Daily Papers

This paper localizes the policy routing mechanism in alignment-trained language models. An intermediate-layer attention gate reads detected content and triggers deeper amplifier heads that boost the signal toward refusal. In smaller models the gate and amplifier are single heads; at larger scale they become bands of heads across adjacent layers. The gate contributes under 1% of output DLA, but interchange testing (p<0.001) and knockout cascade confirm it is causally necessary. Interchange screening at n>=120 detects the same motif in twelve models from six labs (2B to 72B), though specific heads differ by lab. Per-head ablation weakens up to 58x at 72B and misses gates that interchange identifies; interchange is the only reliable audit at scale. Modulating the detection-layer signal continuously controls policy from hard refusal through evasion to factual answering. On safety prompts the same intervention turns refusal into harmful guidance, showing the safety-trained capability is gated by routing rather than removed. Thresholds vary by topic and by input language, and the circuit relocates across generations within a family while behavioral benchmarks register no change. Routing is early-commitment: the gate commits at its own layer before deeper layers finish processing the input. Under an in-context substitution cipher, gate interchange necessity collapses 70 to 99% across three models and the model switches to puzzle-solving. Injecting the plaintext gate activation into the cipher forward pass restores 48% of refusals in Phi-4-mini, localizing the bypass to the routing interface. A second method, cipher contrast analysis, uses plain/cipher DLA differences to map the full cipher-sensitive routing circuit in O(3n) forward passes. Any encoding that defeats detection-layer pattern matching bypasses the policy regardless of whether deeper layers reconstruct the content.

Selecting LLM-generated code candidates using LLM-generated tests is challenging because the tests themselves may be incorrect. Existing methods either treat all tests equally or rely on ad-hoc heuristics to filter unreliable tests. Yet determining test correctness requires knowing which codes are correct, creating a circular dependency. Our key insight is that we need not determine test correctness at all: test votes should rank, not merely count. What matters is not how many codes pass a test, but whether the test can distinguish correct from incorrect code. We break the circular dependency via leave-one-out evaluation: hold out one test, rank codes by their aggregate scores on all remaining tests, and measure whether the held-out test's pass/fail pattern agrees with this ranking. We formalize this agreement as the leave-one-out AUC~(LOO-AUC) and prove that the expected LOO-AUC is proportional to each test's ability to separate correct code from incorrect code. Building on this, we propose ACES~(AUC ConsistEncy Scoring) with two complementary variants: ACES-C provides closed-form weights that provably approximate the oracle in expectation under a mild assumption on average test quality; ACES-O drops this assumption and iteratively optimizes a differentiable LOO-AUC objective. Both operate solely on the binary pass matrix with negligible overhead, and achieve state-of-the-art Pass@k on multiple code generation benchmarks.