation at adversarial scale is pending. The contribution is deployment-first evidence that the trust infrastructure regulators and industry have converged on is implementable today using W3C-standardized primitives.

We present Foundation-Sec-8B-Reasoning, the first open-source native reasoning model for cybersecurity. Built upon our previously released Foundation-Sec-8B base model (derived from Llama-3.1-8B-Base), the model is trained through a two-stage process combining supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR). Our training leverages proprietary reasoning data spanning cybersecurity analysis, instruction-following, and mathematical reasoning. Evaluation across 10 cybersecurity benchmarks and 10 general-purpose benchmarks demonstrates performance competitive with significantly larger models on cybersecurity tasks while maintaining strong general capabilities. The model shows effective generalization on multi-hop reasoning tasks and strong safety performance when deployed with appropriate system prompts and guardrails. This work demonstrates that domain-specialized reasoning models can achieve strong performance on specialized tasks while maintaining broad general capabilities. We release the model publicly at https://huggingface.co/fdtn-ai/Foundation-Sec-8B-Reasoning.

AI-assisted software generation has increased development speed, but it has also amplified a persistent engineering problem: systems that are functionally correct may still be structurally insecure. In practice, prompt-based security review with large language models often suffers from uneven coverage, weak reproducibility, unsupported findings, and the absence of an immutable audit trail. The ESAA architecture addresses a related governance problem in agentic software engineering by separating heuristic agent cognition from deterministic state mutation through append-only events, constrained outputs, and replay-based verification. This paper presents ESAA-Security, a domain-specific specialization of ESAA for agent-assisted security auditing of software repositories, with particular emphasis on AI-generated or AI-modified code. ESAA-Security structures auditing as a governed execution pipeline with four phases reconnaissance, domain audit execution, risk classification, and final reporting and operationalizes the workflow into 26 tasks, 16 security domains, and 95 executable checks. The framework produces structured check results, vulnerability inventories, severity classifications, risk matrices, remediation guidance, executive summaries, and a final markdown/JSON audit report. The central idea is that security review should not be modeled as a free-form conversation with an LLM, but as an evidence-oriented audit process governed by contracts and events. In ESAA-Security, agents emit structured intentions under constrained protocols; the orchestrator validates them, persists accepted outputs to an append-only log, reprojects derived views, and verifies consistency through replay and hashing. The result is a traceable, reproducible, and risk-oriented audit architecture whose final report is auditable by construction.

Architecture design and optimization are challenging problems in the field of artificial neural networks. Working in this context, we here present SPARCS (SPectral ARchiteCture Search), a novel architecture search protocol which exploits the spectral attributes of the inter-layer transfer matrices. SPARCS allows one to explore the space of possible architectures by spanning continuous and differentiable manifolds, thus enabling for gradient-based optimization algorithms to be eventually employed. With reference to simple benchmark models, we show that the newly proposed method yields a self-emerging architecture with a minimal degree of expressivity to handle the task under investigation and with a reduced parameter count as compared to other viable alternatives.