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Sofia Engine Security Architecture & Threat Model
Sofia Engine is designed under the assumption that edge and industrial environments operate under adversarial and untrusted network conditions.
1. Core Security Invariants
- Default DENY Posture:
The
PolicyEnginerejects all incoming actuation commands by default. An explicit, cryptographically authenticated rule must permit execution. - Replay Protection: All commands require a unique Nonce, monotonic Sequence Number, and Time-To-Live (TTL). Replayed commands or expired timestamps are immediately rejected.
- LLM Actuation Firewall: External AI models (e.g. OpenAI, Anthropic, NVIDIA NIM, local LLMs) are strictly categorized as Advisory Copilots. Under no circumstance can an LLM directly trigger an edge actuator or override safety interlocks.
- Zero-Pickle Artifacts: Sofia models are serialized exclusively as JSON manifests + NPZ/safetensors weight archives with SHA-256 parameter hashing. Arbitrary Python pickle files are strictly rejected.
- Secret Scrubbing: All tokens, API keys, credentials, and sensitive headers are redacted from debug logs and telemetry exports using pattern-matched redaction filters.
2. Threat Mitigations
| Threat | Impact | Sofia Runtime Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Command Injection / Replay | Unauthorized machine actuation | ReplayGuard with Nonce cache, monotonic timestamp validation, and TTL eviction |
| Model Tampering | Adversarial parameter alteration | Mandatory SHA-256 parameter hash verification in ModelManifest prior to loading |
| Sensor Saturation / Clipping | Corrupted diagnostic assessment | DataQuality.SATURATED flag automatically attenuates diagnostic confidence to $\le 0.20$ |
| Memory Exhaustion | Gateway denial-of-service | Static capacity ceilings ($\le 65536$ frame size, fixed circular buffers, zero dynamic allocation in C99) |
| Hostile Telemetry Metadata | Buffer overflow or script injection | Strict identifier sanitization (^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]{1,64}$) on all channels and device IDs |