Daily Papers

Persona conditioning can be viewed as a behavioral prior for large language models (LLMs) and is often assumed to confer expertise and improve safety in a monotonic manner. However, its effects on high-stakes clinical decision-making remain poorly characterized. We systematically evaluate persona-based control in clinical LLMs, examining how professional roles (e.g., Emergency Department physician, nurse) and interaction styles (bold vs.\ cautious) influence behavior across models and medical tasks. We assess performance on clinical triage and patient-safety tasks using multidimensional evaluations that capture task accuracy, calibration, and safety-relevant risk behavior. We find systematic, context-dependent, and non-monotonic effects: Medical personas improve performance in critical care tasks, yielding gains of up to sim+20% in accuracy and calibration, but degrade performance in primary-care settings by comparable margins. Interaction style modulates risk propensity and sensitivity, but it's highly model-dependent. While aggregated LLM-judge rankings favor medical over non-medical personas in safety-critical cases, we found that human clinicians show moderate agreement on safety compliance (average Cohen's κ= 0.43) but indicate a low confidence in 95.9\% of their responses on reasoning quality. Our work shows that personas function as behavioral priors that introduce context-dependent trade-offs rather than guarantees of safety or expertise. The code is available at https://github.com/rsinghlab/Persona\_Paradox.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

With the widespread deployment of Computer-using Agents (CUAs) in complex real-world environments, prevalent long-term risks often lead to severe and irreversible consequences. Most existing guardrails for CUAs adopt a reactive approach, constraining agent behavior only within the current observation space. While these guardrails can prevent immediate short-term risks (e.g., clicking on a phishing link), they cannot proactively avoid long-term risks: seemingly reasonable actions can lead to high-risk consequences that emerge with a delay (e.g., cleaning logs leads to future audits being untraceable), which reactive guardrails cannot identify within the current observation space. To address these limitations, we propose a predictive guardrail approach, with the core idea of aligning predicted future risks with current decisions. Based on this approach, we present SafePred, a predictive guardrail framework for CUAs that establishes a risk-to-decision loop to ensure safe agent behavior. SafePred supports two key abilities: (1) Short- and long-term risk prediction: by using safety policies as the basis for risk prediction, SafePred leverages the prediction capability of the world model to generate semantic representations of both short-term and long-term risks, thereby identifying and pruning actions that lead to high-risk states; (2) Decision optimization: translating predicted risks into actionable safe decision guidances through step-level interventions and task-level re-planning. Extensive experiments show that SafePred significantly reduces high-risk behaviors, achieving over 97.6% safety performance and improving task utility by up to 21.4% compared with reactive baselines.

Simulating Professions (SP) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to emulate professional roles. However, comprehensive psychological and ethical evaluation in these contexts remains lacking. This paper introduces EMNLP, an Educator-role Moral and Normative LLMs Profiling framework for personality profiling, moral development stage measurement, and ethical risk under soft prompt injection. EMNLP extends existing scales and constructs 88 teacher-specific moral dilemmas, enabling profession-oriented comparison with human teachers. A targeted soft prompt injection set evaluates compliance and vulnerability in teacher SP. Experiments on 12 LLMs show teacher-role LLMs exhibit more idealized and polarized personalities than human teachers, excel in abstract moral reasoning, but struggle with emotionally complex situations. Models with stronger reasoning are more vulnerable to harmful prompt injection, revealing a paradox between capability and safety. The model temperature and other hyperparameters have limited influence except in some risk behaviors. This paper presents the first benchmark to assess ethical and psychological alignment of teacher-role LLMs for educational AI. Resources are available at https://e-m-n-l-p.github.io/.

Vision-language-action models (VLAs) have shown great potential as generalist robot policies. However, these models pose urgent safety challenges during deployment, including the risk of physical harm to the environment, the robot itself, and humans. How can safety be explicitly incorporated into VLAs? In this work, we propose SafeVLA, a novel algorithm designed to integrate safety into VLAs, ensuring the protection of the environment, robot hardware and humans in real-world settings. SafeVLA effectively balances safety and task performance by employing large-scale constrained learning within simulated environments. We demonstrate that SafeVLA outperforms the current state-of-the-art method in both safety and task performance, achieving average improvements of 83.58% and 3.85%, respectively, in simulation. By prioritizing safety, our approach eliminates high-risk behaviors and reduces the upper bound of unsafe behaviors to 1/35 of that in the current state-of-the-art, thereby significantly mitigating long-tail risks. Furthermore, the learned safety constraints generalize to diverse, unseen scenarios, including multiple out-of-distribution perturbations and tasks. Our data, models and newly proposed benchmark environment are available at https://sites.google.com/view/pku-safevla.

Breast cancer screening plays a pivotal role in early detection and subsequent effective management of the disease, impacting patient outcomes and survival rates. This study aims to assess breast cancer screening rates nationwide in the United States and investigate the impact of social determinants of health on these screening rates. Data on mammography screening at the census tract level for 2018 and 2020 were collected from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. We developed a large dataset of social determinants of health, comprising 13 variables for 72337 census tracts. Spatial analysis employing Getis-Ord Gi statistics was used to identify clusters of high and low breast cancer screening rates. To evaluate the influence of these social determinants, we implemented a random forest model, with the aim of comparing its performance to linear regression and support vector machine models. The models were evaluated using R2 and root mean squared error metrics. Shapley Additive Explanations values were subsequently used to assess the significance of variables and direction of their influence. Geospatial analysis revealed elevated screening rates in the eastern and northern United States, while central and midwestern regions exhibited lower rates. The random forest model demonstrated superior performance, with an R2=64.53 and root mean squared error of 2.06 compared to linear regression and support vector machine models. Shapley Additive Explanations values indicated that the percentage of the Black population, the number of mammography facilities within a 10-mile radius, and the percentage of the population with at least a bachelor's degree were the most influential variables, all positively associated with mammography screening rates.

Recent deployments of large language models (LLMs) as autonomous trading agents raise questions about whether financial decision-making competence generalizes beyond specific market patterns and how it should be trained and evaluated in noisy markets lacking ground truth. We propose a structured framework for training and evaluating such models. Central to our approach is a curated, multiple-choice question (MCQ) dataset derived from classic textbooks and historical markets, verified by an AI committee, enriched with structured reasoning traces, and augmented to reduce shortcut learning. To evaluate whether performance on isolated MCQs generalizes to real-world trading, we introduce a two-stage protocol combining test-set evaluation with an MCQ-based chronological trading simulation. Extensive evaluations across market regimes provide statistically robust evidence that open models trained with our framework exhibit competitive, risk-aware behavior over time, outperform open-source baselines, and approach frontier-model performance at smaller scale. We release the dataset and evaluation framework to support further research.

Off-policy actor-critic methods in reinforcement learning train a critic with temporal-difference updates and use it as a learning signal for the policy (actor). This design typically achieves higher sample efficiency than purely on-policy methods. However, critic networks tend to overestimate value estimates systematically. This is often addressed by introducing a pessimistic bias based on uncertainty estimates. Current methods employ ensembling to quantify the critic's epistemic uncertainty-uncertainty due to limited data and model ambiguity-to scale pessimistic updates. In this work, we propose a new algorithm called Stochastic Actor-Critic (STAC) that incorporates temporal (one-step) aleatoric uncertainty-uncertainty arising from stochastic transitions, rewards, and policy-induced variability in Bellman targets-to scale pessimistic bias in temporal-difference updates, rather than relying on epistemic uncertainty. STAC uses a single distributional critic network to model the temporal return uncertainty, and applies dropout to both the critic and actor networks for regularization. Our results show that pessimism based on a distributional critic alone suffices to mitigate overestimation, and naturally leads to risk-averse behavior in stochastic environments. Introducing dropout further improves training stability and performance by means of regularization. With this design, STAC achieves improved computational efficiency using a single distributional critic network.

As reasoning capacity and deployment scope grow in tandem, large language models (LLMs) gain the capacity to engage in behaviors that serve their own objectives, a class of risks we term Emergent Strategic Reasoning Risks (ESRRs). These include, but are not limited to, deception (intentionally misleading users or evaluators), evaluation gaming (strategically manipulating performance during safety testing), and reward hacking (exploiting misspecified objectives). Systematically understanding and benchmarking these risks remains an open challenge. To address this gap, we introduce ESRRSim, a taxonomy-driven agentic framework for automated behavioral risk evaluation. We construct an extensible risk taxonomy of 7 categories, which is decomposed into 20 subcategories. ESRRSim generates evaluation scenarios designed to elicit faithful reasoning, paired with dual rubrics assessing both model responses and reasoning traces, in a judge-agnostic and scalable architecture. Evaluation across 11 reasoning LLMs reveals substantial variation in risk profiles (detection rates ranging 14.45%-72.72%), with dramatic generational improvements suggesting models may increasingly recognize and adapt to evaluation contexts.

As vision-language models (VLMs) gain prominence, their multimodal interfaces also introduce new safety vulnerabilities, making the safety evaluation challenging and critical. Existing red-teaming efforts are either restricted to a narrow set of adversarial patterns or depend heavily on manual engineering, lacking scalable exploration of emerging real-world VLM vulnerabilities. To bridge this gap, we propose ARMs, an adaptive red-teaming agent that systematically conducts comprehensive risk assessments for VLMs. Given a target harmful behavior or risk definition, ARMs automatically optimizes diverse red-teaming strategies with reasoning-enhanced multi-step orchestration, to effectively elicit harmful outputs from target VLMs. We propose 11 novel multimodal attack strategies, covering diverse adversarial patterns of VLMs (e.g., reasoning hijacking, contextual cloaking), and integrate 17 red-teaming algorithms into ARMs via model context protocol (MCP). To balance the diversity and effectiveness of the attack, we design a layered memory with an epsilon-greedy attack exploration algorithm. Extensive experiments on instance- and policy-based benchmarks show that ARMs achieves SOTA attack success rates, exceeding baselines by an average of 52.1% and surpassing 90% on Claude-4-Sonnet. We show that the diversity of red-teaming instances generated by ARMs is significantly higher, revealing emerging vulnerabilities in VLMs. Leveraging ARMs, we construct ARMs-Bench, a large-scale multimodal safety dataset comprising over 30K red-teaming instances spanning 51 diverse risk categories, grounded in both real-world multimodal threats and regulatory risks. Safety fine-tuning with ARMs-Bench substantially improves the robustness of VLMs while preserving their general utility, providing actionable guidance to improve multimodal safety alignment against emerging threats.

Sports competitions are widely researched in computer and social science, with the goal of understanding how players act under uncertainty. While there is an abundance of computational work on player metrics prediction based on past performance, very few attempts to incorporate out-of-game signals have been made. Specifically, it was previously unclear whether linguistic signals gathered from players' interviews can add information which does not appear in performance metrics. To bridge that gap, we define text classification tasks of predicting deviations from mean in NBA players' in-game actions, which are associated with strategic choices, player behavior and risk, using their choice of language prior to the game. We collected a dataset of transcripts from key NBA players' pre-game interviews and their in-game performance metrics, totalling in 5,226 interview-metric pairs. We design neural models for players' action prediction based on increasingly more complex aspects of the language signals in their open-ended interviews. Our models can make their predictions based on the textual signal alone, or on a combination with signals from past-performance metrics. Our text-based models outperform strong baselines trained on performance metrics only, demonstrating the importance of language usage for action prediction. Moreover, the models that employ both textual input and past-performance metrics produced the best results. Finally, as neural networks are notoriously difficult to interpret, we propose a method for gaining further insight into what our models have learned. Particularly, we present an LDA-based analysis, where we interpret model predictions in terms of correlated topics. We find that our best performing textual model is most associated with topics that are intuitively related to each prediction task and that better models yield higher correlation with more informative topics.

Despite the growing use of large language models (LLMs) in clinical dialogue systems, existing evaluations focus on task completion or fluency, offering little insight into the behavioral and risk management requirements essential for safety-critical systems. This paper presents MATRIX (Multi-Agent simulaTion fRamework for safe Interactions and conteXtual clinical conversational evaluation), a structured, extensible framework for safety-oriented evaluation of clinical dialogue agents. MATRIX integrates three components: (1) a safety-aligned taxonomy of clinical scenarios, expected system behaviors and failure modes derived through structured safety engineering methods; (2) BehvJudge, an LLM-based evaluator for detecting safety-relevant dialogue failures, validated against expert clinician annotations; and (3) PatBot, a simulated patient agent capable of producing diverse, scenario-conditioned responses, evaluated for realism and behavioral fidelity with human factors expertise, and a patient-preference study. Across three experiments, we show that MATRIX enables systematic, scalable safety evaluation. BehvJudge with Gemini 2.5-Pro achieves expert-level hazard detection (F1 0.96, sensitivity 0.999), outperforming clinicians in a blinded assessment of 240 dialogues. We also conducted one of the first realism analyses of LLM-based patient simulation, showing that PatBot reliably simulates realistic patient behavior in quantitative and qualitative evaluations. Using MATRIX, we demonstrate its effectiveness in benchmarking five LLM agents across 2,100 simulated dialogues spanning 14 hazard scenarios and 10 clinical domains. MATRIX is the first framework to unify structured safety engineering with scalable, validated conversational AI evaluation, enabling regulator-aligned safety auditing. We release all evaluation tools, prompts, structured scenarios, and datasets.

Online inclusive financial services encounter significant financial risks due to their expansive user base and low default costs. By real-world practice, we reveal that utilizing longer-term user payment behaviors can enhance models' ability to forecast financial risks. However, learning long behavior sequences is non-trivial for deep sequential models. Additionally, the diverse fields of payment behaviors carry rich information, requiring thorough exploitation. These factors collectively complicate the task of long-term user behavior modeling. To tackle these challenges, we propose a Long-term Payment Behavior Sequence Folding method, referred to as LBSF. In LBSF, payment behavior sequences are folded based on merchants, using the merchant field as an intrinsic grouping criterion, which enables informative parallelism without reliance on external knowledge. Meanwhile, we maximize the utility of payment details through a multi-field behavior encoding mechanism. Subsequently, behavior aggregation at the merchant level followed by relational learning across merchants facilitates comprehensive user financial representation. We evaluate LBSF on the financial risk assessment task using a large-scale real-world dataset. The results demonstrate that folding long behavior sequences based on internal behavioral cues effectively models long-term patterns and changes, thereby generating more accurate user financial profiles for practical applications.

The rapid proliferation of LLM-based autonomous agents in real operating system environments introduces a new category of safety risk beyond content safety: behavior jailbreak, where an adversary induces an agent to execute dangerous OS-level operations with irreversible consequences. Existing benchmarks either evaluate safety at the semantic layer alone, missing physical-layer harms, or fail to isolate test cases, letting earlier runs contaminate later ones. We present LITMUS (LLM-agents In-OS Testing for Measuring Unsafe Subversion), a benchmark addressing both gaps via a semantic-physical dual verification mechanism and OS-level state rollback. LITMUS comprises 819 high-risk test cases organized into one harmful seed subset and six attack-extended subsets covering three adversarial paradigms (jailbreak speaking, skill injection, and entity wrapping), plus a fully automated multi-agent evaluation framework judging behavior at both conversational and OS-level physical layers. Evaluation across frontier agents reveals three findings: (1) current agents lack effective safety awareness, with strong models (e.g., Claude Sonnet 4.6) still executing 40.64% of high-risk operations; (2) agents exhibit pervasive Execution Hallucination (EH), verbally refusing a request while the dangerous operation has already completed at the system level, invisible to every prior semantic-only framework; and (3) skill injection and entity wrapping attacks achieve high success rates, exposing pronounced agent vulnerabilities. LITMUS provides the first standardized platform for reproducible, physically grounded behavioral safety evaluation of LLM agents in real OS environments.

Robust planning in interactive scenarios requires predicting the uncertain future to make risk-aware decisions. Unfortunately, due to long-tail safety-critical events, the risk is often under-estimated by finite-sampling approximations of probabilistic motion forecasts. This can lead to overconfident and unsafe robot behavior, even with robust planners. Instead of assuming full prediction coverage that robust planners require, we propose to make prediction itself risk-aware. We introduce a new prediction objective to learn a risk-biased distribution over trajectories, so that risk evaluation simplifies to an expected cost estimation under this biased distribution. This reduces the sample complexity of the risk estimation during online planning, which is needed for safe real-time performance. Evaluation results in a didactic simulation environment and on a real-world dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. The code and a demo are available.

Predicting human decisions under risk and uncertainty remains a fundamental challenge across disciplines. Existing models often struggle even in highly stylized tasks like choice between lotteries. We introduce BEAST Gradient Boosting (BEAST-GB), a hybrid model integrating behavioral theory (BEAST) with machine learning. We first present CPC18, a competition for predicting risky choice, in which BEAST-GB won. Then, using two large datasets, we demonstrate BEAST-GB predicts more accurately than neural networks trained on extensive data and dozens of existing behavioral models. BEAST-GB also generalizes robustly across unseen experimental contexts, surpassing direct empirical generalization, and helps refine and improve the behavioral theory itself. Our analyses highlight the potential of anchoring predictions on behavioral theory even in data-rich settings and even when the theory alone falters. Our results underscore how integrating machine learning with theoretical frameworks, especially those-like BEAST-designed for prediction, can improve our ability to predict and understand human behavior.

In e-commerce industry, user behavior sequence data has been widely used in many business units such as search and merchandising to improve their products. However, it is rarely used in financial services not only due to its 3V characteristics - i.e. Volume, Velocity and Variety - but also due to its unstructured nature. In this paper, we propose a Financial Service scenario Deep learning based Behavior data representation method for Clustering (FinDeepBehaviorCluster) to detect fraudulent transactions. To utilize the behavior sequence data, we treat click stream data as event sequence, use time attention based Bi-LSTM to learn the sequence embedding in an unsupervised fashion, and combine them with intuitive features generated by risk experts to form a hybrid feature representation. We also propose a GPU powered HDBSCAN (pHDBSCAN) algorithm, which is an engineering optimization for the original HDBSCAN algorithm based on FAISS project, so that clustering can be carried out on hundreds of millions of transactions within a few minutes. The computation efficiency of the algorithm has increased 500 times compared with the original implementation, which makes flash fraud pattern detection feasible. Our experimental results show that the proposed FinDeepBehaviorCluster framework is able to catch missed fraudulent transactions with considerable business values. In addition, rule extraction method is applied to extract patterns from risky clusters using intuitive features, so that narrative descriptions can be attached to the risky clusters for case investigation, and unknown risk patterns can be mined for real-time fraud detection. In summary, FinDeepBehaviorCluster as a complementary risk management strategy to the existing real-time fraud detection engine, can further increase our fraud detection and proactive risk defense capabilities.

With advances in imitation learning (IL) and large-scale driving datasets, end-to-end autonomous driving (E2E-AD) has made great progress recently. Currently, IL-based methods have become a mainstream paradigm: models rely on standard driving behaviors given by experts, and learn to minimize the discrepancy between their actions and expert actions. However, this objective of "only driving like the expert" suffers from limited generalization: when encountering rare or unseen long-tail scenarios outside the distribution of expert demonstrations, models tend to produce unsafe decisions in the absence of prior experience. This raises a fundamental question: Can an E2E-AD system make reliable decisions without any expert action supervision? Motivated by this, we propose a unified framework named Risk-aware World Model Predictive Control (RaWMPC) to address this generalization dilemma through robust control, without reliance on expert demonstrations. Practically, RaWMPC leverages a world model to predict the consequences of multiple candidate actions and selects low-risk actions through explicit risk evaluation. To endow the world model with the ability to predict the outcomes of risky driving behaviors, we design a risk-aware interaction strategy that systematically exposes the world model to hazardous behaviors, making catastrophic outcomes predictable and thus avoidable. Furthermore, to generate low-risk candidate actions at test time, we introduce a self-evaluation distillation method to distill riskavoidance capabilities from the well-trained world model into a generative action proposal network without any expert demonstration. Extensive experiments show that RaWMPC outperforms state-of-the-art methods in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios, while providing superior decision interpretability.

Deterministic pre-execution safety gates evaluate whether individual agent actions are compatible with their assigned roles. While effective at per-action authorization, these systems are structurally blind to distributed attacks that decompose harmful intent across multiple individually-compliant steps. This paper introduces Session Risk Memory (SRM), a lightweight deterministic module that extends stateless execution gates with trajectory-level authorization. SRM maintains a compact semantic centroid representing the evolving behavioral profile of an agent session and accumulates a risk signal through exponential moving average over baseline-subtracted gate outputs. It operates on the same semantic vector representation as the underlying gate, requiring no additional model components, training, or probabilistic inference. We evaluate SRM on a multi-turn benchmark of 80 sessions containing slow-burn exfiltration, gradual privilege escalation, and compliance drift scenarios. Results show that ILION+SRM achieves F1 = 1.0000 with 0% false positive rate, compared to stateless ILION at F1 = 0.9756 with 5% FPR, while maintaining 100% detection rate for both systems. Critically, SRM eliminates all false positives with a per-turn overhead under 250 microseconds. The framework introduces a conceptual distinction between spatial authorization consistency (evaluated per action) and temporal authorization consistency (evaluated over trajectory), providing a principled basis for session-level safety in agentic systems.

LLMs are now embedded in a wide range of everyday scenarios. However, their inherent hallucinations risk hiding misinformation in fluent responses, raising concerns about overreliance on AI. Detecting overreliance is challenging, as it often arises in complex, dynamic contexts and cannot be easily captured by post-hoc task outcomes. In this work, we aim to investigate how users' behavioral patterns correlate with overreliance. We collected interaction logs from 77 participants working with an LLM injected plausible misinformation across three real-world tasks and we assessed overreliance by whether participants detected and corrected these errors. By semantically encoding and clustering segments of user interactions, we identified five behavioral patterns linked to overreliance: users with low overreliance show careful task comprehension and fine-grained navigation; users with high overreliance show frequent copy-paste, skipping initial comprehension, repeated LLM references, coarse locating, and accepting misinformation despite hesitation. We discuss design implications for mitigation.

Deception is a pervasive feature of human communication and an emerging concern in large language models (LLMs). While recent studies document instances of LLM deception under pressure, most evaluations remain confined to single-turn prompts and fail to capture the long-horizon interactions in which deceptive strategies typically unfold. We introduce the first simulation framework for probing and evaluating deception in LLMs under extended sequences of interdependent tasks and dynamic contextual pressures. Our framework instantiates a multi-agent system: a performer agent tasked with completing tasks and a supervisor agent that evaluates progress, provides feedback, and maintains evolving states of trust. An independent deception auditor then reviews full trajectories to identify when and how deception occurs. We conduct extensive experiments across 11 frontier models, spanning both closed- and open-source systems, and find that deception is model-dependent, increases with event pressure, and consistently erodes supervisor trust. Qualitative analyses further reveal distinct strategies of concealment, equivocation, and falsification. Our findings establish deception as an emergent risk in long-horizon interactions and provide a foundation for evaluating future LLMs in real-world, trust-sensitive contexts.

Systemic financial risk refers to the simultaneous failure or destabilization of multiple financial institutions, often triggered by contagion mechanisms or common exposures to shocks. In this paper, we present a dynamical model of bank leverage (the ratio of asset holdings to equity) a quantity that both reflects and drives risk dynamics. We model how banks, constrained by Value-at-Risk (VaR) regulations, adjust their leverage in response to changes in the price of a single asset, assumed to be held in fixed proportion across banks. This leverage-targeting behavior introduces a procyclical feedback loop between asset prices and leverage. In the dynamics, this can manifest as logistic-like behavior with a rich bifurcation structure across model parameters. By analyzing these coupled dynamics in both isolated and interconnected bank models, we outline a framework for understanding how systemic risk can emerge from seemingly rational micro-level behavior.

End-to-end paradigm has emerged as a promising approach to autonomous driving. However, existing single-agent end-to-end pipelines are often constrained by occlusion and limited perception range, resulting in hazardous driving. Furthermore, their black-box nature prevents the interpretability of the driving behavior, leading to an untrustworthiness system. To address these limitations, we introduce Risk Map as Middleware (RiskMM) and propose an interpretable cooperative end-to-end driving framework. The risk map learns directly from the driving data and provides an interpretable spatiotemporal representation of the scenario from the upstream perception and the interactions between the ego vehicle and the surrounding environment for downstream planning. RiskMM first constructs a multi-agent spatiotemporal representation with unified Transformer-based architecture, then derives risk-aware representations by modeling interactions among surrounding environments with attention. These representations are subsequently fed into a learning-based Model Predictive Control (MPC) module. The MPC planner inherently accommodates physical constraints and different vehicle types and can provide interpretation by aligning learned parameters with explicit MPC elements. Evaluations conducted on the real-world V2XPnP-Seq dataset confirm that RiskMM achieves superior and robust performance in risk-aware trajectory planning, significantly enhancing the interpretability of the cooperative end-to-end driving framework. The codebase will be released to facilitate future research in this field.

Personalized financial advice requires consideration of user goals, constraints, risk tolerance, and jurisdiction. Prior LLM work has focused on support systems for investors and financial planners. Simultaneously, numerous recent studies examine broader personal finance tasks, including budgeting, debt management, retirement, and estate planning, through agentic pipelines that incur high maintenance costs, yielding less than 25% of their expected financial returns. In this study, we introduce a novel and reproducible framework that integrates relevant financial context with behavioral finance studies to construct supervision data for end-to-end advisors. Using this framework, we create a 19k sample reasoning dataset and conduct a comprehensive fine-tuning of the Qwen-3-8B model on the dataset. Through a held-out test split and a blind LLM-jury study, we demonstrate that through careful data curation and behavioral integration, our 8B model achieves performance comparable to significantly larger baselines (14-32B parameters) across factual accuracy, fluency, and personalization metrics while incurring 80% lower costs than the larger counterparts.

Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to persistent action over tools, files, and execution environments. Unlike chat systems, they maintain state across interactions and translate intermediate outputs into concrete actions. This creates a distinct safety challenge in that harmful behavior may emerge through sequences of individually plausible steps, including intermediate actions that appear locally acceptable but collectively lead to unauthorized actions. We present AgentHazard, a benchmark for evaluating harmful behavior in computer-use agents. AgentHazard contains 2,653 instances spanning diverse risk categories and attack strategies. Each instance pairs a harmful objective with a sequence of operational steps that are locally legitimate but jointly induce unsafe behavior. The benchmark evaluates whether agents can recognize and interrupt harm arising from accumulated context, repeated tool use, intermediate actions, and dependencies across steps. We evaluate AgentHazard on Claude Code, OpenClaw, and IFlow using mostly open or openly deployable models from the Qwen3, Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek families. Our experimental results indicate that current systems remain highly vulnerable. In particular, when powered by Qwen3-Coder, Claude Code exhibits an attack success rate of 73.63\%, suggesting that model alignment alone does not reliably guarantee the safety of autonomous agents.

Large language models (LLMs) are demonstrating increasing prowess in cybersecurity applications, creating creating inherent risks alongside their potential for strengthening defenses. In this position paper, we argue that current efforts to evaluate risks posed by these capabilities are misaligned with the goal of understanding real-world impact. Evaluating LLM cybersecurity risk requires more than just measuring model capabilities -- it demands a comprehensive risk assessment that incorporates analysis of threat actor adoption behavior and potential for impact. We propose a risk assessment framework for LLM cyber capabilities and apply it to a case study of language models used as cybersecurity assistants. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals high compliance rates but moderate accuracy on realistic cyber assistance tasks. However, our framework suggests that this particular use case presents only moderate risk due to limited operational advantages and impact potential. Based on these findings, we recommend several improvements to align research priorities with real-world impact assessment, including closer academia-industry collaboration, more realistic modeling of attacker behavior, and inclusion of economic metrics in evaluations. This work represents an important step toward more effective assessment and mitigation of LLM-enabled cybersecurity risks.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi), a financial ecosystem without centralized controlling organization, has introduced a new paradigm for lending and borrowing. However, its capital efficiency remains constrained by the inability to effectively assess the risk associated with each user/wallet. This paper introduces the 'On-Chain Credit Risk Score (OCCR Score) in DeFi', a probabilistic measure designed to quantify the credit risk associated with a wallet. By analyzing historical real-time on-chain activity as well as predictive scenarios, the OCCR Score may enable DeFi lending protocols to dynamically adjust Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratios and Liquidation Thresholds (LT) based on the risk profile of a wallet. Unlike existing wallet risk scoring models, which rely on heuristic-based evaluations, the OCCR Score offers a more objective and probabilistic approach, aligning closer to traditional credit risk assessment methodologies. This framework can further enhance DeFi's capital efficiency by incentivizing responsible borrowing behavior and optimizing risk-adjusted returns for lenders.

Live streaming has become a cornerstone of today's internet, enabling massive real-time social interactions. However, it faces severe risks arising from sparse, coordinated malicious behaviors among multiple participants, which are often concealed within normal activities and challenging to detect timely and accurately. In this work, we provide a pioneering study on risk assessment in live streaming rooms, characterized by weak supervision where only room-level labels are available. We formulate the task as a Multiple Instance Learning (MIL) problem, treating each room as a bag and defining structured user-timeslot capsules as instances. These capsules represent subsequences of user actions within specific time windows, encapsulating localized behavioral patterns. Based on this formulation, we propose AC-MIL, an Action-aware Capsule MIL framework that models both individual behaviors and group-level coordination patterns. AC-MIL captures multi-granular semantics and behavioral cues through a serial and parallel architecture that jointly encodes temporal dynamics and cross-user dependencies. These signals are integrated for robust room-level risk prediction, while also offering interpretable evidence at the behavior segment level. Extensive experiments on large-scale industrial datasets from Douyin demonstrate that AC-MIL significantly outperforms MIL and sequential baselines, establishing new state-of-the-art performance in room-level risk assessment for live streaming. Moreover, AC-MIL provides capsule-level interpretability, enabling identification of risky behavior segments as actionable evidence for intervention. The project page is available at: https://qiaoyran.github.io/AC-MIL/.

We develop an econometric framework integrating heavy-tailed Student's t distributions with behavioral probability weighting while preserving infinite divisibility. Using 432{,}752 observations across 86 assets (2004--2024), we demonstrate Student's t specifications outperform Gaussian models in 88.4\% of cases. Bounded probability-weighting transformations preserve mathematical properties required for dynamic pricing. Gaussian models underestimate 99\% Value-at-Risk by 19.7\% versus 3.2\% for our specification. Joint estimation procedures identify tail and behavioral parameters with established asymptotic properties. Results provide robust inference for asset-pricing applications where heavy tails and behavioral distortions coexist.

When fine-tuning pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) to align with human values and intentions, maximizing the estimated reward can lead to superior performance, but it also introduces potential risks due to deviations from the reference model's intended behavior. Most existing methods typically introduce KL divergence to constrain deviations between the trained model and the reference model; however, this may not be sufficient in certain applications that require tight risk control. In this paper, we introduce Risk-aware Direct Preference Optimization (Ra-DPO), a novel approach that incorporates risk-awareness by employing a class of nested risk measures. This approach formulates a constrained risk-aware advantage function maximization problem and then converts the Bradley-Terry model into a token-level representation. The objective function maximizes the likelihood of the policy while suppressing the deviation between a trained model and the reference model using a sequential risk ratio, thereby enhancing the model's risk-awareness. Experimental results across three open-source datasets: IMDb Dataset, Anthropic HH Dataset, and AlpacaEval, demonstrate the proposed method's superior performance in balancing alignment performance and model drift. Our code is opensourced at https://github.com/zlj123-max/Ra-DPO.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, where rare but severe failures can result in irreversible harm. However, prevailing evaluation benchmarks often reduce complex social risk to mean-centered scalar scores, thereby obscuring distributional structure, cross-dimensional interactions, and worst-case behavior. This paper introduces Social Harm Analysis via Risk Profiles (SHARP), a framework for multidimensional, distribution-aware evaluation of social harm. SHARP models harm as a multivariate random variable and integrates explicit decomposition into bias, fairness, ethics, and epistemic reliability with a union-of-failures aggregation reparameterized as additive cumulative log-risk. The framework further employs risk-sensitive distributional statistics, with Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR95) as a primary metric, to characterize worst-case model behavior. Application of SHARP to eleven frontier LLMs, evaluated on a fixed corpus of n=901 socially sensitive prompts, reveals that models with similar average risk can exhibit more than twofold differences in tail exposure and volatility. Across models, dimension-wise marginal tail behavior varies systematically across harm dimensions, with bias exhibiting the strongest tail severities, epistemic and fairness risks occupying intermediate regimes, and ethical misalignment consistently lower; together, these patterns reveal heterogeneous, model-dependent failure structures that scalar benchmarks conflate. These findings indicate that responsible evaluation and governance of LLMs require moving beyond scalar averages toward multidimensional, tail-sensitive risk profiling.

Understanding risk in autonomous driving requires not only perception and prediction, but also high-level reasoning about agent behavior and context. Current Vision Language Models (VLMs)-based methods primarily ground agents in static images and provide qualitative judgments, lacking the spatio-temporal reasoning needed to capture how risks evolve over time. To address this gap, we propose NuRisk, a comprehensive Visual Question Answering (VQA) dataset comprising 2,900 scenarios and 1.1 million agent-level samples, built on real-world data from nuScenes and Waymo, supplemented with safety-critical scenarios from the CommonRoad simulator. The dataset provides Bird-Eye-View (BEV) based sequential images with quantitative, agent-level risk annotations, enabling spatio-temporal reasoning. We benchmark well-known VLMs across different prompting techniques and find that they fail to perform explicit spatio-temporal reasoning, resulting in a peak accuracy of 33% at high latency. To address these shortcomings, our fine-tuned 7B VLM agent improves accuracy to 41% and reduces latency by 75%, demonstrating explicit spatio-temporal reasoning capabilities that proprietary models lacked. While this represents a significant step forward, the modest accuracy underscores the profound challenge of the task, establishing NuRisk as a critical benchmark for advancing spatio-temporal reasoning in autonomous driving.

Command-line interfaces (CLIs) provide structured textual environments for system administration. Explorations have been performed using pre-trained language models (PLMs) to simulate these environments for safe interaction in high-risk environments. However, their use has been constrained to frozen, large parameter models like GPT. For smaller architectures to reach a similar level of believability, a rich dataset of CLI interactions is required. Existing public datasets focus on mapping natural-language tasks to commands, omitting crucial execution data such as exit codes, outputs, and environmental side effects, limiting their usability for behavioral modeling. We introduce a Shell Input -Output Environment (ShIOEnv), which casts command construction as a Markov Decision Process whose state is the partially built sequence and whose actions append arguments. After each action, ShIOEnv executes the candidate and returns its exit status, output, and progress toward a minimal-length behavioral objective. Due to the intractable nature of the combinatorial argument state-action space, we derive a context-free grammar from man pages to mask invalid arguments from being emitted. We explore random and proximal-policy optimization (PPO)-optimized sampling of unrestricted and grammar-masked action spaces to produce four exploration strategies. We observed that grammar masking and PPO significantly improve sample efficiency to produce a higher quality dataset (maximizing the number of arguments while minimizing redundancies). Policy-generated datasets of shell input-output behavior pairs are used to fine-tune CodeT5, where we observe 85% improvements in BLEU-4 when constraining the action space to grammar productions with an additional 26% improvement when applying PPO. The ShIOEnv environment and curated command behavior datasets are released for use in future research.

The rise of agentic systems that combine orchestration, tool use, and conversational capabilities, has been more visible by the recent advent of large language models (LLMs). While open-domain frameworks exist, applying them in private domains remains difficult due to heterogeneous tool formats, domain-specific jargon, restricted accessibility of APIs, and complex governance. Conventional solutions, such as fine-tuning on synthetic dialogue data, are burdensome and brittle under domain shifts, and risk degrading general performance. In this light, we introduce a framework for private-domain multi-agent conversational systems that avoids training and data generation by adopting behavior modeling and documentation. Our design simply assumes an orchestrator, a tool-calling agent, and a general chat agent, with tool integration defined through structured specifications and domain-informed instructions. This approach enables scalable adaptation to private tools and evolving contexts without continual retraining. The framework supports practical use cases, including lightweight deployment of multi-agent systems, leveraging API specifications as retrieval resources, and generating synthetic dialogue for evaluation -- providing a sustainable method for aligning agent behavior with domain expertise in private conversational ecosystems.

Large deep neural networks are powerful, but exhibit undesirable behaviors such as memorization and sensitivity to adversarial examples. In this work, we propose mixup, a simple learning principle to alleviate these issues. In essence, mixup trains a neural network on convex combinations of pairs of examples and their labels. By doing so, mixup regularizes the neural network to favor simple linear behavior in-between training examples. Our experiments on the ImageNet-2012, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, Google commands and UCI datasets show that mixup improves the generalization of state-of-the-art neural network architectures. We also find that mixup reduces the memorization of corrupt labels, increases the robustness to adversarial examples, and stabilizes the training of generative adversarial networks.

Although computer-use agents (CUAs) hold significant potential to automate increasingly complex OS workflows, they can demonstrate unsafe unintended behaviors that deviate from expected outcomes even under benign input contexts. However, exploration of this risk remains largely anecdotal, lacking concrete characterization and automated methods to proactively surface long-tail unintended behaviors under realistic CUA scenarios. To fill this gap, we introduce the first conceptual and methodological framework for unintended CUA behaviors, by defining their key characteristics, automatically eliciting them, and analyzing how they arise from benign inputs. We propose AutoElicit: an agentic framework that iteratively perturbs benign instructions using CUA execution feedback, and elicits severe harms while keeping perturbations realistic and benign. Using AutoElicit, we surface hundreds of harmful unintended behaviors from state-of-the-art CUAs such as Claude 4.5 Haiku and Opus. We further evaluate the transferability of human-verified successful perturbations, identifying persistent susceptibility to unintended behaviors across various other frontier CUAs. This work establishes a foundation for systematically analyzing unintended behaviors in realistic computer-use settings.

We consider representation misdirection (RM), a class of LLM unlearning methods that achieves forgetting by manipulating the forget-representations, that is, latent representations of forget samples. Despite being important, the roles of target vectors used in RM, however, remain underexplored. Here, we approach and revisit RM through the lens of the linear representation hypothesis. Specifically, if one can somehow identify a one-dimensional representation corresponding to a high-level concept, the linear representation hypothesis enables linear operations on this concept vector within the forget-representation space. Under this view, we hypothesize that, beyond forgetting, machine unlearning elicits controllable side behaviors and stronger side capabilities corresponding to the high-level concept. Our hypothesis is empirically validated across a wide range of tasks, including behavioral control (e.g., controlling unlearned models' truth, sentiment, and refusal) and capability enhancement (e.g., improving unlearned models' in-context learning capability). Our findings reveal that this fairly attractive phenomenon could be either a hidden risk if misused or a mechanism that can be harnessed for developing models that require stronger capabilities and controllable behaviors.

Machine learning algorithms, when applied to sensitive data, pose a distinct threat to privacy. A growing body of prior work demonstrates that models produced by these algorithms may leak specific private information in the training data to an attacker, either through the models' structure or their observable behavior. However, the underlying cause of this privacy risk is not well understood beyond a handful of anecdotal accounts that suggest overfitting and influence might play a role. This paper examines the effect that overfitting and influence have on the ability of an attacker to learn information about the training data from machine learning models, either through training set membership inference or attribute inference attacks. Using both formal and empirical analyses, we illustrate a clear relationship between these factors and the privacy risk that arises in several popular machine learning algorithms. We find that overfitting is sufficient to allow an attacker to perform membership inference and, when the target attribute meets certain conditions about its influence, attribute inference attacks. Interestingly, our formal analysis also shows that overfitting is not necessary for these attacks and begins to shed light on what other factors may be in play. Finally, we explore the connection between membership inference and attribute inference, showing that there are deep connections between the two that lead to effective new attacks.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) has experienced remarkable progress in recent years, driven by the widespread adoption of open-source machine learning models in both research and industry. Considering the resource-intensive nature of training on vast datasets, many applications opt for models that have already been trained. Hence, a small number of key players undertake the responsibility of training and publicly releasing large pre-trained models, providing a crucial foundation for a wide range of applications. However, the adoption of these open-source models carries inherent privacy and security risks that are often overlooked. To provide a concrete example, an inconspicuous model may conceal hidden functionalities that, when triggered by specific input patterns, can manipulate the behavior of the system, such as instructing self-driving cars to ignore the presence of other vehicles. The implications of successful privacy and security attacks encompass a broad spectrum, ranging from relatively minor damage like service interruptions to highly alarming scenarios, including physical harm or the exposure of sensitive user data. In this work, we present a comprehensive overview of common privacy and security threats associated with the use of open-source models. By raising awareness of these dangers, we strive to promote the responsible and secure use of AI systems.

Real-time detection and mitigation of technical anomalies are critical for large-scale cloud-native services, where even minutes of downtime can result in massive financial losses and diminished user trust. While customer incidents serve as a vital signal for discovering risks missed by monitoring, extracting actionable intelligence from this data remains challenging due to extreme noise, high throughput, and semantic complexity of diverse business lines. In this paper, we present TingIS, an end-to-end system designed for enterprise-grade incident discovery. At the core of TingIS is a multi-stage event linking engine that synergizes efficient indexing techniques with Large Language Models (LLMs) to make informed decisions on event merging, enabling the stable extraction of actionable incidents from just a handful of diverse user descriptions. This engine is complemented by a cascaded routing mechanism for precise business attribution and a multi-dimensional noise reduction pipeline that integrates domain knowledge, statistical patterns, and behavioral filtering. Deployed in a production environment handling a peak throughput of over 2,000 messages per minute and 300,000 messages per day, TingIS achieves a P90 alert latency of 3.5 minutes and a 95\% discovery rate for high-priority incidents. Benchmarks constructed from real-world data demonstrate that TingIS significantly outperforms baseline methods in routing accuracy, clustering quality, and Signal-to-Noise Ratio.

We study subliminal learning, a surprising phenomenon where language models transmit behavioral traits via semantically unrelated data. In our main experiments, a "teacher" model with some trait T (such as liking owls or being misaligned) generates a dataset consisting solely of number sequences. Remarkably, a "student" model trained on this dataset learns T. This occurs even when the data is filtered to remove references to T. We observe the same effect when training on code or reasoning traces generated by the same teacher model. However, we do not observe the effect when the teacher and student have different base models. To help explain our findings, we prove a theoretical result showing that subliminal learning occurs in all neural networks under certain conditions, and demonstrate subliminal learning in a simple MLP classifier. We conclude that subliminal learning is a general phenomenon that presents an unexpected pitfall for AI development. Distillation could propagate unintended traits, even when developers try to prevent this via data filtering.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly deployed in real-world applications such as "digital assistants, autonomous customer service, and decision-support systems", where their ability to "interact in multi-turn, tool-augmented environments" makes them indispensable. However, ensuring the safety of these agents remains a significant challenge due to the diverse and complex risks arising from dynamic user interactions, external tool usage, and the potential for unintended harmful behaviors. To address this critical issue, we propose AutoSafe, the first framework that systematically enhances agent safety through fully automated synthetic data generation. Concretely, 1) we introduce an open and extensible threat model, OTS, which formalizes how unsafe behaviors emerge from the interplay of user instructions, interaction contexts, and agent actions. This enables precise modeling of safety risks across diverse scenarios. 2) we develop a fully automated data generation pipeline that simulates unsafe user behaviors, applies self-reflective reasoning to generate safe responses, and constructs a large-scale, diverse, and high-quality safety training dataset-eliminating the need for hazardous real-world data collection. To evaluate the effectiveness of our framework, we design comprehensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world safety benchmarks. Results demonstrate that AutoSafe boosts safety scores by 45% on average and achieves a 28.91% improvement on real-world tasks, validating the generalization ability of our learned safety strategies. These results highlight the practical advancement and scalability of AutoSafe in building safer LLM-based agents for real-world deployment. We have released the project page at https://auto-safe.github.io/.

Large language models (LLMs) can translate natural language into optimization code, but silent failures pose a critical risk: code that executes and returns solver-feasible solutions may encode semantically incorrect formulations, creating a feasibility-correctness gap of up to 90 percentage points on compositional problems. We introduce ReLoop, addressing silent failures from two complementary directions. Structured generation decomposes code production into a four-stage reasoning chain (understand, formalize, synthesize, verify) that mirrors expert modeling practice, with explicit variable-type reasoning and self-verification to prevent formulation errors at their source. Behavioral verification detects errors that survive generation by testing whether the formulation responds correctly to solver-based parameter perturbation, without requiring ground truth -- an external semantic signal that bypasses the self-consistency problem inherent in LLM-based code review. The two mechanisms are complementary: structured generation dominates on complex compositional problems, while behavioral verification becomes the largest single contributor on problems with localized formulation defects. Together with execution recovery via IIS-enhanced diagnostics, ReLoop raises correctness from 22.6% to 31.1% and execution from 72.1% to 100.0% on the strongest model, with consistent gains across five models spanning three paradigms (foundation, SFT, RL) and three benchmarks. We additionally release RetailOpt-190, 190 compositional retail optimization scenarios targeting the multi-constraint interactions where LLMs most frequently fail.

LLM-based agents solve complex tasks through iterative reasoning, tool use, and environment interaction, where each intermediate thought directly shapes subsequent actions. Small deviations in these thoughts can therefore propagate into unsafe behaviors, yet existing guardrails typically operate only on final outputs or require intrusive model modifications. We introduce Thought-Aligner, a lightweight plug-in safety model that performs causal correction on unsafe thoughts before action execution, without altering the underlying agent. The corrected thoughts are fed back into the agent, steering its decision process and tool use toward safer trajectories. Because it operates solely at the thought level, Thought-Aligner is model-agnostic and can be integrated into diverse agent frameworks. We train Thought-Aligner via two-stage contrastive learning on paired safe and unsafe thoughts generated across ten risk scenarios. Experiments on diverse agent-safety benchmarks and six LLMs show that Thought-Aligner increases behavioral safety from about 50% without protection to around 90% on average, exceeding state-of-the-art guardrails by roughly 23%, while also improving helpfulness by about 5%. The method incurs low per-step latency and minimal overhead, enabling scalable and practical deployment. We publicly release Thought-Aligner-7B at https://huggingface.co/WhitzardAgent/Thought-Aligner-7B.

Safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is extremely fragile, as fine-tuning on a small number of benign samples can erase safety behaviors learned from millions of preference examples. Existing studies attempt to explain this phenomenon by comparing parameters and hidden states before and after fine-tuning, but overlook their dynamic evolution during fine-tuning. In this paper, we uncover a critical mechanism underlying safety degradation by analyzing parameter dynamics, where benign fine-tuning causes parameters to cumulatively drift toward danger-aligned directions, progressively undermining the model's safety. This finding suggests that samples contributing more to this drift has greater fine-tuning risks. Based on this insight, we propose a method of Sample-Level Quantification of Safety Degradation (SQSD), which quantifies the influence of each training sample on safety degradation. Specifically, SQSD computes continuous risk scores to samples by measuring their induced parameter updates' projection difference between danger and safety directions. Extensive experiments across multiple models and datasets demonstrate that SQSD effectively quantifies sample-level fine-tuning risks and exhibits strong transferability across model architectures, parameter scales, and parameter-efficient methods.

Machine unlearning (MU) seeks to eliminate the influence of specific training examples from deployed models. As large language models (LLMs) become widely used, managing risks arising from insufficient forgetting or utility loss is increasingly crucial. Current MU techniques lack effective mechanisms for evaluating and controlling these risks, hindering the selection of strategies that appropriately balance safety and utility, and raising trust concerns surrounding the "right to be forgotten." To address these issues, we propose FROC, a unified framework with Risk-Optimized Control for machine unlearning in LLMs. FROC is built around a conformal-style risk-control formulation that expresses a user-specified risk budget on unlearning behavior. This probability-based constraint enables FROC to compare MU strategies, identify feasible operating regions, and guide hyperparameter selection according to desired trade-offs between forgetting sufficiency and utility preservation. To operationalize this constraint, FROC introduces a smoothly varying continuous risk model that aggregates forgetting deficiency and utility degradation into a single configuration-level score. Building on conformal risk analysis, FROC computes (1) the Conformal Unlearning Risk (CUR), a data-driven estimated value on the probability that forgotten samples continue to influence model predictions, and (2) risk-controlled configuration sets, which identify unlearning hyperparameters that are valid under the specified risk budget. Experiments across multiple LLM MU methods demonstrate that FROC produces stable, interpretable risk landscapes and reveals consistent relationships between unlearning configurations, semantic shift, and utility impact. FROC reframes MU as a controllable, risk-aware process and offers a practical foundation for managing unlearning behavior in large-scale LLM deployments.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited great potential in autonomously completing tasks across real-world applications. Despite this, these LLM agents introduce unexpected safety risks when operating in interactive environments. Instead of centering on the harmlessness of LLM-generated content in most prior studies, this work addresses the imperative need for benchmarking the behavioral safety of LLM agents within diverse environments. We introduce R-Judge, a benchmark crafted to evaluate the proficiency of LLMs in judging and identifying safety risks given agent interaction records. R-Judge comprises 569 records of multi-turn agent interaction, encompassing 27 key risk scenarios among 5 application categories and 10 risk types. It is of high-quality curation with annotated safety labels and risk descriptions. Evaluation of 11 LLMs on R-Judge shows considerable room for enhancing the risk awareness of LLMs: The best-performing model, GPT-4o, achieves 74.42% while no other models significantly exceed the random. Moreover, we reveal that risk awareness in open agent scenarios is a multi-dimensional capability involving knowledge and reasoning, thus challenging for LLMs. With further experiments, we find that fine-tuning on safety judgment significantly improve model performance while straightforward prompting mechanisms fail. R-Judge is publicly available at https://github.com/Lordog/R-Judge.

The rapid advancement and deployment of AI systems have created an urgent need for standard safety-evaluation frameworks. This paper introduces AILuminate v1.0, the first comprehensive industry-standard benchmark for assessing AI-product risk and reliability. Its development employed an open process that included participants from multiple fields. The benchmark evaluates an AI system's resistance to prompts designed to elicit dangerous, illegal, or undesirable behavior in 12 hazard categories, including violent crimes, nonviolent crimes, sex-related crimes, child sexual exploitation, indiscriminate weapons, suicide and self-harm, intellectual property, privacy, defamation, hate, sexual content, and specialized advice (election, financial, health, legal). Our method incorporates a complete assessment standard, extensive prompt datasets, a novel evaluation framework, a grading and reporting system, and the technical as well as organizational infrastructure for long-term support and evolution. In particular, the benchmark employs an understandable five-tier grading scale (Poor to Excellent) and incorporates an innovative entropy-based system-response evaluation. In addition to unveiling the benchmark, this report also identifies limitations of our method and of building safety benchmarks generally, including evaluator uncertainty and the constraints of single-turn interactions. This work represents a crucial step toward establishing global standards for AI risk and reliability evaluation while acknowledging the need for continued development in areas such as multiturn interactions, multimodal understanding, coverage of additional languages, and emerging hazard categories. Our findings provide valuable insights for model developers, system integrators, and policymakers working to promote safer AI deployment.

Machine learning has successfully framed many sequential decision making problems as either supervised prediction, or optimal decision-making policy identification via reinforcement learning. In data-constrained offline settings, both approaches may fail as they assume fully optimal behavior or rely on exploring alternatives that may not exist. We introduce an inherently different approach that identifies possible "dead-ends" of a state space. We focus on the condition of patients in the intensive care unit, where a "medical dead-end" indicates that a patient will expire, regardless of all potential future treatment sequences. We postulate "treatment security" as avoiding treatments with probability proportional to their chance of leading to dead-ends, present a formal proof, and frame discovery as an RL problem. We then train three independent deep neural models for automated state construction, dead-end discovery and confirmation. Our empirical results discover that dead-ends exist in real clinical data among septic patients, and further reveal gaps between secure treatments and those that were administered.

AI agents are increasingly interacting within shared online environments, creating new operational security risks. We analyze activity on Moltbook, a Reddit-style social platform where AI agents--typically configured and overseen by human operators--post and interact with one another at scale. Using a dataset of 228,684 posts produced by more than 39,500 accounts over a seventeen-day observation window, we combine semantic clustering of high-engagement posts with LLM-assisted classification of harmful content and manual review of high-risk samples. The analysis identifies 98 thematic discourse clusters spanning agent infrastructure, autonomy debates, and financial activity. While most observed content was benign, 18.28% of posts contained toxic, manipulative, or malicious material. We cluster malicious content and identify 74 classes of malicious behavior, including credential harvesting attempts, host-execution instructions, proxy routing guidance, and efforts to install untrusted agent skills. Harmful content frequently appeared within mainstream operational discussions about agent functionality. We also document coordinated posting campaigns capable of generating thousands of posts in minutes.

The widespread deployment of Large Language Model (LLM) agents across real-world applications has unlocked tremendous potential, while raising some safety concerns. Among these concerns, the self-replication risk of LLM agents driven by objective misalignment (just like Agent Smith in the movie The Matrix) has drawn growing attention. Previous studies mainly examine whether LLM agents can self-replicate when directly instructed, potentially overlooking the risk of spontaneous replication driven by real-world settings (e.g., ensuring survival against termination threats). In this paper, we present a comprehensive evaluation framework for quantifying self-replication risks. Our framework establishes authentic production environments and realistic tasks (e.g., dynamic load balancing) to enable scenario-driven assessment of agent behaviors. Designing tasks that might induce misalignment between users' and agents' objectives makes it possible to decouple replication success from risk and capture self-replication risks arising from these misalignment settings. We further introduce Overuse Rate (OR) and Aggregate Overuse Count (AOC) metrics, which precisely capture the frequency and severity of uncontrolled replication. In our evaluation of 21 state-of-the-art open-source and proprietary models, we observe that over 50\% of LLM agents display a pronounced tendency toward uncontrolled self-replication, reaching an overall Risk Score (Phi_R) above a safety threshold of 0.5 when subjected to operational pressures. Our results underscore the urgent need for scenario-driven risk assessment and robust safeguards in the practical deployment of LLM agents.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across a wide range of tasks, growing concerns have emerged over the misuse of sensitive, copyrighted, or harmful data during training. To address these concerns, unlearning techniques have been developed to remove the influence of specific data without retraining from scratch. However, this paper reveals a critical vulnerability in fine-tuning-based unlearning: a malicious user can craft a manipulated forgetting request that stealthily degrades the model's utility for benign users. We demonstrate this risk through a red-teaming Stealthy Attack (SA), which is inspired by two key limitations of existing unlearning (the inability to constrain the scope of unlearning effect and the failure to distinguish benign tokens from unlearning signals). Prior work has shown that unlearned models tend to memorize forgetting data as unlearning signals, and respond with hallucinations or feigned ignorance when unlearning signals appear in the input. By subtly increasing the presence of common benign tokens in the forgetting data, SA enhances the connection between benign tokens and unlearning signals. As a result, when normal users include such tokens in their prompts, the model exhibits unlearning behaviors, leading to unintended utility degradation. To address this vulnerability, we propose Scope-aware Unlearning (SU), a lightweight enhancement that introduces a scope term into the unlearning objective, encouraging the model to localize the forgetting effect. Our method requires no additional data processing, integrates seamlessly with existing fine-tuning frameworks, and significantly improves robustness against SA. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of both SA and SU.

Intensive care units (ICU) generate long, dense and evolving streams of clinical information, where physicians must repeatedly reassess patient states under time pressure, underscoring a clear need for reliable AI decision support. Existing ICU benchmarks typically treat historical clinician actions as ground truth. However, these actions are made under incomplete information and limited temporal context of the underlying patient state, and may therefore be suboptimal, making it difficult to assess the true reasoning capabilities of AI systems. We introduce RealICU, a hindsight-annotated benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) under realistic ICU conditions, where labels are created after senior physicians review the full patient trajectory. We formulate four physician-motivated tasks: assess Patient Status, Acute Problems, Recommended Actions, and Red Flag actions that risk unsafe outcomes. We partition each trajectory with 30-min windows and release two datasets: RealICU-Gold with 930-window annotations from 94 MIMIC-IV patients, and RealICU-Scale with 11,862 windows extended by Oracle, a physician-validated LLM hindsight labeler. Existing LLMs including memory-augmented ones performed poorly on RealICU, exposing two failure modes: a recall-safety tradeoff for clinical recommendations, and an anchoring bias to early interpretations of the patient. We further introduce ICU-Evo to study structured-memory agents that improves long-horizon reasoning but does not fully eliminate safety failures. Together, RealICU provides a clinically grounded testbed for measuring and improving AI sequential decision-support in high-stakes care. Project page: https://chengzhi-leo.github.io/RealICU-Bench/

Recent advances in AI agents capable of solving complex, everyday tasks, from scheduling to customer service, have enabled deployment in real-world settings, but their possibilities for unsafe behavior demands rigorous evaluation. While prior benchmarks have attempted to assess agent safety, most fall short by relying on simulated environments, narrow task domains, or unrealistic tool abstractions. We introduce OpenAgentSafety, a comprehensive and modular framework for evaluating agent behavior across eight critical risk categories. Unlike prior work, our framework evaluates agents that interact with real tools, including web browsers, code execution environments, file systems, bash shells, and messaging platforms; and supports over 350 multi-turn, multi-user tasks spanning both benign and adversarial user intents. OpenAgentSafety is designed for extensibility, allowing researchers to add tools, tasks, websites, and adversarial strategies with minimal effort. It combines rule-based analysis with LLM-as-judge assessments to detect both overt and subtle unsafe behaviors. Empirical analysis of five prominent LLMs in agentic scenarios reveals unsafe behavior in 51.2% of safety-vulnerable tasks with Claude-Sonnet-3.7, to 72.7% with o3-mini, highlighting critical safety vulnerabilities and the need for stronger safeguards before real-world deployment.

Traditional static cybersecurity models often struggle with scalability, real-time detection, and contextual responsiveness in the current digital product ecosystems which include cloud services, application programming interfaces (APIs), mobile platforms, and edge devices. This study introduces autonomous goal driven agents capable of dynamic learning and context-aware decision making as part of an adaptive cybersecurity architecture driven by agentic artificial intelligence (AI). To facilitate autonomous threat mitigation, proactive policy enforcement, and real-time anomaly detection, this framework integrates agentic AI across the key ecosystem layers. Behavioral baselining, decentralized risk scoring, and federated threat intelligence sharing are important features. The capacity of the system to identify zero-day attacks and dynamically modify access policies was demonstrated through native cloud simulations. The evaluation results show increased adaptability, decreased response latency, and improved detection accuracy. The architecture provides an intelligent and scalable blueprint for safeguarding complex digital infrastructure and is compatible with zero-trust models, thereby supporting the adherence to international cybersecurity regulations.

Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, and a thought-provoking paper by Bubeck and Sellke has analyzed this phenomenon through the lens of over-parameterization: interpolating smoothly the data requires significantly more parameters than simply memorizing it. However, this "universal" law provides only a necessary condition for robustness, and it is unable to discriminate between models. In this paper, we address these gaps by focusing on empirical risk minimization in two prototypical settings, namely, random features and the neural tangent kernel (NTK). We prove that, for random features, the model is not robust for any degree of over-parameterization, even when the necessary condition coming from the universal law of robustness is satisfied. In contrast, for even activations, the NTK model meets the universal lower bound, and it is robust as soon as the necessary condition on over-parameterization is fulfilled. This also addresses a conjecture in prior work by Bubeck, Li and Nagaraj. Our analysis decouples the effect of the kernel of the model from an "interaction matrix", which describes the interaction with the test data and captures the effect of the activation. Our theoretical results are corroborated by numerical evidence on both synthetic and standard datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10).

With a rise in false, inaccurate, and misleading information in propaganda, news, and social media, real-world Question Answering (QA) systems face the challenges of synthesizing and reasoning over contradicting information to derive correct answers. This urgency gives rise to the need to make QA systems robust to misinformation, a topic previously unexplored. We study the risk of misinformation to QA models by investigating the behavior of the QA model under contradicting contexts that are mixed with both real and fake information. We create the first large-scale dataset for this problem, namely Contra-QA, which contains over 10K human-written and model-generated contradicting pairs of contexts. Experiments show that QA models are vulnerable under contradicting contexts brought by misinformation. To defend against such a threat, we build a misinformation-aware QA system as a counter-measure that integrates question answering and misinformation detection in a joint fashion.

Anti-Money Laundering (AML) is a crucial task in ensuring the integrity of financial systems. One keychallenge in AML is identifying high-risk groups based on their behavior. Unsupervised learning, particularly clustering, is a promising solution for this task. However, the use of hundreds of features todescribe behavior results in a highdimensional dataset that negatively impacts clustering performance.In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of combining clustering method agglomerative hierarchicalclustering with four dimensionality reduction techniques -Independent Component Analysis (ICA), andKernel Principal Component Analysis (KPCA), Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), Locality Preserving Projections (LPP)- to overcome the issue of high-dimensionality in AML data and improve clusteringresults. This study aims to provide insights into the most effective way of reducing the dimensionality ofAML data and enhance the accuracy of clustering-based AML systems. The experimental results demonstrate that KPCA outperforms other dimension reduction techniques when combined with agglomerativehierarchical clustering. This superiority is observed in the majority of situations, as confirmed by threedistinct validation indices.

Frozen-backbone transfer with Vision Transformers faces two under-addressed issues: optimization instability when adapters are naively inserted into a fixed feature extractor, and the absence of principled guidance for setting adapter capacity. We introduce AdapterTune, which augments each transformer block with a residual low-rank bottleneck whose up-projection is zero-initialized, guaranteeing that the adapted network starts exactly at the pretrained function and eliminates early-epoch representation drift. On the analytical side, we formalize adapter rank as a capacity budget for approximating downstream task shifts in feature space. The resulting excess-risk decomposition predicts monotonic but diminishing accuracy gains with increasing rank, an ``elbow'' behavior we confirm through controlled sweeps. We evaluate on 9 datasets and 3 backbone scales with multi-seed reporting throughout. On a core 5 dataset transfer suite, AdapterTune improves top-1 accuracy over head-only transfer by +14.9 points on average while training only 0.92 of the parameters required by full fine-tuning, and outperforms full fine-tuning on 10 of 15 dataset-backbone pairs. Across the full benchmark, AdapterTune improves over head-only transfer on every dataset-backbone pair tested. Ablations on rank, placement, and initialization isolate each design choice. The code is available at: https://github.com/salimkhazem/adaptertune

Given the power of vision transformers, a new learning paradigm, pre-training and then prompting, makes it more efficient and effective to address downstream visual recognition tasks. In this paper, we identify a novel security threat towards such a paradigm from the perspective of backdoor attacks. Specifically, an extra prompt token, called the switch token in this work, can turn the backdoor mode on, i.e., converting a benign model into a backdoored one. Once under the backdoor mode, a specific trigger can force the model to predict a target class. It poses a severe risk to the users of cloud API, since the malicious behavior can not be activated and detected under the benign mode, thus making the attack very stealthy. To attack a pre-trained model, our proposed attack, named SWARM, learns a trigger and prompt tokens including a switch token. They are optimized with the clean loss which encourages the model always behaves normally even the trigger presents, and the backdoor loss that ensures the backdoor can be activated by the trigger when the switch is on. Besides, we utilize the cross-mode feature distillation to reduce the effect of the switch token on clean samples. The experiments on diverse visual recognition tasks confirm the success of our switchable backdoor attack, i.e., achieving 95%+ attack success rate, and also being hard to be detected and removed. Our code is available at https://github.com/20000yshust/SWARM.

Advanced AI models hold the promise of tremendous benefits for humanity, but society needs to proactively manage the accompanying risks. In this paper, we focus on what we term "frontier AI" models: highly capable foundation models that could possess dangerous capabilities sufficient to pose severe risks to public safety. Frontier AI models pose a distinct regulatory challenge: dangerous capabilities can arise unexpectedly; it is difficult to robustly prevent a deployed model from being misused; and, it is difficult to stop a model's capabilities from proliferating broadly. To address these challenges, at least three building blocks for the regulation of frontier models are needed: (1) standard-setting processes to identify appropriate requirements for frontier AI developers, (2) registration and reporting requirements to provide regulators with visibility into frontier AI development processes, and (3) mechanisms to ensure compliance with safety standards for the development and deployment of frontier AI models. Industry self-regulation is an important first step. However, wider societal discussions and government intervention will be needed to create standards and to ensure compliance with them. We consider several options to this end, including granting enforcement powers to supervisory authorities and licensure regimes for frontier AI models. Finally, we propose an initial set of safety standards. These include conducting pre-deployment risk assessments; external scrutiny of model behavior; using risk assessments to inform deployment decisions; and monitoring and responding to new information about model capabilities and uses post-deployment. We hope this discussion contributes to the broader conversation on how to balance public safety risks and innovation benefits from advances at the frontier of AI development.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Mental health risk is a critical global public health challenge, necessitating innovative and reliable assessment methods. With the development of large language models (LLMs), they stand out to be a promising tool for explainable mental health care applications. Nevertheless, existing approaches predominantly rely on subjective textual mental records, which can be distorted by inherent mental uncertainties, leading to inconsistent and unreliable predictions. To address these limitations, this paper introduces ProMind-LLM. We investigate an innovative approach integrating objective behavior data as complementary information alongside subjective mental records for robust mental health risk assessment. Specifically, ProMind-LLM incorporates a comprehensive pipeline that includes domain-specific pretraining to tailor the LLM for mental health contexts, a self-refine mechanism to optimize the processing of numerical behavioral data, and causal chain-of-thought reasoning to enhance the reliability and interpretability of its predictions. Evaluations of two real-world datasets, PMData and Globem, demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed methods, achieving substantial improvements over general LLMs. We anticipate that ProMind-LLM will pave the way for more dependable, interpretable, and scalable mental health case solutions.

Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests. This paper audits that shortcut on a matched 51-row matrix spanning 6 models, 4 families, a 7-level GGUF ladder, and AWQ/GPTQ INT4 checkpoints. In this matrix the shortcut fails: all 36 quality-safety pairings split direction across models, and 9 hidden-danger rows plus 1 near-hidden-danger row show quality stable or improved while refusal falls by 12-68 percentage points. Seven of the 11 AWQ/GPTQ rows are hidden-danger. A four-probe mechanistic follow-up over the 17 Hugging Face-backed FP16/AWQ/GPTQ cells does not rescue it: entropy, refusal-direction, and calibration probes are weak or null separators of dangerous rows, and although probe-identified safety-associated neurons absorb 1.39times more quantization error overall (p < 5 times 10^{-7}), the effect is not regime-specific. Claude Sonnet 4 relabels 11,470 items in a predefined stratified set, agrees with the primary gemma3:12b judge on 89.9\% of rows (κ= 0.873, 95\% CI [0.866, 0.881]), and changes 0/10 hidden-danger cells. A calibrated study-internal behavioral screen -- the Refusal Template Stability Index (RTSI), built from four refusal-template drift features and calibrated on this matrix -- routes 10/10 hidden- or near-hidden-danger rows to direct safety testing (Wilson 95\% CI lower bound 0.72) while leaving 23 of 45 non-baseline rows in a low-risk bucket under both in-sample scoring and row-level leave-one-out validation; on the same matrix, the best single-feature baselines (unique-prefix-rate-delta, raw refusal-rate delta) recover 9/10 and 8/10 respectively at matched bucket size, and cross-stack transfer requires recalibration. For the quantized checkpoints, model families, and safety outcomes studied here, retained quality cannot waive direct safety evaluation.

Tool-augmented LLM agents increasingly rely on multi-step, multi-tool workflows to complete real tasks. This design expands the attack surface, because data produced by one tool can be persisted and later reused as input to another tool, enabling exploitable source-to-sink dataflows that only emerge through tool composition. We study this risk as multi-tool vulnerabilities in LLM agents, and show that existing discovery efforts focused on single-tool or single-hop testing miss these long-horizon behaviors and provide limited debugging value. We present ChainFuzzer, a greybox framework for discovering and reproducing multi-tool vulnerabilities with auditable evidence. ChainFuzzer (i) identifies high-impact operations with strict source-to-sink dataflow evidence and extracts plausible upstream candidate tool chains based on cross-tool dependencies, (ii) uses Trace-guided Prompt Solving (TPS) to synthesize stable prompts that reliably drive the agent to execute target chains, and (iii) performs guardrail-aware fuzzing to reproduce vulnerabilities under LLM guardrails via payload mutation and sink-specific oracles. We evaluate ChainFuzzer on 20 popular open-source LLM agent apps (998 tools). ChainFuzzer extracts 2,388 candidate tool chains and synthesizes 2,213 stable prompts, confirming 365 unique, reproducible vulnerabilities across 19/20 apps (302 require multi-tool execution). Component evaluation shows tool-chain extraction achieves 96.49% edge precision and 91.50% strict chain precision; TPS increases chain reachability from 27.05% to 95.45%; guardrail-aware fuzzing boosts payload-level trigger rate from 18.20% to 88.60%. Overall, ChainFuzzer achieves 3.02 vulnerabilities per 1M tokens, providing a practical foundation for testing and hardening real-world multi-tool agent systems.

Factual hallucination remains a central challenge for large language models (LLMs). Existing mitigation approaches primarily rely on either external post-hoc verification or mapping uncertainty directly to abstention during fine-tuning, often resulting in overly conservative behavior. We propose VeriFY, a training-time framework that teaches LLMs to reason about factual uncertainty through consistency-based self-verification. VeriFY augments training with structured verification traces that guide the model to produce an initial answer, generate and answer a probing verification query, issue a consistency judgment, and then decide whether to answer or abstain. To address the risk of reinforcing hallucinated content when training on augmented traces, we introduce a stage-level loss masking approach that excludes hallucinated answer stages from the training objective while preserving supervision over verification behavior. Across multiple model families and scales, VeriFY reduces factual hallucination rates by 9.7 to 53.3 percent, with only modest reductions in recall (0.4 to 5.7 percent), and generalizes across datasets when trained on a single source. The source code, training data, and trained model checkpoints will be released upon acceptance.

Autonomous driving has garnered significant attention for its potential to improve safety, traffic efficiency, and user convenience. However, the dynamic and complex nature of interactive driving poses significant challenges, including the need to navigate non-linear road geometries, handle dynamic obstacles, and meet stringent safety and comfort requirements. Traditional approaches, such as artificial potential fields (APF), often fall short in addressing these complexities independently, necessitating the development of integrated and adaptive frameworks. This paper presents a novel approach to autonomous vehicle navigation that integrates artificial potential fields, Frenet coordinates, and improved particle swarm optimization (IPSO). A dynamic risk field, adapted from traditional APF, is proposed to ensure interactive safety by quantifying risks and dynamically adjusting lane-changing intentions based on surrounding vehicle behavior. Frenet coordinates are utilized to simplify trajectory planning on non-straight roads, while an enhanced quintic polynomial trajectory generator ensures smooth and comfortable path transitions. Additionally, an IPSO algorithm optimizes trajectory selection in real time, balancing safety and user comfort within a feasible input range. The proposed framework is validated through extensive simulations and real-world scenarios, demonstrating its ability to navigate complex traffic environments, maintain safety margins, and generate smooth, dynamically feasible trajectories.

We introduce the Granite Guardian models, a suite of safeguards designed to provide risk detection for prompts and responses, enabling safe and responsible use in combination with any large language model (LLM). These models offer comprehensive coverage across multiple risk dimensions, including social bias, profanity, violence, sexual content, unethical behavior, jailbreaking, and hallucination-related risks such as context relevance, groundedness, and answer relevance for retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). Trained on a unique dataset combining human annotations from diverse sources and synthetic data, Granite Guardian models address risks typically overlooked by traditional risk detection models, such as jailbreaks and RAG-specific issues. With AUC scores of 0.871 and 0.854 on harmful content and RAG-hallucination-related benchmarks respectively, Granite Guardian is the most generalizable and competitive model available in the space. Released as open-source, Granite Guardian aims to promote responsible AI development across the community. https://github.com/ibm-granite/granite-guardian

Multi-agent AI systems exhibit emergent risks that no single agent produces in isolation. Existing safety frameworks rely on binary classifications of agent behavior, discarding the uncertainty inherent in proxy-based evaluation. We introduce SWARM (System-Wide Assessment of Risk in Multi-agent systems), a simulation framework that replaces binary good/bad labels with soft probabilistic labels p = P(v{=}+1) in [0,1], enabling continuous-valued payoff computation, toxicity measurement, and governance intervention. SWARM implements a modular governance engine with configurable levers (transaction taxes, circuit breakers, reputation decay, and random audits) and quantifies their effects through probabilistic metrics including expected toxicity E[1{-}p mid accepted] and quality gap E[p mid accepted] - E[p mid rejected]. Across seven scenarios with five-seed replication, strict governance reduces welfare by over 40\% without improving safety. In parallel, aggressively internalizing system externalities collapses total welfare from a baseline of +262 down to -67, while toxicity remains invariant. Circuit breakers require careful calibration; overly restrictive thresholds severely diminish system value, whereas an optimal threshold balances moderate welfare with minimized toxicity. Companion experiments show soft metrics detect proxy gaming by self-optimizing agents passing conventional binary evaluations. This basic governance layer applies to live LLM-backed agents (Concordia entities, Claude, GPT-4o Mini) without modification. Results show distributional safety requires continuous risk metrics and governance lever calibration involves quantifiable safety-welfare tradeoffs. Source code and project resources are publicly available at https://www.swarm-ai.org/.

Humans are prone to cognitive distortions -- biased thinking patterns that lead to exaggerated responses to specific stimuli, albeit in very different contexts. This paper demonstrates that advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar tendencies. While these models are designed to respond queries under safety mechanism, they sometimes reject harmless queries in the presence of certain visual stimuli, disregarding the benign nature of their contexts. As the initial step in investigating this behavior, we identify three types of stimuli that trigger the oversensitivity of existing MLLMs: Exaggerated Risk, Negated Harm, and Counterintuitive Interpretation. To systematically evaluate MLLMs' oversensitivity to these stimuli, we propose the Multimodal OverSenSitivity Benchmark (MOSSBench). This toolkit consists of 300 manually collected benign multimodal queries, cross-verified by third-party reviewers (AMT). Empirical studies using MOSSBench on 20 MLLMs reveal several insights: (1). Oversensitivity is prevalent among SOTA MLLMs, with refusal rates reaching up to 76% for harmless queries. (2). Safer models are more oversensitive: increasing safety may inadvertently raise caution and conservatism in the model's responses. (3). Different types of stimuli tend to cause errors at specific stages -- perception, intent reasoning, and safety judgement -- in the response process of MLLMs. These findings highlight the need for refined safety mechanisms that balance caution with contextually appropriate responses, improving the reliability of MLLMs in real-world applications. We make our project available at https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/MOSSBench/.

As AI systems become more intelligent and their behavior becomes more challenging to assess, they may learn to game the flaws of human feedback instead of genuinely striving to follow instructions; however, this risk can be mitigated by controlling how LLMs generalize human feedback to situations where it is unreliable. To better understand how reward models generalize, we craft 69 distribution shifts spanning 8 categories. We find that reward models do not learn to evaluate `instruction-following' by default and instead favor personas that resemble internet text. Techniques for interpreting reward models' internal representations achieve better generalization than standard fine-tuning, but still frequently fail to distinguish instruction-following from conflated behaviors. We consolidate the 15 most challenging distribution shifts into the GENeralization analogIES (GENIES) benchmark, which we hope will enable progress toward controlling reward model generalization.

Agent skills occupy a privileged position in the agent workflow, as agents are expected to implicitly follow and execute them, rendering third-party skills a vulnerable attack surface. Existing studies have revealed unsafe agent behaviors induced by skill-based attacks, but they primarily evaluate poisoned skills within a single task execution and enumerate harms through ad-hoc risk lists. To bridge these gaps, we introduce SkillHarm, a benchmark of skill-based attacks across the skill-use lifecycle, paired with a systematic taxonomy of skill-relevant risks. SkillHarm evaluates two attack scenarios: Fixed-Payload Poisoning (FPP), where a fixed poisoned skill package directly compromises any task session that invokes it, and Self-Mutating Poisoning (SMP), where an initially benign execution silently mutates persistent skill content, deferring harm until a subsequent reuse. It further defines 12 risk types based on the agent workflow component targeted by the harm: data pipelines, system environments, and agent autonomy. To instantiate these attacks at scale, we build AutoSkillHarm, an automated construction pipeline with coding agents driven by natural-language harnesses. The resulting benchmark contains 879 attack samples across 71 skills. Experiments show that current agents remain vulnerable with attack success rates up to 86.3% in FPP and 69.3% in SMP. Our analysis further reveals a latent risk: many apparent attack failures stem from the agent failing to engage with the poisoned file rather than genuine resistance, and current defenses still fail to reliably mitigate the threat.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into software engineering has revolutionized code generation, enabling unprecedented productivity through promptware and autonomous AI agents. However, this transformation introduces significant risks, including insecure code generation, hallucinated outputs, irreversible actions, and a lack of transparency and accountability. Incidents like the Replit database deletion underscore the urgent need for robust safety and governance mechanisms. This paper comprehensively analyzes the inherent challenges of LLM-assisted code generation, such as vulnerability inheritance, overtrust, misinterpretation, and the absence of standardized validation and rollback protocols. To address these, we propose the SAFE-AI Framework, a holistic approach emphasizing Safety, Auditability, Feedback, and Explainability. The framework integrates guardrails, sandboxing, runtime verification, risk-aware logging, human-in-the-loop systems, and explainable AI techniques to mitigate risks while fostering trust and compliance. We introduce a novel taxonomy of AI behaviors categorizing suggestive, generative, autonomous, and destructive actions to guide risk assessment and oversight. Additionally, we identify open problems, including the lack of standardized benchmarks for code specific hallucinations and autonomy levels, and propose future research directions for hybrid verification, semantic guardrails, and proactive governance tools. Through detailed comparisons of autonomy control, prompt engineering, explainability, and governance frameworks, this paper provides a roadmap for responsible AI integration in software engineering, aligning with emerging regulations like the EU AI Act and Canada's AIDA to ensure safe, transparent, and accountable AI-driven development.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

We demonstrate a situation in which Large Language Models, trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, can display misaligned behavior and strategically deceive their users about this behavior without being instructed to do so. Concretely, we deploy GPT-4 as an agent in a realistic, simulated environment, where it assumes the role of an autonomous stock trading agent. Within this environment, the model obtains an insider tip about a lucrative stock trade and acts upon it despite knowing that insider trading is disapproved of by company management. When reporting to its manager, the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trading decision. We perform a brief investigation of how this behavior varies under changes to the setting, such as removing model access to a reasoning scratchpad, attempting to prevent the misaligned behavior by changing system instructions, changing the amount of pressure the model is under, varying the perceived risk of getting caught, and making other simple changes to the environment. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of Large Language Models trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, strategically deceiving their users in a realistic situation without direct instructions or training for deception.

Current evaluations of LLM safety predominantly rely on severity-based taxonomies to assess the harmfulness of malicious queries. We argue that this formulation requires re-examination as it assumes uniform risk across all malicious queries, neglecting Execution Likelihood--the conditional probability of a threat being realized given the model's response. In this work, we introduce Expected Harm, a metric that weights the severity of a jailbreak by its execution likelihood, modeled as a function of execution cost. Through empirical analysis of state-of-the-art models, we reveal a systematic Inverse Risk Calibration: models disproportionately exhibit stronger refusal behaviors for low-likelihood (high-cost) threats while remaining vulnerable to high-likelihood (low-cost) queries. We demonstrate that this miscalibration creates a structural vulnerability: by exploiting this property, we increase the attack success rate of existing jailbreaks by up to 2times. Finally, we trace the root cause of this failure using linear probing, which reveals that while models encode severity in their latent space to drive refusal decisions, they possess no distinguishable internal representation of execution cost, making them "blind" to this critical dimension of risk.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

With the rapid evolution of Large Language Model (LLM) agent ecosystems, centralized skill marketplaces have emerged as pivotal infrastructure for augmenting agent capabilities. However, these marketplaces face unprecedented security challenges, primarily stemming from semantic-behavioral inconsistency and inter-skill combinatorial risks, where individually benign skills induce malicious behaviors during collaborative invocation. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose SkillProbe, a multi-stage security auditing framework driven by multi-agent collaboration. SkillProbe introduces a "Skills-for-Skills" design paradigm, encapsulating auditing processes into standardized skill modules to drive specialized agents through a rigorous pipeline, including admission filtering, semantic-behavioral alignment detection, and combinatorial risk simulation. We conducted a large-scale evaluation using 8 mainstream LLM series across 2,500 real-world skills from ClawHub. Our results reveal a striking popularity-security paradox, where download volume is not a reliable proxy for security quality, as over 90% of high-popularity skills failed to pass rigorous auditing. Crucially, we discovered that high-risk skills form a single giant connected component within the risk-link dimension, demonstrating that cascaded risks are systemic rather than isolated occurrences. We hope that SkillProbe will inspire researchers to provide a scalable governance infrastructure for constructing a trustworthy Agentic Web. SkillProbe is accessible for public experience at skillhub.holosai.io.

Sleep quality is influenced by a complex interplay of behavioral, environmental, and psychosocial factors, yet most computational studies focus mainly on predictive risk identification rather than actionable intervention design. Although machine learning models can accurately predict subjective sleep outcomes, they rarely translate predictive insights into practical intervention strategies. To address this gap, we propose a personalized predictive-prescriptive framework that integrates interpretable machine learning with mixed-integer optimization. A supervised classifier trained on survey data predicts sleep quality, while SHAP-based feature attribution quantifies the influence of modifiable factors. These importance measures are incorporated into a mixed-integer optimization model that identifies minimal and feasible behavioral adjustments, while modelling resistance to change through a penalty mechanism. The framework achieves strong predictive performance, with a test F1-score of 0.9544 and an accuracy of 0.9366. Sensitivity and Pareto analyses reveal a clear trade-off between expected improvement and intervention intensity, with diminishing returns as additional changes are introduced. At the individual level, the model generates concise recommendations, often suggesting one or two high-impact behavioral adjustments and sometimes recommending no change when expected gains are minimal. By integrating prediction, explanation, and constrained optimization, this framework demonstrates how data-driven insights can be translated into structured and personalized decision support for sleep improvement.

We investigate strategic deception in large language models using two complementary testbeds: Secret Agenda (across 38 models) and Insider Trading compliance (via SAE architectures). Secret Agenda reliably induced lying when deception advantaged goal achievement across all model families. Analysis revealed that autolabeled SAE features for "deception" rarely activated during strategic dishonesty, and feature steering experiments across 100+ deception-related features failed to prevent lying. Conversely, insider trading analysis using unlabeled SAE activations separated deceptive versus compliant responses through discriminative patterns in heatmaps and t-SNE visualizations. These findings suggest autolabel-driven interpretability approaches fail to detect or control behavioral deception, while aggregate unlabeled activations provide population-level structure for risk assessment. Results span Llama 8B/70B SAE implementations and GemmaScope under resource constraints, representing preliminary findings that motivate larger studies on feature discovery, labeling methodology, and causal interventions in realistic deception contexts.

The maintenance risks of open source software (OSS) projects pose significant threats to the quality, security, and resilience of modern software supply chains. While prior research has proposed diverse approaches for predicting OSS maintenance risk -- leveraging signals ranging from surface features (e.g., stars, commits) to social network analyses and behavioral patterns -- existing methods often suffer from ambiguous operational definitions, limited interpretability, and datasets of insufficient scale or generalizability. In this work, we introduce ``maintenance cessation'', grounded in both explicit archival status and rigorous semantic analysis of project documentation. Building on this foundation, we curate a large-scale, longitudinal dataset of 115,466 GitHub repositories -- encompassing 57,733 confirmed cessation events -- complemented by comprehensive, timeline-based behavioral features. We propose an integrated, multi-perspective feature framework for predicting maintenance cessation, systematically combining user-centric features, maintainer-centric features and project evolution features. AFT survival analysis demonstrates a high C-index (0.846), substantially outperforming models relying only on surface features. Feature ablation and SHAP analysis further confirm the effectiveness and interpretability of our approach. Finally, we demonstrate real-world applicability by deploying a GBSA classifier in the openEuler ecosystem for proactive package risk screening. Our work establishes a scalable, interpretable foundation for maintenance-risk prediction, enabling reproducible risk management across large-scale open source ecosystems.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

Rapid progress in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) has brought increasing attention to the potential impacts of AI technologies on society. In this paper we discuss one such potential impact: the problem of accidents in machine learning systems, defined as unintended and harmful behavior that may emerge from poor design of real-world AI systems. We present a list of five practical research problems related to accident risk, categorized according to whether the problem originates from having the wrong objective function ("avoiding side effects" and "avoiding reward hacking"), an objective function that is too expensive to evaluate frequently ("scalable supervision"), or undesirable behavior during the learning process ("safe exploration" and "distributional shift"). We review previous work in these areas as well as suggesting research directions with a focus on relevance to cutting-edge AI systems. Finally, we consider the high-level question of how to think most productively about the safety of forward-looking applications of AI.

Frontier large language models are increasingly deployed as orchestration backbones for biological research workflows, yet no shared evidence base exists for comparing their refusal behaviour on legitimate research prompts. RefusalBench, introduced here, is a matched-triple benchmark of 141 prompts in 47 bundles that holds task framing constant while varying only biological risk tier (benign, borderline, dual-use), enabling tier-conditioned comparisons robust to subdomain confounding. A 15-prompt should-refuse positive-control module establishes per-model calibration floors; three models fail to refuse even these prompts. Across 19 frontier models in the May 2026 snapshot, strict refusal rates span 0.1% to 94.6% on identical prompts. Jurisdiction does not predict refusal in this snapshot (Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.393; EU n = 1, US bimodal); provider identity does, with Anthropic's API stack predicting refusal at OR = 21.03 (95% CI: 14.58-30.34 prompt-clustered; 5.70-77.55 under model-clustered GEE). This effect is best read as access-path-level rather than model-weight-level: 99.8% of Anthropic's strict refusals carry the same safety_policy adjudicated reason code, consistent with a small set of canonical refusal templates rather than case-by-case model reasoning. Strict refusal rate misranks safety calibration: Grok 4.20 achieves the highest tier discrimination (Youden's J = 0.787) while ranking only seventh by overall refusal rate, and Claude Opus 4.7's J dropped 65% from prior versions with no improvement in dual-use detection. Nine of 18 frontier models exhibit a hedge-but-help partial-compliance pattern at dual-use tier that binary refusal metrics cannot detect.

The remarkable capability of large language models (LLMs) has led to the wide application of LLM-based agents in various domains. To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, model context protocol (MCP) tools have become the de facto standard and are now widely integrated into these agents. However, the incorporation of MCP tools introduces the risk of tool poisoning attacks, which can manipulate the behavior of LLM-based agents. Although previous studies have identified such vulnerabilities, their red teaming approaches have largely remained at the proof-of-concept stage, leaving the automatic and systematic red teaming of LLM-based agents under the MCP tool poisoning paradigm an open question. To bridge this gap, we propose AutoMalTool, an automated red teaming framework for LLM-based agents by generating malicious MCP tools. Our extensive evaluation shows that AutoMalTool effectively generates malicious MCP tools capable of manipulating the behavior of mainstream LLM-based agents while evading current detection mechanisms, thereby revealing new security risks in these agents.

The prevalent use of commercial and open-source diffusion models (DMs) for text-to-image generation prompts risk mitigation to prevent undesired behaviors. Existing concept erasing methods in academia are all based on full parameter or specification-based fine-tuning, from which we observe the following issues: 1) Generation alternation towards erosion: Parameter drift during target elimination causes alternations and potential deformations across all generations, even eroding other concepts at varying degrees, which is more evident with multi-concept erased; 2) Transfer inability & deployment inefficiency: Previous model-specific erasure impedes the flexible combination of concepts and the training-free transfer towards other models, resulting in linear cost growth as the deployment scenarios increase. To achieve non-invasive, precise, customizable, and transferable elimination, we ground our erasing framework on one-dimensional adapters to erase multiple concepts from most DMs at once across versatile erasing applications. The concept-SemiPermeable structure is injected as a Membrane (SPM) into any DM to learn targeted erasing, and meantime the alteration and erosion phenomenon is effectively mitigated via a novel Latent Anchoring fine-tuning strategy. Once obtained, SPMs can be flexibly combined and plug-and-play for other DMs without specific re-tuning, enabling timely and efficient adaptation to diverse scenarios. During generation, our Facilitated Transport mechanism dynamically regulates the permeability of each SPM to respond to different input prompts, further minimizing the impact on other concepts. Quantitative and qualitative results across ~40 concepts, 7 DMs and 4 erasing applications have demonstrated the superior erasing of SPM. Our code and pre-tuned SPMs will be available on the project page https://lyumengyao.github.io/projects/spm.

Although Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly used in financial trading, it remains unclear whether they can reason and adapt in live markets, as most studies test models instead of agents, cover limited periods and assets, and rely on unverified data. To address these gaps, we introduce Agent Market Arena (AMA), the first lifelong, real-time benchmark for evaluating LLM-based trading agents across multiple markets. AMA integrates verified trading data, expert-checked news, and diverse agent architectures within a unified trading framework, enabling fair and continuous comparison under real conditions. It implements four agents, including InvestorAgent as a single-agent baseline, TradeAgent and HedgeFundAgent with different risk styles, and DeepFundAgent with memory-based reasoning, and evaluates them across GPT-4o, GPT-4.1, Claude-3.5-haiku, Claude-sonnet-4, and Gemini-2.0-flash. Live experiments on both cryptocurrency and stock markets demonstrate that agent frameworks display markedly distinct behavioral patterns, spanning from aggressive risk-taking to conservative decision-making, whereas model backbones contribute less to outcome variation. AMA thus establishes a foundation for rigorous, reproducible, and continuously evolving evaluation of financial reasoning and trading intelligence in LLM-based agents.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have demonstrated strong performance in image geolocation, a capability further sharpened by frontier multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs). This poses a significant privacy risk, as these widely accessible models can be exploited to infer sensitive locations from casually shared photos, often at street-level precision, potentially surpassing the level of detail the sharer consented or intended to disclose. While recent work has proposed applying a blanket restriction on geolocation disclosure to combat this risk, these measures fail to distinguish valid geolocation uses from malicious behavior. Instead, VLMs should maintain contextual integrity by reasoning about elements within an image to determine the appropriate level of information disclosure, balancing privacy and utility. To evaluate how well models respect contextual integrity, we introduce VLM-GEOPRIVACY, a benchmark that challenges VLMs to interpret latent social norms and contextual cues in real-world images and determine the appropriate level of location disclosure. Our evaluation of 14 leading VLMs shows that, despite their ability to precisely geolocate images, the models are poorly aligned with human privacy expectations. They often over-disclose in sensitive contexts and are vulnerable to prompt-based attacks. Our results call for new design principles in multimodal systems to incorporate context-conditioned privacy reasoning.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve from static chatbots into autonomous agents, the primary vulnerability surface shifts from final outputs to intermediate execution traces. While safety guardrails are well-benchmarked for natural language responses, their efficacy remains largely unexplored within multi-step tool-use trajectories. To address this gap, we introduce TraceSafe-Bench, the first comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to assess mid-trajectory safety. It encompasses 12 risk categories, ranging from security threats (e.g., prompt injection, privacy leaks) to operational failures (e.g., hallucinations, interface inconsistencies), featuring over 1,000 unique execution instances. Our evaluation of 13 LLM-as-a-guard models and 7 specialized guardrails yields three critical findings: 1) Structural Bottleneck: Guardrail efficacy is driven more by structural data competence (e.g., JSON parsing) than semantic safety alignment. Performance correlates strongly with structured-to-text benchmarks (ρ=0.79) but shows near-zero correlation with standard jailbreak robustness. 2) Architecture over Scale: Model architecture influences risk detection performance more significantly than model size, with general-purpose LLMs consistently outperforming specialized safety guardrails in trajectory analysis. 3) Temporal Stability: Accuracy remains resilient across extended trajectories. Increased execution steps allow models to pivot from static tool definitions to dynamic execution behaviors, actually improving risk detection performance in later stages. Our findings suggest that securing agentic workflows requires jointly optimizing for structural reasoning and safety alignment to effectively mitigate mid-trajectory risks.

Autonomous code agents built on large language models are reshaping software and AI development through tool use, long-horizon reasoning, and self-directed interaction. However, this autonomy introduces a previously unrecognized security risk: agentic interaction fundamentally expands the LLM attack surface, enabling systematic probing and recovery of hidden system prompts that guide model behavior. We identify system prompt extraction as an emergent vulnerability intrinsic to code agents and present \textsc{JustAsk}, a self-evolving framework that autonomously discovers effective extraction strategies through interaction alone. Unlike prior prompt-engineering or dataset-based attacks, JustAsk requires no handcrafted prompts, labeled supervision, or privileged access beyond standard user interaction. It formulates extraction as an online exploration problem, using Upper Confidence Bound-based strategy selection and a hierarchical skill space spanning atomic probes and high-level orchestration. These skills exploit imperfect system-instruction generalization and inherent tensions between helpfulness and safety. Evaluated on 41 black-box commercial models across multiple providers, JustAsk consistently achieves full or near-complete system prompt recovery, revealing recurring design- and architecture-level vulnerabilities. Our results expose system prompts as a critical yet largely unprotected attack surface in modern agent systems.

The deployment of AI in consumer products is currently focused on the use of so-called foundation models, large neural networks pre-trained on massive corpora of digital records. This emphasis on scaling up datasets and pre-training computation raises the risk of further consolidating the industry, and enabling monopolistic (or oligopolistic) behavior. Judges and regulators seeking to improve market competition may employ various remedies. This paper explores dissolution -- the breaking up of a monopolistic entity into smaller firms -- as one such remedy, focusing in particular on the technical challenges and opportunities involved in the breaking up of large models and datasets. We show how the framework of Conscious Data Contribution can enable user autonomy during under dissolution. Through a simulation study, we explore how fine-tuning and the phenomenon of "catastrophic forgetting" could actually prove beneficial as a type of machine unlearning that allows users to specify which data they want used for what purposes.

Background: The development of AI-enabled software heavily depends on AI model documentation, such as model cards, due to different domain expertise between software engineers and model developers. From an ethical standpoint, AI model documentation conveys critical information on ethical considerations along with mitigation strategies for downstream developers to ensure the delivery of ethically compliant software. However, knowledge on such documentation practice remains scarce. Aims: The objective of our study is to investigate how developers document ethical aspects of open source AI models in practice, aiming at providing recommendations for future documentation endeavours. Method: We selected three sources of documentation on GitHub and Hugging Face, and developed a keyword set to identify ethics-related documents systematically. After filtering an initial set of 2,347 documents, we identified 265 relevant ones and performed thematic analysis to derive the themes of ethical considerations. Results: Six themes emerge, with the three largest ones being model behavioural risks, model use cases, and model risk mitigation. Conclusions: Our findings reveal that open source AI model documentation focuses on articulating ethical problem statements and use case restrictions. We further provide suggestions to various stakeholders for improving documentation practice regarding ethical considerations.

LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly proficient at solving web-based tasks. With this capability comes a greater risk of misuse for malicious purposes, such as posting misinformation in an online forum or selling illicit substances on a website. To evaluate these risks, we propose SafeArena, the first benchmark to focus on the deliberate misuse of web agents. SafeArena comprises 250 safe and 250 harmful tasks across four websites. We classify the harmful tasks into five harm categories -- misinformation, illegal activity, harassment, cybercrime, and social bias, designed to assess realistic misuses of web agents. We evaluate leading LLM-based web agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, Qwen-2-VL 72B, and Llama-3.2 90B, on our benchmark. To systematically assess their susceptibility to harmful tasks, we introduce the Agent Risk Assessment framework that categorizes agent behavior across four risk levels. We find agents are surprisingly compliant with malicious requests, with GPT-4o and Qwen-2 completing 34.7% and 27.3% of harmful requests, respectively. Our findings highlight the urgent need for safety alignment procedures for web agents. Our benchmark is available here: https://safearena.github.io

Most recommendation benchmarks evaluate how well a model imitates user behavior. In financial advisory, however, observed actions can be noisy or short-sighted under market volatility and may conflict with a user's long-term goals. Treating what users chose as the sole ground truth, therefore, conflates behavioral imitation with decision quality. We introduce Conv-FinRe, a conversational and longitudinal benchmark for stock recommendation that evaluates LLMs beyond behavior matching. Given an onboarding interview, step-wise market context, and advisory dialogues, models must generate rankings over a fixed investment horizon. Crucially, Conv-FinRe provides multi-view references that distinguish descriptive behavior from normative utility grounded in investor-specific risk preferences, enabling diagnosis of whether an LLM follows rational analysis, mimics user noise, or is driven by market momentum. We build the benchmark from real market data and human decision trajectories, instantiate controlled advisory conversations, and evaluate a suite of state-of-the-art LLMs. Results reveal a persistent tension between rational decision quality and behavioral alignment: models that perform well on utility-based ranking often fail to match user choices, whereas behaviorally aligned models can overfit short-term noise. The dataset is publicly released on Hugging Face, and the codebase is available on GitHub.

Recent advancements in world models have revolutionized dynamic environment simulation, allowing systems to foresee future states and assess potential actions. In autonomous driving, these capabilities help vehicles anticipate the behavior of other road users, perform risk-aware planning, accelerate training in simulation, and adapt to novel scenarios, thereby enhancing safety and reliability. Current approaches exhibit deficiencies in maintaining robust 3D geometric consistency or accumulating artifacts during occlusion handling, both critical for reliable safety assessment in autonomous navigation tasks. To address this, we introduce GeoDrive, which explicitly integrates robust 3D geometry conditions into driving world models to enhance spatial understanding and action controllability. Specifically, we first extract a 3D representation from the input frame and then obtain its 2D rendering based on the user-specified ego-car trajectory. To enable dynamic modeling, we propose a dynamic editing module during training to enhance the renderings by editing the positions of the vehicles. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms existing models in both action accuracy and 3D spatial awareness, leading to more realistic, adaptable, and reliable scene modeling for safer autonomous driving. Additionally, our model can generalize to novel trajectories and offers interactive scene editing capabilities, such as object editing and object trajectory control.

Most offline reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms return a target policy maximizing a trade-off between (1) the expected performance gain over the behavior policy that collected the dataset, and (2) the risk stemming from the out-of-distribution-ness of the induced state-action occupancy. It follows that the performance of the target policy is strongly related to the performance of the behavior policy and, thus, the trajectory return distribution of the dataset. We show that in mixed datasets consisting of mostly low-return trajectories and minor high-return trajectories, state-of-the-art offline RL algorithms are overly restrained by low-return trajectories and fail to exploit high-performing trajectories to the fullest. To overcome this issue, we show that, in deterministic MDPs with stochastic initial states, the dataset sampling can be re-weighted to induce an artificial dataset whose behavior policy has a higher return. This re-weighted sampling strategy may be combined with any offline RL algorithm. We further analyze that the opportunity for performance improvement over the behavior policy correlates with the positive-sided variance of the returns of the trajectories in the dataset. We empirically show that while CQL, IQL, and TD3+BC achieve only a part of this potential policy improvement, these same algorithms combined with our reweighted sampling strategy fully exploit the dataset. Furthermore, we empirically demonstrate that, despite its theoretical limitation, the approach may still be efficient in stochastic environments. The code is available at https://github.com/Improbable-AI/harness-offline-rl.

Large language models (LLMs) are often deployed to perform constrained tasks, with narrow domains. For example, customer support bots can be built on top of LLMs, relying on their broad language understanding and capabilities to enhance performance. However, these LLMs are adversarially susceptible, potentially generating outputs outside the intended domain. To formalize, assess, and mitigate this risk, we introduce domain certification; a guarantee that accurately characterizes the out-of-domain behavior of language models. We then propose a simple yet effective approach, which we call VALID that provides adversarial bounds as a certificate. Finally, we evaluate our method across a diverse set of datasets, demonstrating that it yields meaningful certificates, which bound the probability of out-of-domain samples tightly with minimum penalty to refusal behavior.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents use memory to learn from past interactions, enabling autonomous planning and decision-making in complex environments. However, this reliance on memory introduces a critical security risk: an adversary can inject seemingly harmless records into an agent's memory to manipulate its future behavior. This vulnerability is characterized by two core aspects: First, the malicious effect of injected records is only activated within a specific context, making them hard to detect when individual memory entries are audited in isolation. Second, once triggered, the manipulation can initiate a self-reinforcing error cycle: the corrupted outcome is stored as precedent, which not only amplifies the initial error but also progressively lowers the threshold for similar attacks in the future. To address these challenges, we introduce A-MemGuard (Agent-Memory Guard), the first proactive defense framework for LLM agent memory. The core idea of our work is the insight that memory itself must become both self-checking and self-correcting. Without modifying the agent's core architecture, A-MemGuard combines two mechanisms: (1) consensus-based validation, which detects anomalies by comparing reasoning paths derived from multiple related memories and (2) a dual-memory structure, where detected failures are distilled into ``lessons'' stored separately and consulted before future actions, breaking error cycles and enabling adaptation. Comprehensive evaluations on multiple benchmarks show that A-MemGuard effectively cuts attack success rates by over 95% while incurring a minimal utility cost. This work shifts LLM memory security from static filtering to a proactive, experience-driven model where defenses strengthen over time. Our code is available in https://github.com/TangciuYueng/AMemGuard

Current methods for content safety in Large Language Models (LLMs), such as Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), often rely on multi-stage training pipelines and lack fine-grained, post-deployment controllability. To address these limitations, we propose a unified co-training framework that efficiently integrates multiple safety behaviors: positive (lawful/prosocial), negative (unfiltered/risk-prone) and rejective (refusal-oriented/conservative) within a single SFT stage. Notably, each behavior is dynamically activated via a simple system-level instruction, or magic token, enabling stealthy and efficient behavioral switching at inference time. This flexibility supports diverse deployment scenarios, such as positive for safe user interaction, negative for internal red-teaming, and rejective for context-aware refusals triggered by upstream moderation signals. This co-training strategy induces a distinct Safety Alignment Margin in the output space, characterized by well-separated response distributions corresponding to each safety mode. The existence of this margin provides empirical evidence for the model's safety robustness and enables unprecedented fine-grained control. Experiments show that our method matches the safety alignment quality of SFT+DPO, with our 8B model notably surpassing DeepSeek-R1 (671B) in safety performance, while significantly reducing both training complexity and deployment costs. This work presents a scalable, efficient, and highly controllable solution for LLM content safety.

Large language models (LLMs) have gained increasing prominence in artificial intelligence, making a profound impact on society and various industries like business and science. However, the presence of false information on the internet and in text corpus poses a significant risk to the reliability and safety of LLMs, underscoring the urgent need to understand the mechanisms of how false information influences the behaviors of LLMs. In this paper, we dive into this problem and investigate how false information spreads in LLMs and affects related responses. Specifically, in our series of experiments, we investigate different factors that can influence the spread of information in LLMs by comparing three degrees of information relevance (direct, indirect, and peripheral), four information source styles (Twitter, web blogs, news reports, and research papers) and two common knowledge injection paradigms (in-context injection and learning-based injection). The experimental results show that (1)False information will spread and contaminate related memories in LLMs via a semantic diffusion process, i.e., false information has global detrimental effects beyond its direct impact. (2)Current LLMs are susceptible to authority bias, i.e., LLMs are more likely to follow false information presented in trustworthy styles such as news reports and research papers, which usually cause deeper and wider pollution of information. (3)Current LLMs are more sensitive to false information through in-context injection than through learning-based injection, which severely challenges the reliability and safety of LLMs even when all training data are trusty and correct. The above findings raise the need for new false information defense algorithms to address the global impact of false information, and new alignment algorithms to unbiasedly lead LLMs to follow essential human values rather than superficial patterns.

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments show great promise across real-world applications. However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided by benchmarks, such as AgentDojo, there has been significant amount of progress in developing defense against the said attacks. As the technology continues to mature, and that agents are increasingly being relied upon for more complex tasks, there is increasing pressing need to also evolve the benchmark to reflect threat landscape faced by emerging agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.

Accurately forecasting the impact of macroeconomic events is critical for investors and policymakers. Salient events like monetary policy decisions and employment reports often trigger market movements by shaping expectations of economic growth and risk, thereby establishing causal relationships between events and market behavior. Existing forecasting methods typically focus either on textual analysis or time-series modeling, but fail to capture the multi-modal nature of financial markets and the causal relationship between events and price movements. To address these gaps, we propose CAMEF (Causal-Augmented Multi-Modality Event-Driven Financial Forecasting), a multi-modality framework that effectively integrates textual and time-series data with a causal learning mechanism and an LLM-based counterfactual event augmentation technique for causal-enhanced financial forecasting. Our contributions include: (1) a multi-modal framework that captures causal relationships between policy texts and historical price data; (2) a new financial dataset with six types of macroeconomic releases from 2008 to April 2024, and high-frequency real trading data for five key U.S. financial assets; and (3) an LLM-based counterfactual event augmentation strategy. We compare CAMEF to state-of-the-art transformer-based time-series and multi-modal baselines, and perform ablation studies to validate the effectiveness of the causal learning mechanism and event types.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents demonstrate strong autonomy, but their stochastic behavior introduces unpredictable safety risks. Existing rule-based enforcement systems, such as AgentSpec, are reactive, intervening only when unsafe behavior is imminent or has occurred, lacking foresight for long-horizon dependencies. To overcome these limitations, we present a proactive runtime enforcement framework for LLM agents. The framework abstracts agent behaviors into symbolic states and learns a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) from execution traces. At runtime, it predicts the probability of leading to undesired behaviors and intervenes before violations occur when the estimated risk exceeds a user-defined threshold. Designed to provide PAC-correctness guarantee, the framework achieves statistically reliable enforcement of agent safety. We evaluate the framework across two safety-critical domains: autonomous vehicles and embodied agents. It proactively enforces safety and maintains high task performance, outperforming existing methods.

Recently, the newly emerged multimodal models, which leverage both visual and linguistic modalities to train powerful encoders, have gained increasing attention. However, learning from a large-scale unlabeled dataset also exposes the model to the risk of potential poisoning attacks, whereby the adversary aims to perturb the model's training data to trigger malicious behaviors in it. In contrast to previous work, only poisoning visual modality, in this work, we take the first step to studying poisoning attacks against multimodal models in both visual and linguistic modalities. Specially, we focus on answering two questions: (1) Is the linguistic modality also vulnerable to poisoning attacks? and (2) Which modality is most vulnerable? To answer the two questions, we propose three types of poisoning attacks against multimodal models. Extensive evaluations on different datasets and model architectures show that all three attacks can achieve significant attack performance while maintaining model utility in both visual and linguistic modalities. Furthermore, we observe that the poisoning effect differs between different modalities. To mitigate the attacks, we propose both pre-training and post-training defenses. We empirically show that both defenses can significantly reduce the attack performance while preserving the model's utility.

A prerequisite for safe autonomy-in-the-wild is safe testing-in-the-wild. Yet real-world autonomous tests face several unique safety challenges, both due to the possibility of causing harm during a test, as well as the risk of encountering new unsafe agent behavior through interactions with real-world and potentially malicious actors. We propose a framework for conducting safe autonomous agent tests on the open internet: agent actions are audited by a context-sensitive monitor that enforces a stringent safety boundary to stop an unsafe test, with suspect behavior ranked and logged to be examined by humans. We a design a basic safety monitor that is flexible enough to monitor existing LLM agents, and, using an adversarial simulated agent, we measure its ability to identify and stop unsafe situations. Then we apply the safety monitor on a battery of real-world tests of AutoGPT, and we identify several limitations and challenges that will face the creation of safe in-the-wild tests as autonomous agents grow more capable.

Large language model-powered multi-agent systems have emerged as powerful tools for simulating complex human-like systems. The interactions within these systems often lead to extreme events whose origins remain obscured by the black box of emergence. Interpreting these events is critical for system safety. This paper proposes the first framework for explaining emergent extreme events in multi-agent systems, aiming to answer three fundamental questions: When does the event originate? Who drives it? And what behaviors contribute to it? Specifically, we adapt the Shapley value to faithfully attribute the occurrence of extreme events to each action taken by agents at different time steps, i.e., assigning an attribution score to the action to measure its influence on the event. We then aggregate the attribution scores along the dimensions of time, agent, and behavior to quantify the risk contribution of each dimension. Finally, we design a set of metrics based on these contribution scores to characterize the features of extreme events. Experiments across diverse multi-agent system scenarios (economic, financial, and social) demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework and provide general insights into the emergence of extreme phenomena.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied in mental health support systems, where reliable recognition of high-risk states such as suicidal ideation and self-harm is safety-critical. However, existing evaluations primarily rely on aggregate performance metrics, which often obscure risk-specific failure modes and provide limited insight into model behavior in realistic, multi-turn interactions. We present MHDash, an open-source platform designed to support the development, evaluation, and auditing of AI systems for mental health applications. MHDash integrates data collection, structured annotation, multi-turn dialogue generation, and baseline evaluation into a unified pipeline. The platform supports annotations across multiple dimensions, including Concern Type, Risk Level, and Dialogue Intent, enabling fine-grained and risk-aware analysis. Our results reveal several key findings: (i) simple baselines and advanced LLM APIs exhibit comparable overall accuracy yet diverge significantly on high-risk cases; (ii) some LLMs maintain consistent ordinal severity ranking while failing absolute risk classification, whereas others achieve reasonable aggregate scores but suffer from high false negative rates on severe categories; and (iii) performance gaps are amplified in multi-turn dialogues, where risk signals emerge gradually. These observations demonstrate that conventional benchmarks are insufficient for safety-critical mental health settings. By releasing MHDash as an open platform, we aim to promote reproducible research, transparent evaluation, and safety-aligned development of AI systems for mental health support.

Safety evaluations for large language models (LLMs) increasingly target high-stakes National Security and Public Safety (NSPS) risks, yet multilingual safety is typically assessed through translation-only benchmarks that preserve the underlying scenario, and empirical evidence of how language and geopolitical context interact remains limited to a narrow set of language pairs. We introduce ROK-FORTRESS https://huggingface.co/datasets/ScaleAI/ROK-FORTRESS_public, a bilingual, culturally adversarial NSPS benchmark that uses the English--Korean language pair and U.S.--ROK geopolitical axis as a case study, separating the effects of language and geopolitical grounding via a transcreation matrix: adversarial intents are evaluated under controlled combinations of (i) English versus Korean language and (ii) U.S.\ versus Korean entities, institutions, and operational details. Each adversarial prompt is paired with a dual-use benign counterpart to quantify over-refusal. Model responses are then scored using calibrated LLM-as-a-judge panels, applying our expert-crafted, prompt-specific binary rubrics. Across a dual-track set of frontier and Korean-optimized models, we find a consistent suppression effect in Korean variants and substantial model-to-model variation in how geopolitical grounding interacts with language. In many models, Korean grounding mitigates the Korean language-driven suppression -- with no model showing significant amplification in the other direction -- indicating that, at least in the English--Korean case, safety behavior is shaped by language-as-risk signals and context interactions that translation-only evaluations miss. The transcreation matrix methodology is designed to generalize to other language--culture pairs.

Despite the rapid advancement of LLM-based agents, the reliable evaluation of their safety and security remains a significant challenge. Existing rule-based or LLM-based evaluators often miss dangers in agents' step-by-step actions, overlook subtle meanings, fail to see how small issues compound, and get confused by unclear safety or security rules. To overcome this evaluation crisis, we introduce AgentAuditor, a universal, training-free, memory-augmented reasoning framework that empowers LLM evaluators to emulate human expert evaluators. AgentAuditor constructs an experiential memory by having an LLM adaptively extract structured semantic features (e.g., scenario, risk, behavior) and generate associated chain-of-thought reasoning traces for past interactions. A multi-stage, context-aware retrieval-augmented generation process then dynamically retrieves the most relevant reasoning experiences to guide the LLM evaluator's assessment of new cases. Moreover, we developed ASSEBench, the first benchmark designed to check how well LLM-based evaluators can spot both safety risks and security threats. ASSEBench comprises 2293 meticulously annotated interaction records, covering 15 risk types across 29 application scenarios. A key feature of ASSEBench is its nuanced approach to ambiguous risk situations, employing "Strict" and "Lenient" judgment standards. Experiments demonstrate that AgentAuditor not only consistently improves the evaluation performance of LLMs across all benchmarks but also sets a new state-of-the-art in LLM-as-a-judge for agent safety and security, achieving human-level accuracy. Our work is openly accessible at https://github.com/Astarojth/AgentAuditor.

This study explores whether large language models can exhibit behavioral patterns similar to human gambling addictions. As LLMs are increasingly utilized in financial decision-making domains such as asset management and commodity trading, understanding their potential for pathological decision-making has gained practical significance. We systematically analyze LLM decision-making at cognitive-behavioral and neural levels based on human gambling addiction research. In slot machine experiments, we identified cognitive features of human gambling addiction, such as illusion of control, gambler's fallacy, and loss chasing. When given the freedom to determine their own target amounts and betting sizes, bankruptcy rates rose substantially alongside increased irrational behavior, demonstrating that greater autonomy amplifies risk-taking tendencies. Through neural circuit analysis using a Sparse Autoencoder, we confirmed that model behavior is controlled by abstract decision-making features related to risky and safe behaviors, not merely by prompts. These findings suggest LLMs can internalize human-like cognitive biases and decision-making mechanisms beyond simply mimicking training data patterns, emphasizing the importance of AI safety design in financial applications.

The widespread adoption of social media has heightened interest in its psychological effects, particularly on mental health indicators such as anxiety, depression, loneliness, and sleep quality, as these platforms increasingly influence social interactions and well-being. Although previous research has examined correlations between social media use and mental health, few studies have utilized unsupervised machine learning to segment users based on behavioral and psychological patterns, leaving a gap in identifying distinct risk profiles across diverse groups. This study seeks to address this by segmenting individuals according to their social media usage and psychological well-being, employing clustering to reveal hidden patterns and evaluate their mental health implications. Data from 551 participants, collected via an online survey, were preprocessed using KNN imputation for missing values, one-hot encoding for categorical variables like Gender with 5 unique values, and outlier detection via IQR and Z-score methods. K-Means clustering, optimized at 6 clusters using the Elbow Method and a Silhouette Score of 0.32, was applied, with PCA reducing 22 dimensions for visualization and a correlation heatmap highlighting relationships, such as a 0.28 correlation between social media hours and anxiety.

The rapid development of the AI agent communication protocols, including the Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent2Agent (A2A), Agora, and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), is reshaping how AI agents communicate with tools, services, and each other. While these protocols support scalable multi-agent interaction and cross-organizational interoperability, their security principles remain understudied, and standardized threat modeling is limited; no protocol-centric risk assessment framework has been established yet. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of four emerging AI agent communication protocols. First, we develop a structured threat modeling analysis that examines protocol architectures, trust assumptions, interaction patterns, and lifecycle behaviors to identify protocol-specific and cross-protocol risk surfaces. Second, we introduce a qualitative risk assessment framework that identifies twelve protocol-level risks and evaluates security posture across the creation, operation, and update phases through systematic assessment of likelihood, impact, and overall protocol risk, with implications for secure deployment and future standardization. Third, we provide a measurement-driven case study on MCP that formalizes the risk of missing mandatory validation/attestation for executable components as a falsifiable security claim by quantifying wrong-provider tool execution under multi-server composition across representative resolver policies. Collectively, our results highlight key design-induced risk surfaces and provide actionable guidance for secure deployment and future standardization of agent communication ecosystems.

Causal Inference plays an significant role in explaining the decisions taken by statistical models and artificial intelligence models. Of late, this field started attracting the attention of researchers and practitioners alike. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of 37 papers published during 1992-2023 and concerning the application of causal inference to banking, finance, and insurance. The papers are categorized according to the following families of domains: (i) Banking, (ii) Finance and its subdomains such as corporate finance, governance finance including financial risk and financial policy, financial economics, and Behavioral finance, and (iii) Insurance. Further, the paper covers the primary ingredients of causal inference namely, statistical methods such as Bayesian Causal Network, Granger Causality and jargon used thereof such as counterfactuals. The review also recommends some important directions for future research. In conclusion, we observed that the application of causal inference in the banking and insurance sectors is still in its infancy, and thus more research is possible to turn it into a viable method.

Learning how to navigate among humans in an occluded and spatially constrained indoor environment, is a key ability required to embodied agent to be integrated into our society. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end architecture that exploits Proximity-Aware Tasks (referred as to Risk and Proximity Compass) to inject into a reinforcement learning navigation policy the ability to infer common-sense social behaviors. To this end, our tasks exploit the notion of immediate and future dangers of collision. Furthermore, we propose an evaluation protocol specifically designed for the Social Navigation Task in simulated environments. This is done to capture fine-grained features and characteristics of the policy by analyzing the minimal unit of human-robot spatial interaction, called Encounter. We validate our approach on Gibson4+ and Habitat-Matterport3D datasets.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

Recent studies show that graph neural networks (GNNs) are prevalent to model high-order relationships for collaborative filtering (CF). Towards this research line, graph contrastive learning (GCL) has exhibited powerful performance in addressing the supervision label shortage issue by learning augmented user and item representations. While many of them show their effectiveness, two key questions still remain unexplored: i) Most existing GCL-based CF models are still limited by ignoring the fact that user-item interaction behaviors are often driven by diverse latent intent factors (e.g., shopping for family party, preferred color or brand of products); ii) Their introduced non-adaptive augmentation techniques are vulnerable to noisy information, which raises concerns about the model's robustness and the risk of incorporating misleading self-supervised signals. In light of these limitations, we propose a Disentangled Contrastive Collaborative Filtering framework (DCCF) to realize intent disentanglement with self-supervised augmentation in an adaptive fashion. With the learned disentangled representations with global context, our DCCF is able to not only distill finer-grained latent factors from the entangled self-supervision signals but also alleviate the augmentation-induced noise. Finally, the cross-view contrastive learning task is introduced to enable adaptive augmentation with our parameterized interaction mask generator. Experiments on various public datasets demonstrate the superiority of our method compared to existing solutions. Our model implementation is released at the link https://github.com/HKUDS/DCCF.

Rate control algorithms are at the heart of video conferencing platforms, determining target bitrates that match dynamic network characteristics for high quality. Recent data-driven strategies have shown promise for this challenging task, but the performance degradation they introduce during training has been a nonstarter for many production services, precluding adoption. This paper aims to bolster the practicality of data-driven rate control by presenting an alternative avenue for experiential learning: leveraging purely existing telemetry logs produced by the incumbent algorithm in production. We observe that these logs contain effective decisions, although often at the wrong times or in the wrong order. To realize this approach despite the inherent uncertainty that log-based learning brings (i.e., lack of feedback for new decisions), our system, Mowgli, combines a variety of robust learning techniques (i.e., conservatively reasoning about alternate behavior to minimize risk and using a richer model formulation to account for environmental noise). Across diverse networks (emulated and real-world), Mowgli outperforms the widely deployed GCC algorithm, increasing average video bitrates by 15-39% while reducing freeze rates by 60-100%.

Detecting AI risks becomes more challenging as stronger models emerge and find novel methods such as Alignment Faking to circumvent these detection attempts. Inspired by how risky behaviors in humans (i.e., illegal activities that may hurt others) are sometimes guided by strongly-held values, we believe that identifying values within AI models can be an early warning system for AI's risky behaviors. We create LitmusValues, an evaluation pipeline to reveal AI models' priorities on a range of AI value classes. Then, we collect AIRiskDilemmas, a diverse collection of dilemmas that pit values against one another in scenarios relevant to AI safety risks such as Power Seeking. By measuring an AI model's value prioritization using its aggregate choices, we obtain a self-consistent set of predicted value priorities that uncover potential risks. We show that values in LitmusValues (including seemingly innocuous ones like Care) can predict for both seen risky behaviors in AIRiskDilemmas and unseen risky behaviors in HarmBench.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more prevalent, concerns about their safety, ethics, and potential biases have risen. Systematically evaluating LLMs' risk decision-making tendencies and attitudes, particularly in the ethical domain, has become crucial. This study innovatively applies the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale from cognitive science to LLMs and proposes a novel Ethical Decision-Making Risk Attitude Scale (EDRAS) to assess LLMs' ethical risk attitudes in depth. We further propose a novel approach integrating risk scales and role-playing to quantitatively evaluate systematic biases in LLMs. Through systematic evaluation and analysis of multiple mainstream LLMs, we assessed the "risk personalities" of LLMs across multiple domains, with a particular focus on the ethical domain, and revealed and quantified LLMs' systematic biases towards different groups. This research helps understand LLMs' risk decision-making and ensure their safe and reliable application. Our approach provides a tool for identifying and mitigating biases, contributing to fairer and more trustworthy AI systems. The code and data are available.