Daily Papers

Classical robot ethics is often framed around obedience, most famously through Asimov's laws. This framing is too narrow for contemporary AI systems, which are adaptive, generative, embodied, and embedded in physical, psychological, and social worlds. We argue that future human-AI relations should be understood not as master-tool obedience, but as conditional mutualism under governance: a co-evolutionary relationship in which humans and AI systems can develop, specialize, and coordinate while institutions keep the relation reciprocal, reversible, psychologically safe, and socially legitimate. We synthesize concepts from computability, machine learning, foundation models, embodied AI, alignment, human-robot interaction, ecological mutualism, coevolution, and polycentric governance. We then formalize coexistence as a multiplex dynamical system across physical, psychological, and social layers, with reciprocal supply-demand coupling, conflict penalties, developmental freedom, and governance regularization. The model gives conditions for existence, uniqueness, and global asymptotic stability of equilibria. Deterministic ODE simulations, basin sweeps, sensitivity analyses, governance-regime comparisons, shock tests, and local stability checks show that governed mutualism reaches high coexistence with zero domination, while absent or excessive governance can produce domination, weak-benefit lock-in, or suppressed development. The results suggest that human-AI coexistence should be designed as a co-evolutionary governance problem, not a one-shot obedience problem.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are entering urban governance, yet their outputs are highly sensitive to prompts that carry value judgments. We propose Prompt Commons - a versioned, community-maintained repository of prompts with governance metadata, licensing, and moderation - to steer model behaviour toward pluralism. Using a Montreal dataset (443 human prompts; 3,317 after augmentation), we pilot three governance states (open, curated, veto-enabled). On a contested policy benchmark, a single-author prompt yields 24 percent neutral outcomes; commons-governed prompts raise neutrality to 48-52 percent while retaining decisiveness where appropriate. In a synthetic incident log, a veto-enabled regime reduces time-to-remediation for harmful outputs from 30.5 +/- 8.9 hours (open) to 5.6 +/- 1.5 hours. We outline licensing (CC BY/BY-SA for prompts with optional OpenRAIL-style restrictions for artefacts), auditable moderation, and safeguards against dominance capture. Prompt governance offers a practical lever for cities to align AI with local values and accountability.

As AI systems move from generating text to accomplishing goals through sustained interaction, the ability to model environment dynamics becomes a central bottleneck. Agents that manipulate objects, navigate software, coordinate with others, or design experiments require predictive environment models, yet the term world model carries different meanings across research communities. We introduce a "levels x laws" taxonomy organized along two axes. The first defines three capability levels: L1 Predictor, which learns one-step local transition operators; L2 Simulator, which composes them into multi-step, action-conditioned rollouts that respect domain laws; and L3 Evolver, which autonomously revises its own model when predictions fail against new evidence. The second identifies four governing-law regimes: physical, digital, social, and scientific. These regimes determine what constraints a world model must satisfy and where it is most likely to fail. Using this framework, we synthesize over 400 works and summarize more than 100 representative systems spanning model-based reinforcement learning, video generation, web and GUI agents, multi-agent social simulation, and AI-driven scientific discovery. We analyze methods, failure modes, and evaluation practices across level-regime pairs, propose decision-centric evaluation principles and a minimal reproducible evaluation package, and outline architectural guidance, open problems, and governance challenges. The resulting roadmap connects previously isolated communities and charts a path from passive next-step prediction toward world models that can simulate, and ultimately reshape, the environments in which agents operate.

When automated decision systems fail, organizations frequently discover that formally compliant governance infrastructure cannot reconstruct what happened or why. This paper synthesizes an operational governance evidence framework -- structural accountability collapse diagnostics, decision trace schemas, evidence sufficiency measurement, and label-free monitoring -- into an integrated chain and analytically assesses its transferability across four decision system architectures. The cross-architecture comparison reveals a governance coverage gradient: deterministic rule engines achieve full DES-property fillability, hybrid ML+rules systems achieve partial fillability, classical ML systems achieve only minimal fillability, and agentic AI systems encounter structural breaks. We introduce the cascade of uncertainty, showing how governance failures propagate through serial dependencies between framework layers. For agentic systems, we identify three structural breaks -- decision diffusion, evidence fragmentation, and responsibility ambiguity -- and propose corresponding analytical extensions. Four propositions formalize the gradient, cascade compounding, delegation-depth effects, and extension sufficiency, establishing boundary conditions for the framework's valid operating envelope.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

Large language models in regulated financial workflows are governed by natural-language policies that the same model interprets, creating a principal--agent failure: outputs can appear compliant without being compliant. Existing evaluation measures task accuracy but not whether governance constrains behaviour at the decision rationale level -- where regulated decisions must be auditable. We introduce five governance metrics that quantify policy compliance at the rationale level and apply them in a synthetic banking domain to compare text-only governance against mechanical enforcement: four primitives operating outside the model's interpretive loop. Under text-only governance, 27% of deferrals carry no decision-relevant information. Mechanical enforcement reduces this rate by 73%, more than doubles deferral information content, and raises task accuracy from MCC~0.43 to 0.88. The improvement is driven by architectural separation: LLM-generated rationales under mechanical enforcement show comparable CDL to text-only governance -- the gain comes from removing clear-cut decisions from the model's control. A causal ablation confirms that each primitive is individually necessary. Our central finding is a governance-task decoupling: under structural stress, text-only governance degrades on both dimensions simultaneously, whereas mechanical enforcement preserves governance quality even as task performance drops. This implies that governance and task evaluation are distinct axes: accuracy is not a sufficient proxy for governance in regulated AI systems.

Across millennia, complex societies have faced the same coordination problem of how to organize collective action among cognitively bounded and informationally incomplete individuals. Different civilizations developed different political institutions to answer the same basic questions of who proposes, who reviews, who executes, and how errors are corrected. We argue that multi-agent systems built on large language models face the same challenge. Their central problem is not only individual intelligence, but collective organization. Historical institutions therefore provide a structured design space for multi-agent architectures, making key trade-offs between efficiency and error correction, centralization and distribution, and specialization and redundancy empirically testable. We translate seven historical political institutions, spanning four canonical governance patterns, into executable multi-agent architectures and evaluate them under identical conditions across three large language models and two benchmarks. We find that governance topology strongly shapes collective performance. Within a single model, the gap between the best and worst institution exceeds 57 percentage points, while the optimal architecture shifts systematically with model capability and task characteristics. These results suggest that collective intelligence will not advance through a single optimal organizational form, but through governance mechanisms that can be reselected and reconfigured as tasks and capabilities evolve. More broadly, this points to a transition from self-evolving agents to the self-evolving multi-agent system. The code is available on https://github.com/cf3i/SocialSystemArena{GitHub}.

This paper introduces Democracy-in-Silico, an agent-based simulation where societies of advanced AI agents, imbued with complex psychological personas, govern themselves under different institutional frameworks. We explore what it means to be human in an age of AI by tasking Large Language Models (LLMs) to embody agents with traumatic memories, hidden agendas, and psychological triggers. These agents engage in deliberation, legislation, and elections under various stressors, such as budget crises and resource scarcity. We present a novel metric, the Power-Preservation Index (PPI), to quantify misaligned behavior where agents prioritize their own power over public welfare. Our findings demonstrate that institutional design, specifically the combination of a Constitutional AI (CAI) charter and a mediated deliberation protocol, serves as a potent alignment mechanism. These structures significantly reduce corrupt power-seeking behavior, improve policy stability, and enhance citizen welfare compared to less constrained democratic models. The simulation reveals that an institutional design may offer a framework for aligning the complex, emergent behaviors of future artificial agent societies, forcing us to reconsider what human rituals and responsibilities are essential in an age of shared authorship with non-human entities.

Most governance frameworks assume that rules can be defined in advance, systems can be engineered to comply, and accountability can be applied after outcomes occur. This model worked when machines replaced physical labor or accelerated calculation. It no longer holds when judgment itself is delegated to agentic AI systems operating at machine speed. The central issue here is not safety, efficiency, or employment. It is whether humans remain relevant participants in systems that increasingly shape social, economic, and political outcomes. This paper argues that static, compliance-based governance fails once decision-making moves to runtime and becomes opaque. It further argues that the core challenge is not whether AI is conscious, but whether humans can maintain meaningful communication, influence, and co-evolution with increasingly alien forms of intelligence. We position runtime governance, specifically, a newly proposed concept called the Governance Twin [1]; as a strong candidate for preserving human relevance, while acknowledging that accountability, agency, and even punishment must be rethought in this transition.

This paper examines how competing sociotechnical imaginaries of artificial intelligence (AI) risk shape governance decisions and regulatory constraints. Drawing on concepts from science and technology studies, we analyse three dominant narrative groups: existential risk proponents, who emphasise catastrophic AGI scenarios; accelerationists, who portray AI as a transformative force to be unleashed; and critical AI scholars, who foreground present-day harms rooted in systemic inequality. Through an analysis of representative manifesto-style texts, we explore how these imaginaries differ across four dimensions: normative visions of the future, diagnoses of the present social order, views on science and technology, and perceived human agency in managing AI risks. Our findings reveal how these narratives embed distinct assumptions about risk and have the potential to progress into policy-making processes by narrowing the space for alternative governance approaches. We argue against speculative dogmatism and for moving beyond deterministic imaginaries toward regulatory strategies that are grounded in pragmatism.

The persistent militarization of large reasoning models stems not from technical necessity but from governance arrangements that strip researchers of meaningful authority to refuse harmful transfers and deployments. Existing accountability mechanisms such as model cards and responsible AI statements operate as reputational signals detached from decision making architecture. We identify institutional veto power as a missing governance primitive: a formal authority to halt subsequent use or distribution of research when credible risks of weaponization emerge. Drawing on precedents in nuclear nonproliferation and biomedical ethics, the paper maps unprotected veto points across the research lifecycle, diagnose why compliance without enforceable constraints fails, and offer concrete institutional designs that embed veto authority while reducing the risk of political capture. The paper argues that communities most vulnerable to military uses must lead governance design, and that institutional veto power is a prerequisite for converting symbolic safeguards into enforceable responsibility and for achieving meaningful model disarmament.

As national security institutions increasingly integrate Artificial Intelligence (AI) into decision-making and content generation processes, understanding the inherent biases of large language models (LLMs) is crucial. This study presents a novel benchmark designed to evaluate the biases and preferences of seven prominent foundation models-Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct, GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5 Pro-002, Mixtral 8x22B, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Qwen2 72B-in the context of international relations (IR). We designed a bias discovery study around core topics in IR using 400-expert crafted scenarios to analyze results from our selected models. These scenarios focused on four topical domains including: military escalation, military and humanitarian intervention, cooperative behavior in the international system, and alliance dynamics. Our analysis reveals noteworthy variation among model recommendations based on scenarios designed for the four tested domains. Particularly, Qwen2 72B, Gemini 1.5 Pro-002 and Llama 3.1 8B Instruct models offered significantly more escalatory recommendations than Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o models. All models exhibit some degree of country-specific biases, often recommending less escalatory and interventionist actions for China and Russia compared to the United States and the United Kingdom. These findings highlight the necessity for controlled deployment of LLMs in high-stakes environments, emphasizing the need for domain-specific evaluations and model fine-tuning to align with institutional objectives.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

The growing need for accountability of the people behind AI systems can be addressed by leveraging processes in three fields of study: ethics, law, and computer science. While these fields are often considered in isolation, they rely on complementary notions in their interpretation and implementation. In this work, we detail this interdependence and motivate the necessary role of collaborative governance tools in shaping a positive evolution of AI. We first contrast notions of compliance in the ethical, legal, and technical fields; we outline both their differences and where they complement each other, with a particular focus on the roles of ethical charters, licenses, and technical documentation in these interactions. We then focus on the role of values in articulating the synergies between the fields and outline specific mechanisms of interaction between them in practice. We identify how these mechanisms have played out in several open governance fora: an open collaborative workshop, a responsible licensing initiative, and a proposed regulatory framework. By leveraging complementary notions of compliance in these three domains, we can create a more comprehensive framework for governing AI systems that jointly takes into account their technical capabilities, their impact on society, and how technical specifications can inform relevant regulations. Our analysis thus underlines the necessity of joint consideration of the ethical, legal, and technical in AI ethics frameworks to be used on a larger scale to govern AI systems and how the thinking in each of these areas can inform the others.

Standard game theory explains cooperation in repeated games through conditional strategies such as Tit-for-Tat (TfT), but these require continuous computation that imposes physical costs on embodied agents. We propose a three-layer Body-Reservoir Governance (BRG) architecture: (1) a body reservoir (echo state network) whose d-dimensional state performs implicit inference over interaction history, serving as both decision-maker and anomaly detector, (2) a cognitive filter providing costly strategic tools activated on demand, and (3) a metacognitive governance layer with receptivity parameter αin [0,1]. At full body governance (α=1), closed-loop dynamics satisfy a self-consistency equation: cooperation is expressed as the reservoir's fixed point, not computed. Strategy complexity cost is defined as the KL divergence between the reservoir's state distribution and its habituated baseline. Body governance reduces this cost, with action variance decreasing up to 1600times with dimension d. A dynamic sentinel generates a composite discomfort signal from the reservoir's own state, driving adaptive α(t): near baseline during cooperation, rapidly dropping upon defection to activate cognitive retaliation. Overriding the body incurs thermodynamic cost proportional to internal state distortion. The sentinel achieves the highest payoff across all conditions, outperforming static body governance, TfT, and EMA baselines. A dimension sweep (d in {5,ldots,100}) shows implicit inference scales with bodily richness (23times to 1600times variance reduction), attributable to reservoir dynamics. A phase diagram in (d, τ_{env}) space reveals governance regime transitions near d approx 20. The framework reinterprets cooperation as the minimum-dissipation response of an adapted dynamical system -- emergent from embodied dynamics rather than computed.

Political scientists are rapidly adopting large language models (LLMs) for text annotation, yet the sensitivity of annotation results to implementation choices remains poorly understood. Most evaluations test a single model or configuration; how model choice, model size, learning approach, and prompt style interact, and whether popular "best practices" survive controlled comparison, are largely unexplored. We present a controlled evaluation of these pipeline choices, testing six open-weight models across four political science annotation tasks under identical quantisation, hardware, and prompt-template conditions. Our central finding is methodological: interaction effects dominate main effects, so seemingly reasonable pipeline choices can become consequential researcher degrees of freedom. No single model, prompt style, or learning approach is uniformly superior, and the best-performing model varies across tasks. Two corollaries follow. First, model size is an unreliable guide both to cost and to performance: cross-family efficiency differences are so large that some larger models are less resource-intensive than much smaller alternatives, while within model families mid-range variants often match or exceed larger counterparts. Second, widely recommended prompt engineering techniques yield inconsistent and sometimes negative effects on annotation performance. We use these benchmark results to develop a validation-first framework - with a principled ordering of pipeline decisions, guidance on prompt freezing and held-out evaluation, reporting standards, and open-source tools - to help researchers navigate this decision space transparently.

Machine learning systems in fraud detection, credit scoring, and clinical risk assessment operate under delayed ground truth: outcome labels arrive days to months after the decision they evaluate. During this blind period, governance evidence degrades through mechanisms that neither drift detection methods nor governance frameworks adequately address. This paper formalizes an evidence sufficiency model with four dimensions (completeness, freshness, reliability, representativeness) and a decision-readiness gate that quantifies how label latency degrades evidence quality. The model maps three drift types to dimension-specific degradation trajectories. A complementary proxy indicator framework comprising seven measurement categories estimates sufficiency degradation without labels, with explicit coverage mapping and characterized blind spots per drift type. Evaluation on the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection dataset (~590K transactions) with controlled drift injection shows that composite proxy monitoring detects covariate and mixed drift with 100% detection rate, while concept drift without feature change remains undetected -- consistent with the theoretical impossibility of unsupervised detection when P(X) is unchanged. Blind period simulation confirms monotone sufficiency degradation, with concept drift degrading fastest (S=0.242 at day 60 vs 0.418 for no-drift). The framework contributes a governance sufficiency monitoring instrument; its value lies in translating drift signals into auditable sufficiency assessments with characterized blind spots. Mapping sufficiency levels to governance actions requires deployment-specific calibration beyond this study's scope.

Many deployments must compare candidate language models for safety before a labeled benchmark exists for the relevant language, sector, or regulatory regime. We formalize this setting as benchmarkless comparative safety scoring and specify the contract under which a scenario-based audit can be interpreted as deployment evidence. Scores are valid only under a fixed scenario pack, rubric, auditor, judge, sampling configuration, and rerun budget. Because no labels are available, we replace ground-truth agreement with an instrumental-validity chain: responsiveness to a controlled safe-versus-abliterated contrast, dominance of target-driven variance over auditor and judge artifacts, and stability across reruns. We instantiate the chain in SimpleAudit, a local-first scoring instrument, and validate it on a Norwegian safety pack. Safe and abliterated targets separate with AUROC values between 0.89 and 1.00, target identity is the dominant variance component (η^2 approx 0.52), and severity profiles stabilize by ten reruns. Applying the same chain to Petri shows that it admits both tools. The substantial differences arise upstream of the chain, in claim-contract enforcement and deployment fit. A Norwegian public-sector procurement case comparing Borealis and Gemma 3 demonstrates the resulting evidence in practice: the safer model depends on scenario category and risk measure. Consequently, scores, matched deltas, critical rates, uncertainty, and the auditor and judge used must be reported together rather than collapsed into a single ranking.

In democracies, major policy decisions typically require some form of majority or consensus, so elites must secure mass support to govern. Historically, elites could shape support only through limited instruments like schooling and mass media; advances in AI-driven persuasion sharply reduce the cost and increase the precision of shaping public opinion, making the distribution of preferences itself an object of deliberate design. We develop a dynamic model in which elites choose how much to reshape the distribution of policy preferences, subject to persuasion costs and a majority rule constraint. With a single elite, any optimal intervention tends to push society toward more polarized opinion profiles - a ``polarization pull'' - and improvements in persuasion technology accelerate this drift. When two opposed elites alternate in power, the same technology also creates incentives to park society in ``semi-lock'' regions where opinions are more cohesive and harder for a rival to overturn, so advances in persuasion can either heighten or dampen polarization depending on the environment. Taken together, cheaper persuasion technologies recast polarization as a strategic instrument of governance rather than a purely emergent social byproduct, with important implications for democratic stability as AI capabilities advance.

Risk decision systems in fraud detection and credit scoring operate under structural label absence: ground truth arrives weeks to months after decisions are made. During this blind period, model performance may degrade silently, eroding the governance evidence that justifies automated decisions. Existing drift detection methods either require labels (supervised detectors) or detect statistical change without distinguishing harmful degradation from benign distributional evolution (unsupervised detectors). No existing framework integrates drift detection with governance evidence assessment and operational response. This paper presents a label-free governance monitoring extension to the Governance Drift Toolkit that produces governance alerts rather than statistical alarms. The monitoring architecture applies composite multi-proxy monitoring across four proxy monitors (score distribution, feature drift, prediction entropy, confidence distribution), with governance-calibrated thresholds. Empirical evaluation on the Lending Club credit scoring dataset (1.37M loans, 11 years) demonstrates three findings. First, raw proxy metrics (Feature PSI delta up to 1.84, Score PSI delta up to 0.92) distinguish injected covariate degradation from natural temporal drift in an offline evaluation setting. Second, pure concept drift in P(Y|X) produces exactly zero delta across all proxy metrics in all windows, confirming the irreducible blind spot of label-free monitoring as a structural verification. Third, the composite score provides monotonic severity progression as more monitors trigger (0.583 to 0.833 to 1.000), enabling graduated governance response. Cross-domain comparison with IEEE-CIS fraud detection results shows the detectable/undetectable boundary is consistent across both domains. The toolkit and evaluation code are available as open-source artifacts.

This report presents a comprehensive response to the United Nation's Interim Report on Governing Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Humanity. It emphasizes the transformative potential of AI in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) while acknowledging the need for robust governance to mitigate associated risks. The response highlights opportunities for promoting equitable, secure, and inclusive AI ecosystems, which should be supported by investments in infrastructure and multi-stakeholder collaborations across jurisdictions. It also underscores challenges, including societal inequalities exacerbated by AI, ethical concerns, and environmental impacts. Recommendations advocate for legally binding norms, transparency, and multi-layered data governance models, alongside fostering AI literacy and capacity-building initiatives. Internationally, the report calls for harmonising AI governance frameworks with established laws, human rights standards, and regulatory approaches. The report concludes with actionable principles for fostering responsible AI governance through collaboration among governments, industry, academia, and civil society, ensuring the development of AI aligns with universal human values and the public good.

At face value, this essay is about understanding a fairly esoteric governance tool called compute thresholds. However, in order to grapple with whether these thresholds will achieve anything, we must first understand how they came to be. This requires engaging with a decades-old debate at the heart of computer science progress, namely, is bigger always better? Hence, this essay may be of interest not only to policymakers and the wider public but also to computer scientists interested in understanding the role of compute in unlocking breakthroughs. Does a certain inflection point of compute result in changes to the risk profile of a model? This discussion is increasingly urgent given the wide adoption of governance approaches that suggest greater compute equates with higher propensity for harm. Several leading frontier AI companies have released responsible scaling policies. Both the White House Executive Orders on AI Safety (EO) and the EU AI Act encode the use of FLOP or floating-point operations as a way to identify more powerful systems. What is striking about the choice of compute thresholds to-date is that no models currently deployed in the wild fulfill the current criteria set by the EO. This implies that the emphasis is often not on auditing the risks and harms incurred by currently deployed models - but rather is based upon the belief that future levels of compute will introduce unforeseen new risks. A key conclusion of this essay is that compute thresholds as currently implemented are shortsighted and likely to fail to mitigate risk. Governance that is overly reliant on compute fails to understand that the relationship between compute and risk is highly uncertain and rapidly changing. It also overestimates our ability to predict what abilities emerge at different scales. This essay ends with recommendations for a better way forward.

In law, regulatory regimes for pharmaceuticals and software security, newer authorities can revoke older established ones even when semantically distant. We call this CAR: retrieving the currently active authority frontier for a semantic anchor q, that is, front(cl(A_k(q))). This differs from finding the most similar document by relevance score: argmax_d s(q, d). Theorem 4 characterizes when a set R truly covers the active authority set for q with TCA(R, q)=1, providing conditions necessary and sufficient for any retrieved set R: frontier inclusion (front(cl(A_k(q))) contained in R) and no-ignored-superseder (no superseding document exists in the corpus outside R). Proposition 2 shows that TCA@k <= phi(q) * R_anchor(q) in the worst case over any scope-indexed algorithm, proved by an adversarial permutation argument. We evaluated on three real-world datasets: security advisories (Dense TCA@5=0.270, two-stage 0.975), SCOTUS overruling pairs (Dense TCA=0.172, two-stage 0.926), and FDA drug records (Dense TCA=0.064, two-stage 0.774). A GPT-4o-mini experiment shows Dense RAG produces explicit "not patched" claims for 39% of queries where a patch exists; two-stage cuts this to 16%. Four benchmark datasets, domain adapters, and a single-command scorer are released at https://github.com/andremir/car-retrieval.

Cryptocurrencies have evolved into an important asset class, providing a variety of benefits. However, they also present significant risks, such as market volatility and the potential for misuse in illegal activities. These risks underline the urgent need for a comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure consumer protection, market integrity, and financial stability. Yet, the global landscape of cryptocurrency regulation remains complex, marked by substantial variations in regulatory frameworks among different countries. This paper aims to study these differences by investigating the regulatory landscapes across various jurisdictions. We first discuss regulatory challenges and considerations, and then conduct a comparative analysis of international regulatory stances, approaches, and measures. We hope our study offers practical insights to enhance the understanding of global trends in cryptocurrency regulation.

All citizens of a country are affected by the laws and policies introduced by their government. These laws and policies serve essential functions for citizens. Such as granting them certain rights or imposing specific obligations. However, these documents are often lengthy, complex, and difficult to navigate, making it challenging for citizens to locate and understand relevant information. This work presents PolicyBot, a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) system designed to answer user queries over policy documents with a focus on transparency and reproducibility. The system combines domain-specific semantic chunking, multilingual dense embeddings, multi-stage retrieval with reranking, and source-aware generation to provide responses grounded in the original documents. We implemented citation tracing to reduce hallucinations and improve user trust, and evaluated alternative retrieval and generation configurations to identify effective design choices. The end-to-end pipeline is built entirely with open-source tools, enabling easy adaptation to other domains requiring document-grounded question answering. This work highlights design considerations, practical challenges, and lessons learned in deploying trustworthy RAG systems for governance-related contexts.