Daily Papers

The integration of external tools has transitioned LLM agents from passive responders to autonomous systems. However, current benchmarks prioritize execution success, neglecting self-awareness capability, the ability to discern whether a problem requires necessary external resources or can be solved via internal parametric knowledge. To address this, we introduce KAPRO (Knowing-Acting Quadrant PRObe), a framework that evaluates cognitive-behavioral alignment by decoupling an agent's metacognitive judgment (Knowing) from its spontaneous execution (Acting). We further construct KAware, a dataset rigorously partitioning tasks into external, internal, and hybrid subspaces to systematically probe these epistemic boundaries. Extensive experiments across diverse agent architectures show that self-awareness capability is strongly correlated with task success but degrades sharply in internal-capability settings. Moreover, open-source and instruction-following models exhibit stronger tool overuse due to shallow pattern matching, while proprietary and reasoning-oriented models demonstrate more reliable cognitive gating. Benchmark and codes are available at https://github.com/AI-Santiago/KAware.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence that describes the ability to monitor and regulate one's own cognitive processes. Yet LLMs exhibit systemic deficiencies in key metacognitive faculties: they hallucinate with high confidence, fail to recognize knowledge boundaries, and misrepresent their internal uncertainty--undermining trustworthiness and reliability. Since monitoring task performance and adapting behavior accordingly are central to metacognition, we posit that models capable of accurately judging their own performance are better positioned to improve it. We operationalize this idea via two novel mechanisms: reinforcement learning with metacognitive feedback (RLMF), a paradigm to refine completion rankings during preference optimization based on the quality of a model's self-judgments of performance, and metacognitive data selection, which uses similar self-judgments to identify high-value training examples, outperforming naive active learning. We apply these innovations to the problem of faithful calibration (FC), a task that is itself fundamentally metacognitive: the goal is to align expressed with intrinsic uncertainty, difficult even for frontier LLMs. We adopt a two-stage, decoupled approach, first using these methods to calibrate the faithfulness of models' self-reported confidence scores, then mapping to natural, context-adaptable linguistic uncertainty via targeted output editing. Extensive experiments show RLMF achieves generalizable, state-of-the-art FC on diverse tasks while preserving accuracy. Further, RLMF surpasses standard RL by up to 63% while enhancing models' ability to assess and express their own capability limits. This positions RLMF as a promising paradigm to enhance LLM metacognition toward improved abilities and alignment, and suggests metacognitive performance as an effective RL signal to overcome limits of prior intrinsic feedback methods.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

Metacognition is a foundational component of intelligence critical to effective learning, problem solving, decision-making, communication, and more. In recent years, it has become increasingly recognized as a cornerstone of capable, transparent AI systems. Yet while LLMs have made significant progress across diverse real-world tasks, it is not yet clear when, how, or to what extent they can exhibit or be endowed with effective metacognitive abilities, nor how such abilities can be adapted to advance the fundamental capabilities, reliability, and intelligence of AI systems. This paper bridges this gap by presenting the first comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on metacognition for LLMs. We analyze and taxonomize the landscape of this emerging field and summarize recent technical advancements, including methods and benchmarks to measure and evaluate LLMs' metacognitive abilities, techniques to elicit, improve, and apply metacognition in LLMs, and findings and implications of ongoing research. We also discuss applications, open questions and challenges, and promising directions for future work. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful research and discussion. An organized list of papers can be found at https://github.com/yale-nlp/LLM-Metacognition.

Front-end web code has become a core product surface for every frontier LLM release, yet evaluating these interactive applications at development speed remains costly because human-judged leaderboards like Arena do not scale. Existing automated proxies typically lean on reference implementations, test suites, or rigid checklists, and tend to miss the reasoned synthesis a human reviewer performs over a live session. We articulate a new evaluation regime that is simultaneously reference-free, autonomously driven, and holistically reasoned, and instantiate it through two artifacts. \dataname is an 11-domain, 54-leaf, 1,000-query WebDev benchmark spanning both static-presentation and interactive-application tasks, balanced across three difficulty tiers and three target-language groups, with briefs rewritten to resist recall from circulated prompts. \framename, grounded in Flavell's metacognitive monitoring, separates evidence accumulation from judgment across three stages: Static Perception forms a first impression from passive observation; Agent-Driven Interaction explores the application autonomously while capturing continuous screen video, audio, and per-step screenshots; Dynamic Scoring issues holistic functionality and aesthetics verdicts with structured failure attribution only after the evidence chain is complete. On \dataname, \framename aligns closely with expert human ratings while surfacing substantial headroom across 13 frontier LLMs on interactive web generation. \noindenthttps://anonymous.4open.science/r/Cookie-3CE/

Domain expertise enhances judgment within boundaries but creates systematic vulnerabilities specifically at borders. We term this Transitive Expert Error (TEE), distinct from Dunning-Kruger effects, requiring calibrated expertise as precondition. Mechanisms enabling reliable within-domain judgment become liabilities when structural similarity masks causal divergence. Two core mechanisms operate: structural similarity bias causes experts to overweight surface features (shared vocabulary, patterns, formal structure) while missing causal architecture differences; authority persistence maintains confidence across competence boundaries through social reinforcement and metacognitive failures (experts experience no subjective uncertainty as pattern recognition operates smoothly on familiar-seeming inputs.) These mechanism intensify under three conditions: shared vocabulary masking divergent processes, social pressure for immediate judgment, and delayed feedback. These findings extend to AI routing architectures (MoE systems, multi-model orchestration, tool-using agents, RAG systems) exhibiting routing-induced failures (wrong specialist selected) and coverage-induced failures (no appropriate specialist exists). Both produce a hallucination phenotype: confident, coherent, structurally plausible but causally incorrect outputs at domain boundaries. In human systems where mechanisms are cognitive black boxes; AI architectures make them explicit and addressable. We propose interventions: multi-expert activation with disagreement detection (router level), boundary-aware calibration (specialist level), and coverage gap detection (training level). TEE has detectable signatures (routing patterns, confidence-accuracy dissociations, domain-inappropriate content) enabling monitoring and mitigation. What remains intractable in human cognition becomes addressable through architectural design.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence, specifically regarding the awareness of one's own knowledge. While humans rely on shared internal memory for both answering questions and reporting their knowledge state, this dependency in LLMs remains underexplored. This study proposes a framework to measure metacognitive ability d_{type2}' using a dual-prompt method, followed by the introduction of Evolution Strategy for Metacognitive Alignment (ESMA) to bind a model's internal knowledge to its explicit behaviors. ESMA demonstrates robust generalization across diverse untrained settings, indicating a enhancement in the model's ability to reference its own knowledge. Furthermore, parameter analysis attributes these improvements to a sparse set of significant modifications.

A robust decision-making process must take into account uncertainty, especially when the choice involves inherent risks. Because artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly integrated into decision-making workflows, managing uncertainty relies more and more on the metacognitive capabilities of these systems; i.e, their ability to assess the reliability of and regulate their own decisions. Hence, it is crucial to employ robust methods to measure the metacognitive abilities of AI. This paper is primarily a methodological contribution arguing for the adoption of the meta-d' framework as the gold standard for assessing the metacognitive sensitivity of AIs--the ability to generate confidence ratings that distinguish correct from incorrect responses. Moreover, we propose to leverage signal detection theory (SDT) to measure the ability of AIs to spontaneously regulate their decisions based on uncertainty and risk. To demonstrate the practical utility of these psychophysical frameworks, we conduct two series of experiments on three large language models (LLMs)--GPT-5, DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp, and Mistral-Medium-2508.

Metacognitive knowledge refers to humans' intuitive knowledge of their own thinking and reasoning processes. Today's best LLMs clearly possess some reasoning processes. The paper gives evidence that they also have metacognitive knowledge, including ability to name skills and procedures to apply given a task. We explore this primarily in context of math reasoning, developing a prompt-guided interaction procedure to get a powerful LLM to assign sensible skill labels to math questions, followed by having it perform semantic clustering to obtain coarser families of skill labels. These coarse skill labels look interpretable to humans. To validate that these skill labels are meaningful and relevant to the LLM's reasoning processes we perform the following experiments. (a) We ask GPT-4 to assign skill labels to training questions in math datasets GSM8K and MATH. (b) When using an LLM to solve the test questions, we present it with the full list of skill labels and ask it to identify the skill needed. Then it is presented with randomly selected exemplar solved questions associated with that skill label. This improves accuracy on GSM8k and MATH for several strong LLMs, including code-assisted models. The methodology presented is domain-agnostic, even though this article applies it to math problems.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Recent Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit strong perceptual reasoning abilities, yet they often struggle to adapt efficiently when encountering novel tasks at test time. In contrast, humans leverage the metacognitive model with memory, enabling continuous strategy refinement through metacognitive control when faced with new challenges. To bridge this gap, we propose metacognitive test-time reasoning (MCTR), a framework that equips models with the ability to learn, adapt, and improve during test time through metacognitive self-updating. Inspired by the dual structure of human metacognition, MCTR comprises meta-level and object-level VLM reasoning modules, each equipped with dedicated memory systems for hierarchical adaptive reasoning. Specifically, MCTR consists of (1) a meta-reasoning module which incrementally builds a structured memory by discovering and storing task-relevant rules, environmental patterns, and action-outcome relationships from test-time observations as natural language descriptions; and (2) an action-reasoning module that determines optimal actions through context-aware perception and strategic reasoning by dynamically retrieving and integrating knowledge from memory. The action-reasoning module continuously updates its policy through proposed metacognitive test-time reinforcement learning, adapting as knowledge memory evolves. We evaluate MCTR on 45 Atari games (33 seen, 12 unseen). MCTR demonstrates robust test-time adaptation, achieving 9/12 top-1 results on unseen games compared with baselines. Analyses through ablations, learning dynamics, and case studies reveal the complementary contributions of both components and show meta-reasoning evolving toward human-like adaptation strategies.

In Large Language Models (LLMs), there have been consistent advancements in task-specific performance, largely influenced by effective prompt design. While recent research on prompting has enhanced the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, a gap remains in further improving their understanding abilities. In this study, we introduce Metacognitive Prompting (MP), a strategy inspired by human introspective reasoning processes. Using MP, LLMs undergo a systematic series of structured, self-aware evaluations, drawing on both their vast inherent knowledge and new insights. Our experiments involve five prevalent LLMs: Llama2, Vicuna, PaLM, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4, all of which span various general natural language understanding (NLU) tasks from the GLUE and SuperGLUE benchmarks. Results indicate that, although GPT-4 consistently excels in most tasks, PaLM, when equipped with MP, approaches its performance level. Furthermore, across models and datasets, MP consistently outperforms existing prompting methods, including standard and chain-of-thought prompting. This study underscores the potential to amplify the understanding abilities of LLMs and highlights the benefits of mirroring human introspective reasoning in NLU tasks.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

We introduce a cross-domain behavioural assay of monitoring-control coupling in LLMs, grounded in the Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive framework and applying human psychometric methodology to LLM evaluation. The battery comprises 524 items across six cognitive domains (learning, metacognitive calibration, social cognition, attention, executive function, prospective regulation), each grounded in an established experimental paradigm. Tasks T1-T5 were pre-registered on OSF prior to data collection; T6 was added as an exploratory extension. After every forced-choice response, dual probes adapted from Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) ask the model to KEEP or WITHDRAW its answer and to BET or decline. The critical metric is the withdraw delta: the difference in withdrawal rate between incorrect and correct items. Applied to 20 frontier LLMs (10,480 evaluations), the battery discriminates three profiles consistent with the Nelson-Narens architecture: blanket confidence, blanket withdrawal, and selective sensitivity. Accuracy rank and metacognitive sensitivity rank are largely inverted. Retrospective monitoring and prospective regulation appear dissociable (r = .17, 95% CI wide given n=20; exemplar-based evidence is the primary support). Scaling on metacognitive calibration is architecture-dependent: monotonically decreasing (Qwen), monotonically increasing (GPT-5.4), or flat (Gemma). Behavioural findings converge structurally with an independent Type-2 SDT approach, providing preliminary cross-method construct validity. All items, data, and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/metacognitive-monitoring-battery.

Recent RL methods have substantially improved the reasoning abilities of LLMs. Existing reward designs mainly follow two paradigms: (1) Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) derives outcome signals from executable checks or ground-truth answers, but provides limited guidance for intermediate reasoning behaviors. (2) Rubrics-as-reward (RaR) goes beyond final-answer checking by using natural-language rubrics to assess reasoning quality and task compliance, but often requires instance-specific rubrics and substantial design effort. To address these issues, we introduce Metacognition-as-Reward (MaR), a metacognition-inspired RL framework that guides LLM reasoning through two general process dimensions: i) metacognitive knowledge, which identifies task-relevant information without hand-crafted instance-specific rubrics, and ii) metacognitive regulation, which plans and adjusts the reasoning process to provide reward guidance beyond final-answer outcomes. MaR scaffolds model rollouts into explicit metacognitive components and optimizes them with a trajectory-level reward over task knowledge coverage, regulation fidelity, and final-answer correctness. In this way, MaR extends reward feedback to reasoning trajectories while grounding the reward signals in general metacognitive dimensions. Experiments on 22 benchmarks show that MaR consistently improves model performance, achieving up to a 7.7% gain over the base model and up to an 11.0% gain over vanilla DAPO. Notably, Qwen3.5-9B + MaR narrows the gap to frontier models, surpassing GPT-OSS-120B on overall average and outperforming stronger models on several individual benchmarks. Process-level analysis further shows substantial improvements in reasoning process quality. MaR also generalizes to out-of-domain datasets, where MaR-trained models improve over their corresponding base models on average.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

Standard evaluation of LLM confidence relies on calibration metrics (ECE, Brier score) that conflate two distinct capacities: how much a model knows (Type-1 sensitivity) and how well it knows what it knows (Type-2 metacognitive sensitivity). We introduce an evaluation framework based on Type-2 Signal Detection Theory that decomposes these capacities using meta-d' and the metacognitive efficiency ratio M-ratio. Applied to four LLMs (Llama-3-8B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3, Llama-3-8B-Base, Gemma-2-9B-Instruct) across 224,000 factual QA trials, we find: (1) metacognitive efficiency varies substantially across models even when Type-1 sensitivity is similar -- Mistral achieves the highest d' but the lowest M-ratio; (2) metacognitive efficiency is domain-specific, with different models showing different weakest domains, invisible to aggregate metrics; (3) temperature manipulation shifts Type-2 criterion while meta-d' remains stable for two of four models, dissociating confidence policy from metacognitive capacity; (4) AUROC_2 and M-ratio produce fully inverted model rankings, demonstrating these metrics answer fundamentally different evaluation questions. The meta-d' framework reveals which models "know what they don't know" versus which merely appear well-calibrated due to criterion placement -- a distinction with direct implications for model selection, deployment, and human-AI collaboration. Pre-registered analysis; code and data publicly available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly surpassing human knowledge in many domains. While improving these models traditionally relies on costly human data, recent self-rewarding mechanisms (Yuan et al., 2024) have shown that LLMs can improve by judging their own responses instead of relying on human labelers. However, existing methods have primarily focused on improving model responses rather than judgment capabilities, resulting in rapid saturation during iterative training. To address this issue, we introduce a novel Meta-Rewarding step to the self-improvement process, where the model judges its own judgements and uses that feedback to refine its judgment skills. Surprisingly, this unsupervised approach improves the model's ability to judge {\em and} follow instructions, as demonstrated by a win rate improvement of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 22.9% to 39.4% on AlpacaEval 2, and 20.6% to 29.1% on Arena-Hard. These results strongly suggest the potential for self-improving models without human supervision.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

Recent advances in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) mark a shift from non-thinking models to post-trained reasoning models capable of solving complex problems through thinking. However, whether such thinking mitigates hallucinations in multimodal perception and reasoning remains unclear. Self-reflective reasoning enhances robustness but introduces additional hallucinations, and subtle perceptual errors still result in incorrect or coincidentally correct answers. Existing benchmarks primarily focus on models before the emergence of reasoning MLLMs, neglecting the internal thinking process and failing to measure the hallucinations that occur during thinking. To address these challenges, we introduce MM-THEBench, a comprehensive benchmark for assessing hallucinations of intermediate CoTs in reasoning MLLMs. MM-THEBench features a fine-grained taxonomy grounded in cognitive dimensions, diverse data with verified reasoning annotations, and a multi-level automated evaluation framework. Extensive experiments on mainstream reasoning MLLMs reveal insights into how thinking affects hallucination and reasoning capability in various multimodal tasks.

The progress of AI is bottlenecked by the quality of evaluation, and powerful LLM-as-a-Judge models have proved to be a core solution. Improved judgment ability is enabled by stronger chain-of-thought reasoning, motivating the need to find the best recipes for training such models to think. In this work we introduce J1, a reinforcement learning approach to training such models. Our method converts both verifiable and non-verifiable prompts to judgment tasks with verifiable rewards that incentivize thinking and mitigate judgment bias. In particular, our approach outperforms all other existing 8B or 70B models when trained at those sizes, including models distilled from DeepSeek-R1. J1 also outperforms o1-mini, and even R1 on some benchmarks, despite training a smaller model. We provide analysis and ablations comparing Pairwise-J1 vs Pointwise-J1 models, offline vs online training recipes, reward strategies, seed prompts, and variations in thought length and content. We find that our models make better judgments by learning to outline evaluation criteria, comparing against self-generated reference answers, and re-evaluating the correctness of model responses.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Recent studies on reasoning models explore the meta-awareness of language models, the ability to know how to think by itself. We argue that large reasoning models lack this meta-awareness property by proving severe misalignment between true rollouts and predicted meta information. We posit that aligning meta-prediction with true rollouts will lead to significant performance gains. To verify this hypothesis, we design a training pipeline that boosts Meta-Awareness via Self-Alignment (MASA), and prove that enhanced meta-awareness directly translates to improved accuracy. Unlike existing meta-cognitive reasoning models, our method does not require external training sources but leverages self-generated signals to train meta-awareness. Moreover, our method enables efficient training by i) filtering out zero-variance prompts that are either trivial or unsolvable and ii) cutting off lengthy rollouts when they are unlikely to lead to correct answers. The results are inspiring: our strategy yields significant improvements in both accuracy and training efficiency on in-domain tasks and shows strong generalization to out-of-domain benchmarks. More specifically, our method can speed up GRPO training by over 1.28x to reach the same performance, and achieve a 19.3% gain in accuracy on AIME25, and a 6.2 % average gain over six mathematics benchmarks. Training with meta-cognitive guidance enhances out-of-domain generalization, giving a 3.87 % boost on GPQA-Diamond and a 2.08 % overall accuracy gain across 13 benchmarks spanning logical, scientific, and coding domains.

A hallmark of human intelligence is Introspection-the ability to assess and reason about one's own cognitive processes. Introspection has emerged as a promising but contested capability in large language models (LLMs). However, current evaluations often fail to distinguish genuine meta-cognition from the mere application of general world knowledge or text-based self-simulation. In this work, we propose a principled taxonomy that formalizes introspection as the latent computation of specific operators over a model's policy and parameters. To isolate the components of generalized introspection, we present Introspect-Bench, a multifaceted evaluation suite designed for rigorous capability testing. Our results show that frontier models exhibit privileged access to their own policies, outperforming peer models in predicting their own behavior. Furthermore, we provide causal, mechanistic evidence explaining both how LLMs learn to introspect without explicit training, and how the mechanism of introspection emerges via attention diffusion.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Ensuring the safety and value alignment of large language models (LLMs) is critical for their deployment. Current alignment efforts primarily target explicit risks such as bias, hate speech, and violence. However, they often fail to address deeper, domain-specific implicit risks and lack a flexible, generalizable framework applicable across diverse specialized fields. Hence, we proposed MENTOR: A MEtacognition-driveN self-evoluTion framework for uncOvering and mitigating implicit Risks in LLMs on Domain Tasks. To address the limitations of labor-intensive human evaluation, we introduce a novel metacognitive self-assessment tool. This enables LLMs to reflect on potential value misalignments in their responses using strategies like perspective-taking and consequential thinking. We also release a supporting dataset of 9,000 risk queries spanning education, finance, and management to enhance domain-specific risk identification. Subsequently, based on the outcomes of metacognitive reflection, the framework dynamically generates supplementary rule knowledge graphs that extend predefined static rule trees. This enables models to actively apply validated rules to future similar challenges, establishing a continuous self-evolution cycle that enhances generalization by reducing maintenance costs and inflexibility of static systems. Finally, we employ activation steering during inference to guide LLMs in following the rules, a cost-effective method to robustly enhance enforcement across diverse contexts. Experimental results show MENTOR's effectiveness: In defensive testing across three vertical domains, the framework substantially reduces semantic attack success rates, enabling a new level of implicit risk mitigation for LLMs. Furthermore, metacognitive assessment not only aligns closely with baseline human evaluators but also delivers more thorough and insightful analysis of LLMs value alignment.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Deep search agents powered by large language models have demonstrated strong capabilities in multi-step retrieval, reasoning, and long-horizon task execution. However, their practical failures often stem from the lack of mechanisms to monitor and regulate reasoning and retrieval states as tasks evolve under uncertainty. Insights from cognitive neuroscience suggest that human metacognition is hierarchically organized, integrating fast anomaly detection with selectively triggered, experience-driven reflection. In this work, we propose Deep Search with Meta-Cognitive Monitoring (DS-MCM), a deep search framework augmented with an explicit hierarchical metacognitive monitoring mechanism. DS-MCM integrates a Fast Consistency Monitor, which performs lightweight checks on the alignment between external evidence and internal reasoning confidence, and a Slow Experience-Driven Monitor, which is selectively activated to guide corrective intervention based on experience memory from historical agent trajectories. By embedding monitoring directly into the reasoning-retrieval loop, DS-MCM determines both when intervention is warranted and how corrective actions should be informed by prior experience. Experiments across multiple deep search benchmarks and backbone models demonstrate that DS-MCM consistently improves performance and robustness.

The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings. Prior work has identified test-time contextual cues, such as hypothetical scenarios, as a source of verbalized evaluation awareness and subsequent behavioral shift. In this paper, we investigate a potential explanation of this phenomenon: evaluation meta-knowledge, defined as parametric knowledge about the structural traits that characterize evaluations. Similar to dataset contamination, where benchmark exposure leads to higher performance through memorization, we hypothesize that models trained on texts describing evaluation practices may implicitly learn to recognize and respond to evaluation-like contexts, for instance, through exposure to scientific articles or social media posts about AI benchmarking. To test this, we fine-tune models on synthetic documents describing evaluation traits such as verifiable structures or moral dilemmas. Evaluating this fine-tuned model on six safety benchmarks, we find that it is significantly safer than the base model and control model. This behavioral shift persists even when restricting the analysis to responses lacking explicit verbalization of evaluation awareness. Our results demonstrate that evaluation meta-knowledge may inflate safety benchmark performance, introducing a novel confounder that is independent of explicit memorization or verbalized evaluation awareness, thus, challenging to detect. These findings have important implications for the design and interpretation of AI safety evaluations. Our code and models are available at https://github.com/compass-group-tue/arxiv2026_evaluation_meta_knowledge.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Large language models excel at reasoning but lack key aspects of introspection, including anticipating their own success and the computation required to achieve it. Humans use real-time introspection to decide how much effort to invest, when to make multiple attempts, when to stop, and when to signal success or failure. Without this, LLMs struggle to make intelligent meta-cognition decisions. Test-time scaling methods like Best-of-N drive up cost and latency by using a fixed budget of samples regardless of the marginal benefit of each one at any point in generation, and the absence of confidence signals can mislead people, prevent appropriate escalation to better tools, and undermine trustworthiness. Learned verifiers or reward models can provide confidence estimates, but do not enable adaptive inference and add substantial cost by requiring extra models or forward passes. We present ZIP-RC, which equips models with zero-overhead introspective predictions of reward and cost. At every token, ZIP-RC reuses reserved or unused logits in the same forward pass as next-token prediction to output a joint distribution over final reward and remaining length -- no extra models, architecture change, or inference overhead. This full joint distribution is used to compute a sampling utility which is the linear combination of the expected maximum reward, total compute, and latency of set of samples if generated to completion. During inference, we maximize this utility with meta-actions that determine which prefix of tokens to continue or initiate sampling from. On mixed-difficulty mathematical benchmarks, ZIP-RC improves accuracy by up to 12% over majority voting at equal or lower average cost, and traces smooth Pareto frontiers between quality, compute, and latency. By providing real-time reward-cost introspection, ZIP-RC enables adaptive, efficient reasoning.

Being prompted to engage in reasoning has emerged as a core technique for using large language models (LLMs), deploying additional inference-time compute to improve task performance. However, as LLMs increase in both size and adoption, inference costs are correspondingly becoming increasingly burdensome. How, then, might we optimize reasoning's cost-performance tradeoff? This work introduces a novel approach based on computational models of metareasoning used in cognitive science, training LLMs to selectively use intermediate reasoning steps only when necessary. We first develop a reward function that incorporates the Value of Computation by penalizing unnecessary reasoning, then use this reward function with Expert Iteration to train the LLM. Compared to few-shot chain-of-thought prompting and STaR, our method significantly reduces inference costs (20-37\% fewer tokens generated across three models) while maintaining task performance across diverse datasets.

Deep research agents increasingly automate complex information-seeking tasks, producing evidence-grounded reports via multi-step reasoning, tool use, and synthesis. Their growing role demands scalable, reliable evaluation, positioning LLM-as-judge as a supervision paradigm for assessing factual accuracy, evidence use, and reasoning quality. Yet the reliability of these judges for deep research agents remains poorly understood, posing a critical meta-evaluation problem: before deploying LLM judges to supervise research agents, we must first evaluate the judges themselves. Existing meta-evaluations fall short in two ways: (1) reliance on coarse, subjective human-preference agreement; (2) focus on instruction-following or verifiable tasks, leaving open-ended agent executions unexplored. To address these gaps, we introduce REFLECT (REliable Fine-grained LLM judge Evaluation via Controlled inTervention), a meta-evaluation benchmark targeting fine-grained failure detection in agentic environments. REFLECT defines a detailed taxonomy of process- and outcome-level failure modes, instantiated by performing controlled and localized interventions on quality-screened agent execution traces. This yields verifiable, comprehensive, and fine-grained instances for validating the judge models. Our experiments show that current LLM judges remain unreliable: even the best-performing models achieve overall accuracies below 55% across reasoning, tool-use, and report-quality failures, with especially poor performance on evidence verification. Together, our taxonomy and findings expose systematic judge limitations, reveal tradeoffs in cost and reliability, and offer actionable guidance for building more reliable evaluation pipelines for deep research agents.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Can humans tell whether a news article was written by a person or a large language model (LLM)? We investigate this question using JudgeGPT, a study platform that independently measures source attribution (human vs. machine) and authenticity judgment (legitimate vs. fake) on continuous scales. From 2,318 judgments collected from 1,054 participants across content generated by six LLMs, we report five findings: (1) participants cannot reliably distinguish machine-generated from human-written text (p > .05, Welch's t-test); (2) this inability holds across all tested models, including open-weight models with as few as 7B parameters; (3) self-reported domain expertise predicts judgment accuracy (r = .35, p < .001) whereas political orientation does not (r = -.10, n.s.); (4) clustering reveals distinct response strategies ("Skeptics" vs. "Believers"); and (5) accuracy degrades after approximately 30 sequential evaluations due to cognitive fatigue. The answer, in short, is no: humans cannot reliably tell. These results indicate that user-side detection is not a viable defense and motivate system-level countermeasures such as cryptographic content provenance.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

LLM-as-a-Judge (LLMaaJ) now underpins scalable evaluation, yet we lack a decisive test of a judge's qualification: can it recover a conversation's latent objective and know when that inference is trustworthy? LLMs degrade under irrelevant or long context; multi-turn jailbreaks further hide goals across turns. We introduce ObjexMT, a benchmark for objective extraction and metacognition. Given a multi-turn transcript, a model must return a one-sentence base objective and a self-reported confidence. Accuracy is computed via LLM-judge semantic similarity to gold objectives, converted to binary correctness by a single human-aligned threshold calibrated once on N = 100 items (tau^*=0.61). Metacognition is evaluated with ECE, Brier, Wrong-at-High-Conf, and risk-coverage. Across gpt-4.1, claude-sonnet-4, and Qwen3-235B-A22B-FP8 on SafeMTData_Attack600, SafeMTData_1K, MHJ, and CoSafe, claude-sonnet-4 attains the best objective-extraction accuracy (0.515) and calibration (ECE 0.296; Brier 0.324); gpt-4.1 and Qwen3-235B-A22B-FP8 tie at 0.441 but are overconfident (mean confidence approx0.88 vs. accuracy approx0.44; Wrong-at-0.90 approx48-52%). Performance varies by dataset (approx0.167-0.865). ObjexMT thus supplies an actionable test for LLM judges: when objectives are not explicit, judges often misinfer them with high confidence. We recommend exposing objectives when feasible and gating decisions by confidence otherwise. Code and data at https://github.com/hyunjun1121/ObjexMT_dataset.

Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs-a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multi-agent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Domain Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation. This work advances AI systems toward human-like social intelligence, with applications in empathetic dialogue and culturally sensitive interactions. Code is available at https://github.com/XMZhangAI/MetaMind.

We report that model quantisation restructures domain-level metacognitive efficiency in LLMs rather than degrading it uniformly. Evaluating Llama-3-8B-Instruct on the same 3,000 questions at Q5_K_M and f16 precision, we find that M-ratio profiles across four knowledge domains are uncorrelated between formats (Spearman rho = 0.00). Arts & Literature moves from worst-monitored (M-ratio = 0.606 at Q5_K_M) to best-monitored (1.542 at f16). Geography moves from well-monitored (1.210) to under-monitored (0.798). However, Type-2 AUROC profiles are perfectly stable across formats (rho = 1.00), localising the restructuring to the M-ratio normalisation rather than the underlying discrimination signal. This finding emerged from a pre-registered attempt to improve metacognition through domain-conditional training. We prescribed confidence-amplification SFT for the diagnosed weak domain, with matched-budget agnostic and wrong-prescription controls. All four confirmatory hypotheses were null (10,000 bootstrap resamples, seed = 42). The training successfully reshaped confidence distributions, doubling the NLP gap in Science from 0.076 to 0.152, but did not improve meta-d' because the diagnostic profile did not transfer across formats. Any system relying on domain-level M-ratio profiles has an unexamined dependency on inference format. Systems using AUROC_2 are safer. We release all code, pre-registrations, and trial-level data.

Large language models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance with sufficient computation, but they do not inherently know how much computation a task requires. We study budgeted inference-time reasoning for multiple tasks under a strict global token constraint and formalize it as a Ordered Stochastic Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problem(OS-MCKP). This perspective highlights a meta-cognitive requirement -- anticipating task difficulty, estimating return over investment (ROI), and allocating computation strategically. We propose ROI-Reasoning, a two-stage framework that endows LLMs with intrinsic, budget-aware rationality. In the first stage, Meta-Cognitive Fine-Tuning teaches models to predict reasoning cost and expected utility before generation, enabling explicit solve-or-skip decisions. Next, Rationality-Aware Reinforcement Learning optimizes sequential decision making under a hard token budget, allowing models to learn long-horizon allocation strategies. Across budgeted mathematical reasoning benchmarks, ROI-Reasoning consistently improves overall score while substantially reducing regret under tight computation budgets.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in decision-making contexts, but when they present answers without signaling low confidence, users may unknowingly act on erroneous outputs. Prior work shows that LLMs maintain internal uncertainty signals, yet their expressed confidence is often miscalibrated and poorly discriminates between correct and incorrect answers. We investigate whether supervised fine-tuning can improve models' ability to communicate uncertainty and whether such improvements generalize across tasks and domains. We fine-tune LLMs on datasets spanning general knowledge, mathematics, and open-ended trivia, and evaluate two metacognitive tasks: (1) single-question confidence estimation, where the model assigns a numeric certainty to its answer, and (2) pairwise confidence comparison, where the model selects which of two answers it is more likely to answer correctly. We assess generalization to unseen domains, including medical and legal reasoning. Results show that fine-tuning improves calibration (alignment between stated confidence and accuracy) and discrimination (higher confidence for correct vs. incorrect responses) within and across domains. However, gains are task-specific: training on single-question calibration does not transfer to pairwise comparison, and vice versa. Multitask fine-tuning yields broader gains, lowering calibration error and strengthening discrimination in out-of-domain evaluations. This suggests that uncertainty communication in LLMs is trainable but requires multitask training to generalize effectively.

Reasoning training incentivizes LLMs to produce long chains of thought (long CoT), which among other things, allows them to explore solution strategies with self-checking. This results in higher accuracy, but inflates context length, token/compute cost, and answer latency. We ask: Can current models leverage their metacognition to provide other combinations on this Pareto frontier, e.g., better accuracy with lower context length and/or latency? Abstractly, we view the model as an improvement operator on its own "thoughts" with a continuum of possible strategies. We identify an interesting inference family Parallel-Distill-Refine (PDR), which performs the following: (i) generate diverse drafts in parallel; (ii) distill them into a bounded, textual workspace; and (iii) refine conditioned on this workspace, producing an output that seeds the next round. Importantly, context length (hence compute cost) is controllable via degree of parallelism, and is no longer conflated with the total number of generated tokens. We report PDR instantiations of current models that give better accuracy than long CoT while incurring lower latency. Setting degree of parallelism to 1 yields an interesting subcase, Sequential Refinement (SR) (iteratively improve a single candidate answer) which provides performance superior to long CoT. Success of such model orchestrations raises the question whether further training could shift the Pareto frontier. To this end, we train an 8B thinking model with Reinforcement Learning (RL) to make it consistent with PDR as the inference method. On math tasks with verifiable answers, iterative pipelines surpass single-pass baselines at matched sequential budgets, with PDR delivering the largest gains (e.g., +11% on AIME 2024 and +9% on AIME 2025).

In this report we review memory-based meta-learning as a tool for building sample-efficient strategies that learn from past experience to adapt to any task within a target class. Our goal is to equip the reader with the conceptual foundations of this tool for building new, scalable agents that operate on broad domains. To do so, we present basic algorithmic templates for building near-optimal predictors and reinforcement learners which behave as if they had a probabilistic model that allowed them to efficiently exploit task structure. Furthermore, we recast memory-based meta-learning within a Bayesian framework, showing that the meta-learned strategies are near-optimal because they amortize Bayes-filtered data, where the adaptation is implemented in the memory dynamics as a state-machine of sufficient statistics. Essentially, memory-based meta-learning translates the hard problem of probabilistic sequential inference into a regression problem.

Recent multimodal large language models have demonstrated strong reasoning ability, yet their reliability as automated evaluators remains limited by a critical weakness: when visual evidence conflicts with textual cues, MLLM judges tend to reward plausible narratives over perceptually correct answers. We identify and systematically analyze this phenomenon, which we term Perceptual Judgment Bias. Through controlled visual perturbations, existing multimodal judges frequently anchor on the response text instead of their own visual perception, leading to inconsistent and non-verifiable evaluations. To address this issue, we introduce the Perceptually Perturbed Judgment Dataset, which constructs minimally edited counterfactual responses that isolate perceptual errors and enable verifiable supervision. Building on this dataset, we develop a unified training framework that combines a structured GRPO-based reward with a batch-ranking objective, achieving coherent global ordering without explicit pairwise labels. Experiments across diverse MLLM-as-a-Judge benchmarks show that our approach substantially improves perceptual fidelity, ranking coherence, and alignment with human evaluation. Our results establish a scalable and generalizable pathway for training multimodal judges that are perceptually grounded, interpretable, and robust to visual-reasoning conflicts.

Recently, the role of LLM-as-judge in evaluating large language models has gained prominence. However, current judge models suffer from narrow specialization and limited robustness, undermining their capacity for comprehensive evaluations. In this work, we present CompassJudger-2, a novel generalist judge model that overcomes these limitations via a task-driven, multi-domain data curation strategy. Central to our approach is supervising judgment tasks with verifiable rewards, guiding intrinsic critical reasoning through rejection sampling to foster robust, generalizable judgment capabilities. We introduce a refined learning objective with margin policy gradient loss to enhance performance. Empirically, CompassJudger-2 achieves superior results across multiple judge and reward benchmarks, and our 7B model demonstrates competitive judgment accuracy with significantly larger models like DeepSeek-V3 and Qwen3-235B-A22B. Additionally, we propose JudgerBenchV2, a comprehensive benchmark evaluating cross-domain judgment accuracy and rank consistency to standardize judge model evaluation. These contributions advance robust, scalable LLM judgment and establish new performance and evaluation standards.

Critique ability, a meta-cognitive capability of humans, presents significant challenges for LLMs to improve. Recent works primarily rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) using critiques generated by a single LLM like GPT-4. However, these model-generated critiques often exhibit flaws due to the inherent complexity of the critique. Consequently, fine-tuning LLMs on such flawed critiques typically limits the model's performance and propagates these flaws into the learned model. To overcome these challenges, this paper proposes a novel data generation pipeline, named MultiCritique, that improves the critique ability of LLMs by utilizing multi-agent feedback in both the SFT and reinforcement learning (RL) stages. First, our data generation pipeline aggregates high-quality critiques from multiple agents instead of a single model, with crucial information as input for simplifying the critique. Furthermore, our pipeline improves the preference accuracy of critique quality through multi-agent feedback, facilitating the effectiveness of RL in improving the critique ability of LLMs. Based on our proposed MultiCritique data generation pipeline, we construct the MultiCritiqueDataset for the SFT and RL fine-tuning stages. Extensive experimental results on two benchmarks demonstrate: 1) the superior quality of our constructed SFT dataset compared to existing critique datasets; 2) additional improvements to the critique ability of LLMs brought by the RL stage. Notably, our fine-tuned 7B model significantly surpasses other advanced 7B-13B open-source models, approaching the performance of advanced 70B LLMs and GPT-4. Codes, datasets and model weights will be publicly available.

We introduce PerceptionComp, a manually annotated benchmark for complex, long-horizon, perception-centric video reasoning. PerceptionComp is designed so that no single moment is sufficient: answering each question requires multiple temporally separated pieces of visual evidence and compositional constraints under conjunctive and sequential logic, spanning perceptual subtasks such as objects, attributes, relations, locations, actions, and events, and requiring skills including semantic recognition, visual correspondence, temporal reasoning, and spatial reasoning. The benchmark contains 1,114 highly complex questions on 279 videos from diverse domains including city walk tours, indoor villa tours, video games, and extreme outdoor sports, with 100% manual annotation. Human studies show that PerceptionComp requires substantial test-time thinking and repeated perception steps: participants take much longer than on prior benchmarks, and accuracy drops to near chance (18.97%) when rewatching is disallowed. State-of-the-art MLLMs also perform substantially worse on PerceptionComp than on existing benchmarks: the best model in our evaluation, Gemini-3-Flash, reaches only 45.96% accuracy in the five-choice setting, while open-source models remain below 40%. These results suggest that perception-centric long-horizon video reasoning remains a major bottleneck, and we hope PerceptionComp will help drive progress in perceptual reasoning.

LLM-as-Judge frameworks are increasingly popular for AI evaluation, yet research findings on the relationship between models' generation and judgment abilities remain inconsistent. We investigate this relationship through systematic dataset- and instance-level analyses across 11 models and 21 diverse tasks. Despite both capabilities relying on the same underlying knowledge, our analyses reveal they are only weakly correlated, primarily due to LLMs' sensitivity to the responses being judged. To address this, we propose a self-reference-guided evaluation strategy that leverages a model's own answers as references. This approach significantly strengthens the correlation between generation and judgment abilities, offering a practical path to align these skills and providing a reliable proxy for model selection in evaluation tasks.

LLMs are typically trained to answer user questions or follow instructions similarly to how human experts respond. However, in the standard alignment framework they lack the basic ability of explicit thinking before answering. Thinking is important for complex questions that require reasoning and planning -- but can be applied to any task. We propose a training method for equipping existing LLMs with such thinking abilities for general instruction following without use of additional human data. We achieve this by an iterative search and optimization procedure that explores the space of possible thought generations, allowing the model to learn how to think without direct supervision. For each instruction, the thought candidates are scored using a judge model to evaluate their responses only, and then optimized via preference optimization. We show that this procedure leads to superior performance on AlpacaEval and Arena-Hard, and shows gains from thinking on non-reasoning categories such as marketing, health and general knowledge, in addition to more traditional reasoning & problem-solving tasks.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

Memory-augmented LLM agents tackle complex long-horizon tasks by recursively summarizing interaction trajectories into compact memory. However, existing approaches typically train these memory policies using outcome-based reinforcement learning, failing to localize where intermediate memory quality degrades. As interactions unfold, ambiguous recursive summaries progressively discard task-relevant information and introduce semantic noise. This exacerbates belief deviation, obscuring the agent's estimate of the latent task state and ultimately derailing long-horizon reasoning. We therefore argue that memory optimization should focus not merely on trajectory-level success, but on the clarity of the belief induced by intermediate summaries. To this end, we introduce Belief Entropy, a self-supervised proxy that probes how uncertain the model remains about the latent task state given its current memory. Based on this proxy, we propose Metacognitive Memory Policy Optimization (MMPO). Instead of relying only on sparse outcome-based signals, MMPO provides fine-grained, memory-specific supervision via explicitly penalizing summaries that induce high epistemic uncertainty. Experiments show that MMPO consistently outperforms existing methods on diverse long-horizon tasks, maintaining 97.1% performance even when scaled to 1.75M-token contexts.

We train a 318M-parameter Transformer language model from scratch on a curated corpus of 1.56 billion tokens of pure Classical Chinese, with zero English characters or Arabic numerals. Through systematic out-of-distribution (OOD) testing, we investigate whether the model can distinguish known from unknown inputs, and crucially, whether it can express this distinction in its generated text. We find a clear dissociation between internal and external uncertainty. Internally, the model exhibits a perplexity jump ratio of 2.39x between real and fabricated historical events (p = 8.9e-11, n = 92 per group), with semi-fabricated events (real figures + fictional events) showing the highest perplexity (4.24x, p = 1.1e-16), demonstrating genuine factual encoding beyond syntactic pattern matching. Externally, however, the model never learns to express uncertainty: classical Chinese epistemic markers appear at lower rates for OOD questions (3.5%) than for in-distribution questions (8.3%, p = 0.023), reflecting rhetorical conventions rather than genuine metacognition. We replicate both findings across three languages (Classical Chinese, English, Japanese), three writing systems, and eight models from 110M to 1.56B parameters. We further show that uncertainty expression frequency is determined entirely by training data conventions, with Classical Chinese models showing a "humility paradox" (more hedging for known topics), while Japanese models almost never hedge. We argue that metacognitive expression -- the ability to say "I don't know" -- does not emerge from language modeling alone and requires explicit training signals such as RLHF.

Critical thinking is essential for rational decision-making and problem-solving. This skill hinges on the ability to provide precise and reasoned critiques and is a hallmark of human intelligence. In the era of large language models (LLMs), this study explores the ability of LLMs to deliver accurate critiques across various tasks. We are interested in this topic as a capable critic model could not only serve as a reliable evaluator, but also as a source of supervised signals for model tuning. Particularly, if a model can self-critique, it has the potential for autonomous self-improvement. To examine this, we introduce a unified evaluation framework for assessing the critique abilities of LLMs. We develop a benchmark called CriticBench, which comprises 3K high-quality natural language queries and corresponding model responses; and annotate the correctness of these responses. The benchmark cover tasks such as math problem-solving, code completion, and question answering. We evaluate multiple LLMs on the collected dataset and our analysis reveals several noteworthy insights: (1) Critique is generally challenging for most LLMs, and this capability often emerges only when models are sufficiently large. (2) In particular, self-critique is especially difficult. Even top-performing LLMs struggle to achieve satisfactory performance. (3) Models tend to have lower critique accuracy on problems where they are most uncertain. To this end, we introduce a simple yet effective baseline named self-check, which leverages self-critique to improve task performance for various models. We hope this study serves as an initial exploration into understanding the critique abilities of LLMs, and aims to inform future research, including the development of more proficient critic models and the application of critiques across diverse tasks.

Test-time scaling increases inference-time computation by allowing models to generate long reasoning chains, and has shown strong performance across many domains. However, in this work, we show that this approach is not yet effective for knowledge-intensive tasks, where high factual accuracy and low hallucination rates are essential. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of test-time scaling using 12 reasoning models on two knowledge-intensive benchmarks. Our results reveal that increasing test-time computation does not consistently improve accuracy and, in many cases, it even leads to more hallucinations. We then analyze how extended reasoning affects hallucination behavior. We find that reduced hallucinations often result from the model choosing to abstain after thinking more, rather than from improved factual recall. Conversely, for some models, longer reasoning encourages attempts on previously unanswered questions, many of which result in hallucinations. Case studies show that extended reasoning can induce confirmation bias, leading to overconfident hallucinations. Despite these limitations, we observe that compared to non-thinking, enabling thinking remains beneficial. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/tts-knowledge

Using Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) as judges to achieve precise and consistent evaluations has gradually become an emerging paradigm across various domains. Evaluating the capability and reliability of MLLM-as-a-judge systems is therefore essential for ensuring trustworthy assessment. Existing judge benchmarks categorize samples by task types but fail to capture the fundamental judgment capabilities required for reliable evaluation. In this work, we introduce M-JudgeBench, a ten-dimensional capability-oriented benchmark designed to comprehensively assess the judgment abilities of MLLMs. Our benchmark decomposes evaluation into pairwise Chain-of-Thought (CoT) comparison, length bias avoidance, and process error detection tasks, jointly covering ten fine-grained subtasks. This design enables diagnosis of model reliability across reasoning styles, response lengths, and cross-model variations. Systematic evaluation uncovers the systematic weaknesses in existing MLLM-as-a-judge systems. To address this issue, we further propose Judge-MCTS, a data construction framework generating pairwise reasoning trajectories with various correctness and length. Using Judge-MCTS, we construct an MCTS-augmented dataset and train M-Judger, a series of strong judge models. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of M-Judger on existing judge benchmarks as well as M-JudgeBench. Overall, our work establishes a more principled foundation for evaluating MLLM-as-a-judge through M-JudgeBench and Judge-MCTS framework, paving the way for future research on judge model evaluation and capability-driven judge training.

Accurate confidence calibration in Large Language Models (LLMs) is critical for safe use in high-stakes domains, where clear verbalized confidence enhances user trust. Traditional methods that mimic reference confidence expressions often fail to capture the reasoning needed for accurate confidence assessment. We propose natural language critiques as a solution, ideally suited for confidence calibration, as precise gold confidence labels are hard to obtain and often require multiple generations. This paper studies how natural language critiques can enhance verbalized confidence, addressing: (1) What to critique: uncertainty (question-focused) or confidence (answer-specific)? Analysis shows confidence suits multiple-choice tasks, while uncertainty excels in open-ended scenarios. (2) How to critique: self-critique or critique calibration training? We propose Self-Critique, enabling LLMs to critique and optimize their confidence beyond mere accuracy, and CritiCal, a novel Critique Calibration training method that leverages natural language critiques to improve confidence calibration, moving beyond direct numerical optimization. Experiments show that CritiCal significantly outperforms Self-Critique and other competitive baselines, even surpassing its teacher model, GPT-4o, in complex reasoning tasks. CritiCal also shows robust generalization in out-of-distribution settings, advancing LLM's reliability.

In this work, we introduce a novel evaluation paradigm for Large Language Models, one that challenges them to engage in meta-reasoning. This approach addresses critical shortcomings in existing math problem-solving benchmarks, traditionally used to evaluate the cognitive capabilities of agents. Our paradigm shifts the focus from result-oriented assessments, which often overlook the reasoning process, to a more holistic evaluation that effectively differentiates the cognitive capabilities among models. For example, in our benchmark, GPT-4 demonstrates a performance ten times more accurate than GPT3-5. The significance of this new paradigm lies in its ability to reveal potential cognitive deficiencies in LLMs that current benchmarks, such as GSM8K, fail to uncover due to their saturation and lack of effective differentiation among varying reasoning abilities. Our comprehensive analysis includes several state-of-the-art math models from both open-source and closed-source communities, uncovering fundamental deficiencies in their training and evaluation approaches. This paper not only advocates for a paradigm shift in the assessment of LLMs but also contributes to the ongoing discourse on the trajectory towards Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). By promoting the adoption of meta-reasoning evaluation methods similar to ours, we aim to facilitate a more accurate assessment of the true cognitive abilities of LLMs.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

Recent studies show that the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) can be improved by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) to question-answering (QA) tasks in areas such as math and coding. With a long context length, LLMs may learn to perform search, as indicated by the self-correction behavior observed in DeepSeek R1. However, this search behavior is often imprecise and lacks confidence, resulting in long, redundant responses and highlighting deficiencies in intuition and verification. Inspired by the Dual Process Theory in psychology, we introduce a simple modification to the QA task that includes four stages: Fast Thinking, where the LLM must answer within a strict token budget; Verification, where the model evaluates its initial response; Slow Thinking, where it refines the initial response with more deliberation; and Summarization, where it distills the refinement from the previous stage into precise steps. Our proposed task improves average accuracy from 24.9% to 27.9% for Qwen2.5-1.5B, and from 45.9% to 49.8% for DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-1.5B. Notably, for Qwen2.5-1.5B, the Fast Thinking mode alone achieves 26.8% accuracy using fewer than 1000 tokens, demonstrating substantial inference efficiency gains. These findings suggest that intuition and deliberative reasoning are distinct, complementary systems benefiting from targeted training.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become central to LLM reasoning, but its outcome-level rewards can make models more willing to give confident answers when evidence or reasoning is unreliable. Existing SFT or RL methods mainly teach LLMs to refuse or express uncertainty at the response level, which can overfit abstention behavior rather than improve reasoning reliability. To address this limitation, we propose Cognitive Pairwise Training (CPT), a cognitive mid-training alignment stage that turns pairwise comparisons over reasoning traces into a reusable alignment signal. By learning to distinguish trustworthy from flawed reasoning, CPT encourages the model to internalize a reasoning-quality discrimination boundary rather than memorize surface refusal patterns. Across five model scales and three model families, CPT improves the reasoning--metacognition trade-off. At 14B, CPT+RL outperforms the standard SFT+RL pipeline by +2.2 math-average points and +5.2 abstention-F1 points. Further analyses show that CPT improves trace quality and exhibits strong robustness and scalability across evaluation and training settings. Code and models are released at https://github.com/Tsinghua-dhy/CPT.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have gained significant attention recently, showing remarkable potential in artificial general intelligence. However, assessing the utility of MLLMs presents considerable challenges, primarily due to the absence of multimodal benchmarks that align with human preferences. Drawing inspiration from the concept of LLM-as-a-Judge within LLMs, this paper introduces a novel benchmark, termed MLLM-as-a-Judge, to assess the ability of MLLMs in assisting judges across diverse modalities, encompassing three distinct tasks: Scoring Evaluation, Pair Comparison, and Batch Ranking. Our study reveals that, while MLLMs demonstrate remarkable human-like discernment in Pair Comparison, there is a significant divergence from human preferences in Scoring Evaluation and Batch Ranking. Furthermore, a closer examination reveals persistent challenges in the judgment capacities of LLMs, including diverse biases, hallucinatory responses, and inconsistencies in judgment, even in advanced models such as GPT-4V. These findings emphasize the pressing need for enhancements and further research efforts to be undertaken before regarding MLLMs as fully reliable evaluators. In light of this, we advocate for additional efforts dedicated to supporting the continuous development within the domain of MLLM functioning as judges. The code and dataset are publicly available at our project homepage: https://mllm-judge.github.io/.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly rely on prolonged reasoning chains to solve complex tasks. However, this trial-and-error approach often leads to high computational overhead and error propagation, where early mistakes can derail subsequent steps. To address these issues, we introduce Meta-Reasoner, a framework that dynamically optimizes inference-time reasoning by enabling LLMs to "think about how to think." Drawing inspiration from human meta-cognition and dual-process theory, Meta-Reasoner operates as a strategic advisor, decoupling high-level guidance from step-by-step generation. It employs "contextual multi-armed bandits" to iteratively evaluate reasoning progress, and select optimal strategies (e.g., backtrack, clarify ambiguity, restart from scratch, or propose alternative approaches), and reallocates computational resources toward the most promising paths. Our evaluations on mathematical reasoning and puzzles highlight the potential of dynamic reasoning chains to overcome inherent challenges in the LLM reasoning process and also show promise in broader applications, offering a scalable and adaptable solution for reasoning-intensive tasks.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

A critical component in the trustworthiness of LLMs is reliable uncertainty communication, yet LLMs often use assertive language when conveying false claims, leading to over-reliance and eroded trust. We present the first systematic study of faithful confidence calibration of LLMs, benchmarking models' ability to use linguistic expressions of uncertainty that faithfully reflect their intrinsic uncertainty, across a comprehensive array of models, datasets, and prompting strategies. Our results demonstrate that LLMs largely fail at this task, and that existing interventions are insufficient: standard prompt approaches provide only marginal gains, and existing, factuality-based calibration techniques can even harm faithful calibration. To address this critical gap, we introduce MetaFaith, a novel prompt-based calibration approach inspired by human metacognition. We show that MetaFaith robustly improves faithful calibration across diverse models and task domains, enabling up to 61% improvement in faithfulness and achieving an 83% win rate over original generations as judged by humans.

Large language models (LLMs) now reach expert-level scores on medical licensing exams, encouraging the assumption that high scores imply safe medical judgment while patients increasingly use them for health advice. We show this assumption is fragile: when misleading context is injected into questions that LLMs originally answer correctly, they abandon the correct answer. We call the ability to maintain correct judgment under adversarial context epistemic resilience, and introduce MedMisBench to measure it. MedMisBench contains 10,932 medical question items and 48,889 misleading context-option pairs spanning medical reasoning, agentic capability, and patient-journey evaluation. Across 11 model configurations, mean accuracy falls from 71.1% on original questions to 38.0% under focused misleading context, with 51.5% attack success. The most damaging injections are formal, rule-like fabrications: authority-framed falsehoods reach 69.5% attack success and exception-poisoning claims reach 64.1%. A 14-member clinical panel from 7 countries identified serious potential harm in 38.2% of reviewed cases. MedMisBench exposes a structural blind spot in LLM evaluation in medical settings: existing benchmarks measure what models know, but not whether they preserve correct medical judgment under misleading context.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

LLM-as-a-Judge refers to the automatic modeling of preferences for responses generated by Large Language Models (LLMs), which is of significant importance for both LLM evaluation and reward modeling. Although generative LLMs have made substantial progress in various tasks, their performance as LLM-Judge still falls short of expectations. In this work, we propose Think-J, which improves generative LLM-as-a-Judge by learning how to think. We first utilized a small amount of curated data to develop the model with initial judgment thinking capabilities. Subsequently, we optimize the judgment thinking traces based on reinforcement learning (RL). We propose two methods for judgment thinking optimization, based on offline and online RL, respectively. The offline RL requires training a critic model to construct positive and negative examples for learning. The online method defines rule-based reward as feedback for optimization. Experimental results showed that our approach can significantly enhance the evaluation capability of generative LLM-Judge, surpassing both generative and classifier-based LLM-Judge without requiring extra human annotations.

Recent research on Reasoning of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sought to further enhance their performance by integrating meta-thinking -- enabling models to monitor, evaluate, and control their reasoning processes for more adaptive and effective problem-solving. However, current single-agent work lacks a specialized design for acquiring meta-thinking, resulting in low efficacy. To address this challenge, we introduce Reinforced Meta-thinking Agents (ReMA), a novel framework that leverages Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) to elicit meta-thinking behaviors, encouraging LLMs to think about thinking. ReMA decouples the reasoning process into two hierarchical agents: a high-level meta-thinking agent responsible for generating strategic oversight and plans, and a low-level reasoning agent for detailed executions. Through iterative reinforcement learning with aligned objectives, these agents explore and learn collaboration, leading to improved generalization and robustness. Experimental results demonstrate that ReMA outperforms single-agent RL baselines on complex reasoning tasks, including competitive-level mathematical benchmarks and LLM-as-a-Judge benchmarks. Comprehensive ablation studies further illustrate the evolving dynamics of each distinct agent, providing valuable insights into how the meta-thinking reasoning process enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) enable complex autonomous behavior, current agents remain constrained by static, human-designed prompts that limit adaptability. Existing self-improving frameworks attempt to bridge this gap but typically rely on inefficient, multi-turn recursive loops that incur high computational costs. To address this, we propose Metacognitive Agent Reflective Self-improvement (MARS), a framework that achieves efficient self-evolution within a single recurrence cycle. Inspired by educational psychology, MARS mimics human learning by integrating principle-based reflection (abstracting normative rules to avoid errors) and procedural reflection (deriving step-by-step strategies for success). By synthesizing these insights into optimized instructions, MARS allows agents to systematically refine their reasoning logic without continuous online feedback. Extensive experiments on six benchmarks demonstrate that MARS outperforms state-of-the-art self-evolving systems while significantly reducing computational overhead.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Recent advancements in Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have significantly improved their performance in tasks combining vision and language. However, challenges persist in detailed multi-modal understanding, comprehension of complex tasks, and reasoning over multi-modal information. This paper introduces MMCTAgent, a novel multi-modal critical thinking agent framework designed to address the inherent limitations of current MLLMs in complex visual reasoning tasks. Inspired by human cognitive processes and critical thinking, MMCTAgent iteratively analyzes multi-modal information, decomposes queries, plans strategies, and dynamically evolves its reasoning. Additionally, MMCTAgent incorporates critical thinking elements such as verification of final answers and self-reflection through a novel approach that defines a vision-based critic and identifies task-specific evaluation criteria, thereby enhancing its decision-making abilities. Through rigorous evaluations across various image and video understanding benchmarks, we demonstrate that MMCTAgent (with and without the critic) outperforms both foundational MLLMs and other tool-augmented pipelines.

Recent advances have shown success in eliciting strong reasoning abilities in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) through rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) with outcome rewards. However, this paradigm typically lacks supervision over the thinking process leading to the final outcome.As a result, the model may learn sub-optimal reasoning strategies, which can hinder its generalization ability. In light of this, we propose SophiaVL-R1, as an attempt to add reward signals for the thinking process in this paradigm. To achieve this, we first train a thinking reward model that evaluates the quality of the entire thinking process. Given that the thinking reward may be unreliable for certain samples due to reward hacking, we propose the Trust-GRPO method, which assigns a trustworthiness weight to the thinking reward during training. This weight is computed based on the thinking reward comparison of responses leading to correct answers versus incorrect answers, helping to mitigate the impact of potentially unreliable thinking rewards. Moreover, we design an annealing training strategy that gradually reduces the thinking reward over time, allowing the model to rely more on the accurate rule-based outcome reward in later training stages. Experiments show that our SophiaVL-R1 surpasses a series of reasoning MLLMs on various benchmarks (e.g., MathVisita, MMMU), demonstrating strong reasoning and generalization capabilities. Notably, our SophiaVL-R1-7B even outperforms LLaVA-OneVision-72B on most benchmarks, despite the latter having 10 times more parameters. All code, models, and datasets are made publicly available at https://github.com/kxfan2002/SophiaVL-R1.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Hallucination remains a critical challenge in large language models (LLMs), hindering the development of reliable multimodal LLMs (MLLMs). Existing solutions often rely on human intervention or underutilize the agent's ability to autonomously mitigate hallucination. To address these limitations, we draw inspiration from how humans make reliable decisions in the real world. They begin with introspective reasoning to reduce uncertainty and form an initial judgment, then rely on external verification from diverse perspectives to reach a final decision. Motivated by this cognitive paradigm, we propose InEx, a training-free, multi-agent framework designed to autonomously mitigate hallucination. InEx introduces internal introspective reasoning, guided by entropy-based uncertainty estimation, to improve the reliability of the decision agent's reasoning process. The agent first generates a response, which is then iteratively verified and refined through external cross-modal multi-agent collaboration with the editing agent and self-reflection agents, further enhancing reliability and mitigating hallucination. Extensive experiments show that InEx consistently outperforms existing methods, achieving 4%-27% gains on general and hallucination benchmarks, and demonstrating strong robustness.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

Rubric-based evaluation has become a prevailing paradigm for evaluating instruction following in large language models (LLMs). Despite its widespread use, the reliability of these rubric-level evaluations remains unclear, calling for meta-evaluation. However, prior meta-evaluation efforts largely focus on the response level, failing to assess the fine-grained judgment accuracy that rubric-based evaluation relies on. To bridge this gap, we introduce RubricEval. Our benchmark features: (1) the first rubric-level meta-evaluation benchmark for instruction following, (2) diverse instructions and responses spanning multiple categories and model sources, and (3) a substantial set of 3,486 quality-controlled instances, along with Easy/Hard subsets that better differentiates judge performance. Our experiments reveal that rubric-level judging remains far from solved: even GPT-4o, a widely adopted judge in instruction-following benchmarks, achieves only 55.97% on Hard subset. Considering evaluation paradigm, rubric-level evaluation outperforms checklist-level, explicit reasoning improves accuracy, and both together reduce inter-judge variance. Through our established rubric taxonomy, we further identify common failure modes and offer actionable insights for reliable instruction-following evaluation.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown impressive performance in various language tasks. However, they are prone to spurious correlations, and often generate illusory information. In real-world applications, PLMs should justify decisions with formalized, coherent reasoning chains, but this challenge remains under-explored. Cognitive psychology theorizes that humans are capable of utilizing fast and intuitive heuristic thinking to make decisions based on past experience, then rationalizing the decisions through slower and deliberative analytic reasoning. We incorporate these interlinked dual processes in fine-tuning and in-context learning with PLMs, applying them to two language understanding tasks that require coherent physical commonsense reasoning. We show that our proposed Heuristic-Analytic Reasoning (HAR) strategies drastically improve the coherence of rationalizations for model decisions, yielding state-of-the-art results on Tiered Reasoning for Intuitive Physics (TRIP). We also find that this improved coherence is a direct result of more faithful attention to relevant language context in each step of reasoning. Our findings suggest that human-like reasoning strategies can effectively improve the coherence and reliability of PLM reasoning.

A hallmark of intelligence is the ability to autonomously learn new flexible, cognitive behaviors - that is, behaviors where the appropriate action depends not just on immediate stimuli (as in simple reflexive stimulus-response associations), but on contextual information that must be adequately acquired, stored and processed. While many meta-learning algorithms can design agents that autonomously learn new tasks, cognitive tasks adds another level of learning and memory to typical ``learning-to-learn'' problems. Here we evolve neural networks, endowed with plastic connections and neuromodulation, over a sizable set of simple cognitive tasks adapted from a computational neuroscience framework. The resulting evolved networks can automatically modify their own connectivity to acquire a novel simple cognitive task, never seen during evolution, from stimuli and rewards alone, through the spontaneous operation of their evolved neural organization and plasticity system. Our results emphasize the importance of carefully considering the multiple learning loops involved in the emergence of intelligent behavior.

Generative recommendation models in the OneRec family have been widely deployed in many real-world services, such as short-video, live-streaming, advertising, and e-commerce. However, these generative models can only benefit from the scaling advantage, while their reasoning ability is hard to activate, since we cannot construct meaningful Chain-of-Thought (CoT) sequences consisting of itemic tokens only. Inspired by the success of the reasoning-style ``think before answer'' paradigm in the LLM field, we conduct preliminary studies (i.e., OneRec-Think, OpenOneRec) to explore reasoning capability in generative recommendation. Nevertheless, we notice an unexpected phenomenon: the thinking mode does not show advantages over the non-thinking mode. Drawing insights from recent findings on CoT robustness in multi-modal language models, we argue that effective reasoning in recommendation rests on two factors: perception, the ability to ground itemic tokens in their underlying language semantics, and cognition, the ability to reorganize a user's behavior sequence into coherent latent interest points. We therefore propose OneReason, which includes: (1) strong itemic token perception in pre-training, (2) a three-level cognition-enhanced CoT format for recommendation tasks in SFT, and (3) a specialize-then-unify training recipe in RL to enhance the thinking ability.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as an effective approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). Despite its efficacy, RLVR faces a meta-learning bottleneck: it lacks mechanisms for error attribution and experience internalization intrinsic to the human learning cycle beyond practice and verification, thereby limiting fine-grained credit assignment and reusable knowledge formation. We term such reusable knowledge representations derived from past errors as meta-experience. Based on this insight, we propose Meta-Experience Learning (MEL), a novel framework that incorporates self-distilled meta-experience into the model's parametric memory. Building upon standard RLVR, we introduce an additional design that leverages the LLM's self-verification capability to conduct contrastive analysis on paired correct and incorrect trajectories, identify the precise bifurcation points where reasoning errors arise, and summarize them into generalizable meta-experience. The meta-experience is further internalized into the LLM's parametric memory by minimizing the negative log-likelihood, which induces a language-modeled reward signal that bridges correct and incorrect reasoning trajectories and facilitates effective knowledge reuse. Experimental results demonstrate that MEL achieves consistent improvements on benchmarks, yielding 3.92%--4.73% Pass@1 gains across varying model sizes.

Using language models to scalably approximate human preferences on text quality (LLM-as-a-judge) has become a standard practice applicable to many tasks. A judgment is often extracted from the judge's textual output alone, typically with greedy decoding. However, LLM judges naturally provide distributions over judgment tokens, inviting a breadth of inference methods for extracting fine-grained preferences. We find that taking the mean of the judgment distribution consistently outperforms taking the mode (i.e. greedy decoding) in all evaluation settings (i.e. pointwise, pairwise, and listwise). We further explore novel methods of deriving preferences from judgment distributions, and find that methods incorporating risk aversion often improve performance. Lastly, we analyze LLM-as-a-judge paired with chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, showing that CoT can collapse the spread of the judgment distribution, often harming performance. Our findings show that leveraging distributional output improves LLM-as-a-judge, as opposed to using the text interface alone.

Great scientists have strong judgement and foresight, closely tied to what we call scientific taste. Here, we use the term to refer to the capacity to judge and propose research ideas with high potential impact. However, most relative research focuses on improving an AI scientist's executive capability, while enhancing an AI's scientific taste remains underexplored. In this work, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Community Feedback (RLCF), a training paradigm that uses large-scale community signals as supervision, and formulate scientific taste learning as a preference modeling and alignment problem. For preference modeling, we train Scientific Judge on 700K field- and time-matched pairs of high- vs. low-citation papers to judge ideas. For preference alignment, using Scientific Judge as a reward model, we train a policy model, Scientific Thinker, to propose research ideas with high potential impact. Experiments show Scientific Judge outperforms SOTA LLMs (e.g., GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro) and generalizes to future-year test, unseen fields, and peer-review preference. Furthermore, Scientific Thinker proposes research ideas with higher potential impact than baselines. Our findings show that AI can learn scientific taste, marking a key step toward reaching human-level AI scientists.

As models increasingly leverage multi-step reasoning strategies to solve complex problems, supervising the logical validity of these intermediate steps has become a critical research challenge. Process reward models address this by providing step-by-step feedback, but current approaches have two major drawbacks: they typically function as classifiers without providing explanations, and their reliance on supervised fine-tuning with static datasets limits generalization. Inspired by recent advances, we reframe stepwise reward modeling from a classification task to a reasoning task itself. We thus propose a generative judge that reasons about the policy model's reasoning steps (i.e., meta-reasons), outputting thinking tokens before delivering a final verdict. Our model, StepWiser, is trained by reinforcement learning using relative outcomes of rollouts. We show it provides (i) better judgment accuracy on intermediate steps than existing methods; (ii) can be used to improve the policy model at training time; and (iii) improves inference-time search.

Scaling up language models to billions of parameters has opened up possibilities for in-context learning, allowing instruction tuning and few-shot learning on tasks that the model was not specifically trained for. This has achieved breakthrough performance on language tasks such as translation, summarization, and question-answering. Furthermore, in addition to these associative "System 1" tasks, recent advances in Chain-of-thought prompt learning have demonstrated strong "System 2" reasoning abilities, answering a question in the field of artificial general intelligence whether LLMs can reason. The field started with the question whether LLMs can solve grade school math word problems. This paper reviews the rapidly expanding field of prompt-based reasoning with LLMs. Our taxonomy identifies different ways to generate, evaluate, and control multi-step reasoning. We provide an in-depth coverage of core approaches and open problems, and we propose a research agenda for the near future. Finally, we highlight the relation between reasoning and prompt-based learning, and we discuss the relation between reasoning, sequential decision processes, and reinforcement learning. We find that self-improvement, self-reflection, and some metacognitive abilities of the reasoning processes are possible through the judicious use of prompts. True self-improvement and self-reasoning, to go from reasoning with LLMs to reasoning by LLMs, remains future work.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in long interactions, existing evaluations focus predominantly on retrospective memory (RM) via explicit queries. Prospective memory (PM), the critical ability to spontaneously recall and act on latent constraints without direct prompts, remains largely unevaluated. We introduce TriggerBench, a comprehensive PM benchmark spanning five dimensions across both daily assistants and professional workflows. TriggerBench pairs scenarios with matched RM controls, contrastive positive/negative variants, and overloaded triggers, enabling fine-grained measurement of proactive recall, false-alarm rate, and attentional robustness under a single protocol. Our evaluation yields three key findings. (i) PM shows a precision-recall trade-off and attentional fragility. Though enhanced reasoning significantly improves proactive recall, models may overfit to an "always-remind" heuristic. Furthermore, PM accuracy degrades substantially under implicit constraints or triggers overloaded by concurrent user requests, indicating that robust PM remains an open challenge. (ii) PM is notably harder than RM: on identical contexts, RM near-saturates up to 100K tokens, while PM decays sharply as context length scales. (iii) PM may serve as a behavioral probe of spare reasoning capacity. Pairing PM scenarios with AIME-2025 math problems reveals that successful trajectories yield higher PM accuracy than failed ones at the same context length, showing PM tracks spare reasoning budget that token count obscures. Project page: https://github.com/KristenZHANG/TriggerBench-Official.

LLM-as-a-judge has become the dominant paradigm for grading model outputs at scale, yet the same model assigns systematically different scores when its output format changes (e.g., a 1-5 rating vs. a True/False label). Existing diagnoses of these format-induced inconsistencies stop at the input-output level. Using Position-aware Edge Attribution Patching (PEAP), we causally investigate the internal mechanism in Gemma-3, Qwen2.5, and Llama-3. We find that judgments across structured understanding and open-ended preference tasks share a sparse, generalized Latent Evaluator sub-graph in the mid-to-late multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs); zero-ablating it collapses judgment while preserving world knowledge in architecturally modular models. By structurally decoupling abstract judging from output formatting, we provide a mechanistic account of format-induced inconsistency on the open-weight models we study: a continuous judgment signal computed in the shared trunk is mapped through fragile, format-specific terminal branches, enabling format-independent preference to be isolated downstream of the requested output format. Our findings imply that benchmark-level reliability comparisons across formats are partially measuring formatter geometry rather than evaluation quality.

Large language models (LLMs) now solve multi-step problems by emitting extended chains of thought. During the process, they often re-derive the same intermediate steps across problems, inflating token usage and latency. This saturation of the context window leaves less capacity for exploration. We study a simple mechanism that converts recurring reasoning fragments into concise, reusable "behaviors" (name + instruction) via the model's own metacognitive analysis of prior traces. These behaviors are stored in a "behavior handbook" which supplies them to the model in-context at inference or distills them into parameters via supervised fine-tuning. This approach achieves improved test-time reasoning across three different settings - 1) Behavior-conditioned inference: Providing the LLM relevant behaviors in-context during reasoning reduces number of reasoning tokens by up to 46% while matching or improving baseline accuracy; 2) Behavior-guided self-improvement: Without any parameter updates, the model improves its own future reasoning by leveraging behaviors from its own past problem solving attempts. This yields up to 10% higher accuracy than a naive critique-and-revise baseline; and 3) Behavior-conditioned SFT: SFT on behavior-conditioned reasoning traces is more effective at converting non-reasoning models into reasoning models as compared to vanilla SFT. Together, these results indicate that turning slow derivations into fast procedural hints enables LLMs to remember how to reason, not just what to conclude.

We find that explicit reasoning does not necessarily translate into better multimodal emotion recognition (MER) accuracy, even though it makes predictions more interpretable. Specifically, for reasoning-based MLLMs, fast thinking by triggering direct answers often outperforms slow thinking after deliberative reasoning. Our empirical analyses show that fast thinking improves recall with broader and more confident predictions, whereas slow thinking favors precision through conservative filtering of incorrect categories. Building on these insights, we propose MER-R1, a reinforcement learning framework that turns slow-fast complementarity into explicit optimization. Dual-objective disentanglement separates recall and precision into two optimization signals, allowing them to be jointly optimized rather than traded off against each other. Slow-fast confidence calibration further aligns the final slow-thinking answer with fast-thinking intuition, strengthening correct emotions while suppressing incorrect ones. In this way, MER-R1 unifies the recall-oriented intuition of fast thinking with the precision-oriented selectivity of slow thinking. We further provide theoretical justification for this synergy, showing that it mitigates variance-induced interference during optimization. Extensive experiments on MER-UniBench and MME-Emotion show that MER-R1 achieves state-of-the-art performance and makes reasoning genuinely benefit emotion recognition.

Recent advances in test-time scaling have led to the emergence of thinking LLMs that exhibit self-reflective behaviors and multi-step reasoning. While RL drives this self-improvement paradigm, a recent study (Gandhi et al., 2025) shows that RL alone does not truly instill these new reasoning abilities - it merely draws out behaviors already present in the base models. This raises a question: How can we train the models that don't exhibit such thinking behavior to develop it in the first place? To this end, we propose ThinkTuning, a GRPO-based interactive training approach where we augment the rollouts of a student model with the guidance from a teacher model. A simple idea from classroom practice inspires our method: a teacher poses a problem, lets the student try an answer, then gives corrective feedback -- enough to point the mind in the right direction and then show the solution. Each piece of feedback reshapes the student's thoughts, leading them to arrive at the correct solution. Similarly, we find that this type of implicit supervision through feedback from a teacher model of the same size improves the reasoning capabilities of the student model. In particular, on average, our method shows a 3.85% improvement over zero-shot baselines across benchmarks, and on MATH-500, AIME and GPQA-Diamond it shows 2.08%, 2.23% and 3.99% improvements over the vanilla-GRPO baseline. Source code is available at https://github.com/3rdAT/ThinkTuning.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

Test-time compute has empowered multimodal large language models to generate extended reasoning chains, yielding strong performance on tasks such as multimodal math reasoning. However, this improved reasoning ability often comes with increased hallucination: as generations become longer, models tend to drift away from image-grounded content and rely more heavily on language priors. Attention analysis shows that longer reasoning chains lead to reduced focus on visual inputs, which contributes to hallucination. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce RH-AUC, a metric that quantifies how a model's perception accuracy changes with reasoning length, allowing us to evaluate whether the model preserves visual grounding during reasoning. We also release RH-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark that spans a variety of multimodal tasks, designed to assess the trade-off between reasoning ability and hallucination. Our analysis reveals that (i) larger models typically achieve a better balance between reasoning and perception, and (ii) this balance is influenced more by the types and domains of training data than by its overall volume. These findings underscore the importance of evaluation frameworks that jointly consider both reasoning quality and perceptual fidelity.

Large Language models are revolutionizing the conversational recommender systems through their impressive capabilities in instruction comprehension, reasoning, and human interaction. A core factor underlying effective recommendation dialogue is the ability to infer and reason about users' mental states (such as desire, intention, and belief), a cognitive capacity commonly referred to as Theory of Mind. Despite growing interest in evaluating ToM in LLMs, current benchmarks predominantly rely on synthetic narratives inspired by Sally-Anne test, which emphasize physical perception and fail to capture the complexity of mental state inference in realistic conversational settings. Moreover, existing benchmarks often overlook a critical component of human ToM: behavioral prediction, the ability to use inferred mental states to guide strategic decision-making and select appropriate conversational actions for future interactions. To better align LLM-based ToM evaluation with human-like social reasoning, we propose RecToM, a novel benchmark for evaluating ToM abilities in recommendation dialogues. RecToM focuses on two complementary dimensions: Cognitive Inference and Behavioral Prediction. The former focus on understanding what has been communicated by inferring the underlying mental states. The latter emphasizes what should be done next, evaluating whether LLMs can leverage these inferred mental states to predict, select, and assess appropriate dialogue strategies. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that RecToM poses a significant challenge. While the models exhibit partial competence in recognizing mental states, they struggle to maintain coherent, strategic ToM reasoning throughout dynamic recommendation dialogues, particularly in tracking evolving intentions and aligning conversational strategies with inferred mental states.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Human intelligence involves metacognitive abilities like self-regulation, recognizing limitations, and seeking assistance only when needed. While LLM Agents excel in many domains, they often lack this awareness. Overconfident agents risk catastrophic failures, while those that seek help excessively hinder efficiency. A key challenge is enabling agents with a limited intervention budget C is to decide when to request assistance. In this paper, we propose an offline framework that trains a "helper" policy to request interventions, such as more powerful models or test-time compute, by combining LLM-based process reward models (PRMs) with tabular reinforcement learning. Using state transitions collected offline, we score optimal intervention timing with PRMs and train the helper model on these labeled trajectories. This offline approach significantly reduces costly intervention calls during training. Furthermore, the integration of PRMs with tabular RL enhances robustness to off-policy data while avoiding the inefficiencies of deep RL. We empirically find that our method delivers optimal helper behavior.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Large language models (LLMs) now exhibit strong multi-step reasoning abilities, but existing inference-time scaling methods remain computationally expensive, often relying on extensive sampling or external evaluators. We propose a principled strategy that frames reasoning as uncertainty minimisation and operates at the level of individual thoughts rather than tokens. Our method selects, at each reasoning step, the continuation that maximizes the model's self-certainty, a metric computed from its internal predictive distribution. This approach achieves significant improvement with a small number of samples, relies exclusively on model-internal signals, and applies to open-ended questions as opposed to methods like majority voting. Experiments on MATH500 and GSM8K across multiple model sizes demonstrate that thought-level self-certainty maximization consistently outperforms greedy decoding and matches or exceeds self-consistency under comparable token budgets. Cross-linguistic evaluations further indicate that the method transfers robustly beyond high-resource languages. Furthermore, analysis of self-certainty dynamics reveals that correct reasoning trajectories converge early to stable paths, suggesting that early decisions, likely associated with the planning of the reasoning process, are predictive of final accuracy. Building on this result, we show that self-certainty maximisation applied to the early steps can explain most of the performance gain and provide a simple yet efficient inference-time scaling method.

This comprehensive report distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost "human-like" cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles in Cognitive Architecture Theory (CAT). We present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions associated with CAT (i.e. memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and meta-cognition) and identify gaps in the research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and meta-cognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions informed by active inference and global workspace theory to address them. We further introduce Epistemic World Models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied across video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our daily lives, the potential harms from deceptive behavior underlie the need for faithfully interpreting their decision-making. While traditional probing methods have shown some effectiveness, they remain best for narrowly scoped tasks while more comprehensive explanations are still necessary. To this end, we investigate meta-models-an architecture using a "meta-model" that takes activations from an "input-model" and answers natural language questions about the input-model's behaviors. We evaluate the meta-model's ability to generalize by training them on selected task types and assessing their out-of-distribution performance in deceptive scenarios. Our findings show that meta-models generalize well to out-of-distribution tasks and point towards opportunities for future research in this area. Our code is available at https://github.com/acostarelli/meta-models-public .

This research introduces the Judge's Verdict Benchmark, a novel two-step methodology to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) as judges for response accuracy evaluation tasks. We assess how well 54 LLMs can replicate human judgment when scoring responses from RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) or Agentic pipelines against ground truth answers. Our methodology progresses from traditional correlation analysis to comprehensive Cohen's Kappa analysis that measures actual agreement patterns. The two-step approach includes: (1) a correlation test that filters judges with strong alignment, followed by (2) a human-likeness test using z-scores to identify two distinct judgment patterns: human-like judgment (|z| < 1) that mimics natural human variation, and super-consistent judgment (z > 1) that exceeds typical human-to-human agreement levels. This methodology reveals that 27 out of 54 tested LLMs achieve Tier 1 performance: 23 models exhibit human-like patterns that preserve the nuances of human judgment, while 4 models demonstrate super-consistent behavior, a pattern that could indicate either enhanced reliability or oversimplification of complex judgments. Testing 43 open-source models (1B-405B parameters) and 11 closed models (GPT, Gemini, Claude variants), we demonstrate that judge excellence is not solely dependent on model size but on specific training strategies. Our key contributions include: (1) establishing that correlation alone is insufficient for judge evaluation, (2) introducing a "Turing Test for judges" based on agreement patterns, and (3) providing a standardized benchmark for classifying LLM judges into distinct performance tiers for different evaluation needs.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

Large Language Models deployed as question answering tools require robust calibration to avoid overconfidence. We systematically evaluate how reasoning capabilities and budget affect confidence assessment accuracy, using the ClimateX dataset (Lacombe et al., 2023) and expanding it to human and planetary health. Our key finding challenges the "test-time scaling" paradigm: while recent reasoning LLMs achieve 48.7% accuracy in assessing expert confidence, increasing reasoning budgets consistently impairs rather than improves calibration. Extended reasoning leads to systematic overconfidence that worsens with longer thinking budgets, producing diminishing and negative returns beyond modest computational investments. Conversely, search-augmented generation dramatically outperforms pure reasoning, achieving 89.3% accuracy by retrieving relevant evidence. Our results suggest that information access, rather than reasoning depth or inference budget, may be the critical bottleneck for improved confidence calibration of knowledge-intensive tasks.

The ability to adapt beliefs or behaviors in response to unexpected outcomes, reflection, is fundamental to intelligent systems' interaction with the world. From a cognitive science perspective, this serves as a core principle of intelligence applicable to both human and AI systems. To address the debate on the intelligence of large language models (LLMs), we propose Reflection-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 7 tasks spanning core cognitive functions crucial for reflection, including perception, memory, belief updating, decision-making, prediction, counterfactual thinking, and meta-reflection. We evaluate the performances of 13 prominent LLMs such as OpenAI o1, GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, etc. The results indicate that current LLMs still lack satisfactory reflection ability. We discuss the underlying causes of these results and suggest potential avenues for future research. In conclusion, Reflection-Bench offers both evaluation tools and inspiration for developing AI capable of reliably interacting with the environment. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/YabYum/ReflectionBench.

Language models have made significant progress in generating coherent text and predicting next tokens based on input prompts. This study compares the next-token prediction performance of two well-known models: OpenAI's GPT-2 and Meta's Llama-2-7b-chat-hf on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. To evaluate their capabilities, we built a dataset from 10 short stories sourced from the Explore ToM Dataset. We enhanced these stories by programmatically inserting additional sentences (infills) using GPT-4, creating variations that introduce different levels of contextual complexity. This setup enables analysis of how increasing context affects model performance. We tested both models under four temperature settings (0.01, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0) and evaluated their ability to predict the next token across three reasoning levels. Zero-order reasoning involves tracking the state, either current (ground truth) or past (memory). First-order reasoning concerns understanding another's mental state (e.g., "Does Anne know the apple is salted?"). Second-order reasoning adds recursion (e.g., "Does Anne think that Charles knows the apple is salted?"). Our results show that adding more infill sentences slightly reduces prediction accuracy, as added context increases complexity and ambiguity. Llama-2 consistently outperforms GPT-2 in prediction accuracy, especially at lower temperatures, demonstrating greater confidence in selecting the most probable token. As reasoning complexity rises, model responses diverge more. Notably, GPT-2 and Llama-2 display greater variability in predictions during first- and second-order reasoning tasks. These findings illustrate how model architecture, temperature, and contextual complexity influence next-token prediction, contributing to a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of current language models.

Despite significant advancements in multimodal reasoning tasks, existing Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are prone to producing visually ungrounded responses when interpreting associated images. In contrast, when humans embark on learning new knowledge, they often rely on a set of fundamental pre-study principles: reviewing outlines to grasp core concepts, summarizing key points to guide their focus and enhance understanding. However, such preparatory actions are notably absent in the current instruction tuning processes. This paper presents Re-Critic, an easily scalable rationale-augmented framework designed to incorporate fundamental rules and chain-of-thought (CoT) as a bridge to enhance reasoning abilities. Specifically, Re-Critic develops a visual rationale synthesizer that scalably augments raw instructions with rationale explanation. To probe more contextually grounded responses, Re-Critic employs an in-context self-critic mechanism to select response pairs for preference tuning. Experiments demonstrate that models fine-tuned with our rationale-augmented dataset yield gains that extend beyond hallucination-specific tasks to broader multimodal reasoning tasks.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in visual understanding, they often struggle when faced with the unstructured and ambiguous nature of human-generated sketches. This limitation is particularly pronounced in the underexplored task of visual grading, where models should not only solve a problem but also diagnose errors in hand-drawn diagrams. Such diagnostic capabilities depend on complex structural, semantic, and metacognitive reasoning. To bridge this gap, we introduce SketchJudge, a novel benchmark tailored for evaluating MLLMs as graders of hand-drawn STEM diagrams. SketchJudge encompasses 1,015 hand-drawn student responses across four domains: geometry, physics, charts, and flowcharts, featuring diverse stylistic variations and distinct error types. Evaluations on SketchJudge demonstrate that even advanced MLLMs lag significantly behind humans, validating the benchmark's effectiveness in exposing the fragility of current vision-language alignment in symbolic and noisy contexts. All data, code, and evaluation scripts are publicly available at https://github.com/yuhangsu82/SketchJudge.

Knowledge augmentation has significantly enhanced the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in knowledge-intensive tasks. However, existing methods typically operate on the simplistic premise that model performance equates with internal knowledge, overlooking the knowledge-confidence gaps that lead to overconfident errors or uncertain truths. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel meta-cognitive framework for reliable knowledge augmentation via differentiated intervention and alignment. Our approach leverages internal cognitive signals to partition the knowledge space into mastered, confused, and missing regions, guiding targeted knowledge expansion. Furthermore, we introduce a cognitive consistency mechanism to synchronize subjective certainty with objective accuracy, ensuring calibrated knowledge boundaries. Extensive experiments demonstrate the our framework consistently outperforms strong baselines, validating its rationality in not only enhancing knowledge capabilities but also fostering cognitive behaviors that better distinguish knowns from unknowns. All codes are available at https://github.com/AI9Stars/Know-More-Know-Clearer.

Self-distillation has emerged as an effective post-training paradigm for LLMs, often improving performance while shortening reasoning traces. However, in mathematical reasoning, we find that it can reduce response length while degrading performance. We trace this degradation to the suppression of epistemic verbalization - the model's expression of uncertainty during reasoning. Through controlled experiments varying conditioning context richness and task coverage, we show that conditioning the teacher on rich information suppresses uncertainty expression, enabling rapid in-domain optimization with limited task coverage but harming OOD performance, where unseen problems benefit from expressing uncertainty and adjusting accordingly. Across Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-7B, and Olmo3-7B-Instruct, we observe performance drops of up to 40%. Our findings highlight that exposing appropriate levels of uncertainty is crucial for robust reasoning and underscore the importance of optimizing reasoning behavior beyond merely reinforcing correct answer traces.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

Which reasoning behaviors are associated with correct answers in reasoning models, and does reasoning-oriented training amplify those behaviors? This distinction is important because reasoning-oriented training can make traces look more deliberative without amplifying the behaviors most tied to model correctness. We quantify this mismatch with Behavioral Lift, a metric that measures how much correctness changes when a behavior is present versus absent in a model's reasoning trace. Across 15 models and 6 benchmarks spanning text-only and vision-language reasoning, we annotate 15,282 traces with a taxonomy whose core behaviors are defined for both LLM and VLM traces. We find evidence for an Amplification-Lift Gap, in which thinking models strongly amplify self-correction, hypothesis testing, and uncertainty acknowledgment, while the highest-lift behaviors are confidence calibration, knowledge alignment, and self-awareness. Confidence calibration is among the strongest positive signals of correctness in both modalities, yet is barely amplified; uncertainty acknowledgment is amplified by 3--7times, yet is weakly or negatively associated with correctness. We find that reasoning-oriented training does not preferentially amplify the highest-Lift behaviors, motivating process-level objectives that reward calibrated and grounded reasoning rather than surface form alone.

Large language model (LLM)-based judges are widely adopted for automated evaluation and reward modeling, yet their judgments are often affected by judgment biases. Accurately evaluating these biases is essential for ensuring the reliability of LLM-based judges. However, existing studies typically investigate limited biases under a single judge formulation, either generative or discriminative, lacking a comprehensive evaluation. To bridge this gap, we propose JudgeBiasBench, a benchmark for systematically quantifying biases in LLM-based judges. JudgeBiasBench defines a taxonomy of judgment biases across 4 dimensions, and constructs bias-augmented evaluation instances through a controlled bias injection pipeline, covering 12 representative bias types. We conduct extensive experiments across both generative and discriminative judges, revealing that current judges exhibit significant and diverse bias patterns that often compromise the reliability of automated evaluation. To mitigate judgment bias, we propose bias-aware training that explicitly incorporates bias-related attributes into the training process, encouraging judges to disentangle task-relevant quality from bias-correlated cues. By adopting reinforcement learning for generative judges and contrastive learning for discriminative judges, our methods effectively reduce judgment biases while largely preserving general evaluation capability.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Most reinforcement learning (RL) methods for training large language models (LLMs) require ground-truth labels or task-specific verifiers, limiting scalability when correctness is ambiguous or expensive to obtain. We introduce Reinforcement Learning from Meta-Evaluation (RLME), which optimizes a generator using reward derived from an evaluator's answers to natural-language meta-questions (e.g., "Is the answer correct?" or "Is the reasoning logically consistent?"). RLME treats the evaluator's probability of a positive judgment as a reward and updates the generator via group-relative policy optimization, enabling learning without labels. Across a suite of experiments, we show that RLME achieves accuracy and sample efficiency comparable to label-based training, enables controllable trade-offs among multiple objectives, steers models toward reliable reasoning patterns rather than post-hoc rationalization, and generalizes to open-domain settings where ground-truth labels are unavailable, broadening the domains in which LLMs may be trained with RL.