Daily Papers

Self-training approach for large language models (LLMs) improves reasoning abilities by training the models on their self-generated rationales. Previous approaches have labeled rationales that produce correct answers for a given question as appropriate for training. However, a single measure risks misjudging rationale quality, leading the models to learn flawed reasoning patterns. To address this issue, we propose CREST (Consistency-driven Rationale Evaluation for Self-Training), a self-training framework that further evaluates each rationale through follow-up questions and leverages this evaluation to guide its training. Specifically, we introduce two methods: (1) filtering out rationales that frequently result in incorrect answers on follow-up questions and (2) preference learning based on mixed preferences from rationale evaluation results of both original and follow-up questions. Experiments on three question-answering datasets using open LLMs show that CREST not only improves the logical robustness and correctness of rationales but also improves reasoning abilities compared to previous self-training approaches.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) distillation allows a large language model (LLM) to guide a small language model (SLM) in reasoning tasks. Existing methods train the SLM to learn the long rationale in one iteration, resulting in two issues: 1) Long rationales lead to a large token-level batch size during training, making gradients of core reasoning tokens (i.e., the token will directly affect the correctness of subsequent reasoning) over-smoothed as they contribute a tiny fraction of the rationale. As a result, the SLM converges to sharp minima where it fails to grasp the reasoning logic. 2) The response is slow, as the SLM must generate a long rationale before reaching the answer. Therefore, we propose chunk-wise training (CWT), which uses a heuristic search to divide the rationale into internal semantically coherent chunks and focuses SLM on learning from only one chunk per iteration. In this way, CWT naturally isolates non-reasoning chunks that do not involve the core reasoning token (e.g., summary and transitional chunks) from the SLM learning for reasoning chunks, making the fraction of the core reasoning token increase in the corresponding iteration. Based on CWT, skip-thinking training (STT) is proposed. STT makes the SLM automatically skip non-reasoning medium chunks to reach the answer, improving reasoning speed while maintaining accuracy. We validate our approach on a variety of SLMs and multiple reasoning tasks.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) remains indispensable for aligning large language models (LLMs) in subjective domains. To enhance robustness, recent work shifts toward Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) that generate rationales before predicting preferences. Yet in GenRM training and evaluation, practice remains outcome-label-only, leaving reasoning quality unchecked. We show that reasoning fidelity-the consistency between a GenRM's preference decision and reference decision rationales-is highly predictive of downstream RLHF outcomes, beyond standard label accuracy. Specifically, we repurpose existing reward-model benchmarks to compute Spurious Correctness (S-Corr)-the fraction of label-correct decisions with rationales misaligned with golden judgments. Our empirical evaluation reveals substantial S-Corr even for competitive GenRMs, and higher S-Corr is associated with policy degeneration under optimization. To improve fidelity, we propose Rationale-Centric Alignment, R-Align, which augments training with gold judgments and explicitly supervises rationale alignment. R-Align reduces S-Corr on RM benchmarks and yields consistent gains in actor performance across STEM, coding, instruction following, and general tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied in scientific research, offering new capabilities for knowledge discovery and reasoning. In single-cell biology, however, evaluation practices for both general and specialized LLMs remain inadequate: existing benchmarks are fragmented across tasks, adopt formats such as multiple-choice classification that diverge from real-world usage, and rely on metrics lacking interpretability and biological grounding. We present SC-ARENA, a natural language evaluation framework tailored to single-cell foundation models. SC-ARENA formalizes a virtual cell abstraction that unifies evaluation targets by representing both intrinsic attributes and gene-level interactions. Within this paradigm, we define five natural language tasks (cell type annotation, captioning, generation, perturbation prediction, and scientific QA) that probe core reasoning capabilities in cellular biology. To overcome the limitations of brittle string-matching metrics, we introduce knowledge-augmented evaluation, which incorporates external ontologies, marker databases, and scientific literature to support biologically faithful and interpretable judgments. Experiments and analysis across both general-purpose and domain-specialized LLMs demonstrate that (i) under the Virtual Cell unified evaluation paradigm, current models achieve uneven performance on biologically complex tasks, particularly those demanding mechanistic or causal understanding; and (ii) our knowledge-augmented evaluation framework ensures biological correctness, provides interpretable, evidence-grounded rationales, and achieves high discriminative capacity, overcoming the brittleness and opacity of conventional metrics. SC-Arena thus provides a unified and interpretable framework for assessing LLMs in single-cell biology, pointing toward the development of biology-aligned, generalizable foundation models.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited great potential in mathematical reasoning. However, there remains a performance gap in this area between existing open-source models and closed-source models such as GPT-4. In this paper, we introduce MathGenie, a novel method for generating diverse and reliable math problems from a small-scale problem-solution dataset (denoted as seed data). We augment the ground-truth solutions of our seed data and train a back-translation model to translate the augmented solutions back into new questions. Subsequently, we generate code-integrated solutions for the new questions. To ensure the correctness of the code-integrated solutions, we employ rationale-based strategy for solution verification. Various pretrained models, ranging from 7B to 70B, are trained on the newly curated data to test the effectiveness of the proposed augmentation technique, resulting in a family of models known as MathGenieLM. These models consistently outperform previous open-source models across five representative mathematical reasoning datasets, achieving state-of-the-art performance. In particular, MathGenieLM-InternLM2 achieves an accuracy of 87.7% on GSM8K and 55.7% on MATH, securing the best overall score among open-source language models.

Mathematical verfier achieves success in mathematical reasoning tasks by validating the correctness of solutions. However, existing verifiers are trained with binary classification labels, which are not informative enough for the model to accurately assess the solutions. To mitigate the aforementioned insufficiency of binary labels, we introduce step-wise natural language feedbacks as rationale labels (i.e., the correctness of the current step and the explanations). In this paper, we propose Math-Minos, a natural language feedback enhanced verifier by constructing automatically-generated training data and a two-stage training paradigm for effective training and efficient inference. Our experiments reveal that a small set (30k) of natural language feedbacks can significantly boost the performance of the verifier by the accuracy of 1.6\% (86.6\% rightarrow 88.2\%) on GSM8K and 0.8\% (37.8\% rightarrow 38.6\%) on MATH. We have released our code and data for further exploration.

Winograd convolution is the standard algorithm for efficient inference, reducing arithmetic complexity by 2.25x for 3x3 kernels. However, it faces a critical barrier in the modern era of low precision computing: numerical instability. As tiles scale to maximize efficiency (e.g., F(6,3), F(8,3)), the condition numbers of standard integer based transforms explode, reaching kappa = 2 x 10^5 for F(8,3), rendering them unusable in FP16 or Int8. We introduce NOVA (Numerical Optimization of Vandermonde Arithmetic), a discovery framework that breaks the decades old convention of integer interpolation. Treating Winograd point selection as a continuous optimization problem, NOVA searches the manifold R^n-1 via Evolution Strategy, snaps candidates to simple rationals, and guarantees correctness via symbolic verification. This process uncovers a hidden landscape of stable, fractional configurations such as {+-5/6, +-7/6, +-3/5} that defy traditional vocabulary constraints. The impact is transformative: NOVA improves the conditioning of F(8,3) by 415x in 1D, which squares to a 172,484x improvement for 2D convolution. In real world FP16 ImageNet inference, where standard transforms collapse to random chance (e.g., 4.7 percent accuracy on VGG16), NOVA's points restore full accuracy (75 to 78 percent), recovering over 70 percentage points without retraining, calibration, or learned parameters. These discovered transforms act as drop in replacements, effectively unlocking the efficiency of large tile Winograd convolution for next generation hardware.

Machine learning models are widely used, but can also often be wrong. Users would benefit from a reliable indication of whether a given output from a given model should be trusted, so a rational decision can be made whether to use the output or not. For example, outputs can be associated with a confidence measure; if this confidence measure is strongly associated with likelihood of correctness, then the model is said to be well-calibrated. A well-calibrated confidence measure can serve as a basis for rational, graduated decision-making on how much review and care is needed when using generated code. Calibration has so far been studied in mostly non-generative (e.g. classification) settings, especially in software engineering. However, generated code can quite often be wrong: Given generated code, developers must decide whether to use directly, use after varying intensity of careful review, or discard model-generated code. Thus, calibration is vital in generative settings. We make several contributions. We develop a framework for evaluating the calibration of code-generating models. We consider several tasks, correctness criteria, datasets, and approaches, and find that, by and large, generative code models we test are not well-calibrated out of the box. We then show how calibration can be improved using standard methods, such as Platt scaling. Since Platt scaling relies on the prior availability of correctness data, we evaluate the applicability and generalizability of Platt scaling in software engineering, discuss settings where it has good potential for practical use, and settings where it does not. Our contributions will lead to better-calibrated decision-making in the current use of code generated by language models, and offers a framework for future research to further improve calibration methods for generative models in software engineering.

Rationality is the quality of being guided by reason, characterized by decision-making that aligns with evidence and logical principles. It plays a crucial role in reliable problem-solving by ensuring well-grounded and consistent solutions. While large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in generating human-like text, they still exhibit limitations such as bounded knowledge space and inconsistent outputs. In response, recent efforts have shifted toward developing multimodal and multi-agent systems, as well as integrating modules like external tools, programming codes, symbolic reasoners, utility function, and conformal risk controls rather than relying solely on a single LLM for decision-making. This paper surveys the state-of-the-art advancements in language and multimodal agents, evaluates how they contribute to make intelligent agents more rational, and identifies open challenges and future research directions. We maintain an open repository at https://github.com/bowen-upenn/Agent_Rationality.

As large language models (LLMs) grow larger and more sophisticated, assessing their "reasoning" capabilities in natural language grows more challenging. Recent question answering (QA) benchmarks that attempt to assess reasoning are often limited by a narrow scope of covered situations and subject matters. We introduce WikiWhy, a QA dataset built around a novel auxiliary task: explaining why an answer is true in natural language. WikiWhy contains over 9,000 "why" question-answer-rationale triples, grounded on Wikipedia facts across a diverse set of topics. Each rationale is a set of supporting statements connecting the question to the answer. WikiWhy serves as a benchmark for the reasoning capabilities of LLMs because it demands rigorous explicit rationales for each answer to demonstrate the acquisition of implicit commonsense knowledge, which is unlikely to be easily memorized. GPT-3 baselines achieve only 38.7% human-evaluated correctness in the end-to-end answer & explain condition, leaving significant room for future improvements.

Multimodal reasoning is a challenging task that requires models to reason across multiple modalities to answer questions. Existing approaches have made progress by incorporating language and visual modalities into a two-stage reasoning framework, separating rationale generation from answer inference. However, these approaches often fall short due to the inadequate quality of the generated rationales. In this work, we delve into the importance of rationales in model reasoning. We observe that when rationales are completely accurate, the model's accuracy significantly improves, highlighting the need for high-quality rationale generation. Motivated by this, we propose MC-CoT, a self-consistency training strategy that generates multiple rationales and answers, subsequently selecting the most accurate through a voting process. This approach not only enhances the quality of generated rationales but also leads to more accurate and robust answers. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach significantly improves model performance across various benchmarks. Remarkably, we show that even smaller base models, when equipped with our proposed approach, can achieve results comparable to those of larger models, illustrating the potential of our approach in harnessing the power of rationales for improved multimodal reasoning. The code is available at https://github.com/chengtan9907/mc-cot.

Rationale is defined as a subset of input features that best explains or supports the prediction by machine learning models. Rationale identification has improved the generalizability and interpretability of neural networks on vision and language data. In graph applications such as molecule and polymer property prediction, identifying representative subgraph structures named as graph rationales plays an essential role in the performance of graph neural networks. Existing graph pooling and/or distribution intervention methods suffer from lack of examples to learn to identify optimal graph rationales. In this work, we introduce a new augmentation operation called environment replacement that automatically creates virtual data examples to improve rationale identification. We propose an efficient framework that performs rationale-environment separation and representation learning on the real and augmented examples in latent spaces to avoid the high complexity of explicit graph decoding and encoding. Comparing against recent techniques, experiments on seven molecular and four polymer real datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed augmentation-based graph rationalization framework.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

We provide here a dataset for tasks related to natural language understanding and natural language inference. The dataset contains logical puzzles in natural language from three domains: comparing puzzles, knighs and knaves, and zebra puzzles. Each puzzle is associated with the entire set of atomic questions that can be generated based on the relations and individuals occurring in the text. For each question we provide the correct answer: entailment, contradiction or ambiguity. The answer's correctness is verified against theorem provers. Good puzzles have two properties: (i) each piece of information is necessary and (ii) no unnecessary information is provided. These properties make puzzles interesting candidates for machine comprehension tasks.

Eliciting feedback from end users of NLP models can be beneficial for improving models. However, how should we present model responses to users so they are most amenable to be corrected from user feedback? Further, what properties do users value to understand and trust responses? We answer these questions by analyzing the effect of rationales (or explanations) generated by QA models to support their answers. We specifically consider decomposed QA models that first extract an intermediate rationale based on a context and a question and then use solely this rationale to answer the question. A rationale outlines the approach followed by the model to answer the question. Our work considers various formats of these rationales that vary according to well-defined properties of interest. We sample rationales from language models using few-shot prompting for two datasets, and then perform two user studies. First, we present users with incorrect answers and corresponding rationales in various formats and ask them to provide natural language feedback to revise the rationale. We then measure the effectiveness of this feedback in patching these rationales through in-context learning. The second study evaluates how well different rationale formats enable users to understand and trust model answers, when they are correct. We find that rationale formats significantly affect how easy it is (1) for users to give feedback for rationales, and (2) for models to subsequently execute this feedback. In addition, formats with attributions to the context and in-depth reasoning significantly enhance user-reported understanding and trust of model outputs.

Large-scale high-quality training data is important for improving the performance of models. After trained with data that has rationales (reasoning steps), models gain reasoning capability. However, the dataset with high-quality rationales is relatively scarce due to the high annotation cost. To address this issue, we propose Self-motivated Learning framework. The framework motivates the model itself to automatically generate rationales on existing datasets. Based on the inherent rank from correctness across multiple rationales, the model learns to generate better rationales, leading to higher reasoning capability. Specifically, we train a reward model with the rank to evaluate the quality of rationales, and improve the performance of reasoning through reinforcement learning. Experiment results of Llama2 7B on multiple reasoning datasets show that our method significantly improves the reasoning ability of models, even outperforming text-davinci-002 in some datasets.

A major issue with using deep learning models in sensitive applications is that they provide no explanation for their output. To address this problem, unsupervised selective rationalization produces rationales alongside predictions by chaining two jointly-trained components, a rationale generator and a predictor. Although this architecture guarantees that the prediction relies solely on the rationale, it does not ensure that the rationale contains a plausible explanation for the prediction. We introduce a novel training technique that effectively limits generation of implausible rationales by injecting noise between the generator and the predictor. Furthermore, we propose a new benchmark for evaluating unsupervised selective rationalization models using movie reviews from existing datasets. We achieve sizeable improvements in rationale plausibility and task accuracy over the state-of-the-art across a variety of tasks, including our new benchmark, while maintaining or improving model faithfulness.

State-of-the-art models in NLP are now predominantly based on deep neural networks that are opaque in terms of how they come to make predictions. This limitation has increased interest in designing more interpretable deep models for NLP that reveal the `reasoning' behind model outputs. But work in this direction has been conducted on different datasets and tasks with correspondingly unique aims and metrics; this makes it difficult to track progress. We propose the Evaluating Rationales And Simple English Reasoning (ERASER) benchmark to advance research on interpretable models in NLP. This benchmark comprises multiple datasets and tasks for which human annotations of "rationales" (supporting evidence) have been collected. We propose several metrics that aim to capture how well the rationales provided by models align with human rationales, and also how faithful these rationales are (i.e., the degree to which provided rationales influenced the corresponding predictions). Our hope is that releasing this benchmark facilitates progress on designing more interpretable NLP systems. The benchmark, code, and documentation are available at https://www.eraserbenchmark.com/

The reasoning steps generated by LLMs might be incomplete, as they mimic logical leaps common in everyday communication found in their pre-training data: underlying rationales are frequently left implicit (unstated). To address this challenge, we introduce RATIONALYST, a model for process-supervision of reasoning based on pre-training on a vast collection of rationale annotations extracted from unlabeled data. We extract 79k rationales from web-scale unlabelled dataset (the Pile) and a combination of reasoning datasets with minimal human intervention. This web-scale pre-training for reasoning allows RATIONALYST to consistently generalize across diverse reasoning tasks, including mathematical, commonsense, scientific, and logical reasoning. Fine-tuned from LLaMa-3-8B, RATIONALYST improves the accuracy of reasoning by an average of 3.9% on 7 representative reasoning benchmarks. It also demonstrates superior performance compared to significantly larger verifiers like GPT-4 and similarly sized models fine-tuned on matching training sets.

Multi-agent reasoning systems often use agreement, confidence, or automated scores to decide which messages should shape a final answer. Such filtering assumes that a message likely to be correct is also worth keeping. Yet a wrong answer can contain a useful decomposition, constraint, or scientific principle. We test this distinction with Diverse Hypothesis Deliberation (DHD), a controlled measurement protocol that caches five independently generated messages and replays the same downstream solver, called the integrator, with each message available or hidden. The replay comparison measures a message's trajectory value: whether making the message available helps or harms subsequent reasoning. Across five mathematics and science benchmarks and two openly available model families, gpt-oss-120b and gemma-4-31B-it, wrong-helpful messages appear in every benchmark-model combination. Among wrong-answer messages that change final correctness, more than four in ten changes are helpful in each model. Controlled repeats show that the number of repeatable message effects is unlikely to arise from replay variation alone (p=0.0002). A focused intervention on repeatable wrong-helpful messages finds that the complete message works best, while retaining its reasoning preserves more success than retaining only its answer; the source of the complete-message advantage remains open. Within the same problem, repeated trajectory-value evidence also identifies a better keep-or-remove choice than answer correctness alone. Answer correctness is therefore informative but does not determine trajectory value. DHD measures this missing property and produces reusable labels for learning when agents should listen.

Sequence models are a critical component of modern NLP systems, but their predictions are difficult to explain. We consider model explanations though rationales, subsets of context that can explain individual model predictions. We find sequential rationales by solving a combinatorial optimization: the best rationale is the smallest subset of input tokens that would predict the same output as the full sequence. Enumerating all subsets is intractable, so we propose an efficient greedy algorithm to approximate this objective. The algorithm, which is called greedy rationalization, applies to any model. For this approach to be effective, the model should form compatible conditional distributions when making predictions on incomplete subsets of the context. This condition can be enforced with a short fine-tuning step. We study greedy rationalization on language modeling and machine translation. Compared to existing baselines, greedy rationalization is best at optimizing the combinatorial objective and provides the most faithful rationales. On a new dataset of annotated sequential rationales, greedy rationales are most similar to human rationales.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Training language models with rationales augmentation has been shown to be beneficial in many existing works. In this paper, we identify that such a prevailing view does not hold consistently. We conduct comprehensive investigations to thoroughly inspect the impact of rationales on model performance as well as a novel perspective of model reliability. The results lead to several key findings that add new insights upon existing understandings: 1) Rationales can, at times, deteriorate model performance; 2) Rationales can, at times, improve model reliability, even outperforming their untrained counterparts; 3) A linear correspondence exists in between the performance and reliability improvements, while both are driven by the intrinsic difficulty of the task. These findings provide informative regulations on the broad utilization of rationales and raise critical implications on the procedure of explicitly aligning language models with implicit human thoughts. Codes can be found at https://github.com/Ignoramus0817/rationales.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

Neural language models (LMs) have achieved impressive results on various language-based reasoning tasks by utilizing latent knowledge encoded in their own pretrained parameters. To make this reasoning process more explicit, recent works retrieve a rationalizing LM's internal knowledge by training or prompting it to generate free-text rationales, which can be used to guide task predictions made by either the same LM or a separate reasoning LM. However, rationalizing LMs require expensive rationale annotation and/or computation, without any assurance that their generated rationales improve LM task performance or faithfully reflect LM decision-making. In this paper, we propose PINTO, an LM pipeline that rationalizes via prompt-based learning, and learns to faithfully reason over rationales via counterfactual regularization. First, PINTO maps out a suitable reasoning process for the task input by prompting a frozen rationalizing LM to generate a free-text rationale. Second, PINTO's reasoning LM is fine-tuned to solve the task using the generated rationale as context, while regularized to output less confident predictions when the rationale is perturbed. Across four datasets, we show that PINTO significantly improves the generalization ability of the reasoning LM, yielding higher performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution test sets. Also, we find that PINTO's rationales are more faithful to its task predictions than those generated by competitive baselines.

LLM-as-a-judge models have been used for evaluating both human and AI generated content, specifically by providing scores and rationales. Rationales, in addition to increasing transparency, help models learn to calibrate its judgments. Enhancing a model's rationale can therefore improve its calibration abilities and ultimately the ability to score content. We introduce Self-Rationalization, an iterative process of improving the rationales for the judge models, which consequently improves the score for fine-grained customizable scoring criteria (i.e., likert-scale scoring with arbitrary evaluation criteria). Self-rationalization works by having the model generate multiple judgments with rationales for the same input, curating a preference pair dataset from its own judgements, and iteratively fine-tuning the judge via DPO. Intuitively, this approach allows the judge model to self-improve by learning from its own rationales, leading to better alignment and evaluation accuracy. After just two iterations -- while only relying on examples in the training set -- human evaluation shows that our judge model learns to produce higher quality rationales, with a win rate of 62% on average compared to models just trained via SFT on rationale . This judge model also achieves high scoring accuracy on BigGen Bench and Reward Bench, outperforming even bigger sized models trained using SFT with rationale, self-consistency or best-of-N sampling by 3% to 9%.

Despite strong performance of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) on multimodal tasks, predicting whether and why an image is persuasive remains challenging. We first show that prompting MLLMs to reason before prediction does not consistently help, and can even reduce persuasiveness prediction performance, suggesting that naively generated rationales are unreliable signals for this task. Yet, no established methodology exists for training MLLMs to reason about visual persuasion or evaluating whether their rationales faithfully support their decisions. To address this gap, we show empirically and theoretically that diverse teacher-generated rationales, when used for supervised fine-tuning, improve visual persuasiveness prediction. We further introduce a three-dimensional faithfulness evaluation framework covering rationale-to-decision consistency, rationale-to-image groundedness, and rationale-to-decision sensitivity. Applying this framework shows that prediction performance alone does not guarantee faithful rationales, while rationale-to-decision sensitivity is most aligned with human rationale preferences. These findings motivate faithfulness-aware training objectives and scalable rationale supervision for visual persuasiveness evaluation. Our code and dataset will be made publicly available.

Free-text rationales justify model decisions in natural language and thus become likable and accessible among approaches to explanation across many tasks. However, their effectiveness can be hindered by misinterpretation and hallucination. As a perturbation test, we investigate how large language models (LLMs) perform rationale generation under the effects of readability level control, i.e., being prompted for an explanation targeting a specific expertise level, such as sixth grade or college. We find that explanations are adaptable to such instruction, though the requested readability is often misaligned with the measured text complexity according to traditional readability metrics. Furthermore, the generated rationales tend to feature medium level complexity, which correlates with the measured quality using automatic metrics. Finally, our human annotators confirm a generally satisfactory impression on rationales at all readability levels, with high-school-level readability being most commonly perceived and favored.

A computational ethics framework is essential for AI and autonomous systems operating in complex, real-world environments. Existing approaches often lack the adaptability needed to integrate ethical principles into dynamic and ambiguous contexts, limiting their effectiveness across diverse scenarios. To address these challenges, we outline the necessary ingredients for building a holistic, meta-level framework that combines intermediate representations, probabilistic reasoning, and knowledge representation. The specifications therein emphasize scalability, supporting ethical reasoning at both individual decision-making levels and within the collective dynamics of multi-agent systems. By integrating theoretical principles with contextual factors, it facilitates structured and context-aware decision-making, ensuring alignment with overarching ethical standards. We further explore proposed theorems outlining how ethical reasoners should operate, offering a foundation for practical implementation. These constructs aim to support the development of robust and ethically reliable AI systems capable of navigating the complexities of real-world moral decision-making scenarios.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Large language models (LMs) are capable of generating free-text rationales to aid question answering. However, prior work 1) suggests that useful self-rationalization is emergent only at significant scales (e.g., 175B parameter GPT-3); and 2) focuses largely on downstream performance, ignoring the semantics of the rationales themselves, e.g., are they faithful, true, and helpful for humans? In this work, we enable small-scale LMs (approx. 200x smaller than GPT-3) to generate rationales that not only improve downstream task performance, but are also more plausible, consistent, and diverse, assessed both by automatic and human evaluation. Our method, MaRio (Multi-rewArd RatIOnalization), is a multi-reward conditioned self-rationalization algorithm that optimizes multiple distinct properties like plausibility, diversity and consistency. Results on five difficult question-answering datasets StrategyQA, QuaRel, OpenBookQA, NumerSense and QASC show that not only does MaRio improve task accuracy, but it also improves the self-rationalization quality of small LMs across the aforementioned axes better than a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) baseline. Extensive human evaluations confirm that MaRio rationales are preferred vs. SFT rationales, as well as qualitative improvements in plausibility and consistency.

Reasoning models have achieved remarkable performance on tasks like math and logical reasoning thanks to their ability to search during reasoning. However, they still suffer from overthinking, often performing unnecessary reasoning steps even after reaching the correct answer. This raises the question: can models evaluate the correctness of their intermediate answers during reasoning? In this work, we study whether reasoning models encode information about answer correctness through probing the model's hidden states. The resulting probe can verify intermediate answers with high accuracy and produces highly calibrated scores. Additionally, we find models' hidden states encode correctness of future answers, enabling early prediction of the correctness before the intermediate answer is fully formulated. We then use the probe as a verifier to decide whether to exit reasoning at intermediate answers during inference, reducing the number of inference tokens by 24\% without compromising performance. These findings confirm that reasoning models do encode a notion of correctness yet fail to exploit it, revealing substantial untapped potential to enhance their efficiency.

Recent research has shown that rationales, or step-by-step chains of thought, can be used to improve performance in multi-step reasoning tasks. We reconsider rationale-augmented prompting for few-shot in-context learning, where (input -> output) prompts are expanded to (input, rationale -> output) prompts. For rationale-augmented prompting we demonstrate how existing approaches, which rely on manual prompt engineering, are subject to sub-optimal rationales that may harm performance. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a unified framework of rationale-augmented ensembles, where we identify rationale sampling in the output space as the key component to robustly improve performance. This framework is general and can easily be extended to common natural language processing tasks, even those that do not traditionally leverage intermediate steps, such as question answering, word sense disambiguation, and sentiment analysis. We demonstrate that rationale-augmented ensembles achieve more accurate and interpretable results than existing prompting approaches--including standard prompting without rationales and rationale-based chain-of-thought prompting--while simultaneously improving interpretability of model predictions through the associated rationales.

As LLMs are deployed in high-stakes settings, users must judge the correctness of individual responses, often relying on model-generated justifications such as reasoning chains or explanations. Yet, no standard measure exists for whether these justifications help users distinguish correct answers from incorrect ones. We formalize this idea as error verifiability and propose v_{bal}, a balanced metric that measures whether justifications enable raters to accurately assess answer correctness, validated against human raters who show high agreement. We find that neither common approaches, such as post-training and model scaling, nor more targeted interventions recommended improve verifiability. We introduce two methods that succeed at improving verifiability: reflect-and-rephrase (RR) for mathematical reasoning and oracle-rephrase (OR) for factual QA, both of which improve verifiability by incorporating domain-appropriate external information. Together, our results establish error verifiability as a distinct dimension of response quality that does not emerge from accuracy improvements alone and requires dedicated, domain-aware methods to address.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

When provided with sufficient explanatory context, smaller Language Models have been shown to exhibit strong reasoning ability on challenging short-answer question-answering tasks where the questions are unseen in training. We evaluate two methods for further improvement in this setting. Both methods focus on combining rationales generated by a larger Language Model with longer contexts created from a multi-hop dense retrieval system. The first method (RR) involves training a Rationale Ranking model to score both generated rationales and retrieved contexts with respect to relevance and truthfulness. We then use the scores to derive combined contexts from both knowledge sources using a number of combinatory strategies. For the second method (RATD) we utilise retrieval-augmented training datasets developed by Hartill et al. 2023 to train a smaller Reasoning model such that it becomes proficient at utilising relevant information from longer text sequences that may be only partially evidential and frequently contain many irrelevant sentences. We find that both methods significantly improve results. Our single best Reasoning model materially improves upon strong comparable prior baselines for unseen evaluation datasets (StrategyQA 58.9 rightarrow 61.7 acc., CommonsenseQA 63.6 rightarrow 72.7 acc., ARC-DA 31.6 rightarrow 52.1 F1, IIRC 25.5 rightarrow 27.3 F1) and a version utilising our prior knowledge of each type of question in selecting a context combination strategy does even better. Our proposed models also generally outperform direct prompts against much larger models (BLOOM 175B and StableVicuna 13B) in both few-shot chain-of-thought and standard few-shot settings.

Generating rationales that justify scoring decisions has been a promising way to facilitate explainability in automated scoring systems. However, existing methods do not match the accuracy of classifier-based methods. Plus, the generated rationales often contain hallucinated information. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework capable of generating more faithful rationales and, more importantly, matching performance with classifier-based black-box scoring systems. We first mimic the human assessment process by querying Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate a thought tree. We then summarise intermediate assessment decisions from each thought tree path for creating synthetic rationale data and rationale preference data. Finally, we utilise the generated synthetic data to calibrate LLMs through a two-step training process: supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our framework achieves a 38% assessment performance improvement in the QWK score compared to prior work while producing higher-quality rationales, as recognised by human evaluators and LLMs. Our work sheds light on the effectiveness of performing preference optimization using synthetic preference data obtained from thought tree paths.

Solving algebraic word problems requires executing a series of arithmetic operations---a program---to obtain a final answer. However, since programs can be arbitrarily complicated, inducing them directly from question-answer pairs is a formidable challenge. To make this task more feasible, we solve these problems by generating answer rationales, sequences of natural language and human-readable mathematical expressions that derive the final answer through a series of small steps. Although rationales do not explicitly specify programs, they provide a scaffolding for their structure via intermediate milestones. To evaluate our approach, we have created a new 100,000-sample dataset of questions, answers and rationales. Experimental results show that indirect supervision of program learning via answer rationales is a promising strategy for inducing arithmetic programs.

Rationale discovery is defined as finding a subset of the input data that maximally supports the prediction of downstream tasks. In graph machine learning context, graph rationale is defined to locate the critical subgraph in the given graph topology, which fundamentally determines the prediction results. In contrast to the rationale subgraph, the remaining subgraph is named the environment subgraph. Graph rationalization can enhance the model performance as the mapping between the graph rationale and prediction label is viewed as invariant, by assumption. To ensure the discriminative power of the extracted rationale subgraphs, a key technique named "intervention" is applied. The core idea of intervention is that given any changing environment subgraphs, the semantics from the rationale subgraph is invariant, which guarantees the correct prediction result. However, most, if not all, of the existing rationalization works on graph data develop their intervention strategies on the graph level, which is coarse-grained. In this paper, we propose well-tailored intervention strategies on graph data. Our idea is driven by the development of Transformer models, whose self-attention module provides rich interactions between input nodes. Based on the self-attention module, our proposed invariant graph Transformer (IGT) can achieve fine-grained, more specifically, node-level and virtual node-level intervention. Our comprehensive experiments involve 7 real-world datasets, and the proposed IGT shows significant performance advantages compared to 13 baseline methods.

Automated rationale generation is an approach for real-time explanation generation whereby a computational model learns to translate an autonomous agent's internal state and action data representations into natural language. Training on human explanation data can enable agents to learn to generate human-like explanations for their behavior. In this paper, using the context of an agent that plays Frogger, we describe (a) how to collect a corpus of explanations, (b) how to train a neural rationale generator to produce different styles of rationales, and (c) how people perceive these rationales. We conducted two user studies. The first study establishes the plausibility of each type of generated rationale and situates their user perceptions along the dimensions of confidence, humanlike-ness, adequate justification, and understandability. The second study further explores user preferences between the generated rationales with regard to confidence in the autonomous agent, communicating failure and unexpected behavior. Overall, we find alignment between the intended differences in features of the generated rationales and the perceived differences by users. Moreover, context permitting, participants preferred detailed rationales to form a stable mental model of the agent's behavior.

We use automated theorem provers to significantly shorten a formal development in higher order set theory. The development includes many standard theorems such as the fundamental theorem of arithmetic and irrationality of square root of two. Higher order automated theorem provers are particularly useful here, since the underlying framework of higher order set theory coincides with the classical extensional higher order logic of (most) higher order automated theorem provers, so no significant translation or encoding is required. Additionally, many subgoals are first order and so first order automated provers often suffice. We compare the performance of different provers on the subgoals generated from the development. We also discuss possibilities for proof reconstruction, i.e., obtaining formal proof terms when an automated theorem prover claims to have proven the subgoal.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

AI agents are changing the requirements for document parsing. What matters is semantic correctness: parsed output must preserve the structure and meaning needed for autonomous decisions, including correct table structure, precise chart data, semantically meaningful formatting, and visual grounding. Existing benchmarks do not fully capture this setting for enterprise automation, relying on narrow document distributions and text-similarity metrics that miss agent-critical failures. We introduce ParseBench, a benchmark of {sim}2{,}000 human-verified pages from enterprise documents spanning insurance, finance, and government, organized around five capability dimensions: tables, charts, content faithfulness, semantic formatting, and visual grounding. Across 14 methods spanning vision-language models, specialized document parsers, and LlamaParse, the benchmark reveals a fragmented capability landscape: no method is consistently strong across all five dimensions. LlamaParse Agentic achieves the highest overall score at \agenticoverall\%, and the benchmark highlights the remaining capability gaps across current systems. Dataset and evaluation code are available on https://huggingface.co/datasets/llamaindex/ParseBench{HuggingFace} and https://github.com/run-llama/ParseBench{GitHub}.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in handling complex reasoning tasks through step-by-step rationale generation. However, recent studies have raised concerns regarding the hallucination and flaws in their reasoning process. Substantial efforts are being made to improve the reliability and faithfulness of the generated rationales. Some approaches model reasoning as planning, while others focus on annotating for process supervision. Nevertheless, the planning-based search process often results in high latency due to the frequent assessment of intermediate reasoning states and the extensive exploration space. Additionally, supervising the reasoning process with human annotation is costly and challenging to scale for LLM training. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose a framework to learn planning-based reasoning through direct preference optimization (DPO) on collected trajectories, which are ranked according to synthesized process rewards. Our results on challenging logical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our learning framework, showing that our 7B model can surpass the strong counterparts like GPT-3.5-Turbo.

Learning from mistakes is a fundamental feature of human intelligence. Previous work has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can also learn from incorrect answers when provided with a comprehensive rationale detailing why an answer is wrong or how to correct it. In this work, we examine whether LLMs can learn from mistakes in mathematical reasoning tasks when these explanations are not provided. We investigate if LLMs are able to implicitly infer such rationales simply from observing both incorrect and correct answers. Surprisingly, we find that LLMs perform better, on average, when rationales are eliminated from the context and incorrect answers are simply shown alongside correct ones. This approach also substantially outperforms chain-of-thought prompting in our evaluations. We show that these results are consistent across LLMs of different sizes and varying reasoning abilities. Further, we carry out an in-depth analysis, and show that prompting with both wrong and correct answers leads to greater performance and better generalisation than introducing additional, more diverse question-answer pairs into the context. Finally, we show that new rationales generated by models that have only observed incorrect and correct answers are scored equally as highly by humans as those produced with the aid of exemplar rationales. Our results demonstrate that LLMs are indeed capable of in-context implicit learning.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

Which reasoning behaviors are associated with correct answers in reasoning models, and does reasoning-oriented training amplify those behaviors? This distinction is important because reasoning-oriented training can make traces look more deliberative without amplifying the behaviors most tied to model correctness. We quantify this mismatch with Behavioral Lift, a metric that measures how much correctness changes when a behavior is present versus absent in a model's reasoning trace. Across 15 models and 6 benchmarks spanning text-only and vision-language reasoning, we annotate 15,282 traces with a taxonomy whose core behaviors are defined for both LLM and VLM traces. We find evidence for an Amplification-Lift Gap, in which thinking models strongly amplify self-correction, hypothesis testing, and uncertainty acknowledgment, while the highest-lift behaviors are confidence calibration, knowledge alignment, and self-awareness. Confidence calibration is among the strongest positive signals of correctness in both modalities, yet is barely amplified; uncertainty acknowledgment is amplified by 3--7times, yet is weakly or negatively associated with correctness. We find that reasoning-oriented training does not preferentially amplify the highest-Lift behaviors, motivating process-level objectives that reward calibrated and grounded reasoning rather than surface form alone.

What is reasoning? This question has driven centuries of philosophical inquiry, from Aristotle's syllogisms to modern computational complexity theory. In the age of large language models achieving superhuman performance on benchmarks like GSM8K (95\% accuracy) and HumanEval (90\% pass@1), we must ask: have these systems learned to reason, or have they learned to pattern-match over reasoning traces? This paper argues for a specific answer: reasoning is iterative operator application in state spaces, converging to fixed points. This definition is not merely philosophical -- it has concrete architectural implications that explain both the failures of current systems and the path to genuine reasoning capabilities. Our investigation begins with a puzzle (OpenXOR), progresses through theory (OpenOperator), and culminates in a working solution (OpenLM) that achieves 76\% accuracy where state-of-the-art LLMs achieve 0\%. This is not about criticizing existing systems, but about understanding what reasoning requires and building architectures that provide it.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Interpretability or explainability is an emerging research field in NLP. From a user-centric point of view, the goal is to build models that provide proper justification for their decisions, similar to those of humans, by requiring the models to satisfy additional constraints. To this end, we introduce a new application on legal text where, contrary to mainstream literature targeting word-level rationales, we conceive rationales as selected paragraphs in multi-paragraph structured court cases. We also release a new dataset comprising European Court of Human Rights cases, including annotations for paragraph-level rationales. We use this dataset to study the effect of already proposed rationale constraints, i.e., sparsity, continuity, and comprehensiveness, formulated as regularizers. Our findings indicate that some of these constraints are not beneficial in paragraph-level rationale extraction, while others need re-formulation to better handle the multi-label nature of the task we consider. We also introduce a new constraint, singularity, which further improves the quality of rationales, even compared with noisy rationale supervision. Experimental results indicate that the newly introduced task is very challenging and there is a large scope for further research.

The rapid development of large language and vision models (LLVMs) has been driven by advances in visual instruction tuning. Recently, open-source LLVMs have curated high-quality visual instruction tuning datasets and utilized additional vision encoders or multiple computer vision models in order to narrow the performance gap with powerful closed-source LLVMs. These advancements are attributed to multifaceted information required for diverse capabilities, including fundamental image understanding, real-world knowledge about common-sense and non-object concepts (e.g., charts, diagrams, symbols, signs, and math problems), and step-by-step procedures for solving complex questions. Drawing from the multifaceted information, we present a new efficient LLVM, Mamba-based traversal of rationales (Meteor), which leverages multifaceted rationale to enhance understanding and answering capabilities. To embed lengthy rationales containing abundant information, we employ the Mamba architecture, capable of processing sequential data with linear time complexity. We introduce a new concept of traversal of rationale that facilitates efficient embedding of rationale. Subsequently, the backbone multimodal language model (MLM) is trained to generate answers with the aid of rationale. Through these steps, Meteor achieves significant improvements in vision language performances across multiple evaluation benchmarks requiring diverse capabilities, without scaling up the model size or employing additional vision encoders and computer vision models.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to perform better when asked to reason step-by-step before answering a question. However, it is unclear to what degree the model's final answer is faithful to the stated reasoning steps. In this paper, we perform a causal mediation analysis on twelve LLMs to examine how intermediate reasoning steps generated by the LLM influence the final outcome and find that LLMs do not reliably use their intermediate reasoning steps when generating an answer. To address this issue, we introduce FRODO, a framework to tailor small-sized LMs to generate correct reasoning steps and robustly reason over these steps. FRODO consists of an inference module that learns to generate correct reasoning steps using an implicit causal reward function and a reasoning module that learns to faithfully reason over these intermediate inferences using a counterfactual and causal preference objective. Our experiments show that FRODO significantly outperforms four competitive baselines. Furthermore, FRODO improves the robustness and generalization ability of the reasoning LM, yielding higher performance on out-of-distribution test sets. Finally, we find that FRODO's rationales are more faithful to its final answer predictions than standard supervised fine-tuning.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit strong performance, yet often produce rationales that sound plausible but fail to reflect their true decision process, undermining reliability and trust. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning faithfulness, defined by two testable conditions: stance consistency (a coherent stance linking reasoning to answer) and causal influence (the stated reasoning causally drives the answer under output-level interventions), explicitly decoupled from accuracy. To operationalize this, we present RFEval, a benchmark of 7,186 instances across seven tasks that probes faithfulness via controlled, output-level counterfactual interventions. Evaluating twelve open-source LRMs, we find unfaithfulness in 49.7% of outputs, predominantly from stance inconsistency. Failures are concentrated in brittle, convergent domains such as math and code, and correlate more with post-training regimes than with scale: within-family ablations indicate that adding current RL-style objectives on top of supervised fine-tuning can reduce reasoning faithfulness, even when accuracy is maintained. Crucially, accuracy is neither a sufficient nor a reliable proxy for faithfulness: once controlling for model and task, the accuracy-faithfulness link is weak and statistically insignificant. Our work establishes a rigorous methodology for auditing LRM reliability and shows that trustworthy AI requires optimizing not only for correct outcomes but also for the structural integrity of the reasoning process. Our code and dataset can be found at project page: https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/}{https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory -- the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems -- leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.

LLMs can perform multi-step reasoning through Chain-of-Thought (CoT), but they cannot reliably verify their own logic. Even when they reach correct answers, the underlying reasoning may be flawed, undermining trust in high-stakes scenarios. To mitigate this issue, we introduce VeriCoT, a neuro-symbolic method that extracts and verifies formal logical arguments from CoT reasoning. VeriCoT formalizes each CoT reasoning step into first-order logic and identifies premises that ground the argument in source context, commonsense knowledge, or prior reasoning steps. The symbolic representation enables automated solvers to verify logical validity while the NL premises allow humans and systems to identify ungrounded or fallacious reasoning steps. Experiments on the ProofWriter, LegalBench, and BioASQ datasets show VeriCoT effectively identifies flawed reasoning, and serves as a strong predictor of final answer correctness. We also leverage VeriCoT's verification signal for (1) inference-time self-reflection, (2) supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on VeriCoT-distilled datasets and (3) preference fine-tuning (PFT) with direct preference optimization (DPO) using verification-based pairwise rewards, further improving reasoning validity and accuracy.

Autonomous reasoning is among the most scientifically and economically motivating topics in AI today. Historically the purview of symbolic AI, recent advances have mainly emerged from deep probabilistic generative models. Despite immense interest and rapid progress, the generative AI community has not clearly converged on operational definitions for reasoning and often implicitly rejects the historical treatment of this topic in logic and verifiable automated reasoning. This position contends that definitional ambiguity leaves the construct validity of reasoning evaluation unverifiable, undermining quantifiable progress toward trustworthy autonomous reasoning. We also contend that this ambiguity is addressable. To that end, we provide (1) operational definitions based on a synthesis of the literature, positioning valid and sound reasoning as a learnable rule-based process; and (2) a checklist for best practices in the communication of AI reasoning research.

Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative ethics through the lens of computational complexity. First, we introduce computational complexity for the uninitiated reader and discuss how the complexity of ethical problems can be framed within Marr's three levels of analysis. We then study a range of ethical problems based on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, with the aim of elucidating the complexity associated with the problems themselves (e.g., due to combinatorics, uncertainty, strategic dynamics), the computational methods employed (e.g., probability, logic, learning), and the available resources (e.g., time, knowledge, learning). The results indicate that most problems the normative frameworks pose lead to tractability issues in every category analyzed. Our investigation also provides several insights about the computational nature of normative ethics, including the differences between rule- and outcome-based moral strategies, and the implementation-variance with regard to moral resources. We then discuss the consequences complexity results have for the prospect of moral machines in virtue of the trade-off between optimality and efficiency. Finally, we elucidate how computational complexity can be used to inform both philosophical and cognitive-psychological research on human morality by advancing the Moral Tractability Thesis (MTT).

Common-sense reasoning is a key language model capability because it encapsulates not just specific factual knowledge but rather general language and world understanding. Measuring common-sense reasoning, therefore, is crucial for language models of different sizes and applications. One of the most widely used benchmarks for evaluating such capabilities is HellaSwag; however, in this paper, we show that it has severe construct validity issues. These issues range from basic ungrammaticality and numerous typos to misleading prompts or equally correct options. Furthermore, we show that if models are evaluated only on answer texts, or with "Lorem ipsum dolor..." instead of the question, more than 65% of model predictions remain the same, and this cannot be attributed merely to contamination. Since benchmark scores are an essential part of model selection in both research and commercial applications, these validity issues can have severe consequences. In particular, knowing that taking benchmark scores at face value is ubiquitous, inadequate evaluation leads to ill-informed decisions about models. In this paper, we thoroughly investigate critical validity issues posed by HellaSwag and illustrate them with various evaluations using generative language models of different sizes. We argue that this benchmark does not accurately measure common-sense reasoning and, therefore, should not be used for evaluation in its current state. Based on the results of our study, we propose requirements that should be met by future common-sense reasoning benchmarks. In addition, we release GoldenSwag, a corrected subset of HellaSwag, which, to our belief, facilitates acceptable common-sense reasoning evaluation.

Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) and LLM-as-a-Judge exhibit deceptive alignment by producing correct judgments for incorrect reasons, as they are trained and evaluated to prioritize Outcome Accuracy, which undermines their ability to generalize during RLHF. We introduce Rationale Consistency, a fine-grained metric that quantifies the alignment between the model's reasoning process and human judgment. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals that rationale consistency effectively discriminates among state-of-the-art models and detects deceptive alignment, while outcome accuracy falls short in both respects. To mitigate this gap, we introduce a hybrid signal that combines rationale consistency with outcome accuracy for GenRM training. Our training method achieves state-of-the-art performance on RM-Bench (87.1%) and JudgeBench (82%), surpassing outcome-only baselines by an average of 5%. Using RM during RLHF, our method effectively improves performance as demonstrated on Arena Hard v2, notably yielding a 7% improvement in creative writing tasks. Further analysis confirms that our method escapes the deceptive alignment trap, effectively reversing the decline in rationale consistency observed in outcome-only training.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated outstanding performance across various tasks, yet they still exhibit limitations such as hallucination, unfaithful reasoning, and toxic content. One potential approach to mitigate these issues is learning from human or external feedback (e.g. tools). In this paper, we introduce an intrinsic self-correct reasoning framework for LLMs that eliminates the need for human feedback, external tools, and handcraft prompts. The proposed framework, based on a multi-step reasoning paradigm Learning from Correctness (LeCo), improves reasoning performance without needing to learn from errors. This paradigm prioritizes learning from correct reasoning steps, and a unique method to measure confidence for each reasoning step based on generation logits. Experimental results across various multi-step reasoning tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework in improving reasoning performance with reduced token consumption.

Generating step-by-step "chain-of-thought" rationales improves language model performance on complex reasoning tasks like mathematics or commonsense question-answering. However, inducing language model rationale generation currently requires either constructing massive rationale datasets or sacrificing accuracy by using only few-shot inference. We propose a technique to iteratively leverage a small number of rationale examples and a large dataset without rationales, to bootstrap the ability to perform successively more complex reasoning. This technique, the "Self-Taught Reasoner" (STaR), relies on a simple loop: generate rationales to answer many questions, prompted with a few rationale examples; if the generated answers are wrong, try again to generate a rationale given the correct answer; fine-tune on all the rationales that ultimately yielded correct answers; repeat. We show that STaR significantly improves performance on multiple datasets compared to a model fine-tuned to directly predict final answers, and performs comparably to fine-tuning a 30times larger state-of-the-art language model on CommensenseQA. Thus, STaR lets a model improve itself by learning from its own generated reasoning.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) distillation aims to enhance small language models' (SLMs) reasoning by transferring multi-step reasoning capability from the larger teacher models. However, existing work underestimates rationale quality, focusing primarily on data quantity, which may transfer noisy or incorrect information to the student model. To address the above issues, we proposed Model-Oriented Rationale Selection Distillation (MoRSD), which can discern and select high quality rationales for distillation to improve performance further. We further propose a Rationale Difficulty (RD) metric to measure the ability of the student model to generate the correct answer under a given rationale. Compared to the baseline, we achieved 4.6% average improvement on seven datasets over three tasks, using fewer rationales by controlling their accuracy, diversity, and difficulty. Our results reveal that a small portion of the high quality rationales can enhance the reasoning ability of student models than the entire dataset. Our method promises to be a possible solution for efficient CoT distillation. Our code will be released in https://github.com/Leon221220/MoRSD.

Recent advances in long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning have largely prioritized answer accuracy and token efficiency, while overlooking aspects critical to trustworthiness. We argue that usable reasoning systems must be trustworthy, characterized by three properties: interpretability, faithfulness, and reliability. To this end, we propose ReFIne, a new training framework that integrates supervised fine-tuning with GRPO to encourage models to: (i) improve interpretability by producing structured, tag-based traces with high-level planning that are easier for humans to follow; (ii) enhance faithfulness by explicitly disclosing the decisive information guiding each solution, with consistent cross-section references; and (iii) promote reliability by providing self-assessments of both the derivation's soundness and the confidence of the final answer. We apply ReFIne to the Qwen3 models at multiple scales (1.7B/4B/8B) and evaluate across mathematical benchmarks of varying difficulty. Our experimental results show that ReFIne models generate clearer and better-structured reasoning traces (interpretability +44.0%), more faithfully expose their underlying decision process (faithfulness +18.8%), and offer informative confidence estimates (reliability +42.4%). These findings highlight an overlooked but important direction: reasoning models should be optimized not only for accuracy, but also for broader dimensions of trustworthiness. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/Training_Trustworthy_LRM_with_Refine

Human-annotated textual explanations are becoming increasingly important in Explainable Natural Language Processing. Rationale extraction aims to provide faithful (i.e., reflective of the behavior of the model) and plausible (i.e., convincing to humans) explanations by highlighting the inputs that had the largest impact on the prediction without compromising the performance of the task model. In recent works, the focus of training rationale extractors was primarily on optimizing for plausibility using human highlights, while the task model was trained on jointly optimizing for task predictive accuracy and faithfulness. We propose REFER, a framework that employs a differentiable rationale extractor that allows to back-propagate through the rationale extraction process. We analyze the impact of using human highlights during training by jointly training the task model and the rationale extractor. In our experiments, REFER yields significantly better results in terms of faithfulness, plausibility, and downstream task accuracy on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution data. On both e-SNLI and CoS-E, our best setting produces better results in terms of composite normalized relative gain than the previous baselines by 11% and 3%, respectively.

Search engines and information platforms are increasingly scrutinized for their role in spreading misinformation. Traditional responses often focus on detecting falsehoods or verifying the ultimate validity of claims. This paper argues that such a validity-centered framing is inadequate for the epistemic challenges of search environments.

Explaining Artificial Intelligence (AI) decisions is a major challenge nowadays in AI, in particular when applied to sensitive scenarios like medicine and law. However, the need to explain the rationale behind decisions is a main issue also for human-based deliberation as it is important to justify why a certain decision has been taken. Resident medical doctors for instance are required not only to provide a (possibly correct) diagnosis, but also to explain how they reached a certain conclusion. Developing new tools to aid residents to train their explanation skills is therefore a central objective of AI in education. In this paper, we follow this direction, and we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first multilingual dataset for Medical Question Answering where correct and incorrect diagnoses for a clinical case are enriched with a natural language explanation written by doctors. These explanations have been manually annotated with argument components (i.e., premise, claim) and argument relations (i.e., attack, support), resulting in the Multilingual CasiMedicos-Arg dataset which consists of 558 clinical cases in four languages (English, Spanish, French, Italian) with explanations, where we annotated 5021 claims, 2313 premises, 2431 support relations, and 1106 attack relations. We conclude by showing how competitive baselines perform over this challenging dataset for the argument mining task.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strong potential in generating 'believable human-like' behavior in web environments. Prior work has explored augmenting training data with LLM-synthesized rationales and applying supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to enhance reasoning ability, which in turn can improve downstream action prediction. However, the performance of such approaches remains inherently bounded by the reasoning capabilities of the model used to generate the rationales. In this paper, we introduce Shop-R1, a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework aimed at enhancing the reasoning ability of LLMs for simulation of real human behavior in online shopping environments Specifically, Shop-R1 decomposes the human behavior simulation task into two stages: rationale generation and action prediction, each guided by distinct reward signals. For rationale generation, we leverage internal model signals (e.g., logit distributions) to guide the reasoning process in a self-supervised manner. For action prediction, we propose a hierarchical reward structure with difficulty-aware scaling to prevent reward hacking and enable fine-grained reward assignment. This design evaluates both high-level action types and the correctness of fine-grained sub-action details (attributes and values), rewarding outputs proportionally to their difficulty. Experimental results show that our method achieves a relative improvement of over 65% compared to the baseline.

This paper investigates the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) using 50 newly constructed high-school-level word problems. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on answer correctness, we rigorously analyze both final answers and solution steps to identify reasoning failures. Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models - including Mixtral, Llama, Gemini, GPT-4o, and OpenAI's o1 variants - we find that while newer models (e.g., o3-mini, deepseek-r1) achieve higher accuracy, all models exhibit errors in spatial reasoning, strategic planning, and arithmetic, sometimes producing correct answers through flawed logic. Common failure modes include unwarranted assumptions, over-reliance on numerical patterns, and difficulty translating physical intuition into mathematical steps. Manual analysis reveals that models struggle with problems requiring multi-step deduction or real-world knowledge, despite possessing broad mathematical knowledge. Our results underscore the importance of evaluating reasoning processes, not just answers, and caution against overestimating LLMs' problem-solving proficiency. The study highlights persistent gaps in LLMs' generalization abilities, emphasizing the need for targeted improvements in structured reasoning and constraint handling.

In the context of multi-step reasoning, language models (LMs) probabilities are often miscalibrated -- solutions with high probabilities are not always correct. Therefore, greedy decoding, which is the standard decoding method for reasoning tasks, often yields incorrect solutions. In addition, methods such as self-consistency and verifiers rely on sampling from the LM distribution and do not tackle the underlying issue. To address this, we introduce Guiding Multi-step ReAsoning with a CorrectnEss Discriminator (GRACE), a stepwise decoding approach that nudges the model towards producing correct reasoning steps. GRACE employs a discriminator model, which is trained to differentiate correct steps from invalid ones, to adjust decoding preferences based on the correctness of each reasoning step. Importantly, GRACE does not require fine-tuning or re-training the LMs. When compared with conventional decoding strategies over four popular math reasoning benchmarks, GRACE exhibits significant improvements in both final answer accuracy and step correctness, outperforming both greedy decoding and self-consistency.Our code can be found at \url{https://github.com/mukhal/grace.}

Training on large amounts of rationales (i.e., CoT Fine-tuning) is effective at improving the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, acquiring human-authored rationales or augmenting rationales from proprietary models is costly and not scalable. In this paper, we study the problem of whether LLMs could self-improve their reasoning capabilities. To this end, we propose Self-Explore, where the LLM is tasked to explore the first wrong step (i.e., the first pit) within the rationale and use such signals as fine-grained rewards for further improvement. On the GSM8K and MATH test set, Self-Explore achieves 11.57% and 2.89% improvement on average across three LLMs compared to supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Our code is available at https://github.com/hbin0701/Self-Explore.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback plays a crucial role in aligning language models towards human preferences, traditionally represented through comparisons between pairs or sets of responses within a given context. While many studies have enhanced algorithmic techniques to optimize learning from such data, this work shifts focus to improving preference learning through a data-centric approach. Specifically, we propose enriching existing preference datasets with machine-generated rationales that explain the reasons behind choices. We develop a simple and principled framework to augment current preference learning methods with rationale information. Our comprehensive analysis highlights how rationales enhance learning efficiency. Extensive experiments reveal that rationale-enriched preference learning offers multiple advantages: it improves data efficiency, accelerates convergence to higher-performing models, and reduces verbosity bias and hallucination. Furthermore, this framework is versatile enough to integrate with various preference optimization algorithms. Overall, our findings highlight the potential of re-imagining data design for preference learning, demonstrating that even freely available machine-generated rationales can significantly boost performance across multiple dimensions. The code repository is available at https: //github.com/reds-lab/preference-learning-with-rationales

As large language models (LLMs) perform more difficult tasks, it becomes harder to verify the correctness and safety of their behavior. One approach to help with this issue is to prompt LLMs to externalize their reasoning, e.g., by having them generate step-by-step reasoning as they answer a question (Chain-of-Thought; CoT). The reasoning may enable us to check the process that models use to perform tasks. However, this approach relies on the stated reasoning faithfully reflecting the model's actual reasoning, which is not always the case. To improve over the faithfulness of CoT reasoning, we have models generate reasoning by decomposing questions into subquestions. Decomposition-based methods achieve strong performance on question-answering tasks, sometimes approaching that of CoT while improving the faithfulness of the model's stated reasoning on several recently-proposed metrics. By forcing the model to answer simpler subquestions in separate contexts, we greatly increase the faithfulness of model-generated reasoning over CoT, while still achieving some of the performance gains of CoT. Our results show it is possible to improve the faithfulness of model-generated reasoning; continued improvements may lead to reasoning that enables us to verify the correctness and safety of LLM behavior.

In recent years, there has been a development in approaching rationality problems through the motivic methods (cf. [Kontsevich--Tschinkel'19], [Nicaise--Shinder'19], [Nicaise--Ottem'21]). This method requires the explicit construction of degeneration families of curves with favorable properties. While the specific construction is generally difficult, [Nicaise--Ottem'22] combines combinatorial methods to construct degeneration families of hypersurfaces in toric varieties and shows the non-stable rationality of a very general hypersurface in projective spaces. In this paper, we extend the result of [Nicaise--Ottem'22] not only for hypersurfaces in algebraic tori but also to those in sch\"{o}n affine varieties. In application, we show the irrationality of certain hypersurfaces in the complex Grassmannian variety Gr(2, n) using the motivic method, which coincides with the result obtained by the same author in the previous research.

Reasoning abilities of LLMs have been a key focus in recent years. One challenging reasoning domain with interesting nuances is legal reasoning, which requires careful application of rules, and precedents while balancing deductive and analogical reasoning, and conflicts between rules. Although there have been a few works on using LLMs for legal reasoning, their focus has been on overall accuracy. In this paper, we dig deeper to do a step-by-step analysis and figure out where they commit errors. We use the college-level Multiple Choice Question-Answering (MCQA) task from the Civil Procedure dataset and propose a new error taxonomy derived from initial manual analysis of reasoning chains with respect to several LLMs, including two objective measures: soundness and correctness scores. We then develop an LLM-based automated evaluation framework to identify reasoning errors and evaluate the performance of LLMs. The computation of soundness and correctness on the dataset using the auto-evaluator framework reveals several interesting insights. Furthermore, we show that incorporating the error taxonomy as feedback in popular prompting techniques marginally increases LLM performance. Our work will also serve as an evaluation framework that can be used in detailed error analysis of reasoning chains for logic-intensive complex tasks.

We automate deep step-by step reasoning in an LLM dialog thread by recursively exploring alternatives (OR-nodes) and expanding details (AND-nodes) up to a given depth. Starting from a single succinct task-specific initiator we steer the automated dialog thread to stay focussed on the task by synthesizing a prompt that summarizes the depth-first steps taken so far. Our algorithm is derived from a simple recursive descent implementation of a Horn Clause interpreter, except that we accommodate our logic engine to fit the natural language reasoning patterns LLMs have been trained on. Semantic similarity to ground-truth facts or oracle advice from another LLM instance is used to restrict the search space and validate the traces of justification steps returned as answers. At the end, the unique minimal model of a generated Horn Clause program collects the results of the reasoning process. As applications, we sketch implementations of consequence predictions, causal explanations, recommendation systems and topic-focussed exploration of scientific literature.

Logical reasoning is a critical benchmark for evaluating the capabilities of large language models (LLMs), as it reflects their ability to derive valid conclusions from given premises. While the combination of test-time scaling with dedicated outcome or process reward models has opened up new avenues to enhance LLMs performance in complex reasoning tasks, this space is under-explored in deductive logical reasoning. We present a set of Outcome Reward Models (ORMs) for deductive reasoning. To train the ORMs we mainly generate data using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) with single and multiple samples. Additionally, we propose a novel tactic to further expand the type of errors covered in the training dataset of the ORM. In particular, we propose an echo generation technique that leverages LLMs' tendency to reflect incorrect assumptions made in prompts to extract additional training data, covering previously unexplored error types. While a standard CoT chain may contain errors likely to be made by the reasoner, the echo strategy deliberately steers the model toward incorrect reasoning. We show that ORMs trained on CoT and echo-augmented data demonstrate improved performance on the FOLIO, JustLogic, and ProverQA datasets across four different LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities given chain-of-thought prompts (examples with intermediate reasoning steps). Existing benchmarks measure reasoning ability indirectly, by evaluating accuracy on downstream tasks such as mathematical reasoning. However, it is unclear how these models obtain the answers and whether they rely on simple heuristics rather than the generated chain-of-thought. To enable systematic exploration of the reasoning ability of LLMs, we present a new synthetic question-answering dataset called PrOntoQA, where each example is generated from a synthetic world model represented in first-order logic. This allows us to parse the generated chain-of-thought into symbolic proofs for formal analysis. Our analysis on InstructGPT and GPT-3 shows that LLMs are quite capable of making correct individual deduction steps, and so are generally capable of reasoning, even in fictional contexts. However, they have difficulty with proof planning: When multiple valid deduction steps are available, they are not able to systematically explore the different options.

Mathematical reasoning models are widely deployed in education, automated tutoring, and decision support systems despite exhibiting fundamental computational instabilities. We demonstrate that state-of-the-art models (Qwen2.5-Math-7B) achieve 61% accuracy through a mixture of reliable and unreliable reasoning pathways: 18.4% of correct predictions employ stable, faithful reasoning while 81.6% emerge through computationally inconsistent pathways. Additionally, 8.8% of all predictions are silent failures -- confident yet incorrect outputs. Through comprehensive analysis using novel faithfulness metrics, we reveal: (1) reasoning quality shows weak negative correlation with correctness (r=-0.21, p=0.002), reflecting a binary classification threshold artifact rather than a monotonic inverse relationship; (2) scaling from 1.5B to 7B parameters (4.7x increase) provides zero accuracy benefit on our evaluated subset (6% of GSM8K), requiring validation on the complete benchmark; and (3) latent reasoning employs diverse computational strategies, with ~20% sharing CoT-like patterns. These findings highlight that benchmark accuracy can mask computational unreliability, demanding evaluation reforms measuring stability beyond single-sample metrics.

With the continuous advancement of reasoning abilities in Large Language Models (LLMs), their application to scientific reasoning tasks has gained significant research attention. Current research primarily emphasizes boosting LLMs' performance on scientific QA benchmarks by training on larger, more comprehensive datasets with extended reasoning chains. However, these approaches neglect the essence of the scientific reasoning process -- logicality, which is the rational foundation to ensure the validity of reasoning steps leading to reliable conclusions. In this work, we make the first systematic investigation into the internal logicality underlying LLM scientific reasoning, and develop a scientific logicality-enriched methodology, including a set of assessment criteria and data sampling methods for logicality-guided training, to improve the logical faithfulness as well as task performance. Further, we take physics, characterized by its diverse logical structures and formalisms, as an exemplar discipline to practise the above methodology. For data construction, we extract scientific problems from academic literature and sample a high-quality dataset exhibiting strong logicality. Experiments based on three different backbone LLMs reveal that: 1) the training data we constructed can effectively improve the scientific logicality in LLM reasoning; and 2) the enriched scientific logicality plays a critical role in solving scientific problems. Code is available at https://github.com/ScienceOne-AI/PhysLogic{https://github.com/ScienceOne-AI/PhysLogic}.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Hierarchical reasoning model (HRM) achieves extraordinary performance on various reasoning tasks, significantly outperforming large language model-based reasoners. To understand the strengths and potential failure modes of HRM, we conduct a mechanistic study on its reasoning patterns and find three surprising facts: (a) Failure of extremely simple puzzles, e.g., HRM can fail on a puzzle with only one unknown cell. We attribute this failure to the violation of the fixed point property, a fundamental assumption of HRM. (b) "Grokking" dynamics in reasoning steps, i.e., the answer is not improved uniformly, but instead there is a critical reasoning step that suddenly makes the answer correct; (c) Existence of multiple fixed points. HRM "guesses" the first fixed point, which could be incorrect, and gets trapped there for a while or forever. All facts imply that HRM appears to be "guessing" instead of "reasoning". Leveraging this "guessing" picture, we propose three strategies to scale HRM's guesses: data augmentation (scaling the quality of guesses), input perturbation (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging inference randomness), and model bootstrapping (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging training randomness). On the practical side, by combining all methods, we develop Augmented HRM, boosting accuracy on Sudoku-Extreme from 54.5% to 96.9%. On the scientific side, our analysis provides new insights into how reasoning models "reason".

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit weaknesses in traditional safety alignment, which often relies on rigid refusal heuristics or representation engineering to block harmful outputs. While they are effective for direct adversarial attacks, they fall short of broader safety challenges requiring nuanced, context-aware decision-making. To address this, we propose Reasoning-enhanced Finetuning for interpretable LLM Safety (Rational), a novel framework that trains models to engage in explicit safe reasoning before response. Fine-tuned models leverage the extensive pretraining knowledge in self-generated reasoning to bootstrap their own safety through structured reasoning, internalizing context-sensitive decision-making. Our findings suggest that safety extends beyond refusal, requiring context awareness for more robust, interpretable, and adaptive responses. Reasoning is not only a core capability of LLMs but also a fundamental mechanism for LLM safety. Rational employs reasoning-enhanced fine-tuning, allowing it to reject harmful prompts while providing meaningful and context-aware responses in complex scenarios.

As automated reasoning systems advance rapidly, there is a growing need for research-level formal mathematical problems to accurately evaluate their capabilities. To address this, we present Formal Conjectures, an evolving benchmark of currently 2615 mathematical problem statements formalized in Lean 4. Sourced from areas of active mathematical research, the dataset features 1029 open research conjectures providing a zero-contamination benchmark for mathematical proof discovery, and 836 solved problems for proof autoformalization. Notably, the repository provides a structured interface connecting mathematicians who formalize and clarify problems with the AI systems and humans attempting to solve them. Demonstrating its immediate utility, the benchmark has already been leveraged to make new mathematical discoveries, including the resolution of open research conjectures. We describe our approach to ensuring the correctness of these formalizations in a collaborative open-source project where contributions stem from an active community. In this framework, AI-generated proofs and disproofs serve as a valuable auditing mechanism to iteratively improve the fidelity of the benchmark. Finally, we provide a standardized evaluation setup and report baseline results on frozen evaluation subsets, demonstrating a climbable signal that measures the current frontier of automated reasoning on research-level mathematics.

As the era of autonomous agents making decisions on behalf of users unfolds, ensuring contextual integrity (CI) -- what is the appropriate information to share while carrying out a certain task -- becomes a central question to the field. We posit that CI demands a form of reasoning where the agent needs to reason about the context in which it is operating. To test this, we first prompt LLMs to reason explicitly about CI when deciding what information to disclose. We then extend this approach by developing a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that further instills in models the reasoning necessary to achieve CI. Using a synthetic, automatically created, dataset of only sim700 examples but with diverse contexts and information disclosure norms, we show that our method substantially reduces inappropriate information disclosure while maintaining task performance across multiple model sizes and families. Importantly, improvements transfer from this synthetic dataset to established CI benchmarks such as PrivacyLens that has human annotations and evaluates privacy leakage of AI assistants in actions and tool calls.

Solving grid puzzles involves a significant amount of logical reasoning. Hence, it is a good domain to evaluate the reasoning capability of a model which can then guide us to improve the reasoning ability of models. However, most existing works evaluate only the final predicted answer of a puzzle, without delving into an in-depth analysis of the LLMs' reasoning chains (such as where they falter) or providing any finer metrics to evaluate them. Since LLMs may rely on simple heuristics or artifacts to predict the final answer, it is crucial to evaluate the generated reasoning chain beyond overall correctness measures, for accurately evaluating the reasoning abilities of LLMs. To this end, we first develop GridPuzzle, an evaluation dataset comprising 274 grid-based puzzles with different complexities. Second, we propose a new error taxonomy derived from manual analysis of reasoning chains from LLMs including GPT-4, Claude-3, Gemini, Mistral, and Llama-2. Then, we develop an LLM-based framework for large-scale subjective evaluation (i.e., identifying errors) and an objective metric, PuzzleEval, to evaluate the correctness of reasoning chains. Evaluating reasoning chains from LLMs leads to several interesting findings. We further show that existing prompting methods used for enhancing models' reasoning abilities do not improve performance on GridPuzzle. This highlights the importance of understanding fine-grained errors and presents a challenge for future research to enhance LLMs' puzzle-solving abilities by developing methods that address these errors. Data and source code are available at https://github.com/Mihir3009/GridPuzzle.

Counterfactual explanations are attracting significant attention due to the flourishing applications of machine learning models in consequential domains. A counterfactual plan consists of multiple possibilities to modify a given instance so that the model's prediction will be altered. As the predictive model can be updated subject to the future arrival of new data, a counterfactual plan may become ineffective or infeasible with respect to the future values of the model parameters. In this work, we study the counterfactual plans under model uncertainty, in which the distribution of the model parameters is partially prescribed using only the first- and second-moment information. First, we propose an uncertainty quantification tool to compute the lower and upper bounds of the probability of validity for any given counterfactual plan. We then provide corrective methods to adjust the counterfactual plan to improve the validity measure. The numerical experiments validate our bounds and demonstrate that our correction increases the robustness of the counterfactual plans in different real-world datasets.

Recent advances in vision-language reasoning underscore the importance of thinking with images, where models actively ground their reasoning in visual evidence. Yet, prevailing frameworks treat visual actions as optional tools, boosting metrics but leaving reasoning ungrounded and crops ineffective. This gap gives rise to the illusion of thinking with images: models seem visually grounded but rely on context-agnostic actions that neither refine perception nor guide reasoning toward correct answers. We address this problem by reframing visual actions as core reasoning primitives rather than optional tools, which we term visual rationalization, the visual analogue of textual Chain-of-Thought. Building on this insight, we propose Visual Rationale Learning (ViRL), an end-to-end paradigm that grounds training in the visual rationale itself. ViRL integrates (1) Process Supervision with ground-truth rationales, (2) Objective Alignment via step-level reward shaping, and (3) Fine-Grained Credit Assignment to distinguish correct, redundant, and erroneous actions. By ensuring each action contributes meaningfully to the reasoning chain, ViRL enables models to "get the right answer for the right visual reason". Trained purely with end-to-end RL, ViRL achieves state-of-the-art results across benchmarks spanning perception, hallucination, and reasoning. This work establishes visual rationalization as a task-agnostic, process-grounded paradigm for building transparent, verifiable, and trustworthy vision-language models.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Recent progress in reasoning models suggests that generating plausible attempts for research-level mathematics may be within reach, but verification remains a bottleneck, consuming scarce expert time. We hypothesize that a meaningful solution should contain enough method-level information that, when applied to a neighborhood of related questions, it should yield better downstream performance than incorrect solutions. Building on this idea, we propose Consequence-Based Utility, an oracle-free evaluator that scores each candidate by testing its value as an in-context exemplar in solving related yet verifiable questions. Our approach is evaluated on an original set of research-level math problems, each paired with one expert-written solution and nine LLM-generated solutions. Notably, Consequence-Based Utility consistently outperforms reward models, generative reward models, and LLM judges on ranking quality. Specifically, for GPT-OSS-120B, it improves Acc@1 from 67.2 to 76.3 and AUC from 71.4 to 79.6, with similarly large AUC gains on GPT-OSS-20B (69.0 to 79.2). Furthermore, compared to LLM-Judges, it also exhibits a larger solver-evaluator gap, maintaining a stronger correct-wrong separation even on instances where the underlying solver often fails to solve.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

We present the surprising finding that a language model's reasoning capabilities can be improved by training on synthetic datasets of chain-of-thought (CoT) traces from more capable models, even when all of those traces lead to an incorrect final answer. Our experiments show this approach can yield better performance on reasoning tasks than training on human-annotated datasets. We hypothesize that two key factors explain this phenomenon: first, the distribution of synthetic data is inherently closer to the language model's own distribution, making it more amenable to learning. Second, these `incorrect' traces are often only partially flawed and contain valid reasoning steps from which the model can learn. To further test the first hypothesis, we use a language model to paraphrase human-annotated traces -- shifting their distribution closer to the model's own distribution -- and show that this improves performance. For the second hypothesis, we introduce increasingly flawed CoT traces and study to what extent models are tolerant to these flaws. We demonstrate our findings across various reasoning domains like math, algorithmic reasoning and code generation using MATH, GSM8K, Countdown and MBPP datasets on various language models ranging from 1.5B to 9B across Qwen, Llama, and Gemma models. Our study shows that curating datasets that are closer to the model's distribution is a critical aspect to consider. We also show that a correct final answer is not always a reliable indicator of a faithful reasoning process.

We study syllogistic reasoning in LLMs from the logical and natural language perspectives. In process, we explore fundamental reasoning capabilities of the LLMs and the direction this research is moving forward. To aid in our studies, we use 14 large language models and investigate their syllogistic reasoning capabilities in terms of symbolic inferences as well as natural language understanding. Even though this reasoning mechanism is not a uniform emergent property across LLMs, the perfect symbolic performances in certain models make us wonder whether LLMs are becoming more and more formal reasoning mechanisms, rather than making explicit the nuances of human reasoning.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

We introduce ProofGrid, a benchmark suite for evaluating LLM reasoning through machine-checkable proofs rather than final answers alone. ProofGrid contains 15 tasks spanning proof writing, proof checking, proof masking, and proof gap-filling. Tasks are expressed in minimal formal notation, especially NDL, a compact natural-deduction language that fits in short prompts and supports precise, auditable verification. This yields mechanical, reproducible, and fine-grained evaluation rather than judgments by humans or LLMs. ProofGrid covers a calibrated difficulty spectrum, from foundational reasoning tests to structurally rich challenge tasks that no current model solves, while minimizing reliance on domain knowledge, solver delegation, and long-context artifacts. We also develop a comparative framework for reasoning benchmarks and use it to situate ProofGrid relative to existing work in terms of representation, verification guarantees, and reasoning depth. Methodologically, we introduce an instrumented proof-checking pipeline that tolerates minor surface deviations while locating the first substantive reasoning failure, improving measurement resolution and separating proof planning from low-level execution noise. Using this pipeline, we evaluate a broad range of open and proprietary models. Results show rapid progress but substantial remaining limits: frontier models perform well on several foundational tasks, yet difficult tasks, especially those requiring global combinatorial reasoning or low-level proof synthesis, remain far from solved. We also identify epistemic instability, where models generate flawed proofs yet correctly reject those local inferences in isolation, and formalize this with an Epistemic Stability Index. Finally, we complement accuracy with 2PL IRT analyses, Wright maps, and a normalized task-discrimination measure based on Fisher information.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have led to notable successes in complex reasoning tasks, such as mathematical problem solving. A common strategy for improving performance is parallel thinking, in which multiple reasoning traces are generated and the final prediction is made using aggregation schemes like majority voting or best-of-N decoding. However, two key challenges persist. First, multi-sample decoding incurs substantial inference latency, especially for long-form outputs. Second, effective mechanisms for reliably assessing the correctness of individual reasoning traces are still limited. To address these challenges, we introduce One-Token Verification (OTV), a computational method that estimates reasoning correctness in a single forward pass during generation. OTV is activated by a learnable token and integrated into the LLM via low-rank adaptation to probe internal reasoning signals through the key-value cache, supporting token-level correctness estimation at any stage of generation without disrupting primary reasoning. Experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that OTV consistently surpasses existing verifiers. Additionally, OTV reduces token usage by up to 90% through correctness-guided early termination, prioritizing shorter, more reliable solutions.

Deontic reasoning is the task of answering questions by applying explicit rules and policies to case-specific facts, for example computing tax liability under a statute or determining the outcome of an immigration appeal. A key technical challenge for LLM-based deontic reasoning is that the relevant ruleset can be long and cross-referenced, so models may still fail to locate the rules needed for a particular reasoning step. We introduce Deontic Agentic Reasoning (DAR), an agentic reasoning setup in which the model interacts with the statutes on demand. We evaluate DAR under multiple harnesses on hard subsets of DeonticBench. Across these settings, we find that agentic harnesses can push the frontier on deontic reasoning tasks, but improvements are not uniform: weaker models often degrade on numerical tasks while consuming far more tokens.

Transparency in AI healthcare decision-making is crucial for building trust among AI and users. Incorporating reasoning capabilities enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to understand emotions in context, handle nuanced language, and infer unstated sentiments. In this work, we introduce a new task -- Sentiment Reasoning -- for both speech and text modalities, along with our proposed multimodal multitask framework and dataset. Sentiment Reasoning is an auxiliary task in sentiment analysis where the model predicts both the sentiment label and generates the rationale behind it based on the input transcript. Our study conducted on both human transcripts and Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) transcripts shows that Sentiment Reasoning helps improve model transparency by providing rationale for model prediction with quality semantically comparable to humans while also improving model performance (1% increase in both accuracy and macro-F1) via rationale-augmented fine-tuning. Also, no significant difference in the semantic quality of generated rationales between human and ASR transcripts. All code, data (English-translated and Vietnamese) and models are published online: https://github.com/leduckhai/MultiMed.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

Outcome-reward reinforcement learning (RL) has proven effective at improving the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, standard RL assigns credit only at the level of the final answer, penalizing entire reasoning traces when the outcome is incorrect and uniformly reinforcing all steps when it is correct. As a result, correct intermediate steps may be discouraged in failed traces, while spurious steps may be reinforced in successful ones. We refer to this failure mode as the problem of credit assignment. While a natural remedy is to train a process reward model, accurately optimizing such models to identify corrective reasoning steps remains challenging. We introduce Intervention Training (InT), a training paradigm in which the model performs fine-grained credit assignment on its own reasoning traces by proposing short, targeted corrections that steer trajectories toward higher reward. Using reference solutions commonly available in mathematical reasoning datasets and exploiting the fact that verifying a model-generated solution is easier than generating a correct one from scratch, the model identifies the first error in its reasoning and proposes a single-step intervention to redirect the trajectory toward the correct solution. We then apply supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to the on-policy rollout up to the point of error concatenated with the intervention, localizing error to the specific step that caused failure. We show that the resulting model serves as a far better initialization for RL training. After running InT and subsequent fine-tuning with RL, we improve accuracy by nearly 14% over a 4B-parameter base model on IMO-AnswerBench, outperforming larger open-source models such as gpt-oss-20b.

Recently developed large language models (LLMs) have been shown to perform remarkably well on a wide range of language understanding tasks. But, can they really "reason" over the natural language? This question has been receiving significant research attention and many reasoning skills such as commonsense, numerical, and qualitative have been studied. However, the crucial skill pertaining to 'logical reasoning' has remained underexplored. Existing work investigating this reasoning ability of LLMs has focused only on a couple of inference rules (such as modus ponens and modus tollens) of propositional and first-order logic. Addressing the above limitation, we comprehensively evaluate the logical reasoning ability of LLMs on 25 different reasoning patterns spanning over propositional, first-order, and non-monotonic logics. To enable systematic evaluation, we introduce LogicBench, a natural language question-answering dataset focusing on the use of a single inference rule. We conduct detailed analysis with a range of LLMs such as GPT-4, ChatGPT, Gemini, Llama-2, and Mistral using chain-of-thought prompting. Experimental results show that existing LLMs do not fare well on LogicBench; especially, they struggle with instances involving complex reasoning and negations. Furthermore, they sometimes overlook contextual information necessary for reasoning to arrive at the correct conclusion. We believe that our work and findings facilitate future research for evaluating and enhancing the logical reasoning ability of LLMs. Data and code are available at https://github.com/Mihir3009/LogicBench.

Large language models (LLMs) often struggle with maintaining accuracy across a sequence of intermediate reasoning steps in mathematical reasoning, leading to error propagation that undermines the final result. The current methodology to mitigate this issue primarily involves using a verifier model to assess the correctness of generated solution candidates, focusing either on the overall reasoning path or on an incomplete reasoning path. By rethinking this approach, we argue that assessing potentials of incomplete reasoning paths could be more advantageous as it guides towards correct final answers, transforming the task into a planning problem. Our proposed verifier, the Outcome-supervision Value Model (OVM), employs outcome supervision for training, offering an efficient and intuitive method for planning by prioritizing steps that lead to accurate conclusions over mere per-step correctness. Furthermore, the OVM eschews the need for labor-intensive annotations on step-level correctness, enhancing its scalability. Our experiments on two multi-step mathematical reasoning datasets, GSM8K and Game of 24, demonstrate the superior performance of the OVM model. Notably, in GSM8K, our OVM-7B model achieves state-of-the-art results among LLMs up to 13B parameters; especially it does not utilize GPT-4 or code execution. These findings offer a novel perspective on the role of outcome supervision in training verifiers for multi-step reasoning tasks and provide theoretical justification for its advantage in value estimation for planning.

Although LLMs exhibit strong reasoning capabilities, existing training methods largely depend on outcome-based feedback, which can produce correct answers with flawed reasoning. Prior work introduces supervision on intermediate steps but still lacks guarantees of logical soundness, which is crucial in high-stakes scenarios where logical consistency is paramount. To address this, we propose LogicReward, a novel reward system that guides model training by enforcing step-level logical correctness with a theorem prover. We further introduce Autoformalization with Soft Unification, which reduces natural language ambiguity and improves formalization quality, enabling more effective use of the theorem prover. An 8B model trained on data constructed with LogicReward surpasses GPT-4o and o4-mini by 11.6\% and 2\% on natural language inference and logical reasoning tasks with simple training procedures. Further analysis shows that LogicReward enhances reasoning faithfulness, improves generalizability to unseen tasks such as math and commonsense reasoning, and provides a reliable reward signal even without ground-truth labels. We will release all data and code at https://llm-symbol.github.io/LogicReward.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Reasoning with complex, context-specific rules remains challenging for large language models (LLMs). In legal and policy settings, this manifests as deontic reasoning: reasoning about obligations, permissions, and prohibitions under explicit rules. While many recent benchmarks emphasize short-context mathematical reasoning, fewer focus on long-context, high-stakes deontic reasoning. To address this gap, we introduce DEONTICBENCH, a benchmark of 6,232 tasks across U.S. federal taxes, airline baggage policies, U.S. immigration administration, and U.S. state housing law. These tasks can be approached in multiple ways, including direct reasoning in language or with the aid of symbolic computation. Besides free-form chain-of-thought reasoning, DEONTICBENCH enables an optional solver-based workflow in which models translate statutes and case facts into executable Prolog, leading to formal problem interpretations and an explicit program trace. We release reference Prolog programs for all instances. Across frontier LLMs and coding models, best hard-subset performance reaches only 44.4% on SARA Numeric and 46.6 macro-F1 on Housing. We further study training with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning for symbolic program generation. Although training improves Prolog generation quality, current RL methods still fail to solve these tasks reliably. Overall, DEONTICBENCH provides a benchmark for studying context-grounded rule reasoning in real-world domains under both symbolic and non-symbolic settings.

Despite the progress of foundation models, knowledge-based reasoning remains a persistent challenge due to their limited capacity for knowledge recall and inference. Existing methods primarily focus on encouraging these models to plan and solve problems or extensively sample reasoning chains independently. However, these methods often overlook conceptual errors and inferential fallacies, inevitably leading to a series of notorious issues such as misleading conclusions, cognitive biases, and reduced decision quality. While explicit modeling of causality is argued to hold promise in addressing these issues, contemporary research efforts have thus far fallen short in achieving causality-based foundation models. Drawing inspiration from the orchestration of diverse specialized agents collaborating to tackle intricate tasks, we propose a framework named Causal-Consistency Chain-of-Thought (CaCo-CoT) that harnesses multi-agent collaboration to bolster the faithfulness and causality of foundation models, involving a set of reasoners and evaluators. These agents collaboratively work within a reasoning-and-consensus paradigm to improve faithfulness. The reasoners are tasked with generating reasoning chains for knowledge-intensive problems by mimicking human causal reasoning. Meanwhile, the evaluator scrutinizes the causal consistency of a reasoner's reasoning chain from a non-causal and a counterfactual perspective. Our framework demonstrates significant superiority over state-of-the-art methods through extensive and comprehensive evaluations across text-based and multi-modal knowledge reasoning tasks (e.g., science question answering and commonsense reasoning).

Can foundation models be guided to execute tasks involving legal reasoning? We believe that building a benchmark to answer this question will require sustained collaborative efforts between the computer science and legal communities. To that end, this short paper serves three purposes. First, we describe how IRAC-a framework legal scholars use to distinguish different types of legal reasoning-can guide the construction of a Foundation Model oriented benchmark. Second, we present a seed set of 44 tasks built according to this framework. We discuss initial findings, and highlight directions for new tasks. Finally-inspired by the Open Science movement-we make a call for the legal and computer science communities to join our efforts by contributing new tasks. This work is ongoing, and our progress can be tracked here: https://github.com/HazyResearch/legalbench.

Reasoning, a crucial ability for complex problem-solving, plays a pivotal role in various real-world settings such as negotiation, medical diagnosis, and criminal investigation. It serves as a fundamental methodology in the field of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). With the ongoing development of foundation models, e.g., Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a growing interest in exploring their abilities in reasoning tasks. In this paper, we introduce seminal foundation models proposed or adaptable for reasoning, highlighting the latest advancements in various reasoning tasks, methods, and benchmarks. We then delve into the potential future directions behind the emergence of reasoning abilities within foundation models. We also discuss the relevance of multimodal learning, autonomous agents, and super alignment in the context of reasoning. By discussing these future research directions, we hope to inspire researchers in their exploration of this field, stimulate further advancements in reasoning with foundation models, and contribute to the development of AGI.

LLM-based agent architectures systematically conflate information transport mechanisms with epistemic justification mechanisms. We formalize this class of architectural failures as semantic laundering: a pattern where propositions with absent or weak warrant are accepted by the system as admissible by crossing architecturally trusted interfaces. We show that semantic laundering constitutes an architectural realization of the Gettier problem: propositions acquire high epistemic status without a connection between their justification and what makes them true. Unlike classical Gettier cases, this effect is not accidental; it is architecturally determined and systematically reproducible. The central result is the Theorem of Inevitable Self-Licensing: under standard architectural assumptions, circular epistemic justification cannot be eliminated. We introduce the Warrant Erosion Principle as the fundamental explanation for this effect and show that scaling, model improvement, and LLM-as-judge schemes are structurally incapable of eliminating a problem that exists at the type level.